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THE
HISTORY OF ENGLAND

VOL. XI





THE
History of England

FROM THE FIRST INVASION BY THE ROMANS
TO THE ACCESSION OF KING
GEORGE THE FIFTH

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With an Introduction
BY
HIS EMINENCE
JAMES CARDINAL GIBBONS

IN ELEVEN VOLUMES

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INTRODUCTION TO PART I.

LINGARD, the Father of Modern English History and the man upon whose labours, as upon a foundation, all our academic text-books have arisen, concluded those labours with the fall of the Stuarts and the accomplishment of what is known as the "English Revolution."

Any historical summary intended to complete his work must, therefore, begin with an appreciation of what "The English Revolution" meant, nor is it possible to comprehend so much as the main lines, even, of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Great Britain and her dependencies, unless we have first a clear vision of the society upon which that Revolution set its stamp.

Briefly, England had fully become by the year 1689 an OLIGARCHY. Her polity was destined to remain strongly established as an oligarchy for generations to come. An oligarchy is a state the government of which resides in one small class, the members whereof enjoy the exercise of power over their fellows and the consequences in wealth and security of that power; and that, not in spite of popular claims, but with the complete sympathy of the people and even to some extent at their demand.

An OLIGARCHY, that is, the conduct of the state by a defined and restricted class, cannot long exist in stable fashion save in the form of what is called an ARISTOCRACY. We must expect to find, and we shall find, that this Oligarchic England, fully established at the accession of William III., was in the hands not only of a few, but of an aristocratic few.

Here it is important to note the meaning of our terms.

An ARISTOCRACY may be defined as an Oligarchy the members of which enjoy a peculiar reverence paid to them by their fellow-citizens. Their manner of life, especially in its externals, their accent in speech, their comportment and carriage, are all expected to conform to certain standards which excite the admiration of the many. Of such an Aristocratic class certain moral qualities are also re-

quired, not the greatest or best, but those essential to the part they have to play. These qualities are judged by their effect upon government, not by their effect upon the human soul. Thus, only certain forms of courage, only certain forms of dignity, are required and obtained of an aristocracy. However avaricious or financially corrupt, it must in certain well-defined fields display integrity, in certain others generosity. It need not be just; but it must be peculiarly severe in the judgment of its own members as they appear in the public eye, lest it should lose that worship which is the whole moral foundation of its power. Finally, an aristocratic class must, above all other characteristics, preserve (if it is to survive) a *representative* quality. It must be *national*.

Its members must in their very amusements betray popular tastes and act as less fortunate citizens would act had they similar opportunities. In its function of leadership an aristocracy must be further careful to avoid the least suspicion of *personal* oppression. It may be oppressive as a body, but such personal power would be fatal to it.

It is obvious that no restricted class could thus act if it were cut off sharply from the mass of the nation. It must be perpetually fed from the general bulk of the citizens. It must recruit itself continually from below and it must be careful not to segregate itself from the governed by crude indications of superiority.

Thus a noble class, properly so called, proud of descent and known by its titles, is the least fitted of all to form an aristocracy in the strict meaning of that term; whereas, a body whose boundaries are deliberately left vague, one whose chief members often carry no honorific label, and one which can prove its ready acceptance of men no matter of what lineage—so long as they are digestible into the aristocratic form—is the best fitted for the task.

Such a class had been in process of formation in England even before the Reformation accelerated the pace of its development. After the Reformation it grew in power and wealth with astonishing rapidity during the sixteenth century. In the course of the seventeenth century it acquired that economic preponderance in the state which is always the concomitant and sometimes the foundation of political power. It captured the universities and the

administration of justice. It broke (in the civil wars) the ancient popular power of the crown.

Of the advantages and disadvantages attaching to this kind of government I shall speak in a moment; but we must at the outset of this preliminary survey remember that such aristocratic government is, of all forms of government, the one most directly opposed to *democracy*. There **is** between its spirit and the spirit of democracy a natural antagonism such as will not be found between democracy and despotism. Indeed, when a democracy and an oligarchy meet in foreign war a duel to the death ensues.

A Democracy is a polity in which the state is governed not only in consonance with the will of its citizens (for all healthy states are governed so, and none more than aristocracies), but upon the *initiative* of the masses. The officers of a democracy, whether chosen by popular acclamation or by lot or by rotation, are subordinate at once to fixed, generally known, laws and to the popular command. A Democracy is essentially a state in which the transcendental dogma of human equality is accepted and informs all public life.

The stupendous military energy which Revolutionary France displayed a hundred years ago, her consequent triumph over the institutions and even over the mind of Europe for twenty years, the final success of her democratic theories achieved in the course of the nineteenth century, coupled with the secure political philosophy of the American democracy during its unique modern expansion in wealth and in population—all these have between them obscured for most modern men not only the virtues and the value, but the very nature of undemocratic forms of government.

Most men of our time not only fail in an attempt to state the argument against Democracy, but find themselves as unable to point out the weaknesses of undemocratic forms of government as they would be to point out the virtues and the excellencies of the same: for democratic terms are almost the only political vocabulary in use even with those who have no experience of democracy in action.

So true is this, that men living under a Despotism or under an Oligarchy to-day pretend to Democratic forms of government and excuse, or boast of, their national institutions under the plea that they are of a popular kind.

Now since we are about to follow in this book the development and fortunes of an ARISTOCRACY long prepared, finally established in England with the accession of William III., and only quite recently fallen to decay; since, that is, we are about to follow two hundred years of the history of a great nation whose fundamental spirit was inimical to Democracy and avid of government by the few, it behooves us to appreciate the strength and weakness of an oligarchy when it is thus aristocratic and stable. Those who, living under foreign and democratic conditions, read the history of modern England without some such preparation, will find themselves continually perplexed; and will lay down her story with less comprehension of her fate and nature than they had when they took it up. Those who, though English and resident in modern England, are deceived by words into conceiving her spirit as democratic, will understand neither their own present nor the past which made them.

I take the marks of aristocratic rule to be as follows:

First, it always coincides with a conviction in the private citizen that the function of government is nothing very universal and still less anything very sacred. On this account the citizens of an Aristocracy are usually jealous in restricting the power of government over their private lives. The function of domestic administration seems to them one of the many things necessary to the existence of a state, but they regard as superior to it the success of commerce, the traditional forms of society, and, above all, the posture of the nation in the face of foreign rivals.

With this way of regarding political power it seems to such men neither unjust nor undignified to leave to a more or less specialised class the management of public affairs. Their tendency to this is increased by the respect they pay to those who govern. This respect tends, of course, to illusion; and many a jest is passed against the citizens of an Oligarchy for their deferential attitude toward men of a mean or mediocre sort who may happen, by no matter what intrigues, to have arrived at the exercise of power. But whether this reverential attitude of mind toward public persons is good or bad, what we have here to recognise is that it is an essential part of the Aristocratic state.

The public officials of a Democracy are servants and, therefore, are always under inspection and supervision and always subject to suspicion. But the public officials of an Aristocratic Oligarchy are, on the contrary, erected by a sort of religious sentiment above their fellows. Actions are passed in them without blame which would insure the punishment of less powerful men. They are not servants, but masters; though masters more restricted in power than the servants of a Democracy. And so necessary to the stability of an Oligarchy is this reverential attitude, that when it declines you may certainly affirm the old strength of the state to be in decay.

But men support an Aristocratic Oligarchy not only because of this attitude toward the function of government, but also because Oligarchy in its period of vigour—that is while it is still Aristocratic—possesses certain remarkable elements of strength not apparent in any other form of government. These elements produce, for a time at least, such national success followed by so high (and legitimate) a national pride, as further convinces men of the value of their institutions. Of this truth the whole history of England throughout the eighteenth and the greater part of the nineteenth century is full.

An Aristocratic Oligarchy, while it is still in its prime, can defend the state, can coördinate all its interests and can suddenly summon up its resources against a foreign menace as cannot a democracy or a monarchy. The members of the Governing Class form between them a species of permanent intelligence committee, singularly supple and singularly solid in judgment. They understand each other thoroughly; they can communicate their experiences one to another in a fashion private, direct, immediate, and conclusive; a fashion never to be reached by the members of a mere mechanical Bureaucracy to which other forms of government are compelled to entrust public affairs. It is in the very nature of Aristocrats that they should be patriots, and there is infinitely less room within their own circle for incompetent favouritism or for a grave misjudgment of ability than there is in the indulgence of a despot or in the enthusiasm of a crowd. Since all the habits of their privileged lives depend upon the continuance of their order, each member instinctively submits to the duty or even the degradation which that order imposes

upon him. The discipline of government is never broken by the appeals of the disaffected to violence—for such an appeal would have no popular echo and would be merely ridiculous.

An Aristocratic Government is, in a word, a standing delegation of men specially and continuously informed—particularly upon Foreign Affairs—which delegation is of its nature at once strongly bound together and yet elastic, while its action is not terminable by personal misfortune, not even by death. It further forms a sort of fly-wheel, correcting the extravagances of passion. An Aristocracy forbids the machine of the state to “race” under the stimulus of some violent public emotion of whose results the masses themselves would soon repent. Its curves of change are deliberate, and it remains cool in judgment in those periods of fever which deliver its foreign rivals, despotic or democratic, into its hands.

All these features you will find reflected in the history of England throughout those two hundred years of her expansion and greatness which lie between the expulsion of the Stuarts and the modern reconstruction of Europe. Thus we perceive throughout the nation, at once ill defined and unmistakable, her ruling body. We can easily appreciate what the English governing class is, and *feel* whether such and such a man is a member of it or no; yet we never find any one clear test either excluding a man from that body or giving him a right of entry thereto. Not great wealth (though that is a fundamental feature in the system), not the long hereditary enjoyment of wealth in one family (though that is another), not even a certain accent in speech and manner in deportment (though that is a still more characteristic third), nor all these combined establish that by which a member of the governing class may be known. And there have been men of low culture, provincial accent, infamous lineage and even lacking wealth, who, because they were serviceable to the needs of the Aristocratic State, readily found their places in the aristocratic management of England.

It is further to be remarked that Aristocracy spontaneously sends forth, and depends upon, certain subsidiary institutions which are, as it were, its roots. Of these perhaps the most important are the educational institutions which recruit it. If the English governing class had not

captured the universities and created in certain great schools (now called "Public Schools") a seed plot for their kind, their continuance would have been uncertain. Meanwhile it is equally necessary for an Aristocratic Oligarchy that it should perform every activity of the state, and on this account you do not find under this sort of government any distinction between the various professions which consolidate at once the strength of the state and the power of its ruling body. The command of the army and the navy, the senate, the judiciary, are not separate functions in the state. The same kind of man defines, administers, makes and defends in arms the law.

Remark the names of all who have contributed to the establishment of modern England since her old monarchy went under with the Stuarts and an aristocracy succeeded it. You will find that, while they are the very opposite of a caste, the masters of her jurisprudence, her most famous judges, her great soldiers and sailors, her ministers, her very schoolmasters have commonly either sprung from an established family or have founded one. The exceptions to this rule are not rare, but they are rare enough to astonish any foreign student who, unused to the nature of aristocratic government, is wise enough to approach his examination of English history by the drawing up of such a list.

When all this is said—which would seem to be a complete apology for Aristocratic Government—we must next appreciate in what it fails and wherein lie the sources of its decay. For the story we are about to follow is the story of a state wonderfully strong and successful so long as it was Aristocratic, but coming at last to a pass in which Aristocratic institutions began to fail it.

In the first place, an Aristocratic Oligarchy cannot *incorporate* alien things: it cannot govern imperially: it cannot diffuse itself as an influence at once masterful, creative and permanent throughout the world.

This truth will sound paradoxical to those who will remember what vast empires Carthage and Venice established (types of such Oligarchies in the past), the sudden success of aristocratic Sparta and, in general, the vigorous growth (upon the map) of governing Oligarchies throughout history.

But Carthage never did what Rome did, nor Venice

what Spain did. If we look closely not at the map, but at the facts of government, we find that Oligarchies have never *transformed* the aliens temporarily subject to them. They have never discovered the art of bringing them into the body of the state. They have been highly successful as tax gatherers over great areas and successful almost in proportion to the apathy of the governed and to the strict limits which Oligarchy itself sets to its own function of government.

But they do not and cannot (as do and can the centralised imperial systems) incorporate what is external to them or even impress it with their mark. Thus, the one alien people with which the English Oligarchy has attempted to deal in this fashion is the Irish. Their failure has been complete; more complete than any other parallel that can be discovered in history. The very virtues which make an Oligarchy intensely national forbid it that international sympathy with the governed without which moulding imperial power is impossible. But where commercial men are determined, *not* to mould the governed in their own image, but to leave them as wholly foreign as is compatible with commercial advantage to themselves, there an Aristocratic and trading Oligarchy is a most efficient instrument. The excellence of Indian administration during at least one long lifetime has depended upon this principle; the economic development of Egypt in recent years has depended upon it. The difference between the methods adopted by great despotisms and by oligarchies in this matter may be compared to the difference between the man who barter and the man who makes. The one handles material objects which he is not concerned to transform, but which he regards as permanently external to himself and only through some rearrangement of position a source of profit; the other deals with material objects for the special purpose of changing them in his own image, and making of them something new that shall reflect himself, his needs, his nature of life.

The one type of power (of which Rome and Spain are the supreme examples in the past and of which Russia may well be the example in the future) expands not merely over the map, but through the souls of subject peoples. Their religion, their mode of thought, their very cooking, becomes that of the Imperial power. In the other, of which

the English state is the great example in the present (and of which Carthage and Venice were the chief examples in the past) everything is done to *prevent* such a disturbance of native habit and to keep the ruling power, whose object is mainly economic advantage, aloof from the life of its subjects. With this Canon preserved, a Commercial and Aristocratic state will, at a less friction and over a far larger field, control where a Despotic state would fail. But its control is neither creative nor rooted.

Again, an Aristocratic state is incapable of reformation from within, for the mass of its citizens is trained to no initiative. Its final and lethal change, which is a sinking of the Oligarchy into mere Plutocracy, comes upon it almost unobserved and always uncorrected.

An Oligarchy will preserve no peculiar control over the colonies it may send out. Even if these reproduce the Oligarchic character of the home country they will form separate nuclei. One such (in the case of England) flourished in the Southern States of the American Union until the Civil War—for these preserved the aristocratic temper. If they start with no such aristocratic guidance they form nuclei very disparate from the Mother Country and independent of it, not only in legal form, but in spiritual type. They will not suffer the discipline of common military action. They will not act as one with the metropolis even during the great crises of national history.

It has been remarked that government of this kind, conducted by a small and privileged class, seems in some fashion inevitable to great commercial and seafaring states. Nor can it be a mere coincidence that nations of such a sort should hardly ever indulge in democratic experiments and never, I think, in despotic ones.

Perhaps one cause of this is to be found in the natural detachment of the merchant adventurer from the function of Home Government coupled with the great effect which landed wealth must have upon the minds of such a class; for men whose object is mere accumulation cannot but respect and give power to those in whose hands they find wealth established. But other causes lie far deeper. The neglect of human equality fosters both a commercial spirit and its resulting differences of wealth, and at the same time leads the state insensibly back from popular or monarchic toward aristocratic government.

I have said that Oligarchy, possessing such strength while it is still Aristocratic, comes to a final and lethal change. Aristocracies do not pass either into Despotisms or Democracies. When they lose the aristocratic spirit they come within grave peril of complete decay. The series of events I am about to follow in this volume cannot be said to end in the full presence of such a peril, but, before my period is concluded that peril may be seen approaching. An Aristocracy is at its liveliest when its governing class is closely in touch with the governed. This is never more the case than in a village community controlled by a resident family of the wealthier class. It is never less the case than in a town of any magnitude. Now, the English polity, as we shall be curious to note in the story of these two centuries, was essentially agricultural in structure (though commercial in spirit) when its Aristocratic character was most marked—that is until the close of the eighteenth century. It retained that character clearly impressed during the first two-thirds of the nineteenth. Even numerically England was till 1860 nearly half agricultural; in tradition and spirit much more than half. The very rapid, the startling, decline in the aristocratic spirit which has marked our own day has corresponded with that recent and enormous expansion of urban population which, within the lifetime of a man, has left agricultural England a mere appendage of the towns.

But there is more than this material cause in the process of transformation which an aristocracy suffers as it approaches its fall.

Because it always has and must recruit itself from below its own existing class, an oligarchy is tempted at last to accept material of no matter what origin and in no matter what amount. Upon the excuse that men always rose in certain numbers into the ranks of the governing body, or “gentry,” through wealth and ability, an aristocracy proceeds in its old age to accept (and to accept in return for bribes given to members of the gentry, not for services to the state) a flood of new men distinguished solely by the chance, and often temporary, acquisition of wealth.

At the same time, age, which affects all things, affects an aristocratic body so that it forgets those canons of conduct necessary to its position. The very fact that these

canons of conduct were not founded in any scheme of virtue or right living, but were only a worldly means to a worldly end, and that end privilege, aids and precipitates the degradation of conduct among the gentry. The instinct of self-preservation becomes blurred, and the fine sense of what may and what may not be done if one's rank is to continue in the saddle fails the ruling body just as the sure touch of an artist or the exact vision of a marksman will fail him with the passage of years. Because public peculation has always been permitted to men of their stamp, because (unlike the servants of a democracy or of a monarchy) they have been left free from external control, the members of an aristocracy come to neglect the boundaries which distinguish what is tolerable in the way of corruption from what is not, and in their last stages they will often help themselves from the Public Purse of which they have charge; and that not in the traditional fashion which their inferiors are ready to excuse, but greedily and without distinction, like any demagogue hastening for wealth before his fall. Meanwhile, in this final and diseased phase of aristocracy there can be no appeal to the political vigour of the mass, for it has been an essential part of aristocratic rule—as suitable to the governors as to the governed—that the masses shall be incapable of corporate action, and above all unwilling to run any physical risk in defence of a political ideal.

All this, however, must be dealt with more fully when we consider the second of the two centuries before us. Nothing of decay appeared in the eighteenth. All during that century the aristocratic character of the British state was vigorous and in tune with its functions. Indeed, until long after the fall of Napoleon, no contemporary, however detached, is recorded as discerning signs of decay. The gentry remained until far into the nineteenth century conspicuous for all the marks such a body should have, and the community they ruled was still conspicuous for all an aristocratic state should present: a great passion for individual liberty; a corresponding contempt for bureaucracy; a reliance upon individual merit; a worship of the features that distinguish the gentleman.

The reader will do well at this point to note briefly certain of the sharpest features of English society between

the Revolution of 1689 and the Napoleonic Wars and to see how closely these reflect the fundamentally aristocratic character of which I have spoken.

Thus, in the list of those who are spokesmen for the state and of those, almost indistinguishable from them, who administrate and guide it, you have during the eighteenth century no single one who has not the outward character of this responsible class. They spring from the most varied origins. The great landed families, the Russells, the Howards, the Pelhams, the Percies, are their nucleus; the squires, both those that remain provincial and modest, and those that increase their fortunes, like the Walpoles and the Churchills, are their continued support. Wealth acquired in the strangest ways will suffice in one generation, or at the most in two, to lift such men as the Foxes or the Pitts into the highest places. But all, without exception, of those who govern speak one language and have one common social custom; even the provincial accent is rare; accents marking a difference of rank are unknown among them. How different to-day!

Again, observe how statesman after statesman enriches himself at the public expense and yet how not one is publicly discovered to have passed a certain line without a public example being immediately made of him. The Great Marlborough himself, suspected of taking a small commission from a Jewish contractor to his armies, is stripped of all his offices. The ministers who have shares in the South Sea Company are not only deprived of their posts, but compelled to disgorge. How different to-day! Admiral Byng, born into the heart of the governing class is shot for a real or supposed neglect of his duty.

Again, each one of the great names is invariably connected with the land. If its bearer was not born so connected, he finds it necessary to establish the connection sooner or later; and not one but dies, few that have not lived, the masters of an agricultural estate. No better example of this could be found than Burke. He is a man coming late in the aristocratic story, with no pretence to high birth and one not inclined by character to play a part among the gentry. Yet his retirement must take the usual form, and he is a squire long before his death.

Note further the strict dependence upon customs, and

the glory in national laws that shall guarantee men against personal oppression. The judiciary of the eighteenth century may be said to live by its strong devotion to the common law and the customs of the English. It defends a freehold, the forms of public life, the exact definition of procedure, with a zeal to be found nowhere else in Europe. Its apparently pedantic devotion to the details of legal ritual is rightly regarded by the mass of those whom it judges as the guarantee of their liberties. And it is true to say that during the eighteenth century an Englishman of the humbler sort enjoyed a *political* freedom not to be found elsewhere in Christendom. His power to express himself against the Executive, the limits within which that Executive was restrained, were more clearly defined than in any other country and were more thoroughly trusted. To give but one instance: the recruiting of men for the army and navy was in much of Europe practically obtained by a general compulsion; after the Revolutionary Wars it was admittedly compulsory. But all the shifts of the British Government for men, the emptying of the prisons, the press gang, the cheats of the recruiting officer, are but so many admissions that the compulsory principle could never be applied in a general fashion to Great Britain. The historian should note how England alone throughout the great struggle of the Napoleonic Wars maintained the *principle* at least of the individual's freedom against the central power that governed him. In spite of all jibes at the tricks (and worse) to which recruitment was reduced, and in spite of all the abomination of cruelty which the voluntary system imposed, voluntary it was and voluntary it remained. By that single test you may judge how truly Aristocratic was the English state.

Observe at the same time the lack of corporate action among the governed. In 1715 the mass of England was certainly Jacobite; yet an aristocratic clique had no difficulty in determining the Hanoverian succession. In the first struggle with France during the Seven Years' War, in the much greater crisis of the Revolutionary and the Napoleonic conflict, the mass are wholly informed by the governing class that is directing the national efforts. From no populace in Europe is the meaning and the opportunity of the French Revolution so successfully hidden as

from the English populace, and, until long after the end of the struggle, the overwhelming majority of those below the rank of the gentry—including even most of the middle classes—thought that nothing had happened abroad save a turmoil of meaningless violence and cruelty ending in the restoration of order. The quaintest legends were easily accepted, and the governed enjoyed the simple story of a man called Bonaparte whose personal tyranny had tortured the whole world until it was easily broken by the invincible armaments of old George III.

It need hardly be added that, with the exception of a single attempted recrudescence, which was not maintained, the power of the crown steadily declined during this corresponding advance of aristocratic sentiment. So true is this that expressions meaning little more than the victory of Oligarchy passed for national symbols, and that the gradual decline of what was left of monarchy came to be regarded as something native to the English constitution. This constitution, in its turn (the creation of the Revolution of 1688 and of the preceding civil struggle of the seventeenth century), was clothed at once with legendary antiquity and with a general worship. Never exactly defined, it was more and more established upon an oligarchic basis—until men came to believe that its peculiar rules establishing the conduct of certain specific organs in the state, notably the House of Commons, had about them a mysterious protective power such as attached to the deities of the old Pagan States. It is customary to laugh at the famous judgment of the Duke of Wellington that the English Constitution previous to the Reform Bill was the best that ever had been or that was conceivable for the state. But the quotation is wonderfully illuminating. The spirit that prompted it was the whole strength of England during those three generations between Blenheim and Waterloo, when England was also the strongest state in Europe.

We shall do well before leaving this, my first point in the introduction to my book (that England had become by 1689 an essentially aristocratic state), to consider briefly the causes of that condition.

When we have examined these causes we shall be led to the second point I have to make, which is that England during the eighteenth century became not only the wealthiest state in the world, but also the state that could most

readily dispose of its economic resources for the purposes of offence or defence.

Britain, during the Middle Ages, had been what every other Christian society of the West had been: one governed by a strong monarchy, but one in which the arrangement of the most important things in life was local and intensely democratic. Its citizens had, for the most part, possession in the instruments of their toil and in the land which they tilled. The mass of opinion supported any strengthening of the central Executive because it was instinctively felt that a powerful king was the defence of the small man against the great. Meanwhile, the regulations which most nearly affected a man's life in his home were drawn from the custom and the feeling of the local community of which he was a member and all acts of administration that directly affected him, or nearly all, were matters in which he had a hand.

How did such a state of society turn into what may be called its direct opposite: an Oligarchy, with a weak, evanescent kingship for its centre, the power of the great everywhere dominating, the mass of the people divorced from their land and from the instruments of their labour? The answer to this fundamental question in the history of England is that this great change had for its prime cause the religious schism of the sixteenth century.

True, the beginning of stronger squires and a weaker crown comes before the Tudor breach with Christendom. A considerable proportion of the land of the country—more than a third, perhaps—had fallen into the hands of the gentry during the fifteenth century; and after the Lancastrian usurpation local government had been entrusted to them almost entirely. But the change of religion under the Tudors gave substance and volume to what had been before but a vague and slight tendency. With the confiscation of the Church lands the gentry were enormously enriched; from possessing a large minority of the acres of England they passed within a generation to the possession of some two-thirds. They then entered upon the career of further monopoly which has been completed in our own day—until at last one may say that the land of England as a whole is in the hands of one small class. The public rights over minerals, forests, wastes and even the shores of the sea, were gradually extinguished. The very roads

of the country became, by legal decision, no more than rights of use over the land of the great owners.

The same religious movement destroyed the coöperative associations which were the defence of the small man, because it destroyed the instinct for corporate action and turned the mass of the State into a dust of individuals.

On the other hand, the intensive fostering of private capacity and of individual initiative, which was the central note of Protestantism and which is so familiar a boast of those who approve the religious revolution of the sixteenth century, must not be neglected by those who are indifferent to that spiritual change, still less must it be neglected by those who are opposed to it. It was the very mission of the Protestant movement, on its temporal side, to stir to competition all private initiative, while, at the same time, it isolated the individual man; and he who would follow the fortunes of England during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries must take full account of this factor. The new religion of the English led to most vigorous action in commerce and in all economic affairs. It produced the great bulk of mechanical discovery and the application of that discovery to the production of wealth. But this mill, while it sifted out the few who were successful in the race, condemned the mass of men, in larger and larger numbers, to a lower and lower economic position until it ground out at last the propertyless millions of to-day.

Everything the Reformation did converged to the establishment of Capitalism in that England which had adopted Protestant principles, and which had set them at last upon a secure foundation in the Revolution of 1689. There was the strong spur of private initiative leading to mechanical discovery and to its application; there was the destruction of the guild and of the corporate life which would have used such discoveries for the common good and would have checked the power of the few: there was the isolation of a number of propertyless men: that number growing greater as time went on and becoming at last the proletarian mass of modern England: there was the accumulation of wealth in few hands, so that the stores of food and the control of land and of the instruments of production were already in the hands of a small privileged class—there was all this already established when the new instruments of industry were perfected and applied.

England was already Capitalist before the Industrial change in machinery began; and she was Capitalist because the Reformation had in the century of its full development made her so. One may put it roughly thus in a test example: In the year 1500 most Englishmen owned the houses in which they lived; in 1600 some three-quarters or two-thirds probably had still this economic buttress behind them; by 1700 not one-half; by 1800 certainly not one-tenth.

Those to whom this doctrine may be novel (I mean the doctrine that the Reformation lies at the basis of Oligarchy in politics, of Capitalism in Economic life) can test its truth by the contrast of Ireland. Here, against forces more adverse and more fierce than are to be discovered elsewhere in history, a consistent national effort has forbidden the growth of the one and has checked the growth of the other. Ireland is neither Oligarchic nor Capitalist, and her differentiating quality is not only race, but rather, and more, religion.

It is at this point that we may approach the second of the two theses to be laid down in this introduction, to wit, that England had not only become an aristocratic state in the eighteenth century, but, coincidently with this, became (a) the wealthiest State in Europe and (b) the State whose wealth was most easily and immediately available for the purposes of offence and defence abroad.

The evils now generally recognised in a Capitalist form of production, and the regret felt by most men to-day for the loss of economic freedom which Englishmen have suffered, must not blind us to the truth that the economic change of the eighteenth century gave England for three generations an economic preponderance throughout the world. Of this we may note many proofs before we examine its causes.

During the whole of the period we are about to examine, England regularly subsidises at will the armies of her continental allies. At the close of it, with a population not half that of her rival, the French monarchy, she raises with ease a revenue equal to that which Versailles can only raise with difficulty, and her revenue is rapidly expanding precisely at the moment when the financial difficulties of France overwhelm that country. But France, be it remembered, was the only other great centre

of wealth in Europe or in the world; for Spain was then in active decay, the Germanies and Russia quite primitively poor.

At the same time England, not only through the commercial initiative of her citizens, nor only through the presence of Capitalism and of its increasing proletariat, but also through her great reserve of accumulated wealth, inaugurated the *industrial revolution* and started, a whole lifetime ahead of the rest of the world, the new forms of production by machinery. Concomitantly with all this she developed a Colonial Empire numbering in men of European blood nearly half her home population. She drove her only commercial rival out of the Indian peninsula and laid the foundations of her power there. She conquered and prepared to exploit a whole group of colonies and dependencies which had been founded by others—Canada the most important—and while she thus increased her commerce so enormously upon every side, she easily supported a navy which had come to accept as its standard of strength that it must be the *double* of its greatest rival.

Take whatever test you will and you may discover that the England which begins by overcoming the Dutch in commerce and ends, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, as the workshop of the world, was wealthier than any rival, was increasing its wealth more rapidly than that of any rival, and could use that wealth more actively and immediately in investment and in war than any rival.

The powerful momentum of such a state of affairs, the habits of mind it bred and in particular the unquestioning confidence in the future, we feel even to this day; for the flood of that great tide ran until well past the middle of the nineteenth century. I have named the causes in the mere recital of the fact: Capitalist production, the discovery and use of machinery, an ardently adventurous temper in commerce, the control of the sea. And the spiritual root of all these things was the individual energy fostered by the new religious scheme which had been imposed upon England by a few rich men in the sixteenth century, but which all England had accepted fully by the seventeenth. The principle of social competition following upon that religious change was, indeed, to reduce the mass of the nation at last to the condition in which we now find it.

It could not but in the long run exalt a very few at the expense of the rest, and finally sink aristocracy itself into the mud of plutocracy. But while the process of development lasted, and it lasted for more than twice the long lifetime of a man, England as a whole increased her wealth out of all past measure and beyond any possible rivalry, and was able to use that wealth not only for a further extension of production and of commerce, but for the defence of the mercantile organism she had created.

Now if it be true that England thus became, as she did, between the accession of William III. and the struggle with Napoleon, by far the wealthiest State in Europe, how was it also true that she had the facility beyond any other State of using her surplus wealth easily and immediately for the purposes of offence and defence against her enemies?

This question must be answered by two replies which are interwoven one with another. First, it was the oligarchic nature of England which gave her this facility. Second, it was the high development of the English banking and credit system which gave her this facility.

The fact that England was an oligarchy—that is, that a few men both economically and politically controlled her wealth—put vast accumulations of surplus values into the hands of a small class which could act directly and immediately. That class was able to save money more rapidly and in larger amounts than could the citizens of a State where wealth was better distributed. At the same time the accumulations so heaped up could be politically directed with little discussion and without delay because few men, and those men all intimately connected, had the political handling of loans and foreign subsidies.

At the same time it was this very same oligarchic social constitution which fostered the development of credit. A small class, the members of which are intimate one with another, is a very seed-plot of credit. The solidarity of the English economic oligarchy profoundly impressed European opinion. The English commercial and territorial oligarchy had not only so many millions ready to pay those who would fight their battles upon the Continent, but when they promised to pay further millions *not yet existent* to fall due in succeeding years they were believed.

Upon these two pillars, both of them the product of an

aristocratic constitution in the State, the power of England to subsidise foreign armies and to support her own forces during four generations depended. Upon these two also depended her power to outlast financial crises which overwhelmed her neighbours.

We must, then, as we read of the elder Pitt's designs and success, the conquest of the St. Lawrence, the struggle with America, and especially as we read of the expansion of English power in India and during the Napoleonic Wars, bear constantly in our minds this double economic feature: that England was throughout the eighteenth century the richest State in Europe (*and one becoming richer at a greater rate by far than any other*), and that England was also, in those days, able to direct her surplus wealth toward political action more decisively and immediately than could any other power.

In our own generation that economic supremacy has largely disappeared. England is surrounded to-day by rivals, two of which (the United States and the French Republic) command more wealth; many others of which, notably modern Russia and the modern German Empire, are rapidly rising to an equality with her in this field; all of which, as in the case of Italy and even recently of Spain, are taking advantage of the long peace for the recruitment of their economic position. In wealth *per capita* the smaller nations everywhere around have also surpassed the greater. Switzerland, Belgium, Holland and Denmark are now prosperous after a fashion that their mightier neighbours cannot show. The criticism might be continued indefinitely. It is enough to conclude by saying that neither an Englishman nor a foreigner will understand the history of England during the one hundred and fifty years or so that are now beyond living memory, unless he continuously bears in mind the picture of an England unique for wealth among all the nations, prodigiously advancing in the same, and, during nearly the whole of that period, the only source whence subsidies could flow for the support of allies or the ruin of enemies upon the fields of continental Europe.

With every year that passes, not only by the rise of so many new economic factors in the world, but also by the universal spread of mechanical production and of international obligations, that unique position which Eng-

land once occupied becomes more and more difficult for modern men to believe and to understand: for it has utterly passed away, and the nation has already crossed the line which separates the easy from the embarrassed treasuries of the modern world. Our poor press upon us. We fear loans. Our taxable limits are reached and exceeded, and still our rivals gain upon us. It is the more important that we should appreciate fully in reading the story of the English eighteenth century, that during all that period—and even till well on in the nineteenth century—the economic supremacy of our State was unquestioned, its economic ease and expansion unrivalled, and the rest of the world in a different and inferior category, as producers, as financiers, as traders, from ourselves.

With these two main provisions, then, of England as an uniquely aristocratic State, and of England growing to occupy an unique economic position, I approach my recital of the historic sequence between the accession of William III. and the Battle of Waterloo.

PART I.

1689-1815.

THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND

CHAPTER I.

THE IRISH WAR—REIGN OF WILLIAM III.

1689–1702.

WITH the accomplishment of the Revolution and the confirmation of William of Orange upon the Throne of England, three departments of history occupying the new reign must occupy our attention. The first is James's attempt to restore his fortunes in Ireland; the second, the foreign policy and fighting following upon William's hostility to Louis XIV. of France; the third, the Domestic History of the settlement which secured the new form of government and the internal policies of the reign.

I will deal with these in their order and first describe the Irish War.

In this connection we must begin by understanding the various forces engaged. They were, besides the Irish people under the leadership of Tyrconnell (who formed the matter of the contest and the prize contended for), four in number. William of Orange; his rival James; Louis XIV. of France, and the English Oligarchy.

William of Orange could not regard Ireland as his principal concern. He had for his chief object in life the reduction of Louis XIV.'s ambition. He was, not only by his situation at the head of the Dutch, but by his whole temperament, tradition, and personal expe-

rience, concentrated upon the one end of setting a boundary to the expansion of that French and Catholic civilisation which had attained to an hegemony over Western Europe.

For him the crown of England and its dependencies inevitably meant a weight which he could throw into the scale against Versailles, and meant little more.

For the English squires and great merchants, for perhaps a majority in the English nation, and certainly for nearly all that was articulate and could act among the English, the mere reduction of Louis XIV. and the mere service of William's Continental policy was not the main matter. William was for *them* but a guarantee that Protestantism should prevail in their own country; that the new system of Government by one powerful class should be affirmed; and that the strong fighting power and military temper of the Irish people, the chief menace to the new state of affairs, should be set back.

For James the problem was to get back his throne as *King of England*. He could only attain that end by a combination of two things: first, the conquest of his enemies, and secondly a reliance upon all the forces which might make his throne stable once it was secured again. These forces were the natural loyalty of many to an established dynasty; the desire of all who were not Anglican to have freedom of worship; the secret detestation felt among the wealthy cultured classes, now grown so powerful, for what they esteemed to be the vulgar enthusiasm of popular religion.

To defeat his enemies James needed weapons, that is, men and money with which to train, arm and pay those men. The weapons directly to his hand were the

money and men of the French King and those of the Irish people. But he could not re-enter England merely as the nominee of the French King, still less as the liberator and champion of Ireland. He must re-enter it as an English King, or fail.

Finally, the object of Louis XIV., though in general it was to impose upon Western Europe the creed and culture for which he stood, yet was in particular an extension of his own power and especially a domination of the Netherlands, the frontier whence that power was most threatened. Therefore, Louis was not principally concerned with the restoration of James II. It was for him but a means to an end. Still less was he concerned with the liberation of Ireland; that seemed to him but a means of a means; an aid supplementary to something which was itself nothing but a further aid to his own dominant scheme.

Put all these four factors together and you have before you a plan of a complex situation which governs the foreign and Irish side of English history from the New Year of 1689 onward for thirteen years.

(1) The English oligarchy, ready to rule and supported by the nation, fears Ireland as an immediate danger, and fears the restoration of personal monarchy as well. William is their standard-bearer, but he is their servant also. They made him.

(2) William thinks of England as a force he can use against Louis on the Continent. Of Ireland he fears that it is an impediment which must be in some way managed, but he cares no more for or about it than that.

(3) James desires to be King of England. Ireland can help to restore him by her military temper, France by her scientific aid and subvention. But still, if he

returns, it must be as King of England and therefore he dares not be a mere conqueror come from abroad.

(4) Louis is thinking of maintaining his Bourbon plan of French domination upon the Continent; is anxious for the frontier of the Low Countries where William is his chief opponent; would be glad indeed to see James back again upon the throne of England, but mainly because that would support his plan. He therefore regards the support of James as but one subsidiary part in his general plan; a part which is worthy of some, but of no great, attention.

Time and the experience of success and of disaster were to modify all these four factors. The English were destined to become in that generation more used to a permanent antagonism against France. Louis was to suffer defeats which would disturb his original view. James was to find by experiment what thinking might have taught him—that he could not again become the English King he wished to be through alien forces, whether Irish or French. But in the main these four points of view were the warp and the woof of external English history, not only, as I have said, until William's death thirteen years later, but on until the great effort of 1715 had ended in failure.

The period covered is the active life of a man. One who was a young man of twenty-five when it opened would be over fifty when it closed. And in that period through the interaction of all these forces the coming England of the eighteenth century was determined.

First let us see how the twin effort of William against Louis XIV., of the English governing classes against Ireland achieved a partial success in the first years of the new régime. This survey concluded, we may turn to the domestic history of the reign.

The effects and the moral nature of the Irish War I will discuss later in their proper place, when I come to consider the relations between the two countries as a whole and that disastrous mishandling of Irish Government to which the future historian will perhaps ascribe the chief perils of England. For the present I am concerned only with putting before the reader the main dates and facts of that episode.

It was upon the Christmas Day of 1688 that James had landed in France, at Ambleteuse. Lord Tyrconnell, the Irish born and Catholic friend of James, whom James had put at the head of the armed forces in Ireland, owed allegiance to James in a personal and special fashion. But apart from that, this man desired the independence of his country and of its religion.

In his desire for this he had negotiated with Louis XIV. two years before, when William of Orange seemed the necessary heir to the English throne; for Tyrconnell saw what the accession of William, even his peaceful accession, would mean to the Church and to the Irish State. We must bear this in mind to understand what followed. With William as *de facto* King of England in the first days of 1689, Tyrconnell's allegiance, and with him that of the Irish troops in Ireland, was regarded, by those who had made the English Revolution, as having passed to William. With James *de jure* King of England it was of course regarded, by those who supported the legitimate monarch, as remaining attached to James. Tyrconnell was, however, still in actual fact independent of both parties, and it was necessary for William and for James to approach him and seek his alliance.

William, a foreigner, and a man depending upon

opposing forces was besieged with advisers; he took the advice of John Temple, the son of Sir William Temple, an English statesman to whom the Dutch were attached; a man preferring retirement to activity at this moment, but presumed to inspire the views of that son whom he had introduced into political life in his own stead. John Temple, true to the compromising spirit of his family, advised William to send over as a sort of Ambassador to Tyrconnell a certain Richard Hamilton. Now Hamilton was the brother-in-law of Lady Tyrconnell, but also (and this is more important), his only cause for being in England at the time was that he had come over *in command of the Irish regiments which had been sent to England to support James*.

William, therefore, in sending Richard Hamilton over to negotiate with Tyrconnell was deliberately taking a great risk, and, as a fact, John Temple's advice was bad. Tyrconnell had no intention of so much as listening to William's overtures, and the only use he made of Hamilton was to give him a commission in his own army. John Temple drowned himself.

Meanwhile, James had determined, with the support of the French King, to cross over to Ireland in person. He landed at Kinsale on the 12th of March, 1689, and entered Dublin in state upon the 24th of that month.

I have said that James did this "with the support of the French King," but the reader should remember of what nature that support was.

Louis's aim was not primarily the restoration of James but the weakening of William. Ireland was no main military objective of his. It served Louis XIV's purpose to prolong the Irish difficulties of

William. It did not serve his purpose to destroy the connection between England and Ireland. James took with him five French officers and a certain supply of French money, but there was no diversion in this direction of the strength of the French Crown.

From Dublin James summoned a Parliament to meet in that capital upon the 7th of May. This Parliament could only, under Tyrconnell's government, be a body representing the Irish people and their religion and one really determined to reverse the blundering cruelties of which all men of mature years could remember the origin; it was bound to restore to their original owners the lands of which they had been dispossessed. In the three provinces of Leinster, Munster and Connaught the Protestant minority had been disarmed, the much larger Protestant population of Ulster, for the most part alien settlers, was still able to resist; and though largely driven from the countryside these men took refuge in the two walled towns of Enniskillen and Derry. Of these two towns Derry was by far the strongest for the purposes of defence, but in the event, both maintained their position against the forces of James. Avaux, the French diplomat who had come with James as his chief adviser, was against an immediate attack upon these strongholds, and so was Tyrconnell. In particular an attack on Derry was dissuaded. There was no siege artillery with the Irish Army. It was hardly trained. It was in very bad discipline for the most part. It lacked resources even more shockingly than it lacked organisation. Nevertheless James determined with this insufficient force to attempt the reduction of the place. The fact that Lundy, the governor of the garrison in Derry, had despaired of resistance and had

sent back to England the two regiments under him must have affected James's judgment. But he counted without an element appreciable in all warfare, of overwhelming importance in civil struggle between ill-trained, or untrained forces—enthusiasm.

The population of Derry was, beyond that of any other of the alien Colonies of the North, aflame with religious and racial feeling. It must be remembered that the town in its present condition had been founded during the memory of men still living as a deliberate stroke against Irish nationality. The land about it had been largely bestowed upon the companies of the City of London, the name of which City had been somewhat grotesquely prefixed to the native name by official decree.¹ The resistance was therefore not only a strategic matter; it was also a symbol and a flag.

The population, under the leadership of a clergyman named Walker, and under that of Baker, a chance soldier who had been raised to command by the citizens, were ready for any sacrifice in defence of their contentions and of everything for which the Protestant ascendancy of the past had stood. They were to prove in memorable fashion the value such convictions have in war. The fortunes of Derry became the pivot of the struggle. News from Derry was the chief news for which the England of the Revolution and in particular the town of London eagerly waited. And though at first the English government thought it impossible to save the town—particularly in view of the fact that military opinion

¹To call Derry "London" derry is still a punctilio with the opposition in Ireland, and is in England a custom almost universal

had pronounced so strongly against it by the sending of its garrison home—a revulsion of feeling compelled the ministry to act, and before the end of April a letter was sent to the officer in command of the town promising four regiments of Infantry and supply. Kirke, who had distinguished himself by his cruelty against Monmouth's army at Sedgmoor in the service of James, and who had been among the first to betray his master and to secede to William, was commissioned to equip the relieving expedition at Liverpool. A man of such a character was perhaps meditating a second treason and contemplating his chances with James. At any rate, his long delay at Liverpool earned him a reprimand (delivered in the middle of May) and even when the convoy had reached Loch Foyle—the entrance to Derry from the sea—Kirke lay day after day inactive outside the boom which the besiegers had thrown across the water approach to the town.

James's army, provided with no equipment for the reduction of the place and innocent of heavy guns, was reduced to blockading it. The citizens endured every extremity of privation and their heroic tenacity was subjected to tests terribly severe by the sight of vessels full of food and having on board a relieving force cruising in their immediate neighbourhood, yet failing to perform their duty.

James had not long remained with his forces in front of Derry. When it became apparent that the town could only be reduced by a long blockade and by famine he had returned to Dublin to open the last really representative Irish Parliament which was to meet upon Irish soil.

That Parliament sitting continuously over nine

weeks recognised James as King, decreed a complete liberty of worship for all religions and went through the form of voting a monthly supply to the Army. The real value of such a form in a ruined country which, even had the national forces secured a permanent success, would have taken a generation to recover, may best be seen in the fact that James was compelled to issue fiat money—brass in the place of gold—and to enforce its circulation. Such financial expedients can only be temporary in any case. They fail immediately unless there is a powerful social organisation to enforce them even for a few months; there was here no such police, and James had as a fact to rely entirely upon such inadequate supplies as his French ally chose to dole out.

The Parliament further voted that the lands taken from their lawful owners some forty years before—that is the whole of the new and monstrous “settlement” of Ireland—were to be restored. But there was a provision that where bona fide purchasers could prove a claim it was to be met from the estates of those who should have forfeited their land by rebellion against James since the 1st of August, 1688. Finally, an Act of Attainder was drawn up against over 2,000 persons, and in the haste which accompanied that measure it is certain that many of those names were introduced without policy, and in satisfaction of private revenge—though it must be remembered that a very large proportion of those whom the Act of Attainder struck were the same as those whom the confiscation of their lands had already affected. The number of those specially affected by the attainder was thus much less than appeared from the lists.

Ten days after the Restoration thus decreed by the National Parliament, on July 28th, Kirke, acting under peremptory orders from England, sailed his ships against the boom which cut off Derry from the sea, broke through it, and relieved the City. Three days later, upon July 31st, the siege was raised. At the same time the defenders of Enniskillen had beaten off at Newtown Butler the Irish force that was advancing against them, and the first days of August, 1689, saw the Government of William provided with bases in the North for the advance of his invasion against the national army of the Irish.

William, even at this moment would have preferred a Continental to an Irish campaign. It was better strategy, certainly, if the defeat of France—his one object—were in view. But the opinion of England was again too strong for him. The German Schomberg, a soldier of fortune (now William's lieutenant and an English Duke), sailed upon the 12th of August for Belfast Lough, stormed Carrickfergus upon its northern shores, and set out upon a march southward, the immediately favorable issue of which could not be doubted. As it happened, however, the struggle was to be more prolonged than the best advised of observers at the moment could have guessed. Its prolongation, but much more the crime and blunder which followed its conclusion were to affect adversely for generations to come that one main problem in the modern history of England, the Irish connection.

It is probable that if Schomberg had attacked boldly in this first campaign, in the late summer of 1689, he would have been immediately successful; it is also probable, paradoxical as the opinion may sound, that such a success, coming close upon the universal Irish

movement of the last six months would have been followed by some sane and permanent settlement. For if Schomberg had won his battle against a body of troops, larger indeed than his own but of far less military value and with no such source of supply and equipment as he had, the action would have been followed (in William's acute anxiety for his Continental policy) by an understanding with the mass of the Irish people still in full possession of the greater part of their country. But Schomberg refused.

He had by the 7th of September reached Dundalk. James's Army had been gathered and awaited him a day's march to the South, at Drogheda, covering Dublin. Schomberg would not attack. He entrenched himself and at last, as the universal custom of war in those days demanded, the approach of winter put an end to these hostilities.

The campaign of the next year opened in a fashion typical of the various interests involved. Louis XIV. refused to regard Ireland as in any sense the pivot of his policy. James's crying need was for trained men and for equipment. The French King provided him with no more than 6,000 such troops, and even these he only granted in exchange for a similar number of James's Irish subjects, whom he proposed to train in the French service. He sent in command of this wholly inadequate force, a wholly inadequate soldier; that same Lauzun, the empty courtier who had served as escort to James's wife, Mary of Modena, when she had fled from London. Such a commission vividly illustrates the attitude of the French King toward the whole affair. To the Netherlands he would no more have sent Lauzun than he would have sent his valet.

Again, Louis might have risked his fortune at sea and should he have been successful he might have prevented or made extremely dangerous the transport of troops from England to Ireland.

French ships could land troops in Ireland without disturbance, and had their master made Ireland his chief objective they could have found a battle ground in St. George's Channel. He attempted nothing of the kind, and when he did act at sea it was with other objects in view and too late for any purpose of James. Meanwhile William, perhaps grasping the cause of his great rival's inactivity, but also seeing that the opportunity had come for settling the Irish difficulty at a blow, determined to cross over and command in person a very large and adequately equipped force. He counted upon leading, all told, some 40,000 men, counting the garrisons already in Ireland. He landed at Carrickfergus on the 14th of June, 1690, in support of Schomberg who was strengthening himself in Ulster and had already received the capitulation of James's last garrison in that province. He joined to his forces the garrisons of Enniskillen and Derry and, supported and supplied by his Fleet, marched immediately down the Coast at the head of 36,000 well equipped, and, for the most part, fairly well-trained men.

Upon the 30th of June he reached the northern bank of the Boyne and Dublin was not thirty miles distant. Upon the same day, as though to emphasize the indifference of Louis to this subsidiary Irish corner of his general European plan, the French Admiral Tourville gained over the English and Dutch Fleets combined off Beachy Head, a victory of the most decisive character. The naval force which had

been capable of such an action could, had it chosen, have made William's invasion of Ireland impossible. Even an invasion of England by French troops (which would have been perfectly feasible after this disaster against the very small armed force left in the country under Marlborough's command) was regarded by Louis as an improper diversion from his main object upon the Continent.

I have said that William III.'s army lay upon that same 30th of June upon the north bank of the River Boyne, a little above Drogheda. This obstacle of the Boyne was defended upon its farther bank by James's troops. In the action that followed there could be no doubt of the result. A ford lay between the unequal forces, a bridge spanned the obstacle somewhat higher. The bridge was turned, the ford was indiscriminately carried by a plain frontal attack and the trained and professional army overcame its opponents without further casualties on its side than are to be expected in such conflicts.¹ On the other hand, the defeated body was so ill pursued, or so well covered, that it did not suffer as such bodies commonly suffer in conflicts of the kind. The total casualties upon both sides in this battle of the Boyne, fought upon the 1st of July, 1690, were hardly—in killed during the heat of the action—one-seventieth of either side; and even in the imperfect pursuit the loss upon the Irish side was not large.

It is remarkable that among the short list of killed were to be discovered the names of Schomberg and of Dr. Walker, who had led the resistance of Derry.

¹ William himself had been grazed by a cannon-ball in a reconnoissance the day before. The wound was insignificant, but gave rise on the Continent to a report of his death.

James immediately left Ireland, passing through Dublin to Waterford, thence by ship to Kinsale. At Kinsale a French man-of-war took him on board and landed him in Brest.

James's immediate abandonment of Ireland as a result of his inevitable defeat at the Boyne has subjected him to many accusations, the stupidest of which perhaps (in the case of such a man) is the accusation of cowardice. If we put ourselves into his shoes and consider the pass into which he had brought himself, we shall understand his action better. From the very beginning of his enterprise the fact that he had to depend upon Catholic Ireland for the reattainment of the English crown was the gravest of drawbacks. He had to use such weapons as were to hand and he had no other weapon to hand; but from the first days in which, three months before, he had grasped that weapon, he had increasingly experienced its doubtful advantage to himself. Delighted to accede to and to foster the plan of *toleration* (which he had wisely chosen in England itself) he was certainly alarmed at the just but hasty and revolutionary resettlement of Irish land; the great Act of Attainder alarmed him still more.

Even if he had won a decisive battle with the wholly insufficient force behind him, he could not re-enter England as king save after some compromise upon the things which the main part of his English subjects held dear. These might easily have been persuaded to a policy of toleration in Ireland and, in some mutilated fashion, to a policy of toleration in England; but to come back as the champion of an alien nationality which had confiscated English goods (for many of these novel owners were English) was

an impossible position. If James's moral chances grew darker and darker in the prospect of an Irish victory, they were perfectly hopeless after an Irish defeat. That defeat had come; and the fact that unexpected acts of heroism were to continue the struggle through two more campaigns and were ultimately to extort reasonable terms for the conquered would, even if he could have foreseen such a prolonged resistance, have been no argument for James's remaining. A successful and unexpectedly lengthy rally, ultimately securing the Treaty of Limerick for the losing side, would have left *him*, had he remained, as far as ever from any chance of recovering his throne.

Apart from James, who now drops out of the Irish story, the interest of the remaining struggle centres upon the town of Limerick.

It is evident that a nation possessed of a seaboard and allies over sea can maintain a struggle with an invader indefinitely so long as the sea is open to its allies, and so long as the invader has not occupied all the ports. Though the Irish had lost the North and their Capital and the East they still retained four Ports of Entry, widely separated and capable of being held against an enemy from the land. These four were Galway, Limerick, and the neighbouring couple, Kinsale and Cork; such harbours securing between them a hold upon the South and West of the island.

Both Lauzun and Tyrconnell had agreed that the defence of Dublin after the loss of the Boyne would be unwise on account of the large and powerful Protestant element in the population of the city. William entered it but five days after the Battle of the

Boyne and with Dublin fell all the Eastern coast that looks toward England, including the Port of Waterford.

Of the four ports still in Irish hands Limerick was strategically the chief, because it was *strategically* the most distant. Galway would fall whenever the obstacle of the Shannon was forced. Cork and Kinsale would normally be attacked before the Western harbours. Supposing each of the four points equally strong, Limerick at the mouth of the Shannon, would be the last in the chain to fall, and, apart from this theoretical consideration, Limerick was the natural centre of the Catholic Southwest. It so happened, however, that the fortification of the town appeared, in the eyes of experts, contemptible. The French contingent was withdrawn to Galway and thence, their commander despairing of the war, shipped back to France whither Tyrconnell also sailed.

The invaders advanced to the line of the Shannon. They did not pass it, but they set siege at once to Limerick. Here, in the absence of foreign aid and of any solid equipment, as of forces upon whose training a commander could rely, the patriot Patrick Sarsfield unexpectedly checked the conquest. The siege pieces and train essential to the operations of the Anglo-Dutch-Huguenot Army, were captured in a successful raid by this leader. An attempt to storm failed, and the abortive siege was raised upon the 30th of August. William's forces fell back Eastward into Tipperary and William himself returned to England, leaving, in command of his army, Solms.

Though Limerick was for the moment saved, the Autumn saw further reverses to the national cause. In that same month of August Marlborough sug-

gested himself to lead the attack upon Cork and upon Kinsale. William, in the face of some opposition at home, accepted the offer and Cork upon the 28th of September, Kinsale by the middle of October, were in the invaders' hands.

Limerick and Galway now alone remained as points of support for the national resistance—and it was in this situation that the year 1690 ended for the habitual winter truce of warfare of those times

In the next and last campaign, that of 1691, the order of events was as follows: Upon William's side the government of Ireland was left in the hands of a commission and Solms was replaced by Ginkel, another Dutchman well experienced in war, over sixty years of age, and a Cavalry Commander who had distinguished himself at the Boyne.

Meanwhile Tyrconnell returned from France. He again came commissioned from James as Lord Lieutenant. Louis again promised supplies of money and of men. Once again, however, Louis was observed to treat the whole Irish business as a small matter, subsidiary to his general European plan. His chief contribution was the loan of an able general, St. Ruth; and unfortunately a divided command (for St. Ruth brought also a commission from James to act as commander-in-chief, militarily independent of Tyrconnell) affected the issue.

It was in the month of May, 1691, that St. Ruth arrived. He exercised the active energies of his character in an attempt (surely hopeless with the few days at his disposal) to turn the Irish levies into something resembling the model of those trained forces which had reached their perfection in his own country. I say "in the *few days* at his disposal," for,

almost coincidently with St. Ruth's appearance, Ginkel concentrated his own well-equipped and well-trained army at Mullingar and began his advance.

It is elementary in the strategies of Ireland that the Shannon is the great obstacle covering the West. The point at once central in this obstacle as a post for its defence against attack from the East, and providing, if it is carried, a communication for invasion Westward, is the town and bridge of Athlone. The town lay upon either side of the River and such was the strength of this position that in spite of the inferiority of the weapon to his hand, St. Ruth believed that it could be held. Athlone did indeed stand a siege, at first with remarkable success, and that before the arrival of St. Ruth. But Ginkel forced a ford above the bridge, turned the position, and Athlone fell upon the 10th of July.

Tyrconnell, jealous of the divided command, returned to Limerick. St. Ruth, still hoping to cover Galway though he had lost the principal line of obstacle defending that town, the Shannon, threw up earth at the hill of Aghrim and in the struggle round that point was himself killed when Ginkel, with great slaughter, forced his entrenchments in the course of July. On the 22d of that month the Dutch general received the capitulation of Galway.

Limerick alone remained; and the resistance of Limerick, the treaty to which that resistance gave birth, might still have effected some permanent settlement in the age-long problem and peril of the relations between the two islands had the Government of William understood the practical value of loyalty and right dealing in statesmanship.

It was upon the 12th of August that Ginkel arrived

before the walls of the City. The coincidence of misfortune which is always apparent in war, deprived the Irish at that very moment of their leader Tyrconnell. He died upon the day that the siege began.

To save the City was impossible. Ginkel was well provided with siege artillery, an English squadron blockaded the approach from the Shannon. But when at last the capitulation was arranged, the gravity of the task was betrayed in the terms of that capitulation and those terms (arranged upon the 3d of October) should be learnt and remembered by every man who desires to understand how closely wickedness and folly can be combined in the graver errors of politicians.

The Treaty
of Limer-
ick.

As I said in the beginning of this, I am here concerned only with the facts of the war; its moral lessons and its consequences I shall deal with later in their proper place. But the Treaty of Limerick must here be fixed in the reader's mind, that he may judge how disastrous was the betrayal which followed upon it.

That Treaty was twofold, military and civil. Under the Military articles all those who desired to remain under arms were allowed a safe conduct to France under their own officers.

It was the Civil articles which formed the gist of the transaction. By these it was solemnly promised that the Catholics of Ireland should enjoy all privileges and rights which they had enjoyed in the reign of Charles II., and this particularly in the exercise of their religion. Further, a Parliament was to be summoned at the first opportunity in order that these rights should be confirmed. There was required from those who now passed under the rule of Will-

iam, an Oath of Allegiance, and that oath once taken no other oath or vexatary test was to be demanded of them. Finally, all the Irish still in arms in the garrisons of the South and West were to remain, after the pacification, in secure possession of their estates, such as they had held during that same reign of Charles II. They were to receive a full amnesty. They could not be prosecuted for any acts committed during the war.

These were the terms of a solemn agreement which, had it been maintained with ordinary loyalty, would have afforded a sure foundation for English policy, not only (as was then imagined to be the only vital thing) in the particular relations between England and Ireland but, what no one could then foresee, in the fortunes of the two nations during the coming centuries of commercial expansion and of colonisation. As it was, it was shamelessly broken, and the fatal consequences of that act of treason are not yet exhausted.

The Treaty of Limerick was deliberately agreed to by the conquerors because the conquered still had it in their power to maintain a most serious resistance. It was a bargain fairly and most openly struck and no one can maintain that it was not struck between the whole of the two contracting parties by the agency of those who signed for them upon either side upon the banks of the Shannon that day. With this Treaty and at this date in October, 1691, the Irish War comes to an end.

The consummation of the Revolution in Scotland Scotland. and the settlement in that country of William and Mary as joint sovereigns, though it is a matter much better understood in England (and much more truth-

fully told by most historians) than the Irish business, was of far less consequence in the general scheme of European history and of that branch thereof which concerns these Islands.

It was certain that Scotland would follow in the wake of England, because the Reformation had rooted itself quite as deeply in the Northern as in the Southern Kingdom. The Revolution was essentially the final establishment of a fully Protestant society in Great Britain; and Scotland which, as a whole, and nationally, was perhaps more vividly Protestant than any State in Europe, could not but fall in with the movement at Westminster.

Nevertheless it is important to appreciate the points in which the Scotch nation differed from the English. In the first place a much sharper tradition of the old civilisation was retained by the Scotch in spite of the vast and fundamental change in ideas which they had suffered in the sixteenth century. They were much more a Monarchy and less an Oligarchy than the English. They were less inclined to compromise; they were more attached to clearly defined first principles and to the logical consequences deducible from the same. In religion the bulk of the nation had adopted the formal, tenable and exclusive philosophy of Calvin, and were in their conception of Church government Presbyterian. In law the same spirit showed itself and shows itself still. The arbitrary and indecisive side of English law stands even to-day, after so close a commercial and social union of so many generations, in sharp contrast with the stricter rules and impersonal jurisprudence of Scotland.

Again, the Scottish religion, or rather that which

had been adopted with popular fervour and upon the popular initiative by the mass of Scotchmen, was proscribed and an Episcopalian system at issue with the national will had been and remained imposed upon Scotland. The quarrel therefore which James had found himself in with his English subjects when he proposed to grant freedom of worship to his few Catholic co-religionists by using as a lever the discontent of the English Nonconformists (which he had proposed at the same time to relieve) was quite a different quarrel to that which he found himself in with his lowland Scotch subjects. Hateful as the Catholic religion was to these and anxious as they were to persecute the practice of it, yet the chances of relief to the Presbyterians which would accompany James's policy of toleration was a very powerful lever indeed.

Again, Scotland was in its small population divided sharply between the Highland tribes and the more commercial inhabitants of the Lowlands. As for these last, the same psychological effects of the Reformation as we have traced in England, with its development of commerce and of middle-class initiative had given to the Lowlands a great and permanent economic preponderance. The Highland clans, numerically a small proportion of the whole population and very simple in their economic organisation, could never again impose themselves by mere military valour upon the Lowlands. But they remained a strong disturbing element in the Kingdom as a whole, always ready to take arms, and menacing, as a simple and poor civilisation always menaces, a wealthier and more complex one upon its borders, the grow-

ing commercialism of the Lowlands. They had less to lose.

Moreover, some appreciable number of the Highlanders—though what exact proportion we cannot tell—were still practising, with more or less ability, the old religion and were a few actively, more traditionally, Catholics. Organized as they were in clans their politics often depended upon the rivalry between particular clans, or the prejudices of a Chief. It is an error to exaggerate the devotion of the Highlands to the name of Stuart, but this element also was present and had something to do with what followed.

With all these elements in mind we can grasp the nature of the Revolution North of the Border.

Just before James's flight, that is, at the end of 1688, the position in Scotland was this: Many of the principal offices of State were in the hands of Catholics appointed by James, and his policy had further secured the government by the appointment of Provosts in sympathy with the King for the principal towns. In the private chapel of the Royal Palace at Holyrood the Mass was established; and a Jesuit school was opened in the immediate neighbourhood. The Chancellor, Perth, was a Catholic—having declared himself converted shortly after the accession of James—and the Chancellor's brother, Lord Melfort, was Secretary of State.

With the flight of James this unnatural structure fell to the ground. Perth fled, was captured, and detained in Stirling Castle for four years. His brother, Melfort, followed James to France and remained at the side of the exiled King, his permanent adviser

and secretary. Edinburgh Castle was indeed still held by its Catholic Governor the Duke of Gordon, but he lacked supplies, and the populace of Edinburgh sacked the Royal Chapel in the Palace and drove out the Jesuits.

The reader must now fix his attention upon two names, that of Claverhouse and that of Dalrymple.

John Graham of Claverhouse (raised by James to the rank of Viscount Dundee) was essentially a soldier. He had seen much of Continental warfare. He supported the Jacobite cause as a General supporting his King.

Dalrymple, the son of the most famous Scotch lawyer of his day and himself in turn the most famous Scotch lawyer in his own, was in everything a contrast to such a character as that of Claverhouse (Dundee). Sprung from a family which had been among the first to declare for the Reformation and having prominently associated himself with the Protestant cause in the North he thought it would be to his personal advantage to turn traitor for the first time and support James in the hope of advancement. When James fell he gave, of course, the example which we find so continually repeated throughout this period, of a double treason; and he immediately attached himself to William.

The Convention which was to decide the fate of the Scotch Crown met in Edinburgh upon the 14th of March, 1689. Claverhouse (Dundee) and the other Jacobite nobles, having obtained leave from their master overseas, attended it. They knew that they would probably be in a minority in the Convention, but they also knew what backing they had in the

Highlands, in the strong personal jealousies among the great men of the Lowlands, in the national suspicion of England, in the hatred of the Presbyterian for the established Episcopacy. They wrote to James urging him to send a letter which should conciliate Presbyterian feeling.

On the first division in the Convention it was apparent that the majority lay with the Revolution, and this majority increased when once it was seen where future power and the exercise of vengeance were likely to lie. And what chances the Jacobites had of success in spite of this Parliamentary defeat were ruined by the purport of James's letter, written by Melfort, unwisely rejecting proposals of conciliation for the Presbyterians and relying principally upon threats of vengeance against those who might betray the legitimate King. Claverhouse (Dundee) left the Convention when it had sat for five days; and there was now nothing left for the Jacobite cause in Scotland to rely upon save the chances of James's success in Ireland; a dangerous and most uncertain weapon even had it come to hand, for the antagonism against the Irish in the Lowlands of Scotland was at least as strong as it was in contemporary England.

Dalrymple, having now for the second time betrayed a cause and joined William, became from this moment the chief power in the State. The Scotch Crown was offered to William and Mary, but in a document so drawn up that it could not be accepted without at the same time accepting Presbyterianism as the religion of the State, or at least without suppressing Episcopacy. William, having accepted the throne, offered the office of Lord Advocate (that is

the power of prosecution and of exercising vengeance over his former allies) to Dalrymple, who eagerly accepted the opportunity. Mackay, a man of Highland extraction, but wholly formed by Continental warfare, was called back from Holland with no very great force, to suppress any danger that might arise in the Highlands. For Claverhouse (Dundee) had determined, in the absence of effective aid from Ireland, to weaken William by such guerilla warfare as could be maintained in the hills. He had before him, of course, the precedent of Montrose. Mackay was ordered to seize the person of Claverhouse (Dundee), in whose interest the castle of Blair in the valley of the Garry (the very gate of the Highlands) was held for King James. Mackay marched up the Valley of the Garry from the South. Less than two hours' march from Blair Castle the road passes through the defile of Killiecrankie.

Battle of
Killie-
crankie.

Mackay, with 4,000 men, was debouching from this defile upon the 27th of July, 1689, at the close of the day, when Claverhouse, who commanded little more than half his enemy's numbers—but these Highlanders were posted upon rising ground above the Valley road—attacked him. After a first volley had been exchanged between the two sides the charge of the Highlanders, down hill, destroyed in a few moments Mackay's formation. Half of his command were put to the sword, the other half fled in disorganised panic.

It is possible that this local but complete success, with the lesson it had taught the more disciplined soldiers of the Revolution might, under Claverhouse's continued leadership, have led to a prolonged guerilla warfare. Unfortunately Claverhouse himself was

struck as he was leading the charge and killed. The words reported of him are consonant with his great motto: "that he never asked the nature of a policy but only the orders of his commanding officer," and the words with which he died were the question whether "it was well." They told him that it was "well for King James, but not for him." With that answer he died, satisfied.

With Claverhouse dead the chances of resistance, even in the hills, grew less and less, and the second throne of William was secure.

In the following year James's last commissioned officer, Buchan, was (May 1, 1690) surprised and his forces dispersed at Cromdale. The victories of William's forces in Ireland destroyed all hope of a Jacobite restoration at that moment. The rebellious clans—who were given till December 31, 1691, to come in—one by one tendered their submission, and though the process dragged on for eighteen months (and closed, as we shall see, with a tragedy), yet no further armed resistance to the new King was to be feared.

The power of Dalrymple and the natural disgust which his career had excited, promised for a moment a reaction toward a really national Government, and Scotland at least was to enjoy, for one brief moment, the experiment of a free Parliament dealing directly with the King and excluding Ministers from its debates. There was no second Chamber to impede the course of legislation, and the national will had an opportunity for direct expression. This plan, if it had succeeded, would have increased the power of the Crown in the Northern kingdom at least, and would have checked the example of Oligarchy which

England was setting to Scotland. But the experiment failed; and the subsequent history of the Scotch Parliament up to the Union is of little interest to the student of these forms of assembly and of their rise and subsequent degradation in modern Europe.

Dalrymple, who had destroyed this opportunity for national expression, or rather who had so tamed it as to make it valueless, fell two years later; but he had effectually done his work.

The occasion of his fall was the Massacre of Glencoe.

The Highland Clans were, as I have said, reluctantly coming in to take the Oath of Allegiance; but Dalrymple had marked down among them that one of which he said that it was the "only Popish Clan in the kingdom"—the Catholic Macdonalds. Their Chief, Macdonald of Glencoe, had for months delayed his submission, and it was Dalrymple's fervent wish that he would still delay it long enough to permit some signal act of vengeance. But this Chieftain, who had already presented himself at Fort William with the object of submitting before the prescribed date of Dec. 31, 1691, and whose oath had been postponed by the officials and not of his own will, had ultimately succeeded in taking the Oath before the Sheriff of his County upon the 7th of January, 1692, and the Attestation thereof had been sent on to Edinburgh.

The
Massacre
of Glencoe.

Technically, Macdonald of Glencoe was a week late, but as the fault was not his it was monstrous that the authorities in Edinburgh should refuse the attestation of the Oath, as they did when they received it. The next step was that William himself wrote to Dal-

rymple hoping that the Catholic tribe might be segregated from the rest and "extirpated." Dalrymple forwarded this order on to Livingstone, the Commander of the King's force in the Highlands, personally demanding "a just example of vengeance," and the "rooting out in earnest" of these Catholic families.

Livingstone proved a worthy tool of these two men, William and Dalrymple, who stand responsible before history for the murder that followed. Though he knew that the Clan had taken the oath, he sent, with a company of soldiers, upon the 1st of February, into the valley of Glencoe, a certain Captain Campbell, a man whose subsequent crime was the more odious because he was allied by marriage with the Chieftain's family. The Clansmen of the Glen received this officer with hospitality, the relations between the soldiers and these Catholic Highlanders were cordial. All was in profound peace when, twelve days after, upon February 13th in the early morning, the issues from the Glen having been, as it was hoped, secured, the soldiers fell suddenly upon their hosts, shot the Chief in the back, followed out their orders to murder every man under seventy years of age, and added, by way of zeal, the further murders of certain women and children. The issues of the Glen were happily not so well guarded but that some fragment of the Clan, among whom were two sons of the dead Chieftain, escaped, and lived to perpetuate the memory of so abominable a thing.

This abomination ended the power of Dalrymple, though it was not until the summer of the year that the protests against him were successful and that he was removed. Punished he could not be, be-

cause William exercised the Royal power to preserve him.

What remains of Scotch history in the last ten years of the reign principally concerns the adventure of the Darien Company.

The Darien
Company.

That same Paterson (we shall come across him later in connection with the Bank of England), who may justly be counted as a principal founder of the new Capitalist system, and who had been so successful as a financial adventurer in England, returned from his exploits in that country to Scotland, of which he was a native, with a scheme for a company that should develop and colonise the unoccupied lands of Central America.

The rapidly accumulating capital of the Lowland merchants, whose predominance the Revolution had established, could here find an easy outlet, and though Scottish trade was restricted by the Navigation Acts and enjoyed, as yet, no free intercourse with England, there was no limit to the expansion it might not take abroad. In 1695 a Charter was granted for general trading and occupation of land and the planting of Colonies and, what is interesting, a clause in this Charter bound the King to defend the adventurers in case of their coming into conflict with foreign powers. With a capital of £600,000 (half of it raised in England) a project was put forward for exploiting the East Indies. The English East India Company at once protested. The project was therefore abandoned, and, as a consequence of this national quarrel, the Scotch took up the subject with a new and patriotic zeal, and with reduced capital the preparations for turning the energies of the Company toward Central America were completed by

1698. Paterson had, with the customary bombast of the promoter, prophesied the inevitable success of the scheme. A moment's reflection will show its madness. It challenged the whole power of Spain and at the same time proposed to colonise the most deadly climate of the New World. The adventurers, whom Paterson himself accompanied, perished in great numbers, but a remnant of them reached New York; a second batch (following the first in ignorance of their disaster) was crushed by a Spanish force, surrendered and returned. The hard-won capital subscribed was wholly lost.

A violent, though temporary anger against England and her Dutch King as the cause of the disaster flamed throughout the Lowlands, which anger, ironically enough, was the starting-point for the Union of the two Crowns. For it was now apparent that with Scotland technically independent of English Government and possessing in practice a foreign policy of her own, it would be impossible for the King of England, if he were also King of Scotland, to be sure of his diplomatic schemes or to lay any plans of Continental policy. The Darien business had led to acts of war with Spain at the very moment when William was engaged with what we shall see on a further page to be the all-important affair of the Spanish Succession, and when it was his chief concern to propitiate Spanish feeling. It is no wonder then, if William's last message to an English Parliament was to urge it to bring about that Union with Scotland without which his own Crown seemed insecure. In his ignorance of British conditions he had thought such a Union possible at the moment of his accession. Fate, through the rapid development of

international commerce, made good that ignorance of his, and caused the Union shortly after his death to become law.

The Foreign affairs of the reign must next be considered.

Foreign
affairs.

If the reign of William III. be regarded from the point of view of general European history, its significance is this: that by the change in the English dynasty, the weight of the new English wealth, of the English Fleet and of English land forces, sometimes not inconsiderable, was thrown into the scale against Louis XIV. and the hegemony of French culture in Europe; and the effect of this extra strength, added to the enemies of the Bourbons, was to prevent a settled establishment of such an hegemony. There was no final triumph for the allies; but the spread of the Bourbon power and ambitions was upon the whole checked.

From the point of view of English history alone, however, this effect must not be exaggerated. It was later than William's time that the great rivalry between France and England was to arise, and the crisis of that rivalry was not to be determined until the French, absorbed in transforming Europe a hundred years later, left the English commercial system free to pursue an almost unlimited expansion.

The Foreign policy of William is consistent and simple. It may be defined as the maintenance of the successive Alliances against Louis XIV. and his own efforts to aid them by his personal presence at the head of his Dutch and English in the field. It is only modified by the alternating support and lack of support which he finds in his English Parliament.

As a General William was mediocre, and the interest of his action lies in the new money and the new men and the ships which his new Crown permitted him to control.

His efforts against his great rival fall into two clear divisions, the first ending with the Peace of Ryswick, signed in 1697; the next beginning with what is called the Question of the Spanish Succession, which reached an acute form three years after the Treaty of Ryswick was signed, and constituted the subject of renewed conflict between the English and the French Crowns for many years after William's own death.

The story of the first of these periods may be briefly told. The Empire with its German States, England, Holland, Spain and Savoy—that is the whole of Europe where it touched upon the French frontiers—were united in restraining the progress of Louis XIV.'s armies. That they were on the whole successful in this task was largely due to the new strength lent them by the fall of the Stuarts and the advent of William of Orange. But William achieved little personally, though year after year he set out for the Low Countries with the close of winter for the opening of each successive year's campaign.

In 1691 a futile series of marches and counter-marches filled the few months of his absence from England upon the Continent, and he effected nothing in spite of the very large votes which Parliament was still willing to grant.

In the next year, 1692, on May 19th, there took place the decisive Battle of the Hogue. Tourville, ostensibly to prepare the sea for an invasion of

England by James, engaged the Dutch and English Fleets which, combined, were immensely superior to his own in number. He did so because he was assured that Russell, the English Admiral, who was in active correspondence with James, would at least stand neutral, and that the French ships would only have the Dutch to meet. It is characteristic of the treble and quadruple treasons of the time that Russell supported the Dutch as heartily as though he had been William's most loyal subject, and the consequence was the destruction of the French force—a destruction which James himself watched from the cliffs above. But, on the other hand, in the Netherlands the fortress of Namur was captured by the French, and William, attempting a surprise action later in the year, on August 3d, at Steenkerke, was defeated. The French victory was not very decisive, but the English loss was heavy, and the battle checked the feeling in favour of the war in England. Mackay, the General who had been defeated at Killiecrankie, was killed.

In 1693, the Fleet of Rooke, the English Admiral, was only saved from disaster off the Spanish Coast by a precipitate flight from the much larger force which Tourville had been able to muster there, and the great merchant fleet, called "The Smyrna Fleet," which he was escorting was captured or wrecked. While in the Netherlands a very heavily fought action (on July 19th), remembered under the title of The village of *Neerwinden*, went against William who was perhaps at this moment at the very lowest of his fortunes abroad.

In 1694 the decision to send the Fleet into the Mediterranean saved the Spanish coast towns and the

Balearic Islands from the French menace that hung over them at the moment, but an expedition against Brest, delivered in the month of June (and duly betrayed by Marlborough to the enemy), was disastrously repelled and Talmash, its leader, Marlborough's rival, was killed.

It was the next year, 1695, that saw the first slight relief in William's Continental position. He recovered Namur—a success which did something to revive the English support for the war—and perhaps had Peace been then negotiated he would have been at the summit of the not very uneven fortunes which he pursued abroad.

But in the next year, 1696, Louis began a series of diplomatic successes by detaching Savoy from the Alliance against him, and in 1697, as the result of conversations between William's Dutch envoy Bentinck (Lord Portland), and the French Marshal Boufflers, Peace was signed at Ryswick on September 21st between the French King and all the members of the Alliance, with the exception of the Emperor. The Emperor adhered to the Treaty six weeks later.

The Treaty of Ryswick, though it is no conspicuous success for William's policy, does mark a limit to the military pressure exercised by Louis XIV. upon his rivals, and it is by the contrast between his position at that moment and his position ten years before, when a Stuart was still upon the throne of England, that we can measure the full effect of the English Revolution abroad.

The Peace was exceedingly popular in England. The Army, as we shall see later when we come to domestic policy, was cut down wholesale (though

The Peace
of Ryswick.

the Navy was maintained at full strength) and the first period of foreign warfare being at an end it was generally believed that England could look forward to a long peace.

So far was this from being the case that almost from that moment there arises the question of the Spanish Succession.

The Spanish Succession.

Spain was *internally* the strong and wealthy country she is to-day, but it was her remaining *external* position, and the recent memory of her great Imperial expansion, which still attracted the notice and the cupidity of Europe; for though the offensive power of the Spanish Crown had singularly diminished in the last hundred years, it constituted a formidable addition to any coalition of which it might form a part; and for the Monarch of one of the great European powers to rule, directly or indirectly, Spain as well as his own dominions seemed at that moment a grave threat to the repose of the rest.


It so happened that Louis XIV., against whom all Europe had so lately combined, seemed upon the point of effecting this unison or at least of having the Spanish Crown under his dominion in the person of his grandson.

Complicated as the subject is, the reader who desires to understand the subsequent history of Europe, the cause of the great Campaigns of Marlborough, and both the power and the etiquette of Monarchy in those days, must grasp on what account the peril of so vast an increase to Louis XIV.'s power menaced the other countries of Europe.

How this danger arose the accompanying table and its explanation will make clear.

GENEALOGICAL TABLE EXPLAINING THE QUESTION OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION.

Philip III. = King of Spain, a Hapsburg, contemporary of James I. of England.



It will be seen that Charles II., the reigning King of Spain in 1698, was the only surviving son of King Philip IV., who had himself been the only surviving son of Philip III.

Now, this King, Charles II., the last of the Spanish Hapsburgs, was childless, and, though a man only between thirty and forty, decrepid and soon to die.

Whenever that death took place, therefore, Leopold the Emperor could claim the Spanish throne as the son of Philip III.'s younger daughter Maria. Louis XIV. could also claim it as the son of Philip III.'s eldest daughter Anne. For the law of Castile, which governs the legitimate Spanish succession, demanded that the Crown should pass to the next female heiress in the absence of a male or his heirs descendant. In the absence, therefore, of any complications, while the Emperor and Louis could both claim the Crown, Louis XIV. was the legitimate heir to Charles II. as the son of the elder daughter.

But complications were abundantly present.

There was, of course, the practical point that Europe would never tolerate the uniting of the Spanish and the French Crowns under the most powerful Monarch of the time. But apart from this fact there was the legitimate point that Louis XIV.'s mother on marrying the King of France had expressly renounced her claim and that of her heirs to the Spanish Crown.

So far, therefore, as those original elements are concerned the Emperor Leopold I. was the true candidate.

Now Europe would not tolerate the sudden enormous accession to the Emperor's power which would be caused by his inheriting Spain and the various

parts of the Spanish Empire in the New World, the Netherlands and Italy, any more than it would tolerate a similar accession of power in the hands of Louis XIV. Leopold was therefore prepared to pass on his claims to his younger son Charles. And if this Charles of Austria could peacefully have acquired the Spanish Crown it would have been in the tradition of the last hundred years—for he was a Hapsburg, and that there should be a younger Hapsburg branch ruling at Madrid while the Senior branch ruled at Vienna was something to which Europe had been long accustomed. Unfortunately, there was a third set of complications which interfered with so reasonable a solution.

A glance at the table will show that the last King of Spain, Charles's father, Philip IV., had married his two daughters, the eldest one Maria Theresa to Louis XIV., the younger one Margaret to the Emperor. Through these two women, therefore, by Castilian law passed a closer claim to the throne than any that could have passed through their Aunts Anne, the Queen of France, or Maria, the Empress, the daughters of Philip III.

Maria Theresa, Louis XIV.'s Queen, had issue Louis, the Dauphin of France. Margaret, the Empress, had issue a daughter Maria Antonia. Having regard to the fact that Castilian law sought in the absence of a male heir the nearest female succession, logic compels us to decide for the claims of the Dauphin, whose mother was the *elder* daughter of the last Spanish King. And the same logic compels us to reject the claims of Maria Antonia, the daughter of the Emperor by the *younger* sister. So now, in our process of gradually narrowing the issue, we have the

Dauphin of France as the legitimate heir to the Spanish throne.

Now Maria Theresa, when she married Louis XIV. had followed the regular practice of Spanish heiresses marrying into any powerful house other than the Hapsburgs, that is, she had renounced her claim and that of her posterity to the Spanish throne. But Louis XIV. had long ago refused to accept the renunciation and that upon two grounds. First, that his wife's dowry was not paid, and, secondly, that the Cortes or Castilian Parliament had not confirmed the renunciation, as was required by Castilian law. Now, supposing Louis XIV.'s objection to his wife's renunciation to be a sound one, you have Louis the Dauphin with the first claim to the throne after Charles II.'s death, next Maria Antonia or any heirs of her body, and lastly Charles, the youngest son of Leopold, to whom his father had passed on the claim Leopold had himself inherited from his mother. Of course, neither Leopold nor the son to whom he proposed to pass on the claim had any legitimate rights at all, as the succession through the younger generation was much closer. But the fact that this younger son was a Hapsburg gave him a strong sentimental claim, backed as it was by the descent and relationship of his father to the Spanish Throne.

As a matter of fact, Louis the Dauphin of France (who had the best claim if we allow his father's renouncing of his mother's repudiation of rights) would never have been allowed by European opinion to unite the two Crowns in his own person any more than Louis XIV. would have been, or the Emperor. He proposed therefore to pass on his rights to a younger son of his, just as the Emperor had, and his younger

son, Philip, Louis XIV.'s grandson, was thus the first standing claimant to the Spanish throne whenever it should become vacant through the approaching death of Charles II.

The next claimant was not Maria Antonia (who was dead), but her little son Joseph Ferdinand, whose father was the Elector of Bavaria, and whose claim is therefore called "The Bavarian Claim"; while the third claimant, the one with the weakest legal claim, was Charles, the younger son of the Emperor.

With all this clear we have the elements of the subsequent problem before us.

First Parti-
tion Treaty.

After the Peace of Ryswick, William III. and Louis XIV., each of whom dreaded a renewal of the war, privately arranged that so far as they were concerned (and "they" meant England, Holland and France) they would support upon the death of Charles II. of Spain a *partition* of his dominions. The Bavarian claimant was to be supported in his demand for the Spanish throne, the Spanish Netherlands and most of the Empire; but Philip was to get Naples and Sicily and the Basque Provinces over the Spanish frontier, while the Hapsburgs were to be restricted to the inheritance of Milan.

If it be wondered why William acceded to this demand on the part of his great rival, the answer is that it prevented either of the great Powers, France or the Empire, from threatening his beloved Holland through the Spanish Netherlands. It is significant of the remaining power of the Crown in England that this very important Treaty was negotiated entirely by William himself, with the aid of his familiar Dutch friend Bentinck, and that all that members of the English Oligarchy who happened to be in office were

asked to do was to affix the great Seal of England and to sign. Though the Treaty was secret it was widely talked about and it is important to note that this talk aroused the strongest Castilian national feeling, which was a determination to avoid partition at any cost. It was this very desire on the part of patriotic Spaniards to avoid partition which led to the paradoxical result immediately following.

In the January of 1690, the Bavarian child upon whose life all the partition plans of William and Louis were based, died. A second Partition Treaty was rapidly put together, but the issue now really turned upon the will that Charles II. might write and whom he might nominate to receive the Spanish Empire *entire*; for the Spaniards were now determined that whoever that will benefited should be the ruler of an undivided Empire.

Second
Partition
Treaty.

It was on October 3, 1700, that the dying King of Spain put his signature to this document wherein, *with the express object of keeping the realm united*, the whole Spanish Empire was left to Philip, the little grandson of Louis XIV. Four weeks later, on the 1st of November, Charles II. died.

At once the interest of Europe and particularly of William III. was fixed upon this point: whether Louis XIV. would accept the will or not. Would he keep to his Partition Treaty (now in the face of Spanish opposition unreliable) or take on the burden and greatness of a new Bourbon Crown? There was certainly divergence in the French Council and hesitation on the part of Louis; but a fortnight after Charles II.'s death, Philip, the little Duke of Anjou, was solemnly presented to the Court of Versailles under the title of Philip V. of Spain, and that child was not only

accepted King in France, but proclaimed in Madrid, in Brussels (then capital of the Spanish Netherlands), and throughout the Spanish Empire.

The old animosity of William to Louis immediately reawoke. A Grand Alliance against the French king was formed in the next year. In 1701 came the acknowledgment by Louis XIV. of James II.'s son as King of England. Parliament, hitherto recalcitrant, prepared to support William, and just before that monarch died in March, 1702, everything was ready for war. Eighty thousand soldiers and sailors were voted in support of it, and England was ready once more to engage in her struggle against the French Crown.

Domestic
affairs.

We must now turn from Ireland, from Scotland and from Foreign Affairs to the Domestic History of the Reign of William and Mary. I shall deal with them at far greater length than most other similar periods in this history because the thirteen years have their great significance in this: That we may watch in them the beginning of that process whereby the conception of an active Monarchy was eliminated from English public life, and the rule of a parliamentary oligarchy of wealthy men substituted for it.

This process was gradual, and it is an error to imagine that it proceeded very far in the short space between the Revolution and the accession of Anne; but the whole foundation of what was once "the English Constitution" was laid in that brief time.

When Charles II. had been restored to the Throne thirty years before, the date marked the real line of cleavage between a new England and the past. The Monarchy returned in the person of Charles II., a subject, small and salaried thing. It had been for centuries before that date the true government of England.

At the same time the House of Commons, that is a Committee of the squires and great merchants, and the House of Lords (a similar body of even wealthier men), became permanent organs of national control acting apart from the Crown, and the former ruling all expenditure.

England, as I have said in the Preface to this book, was already fully established as an oligarchy and the monarchical principle was gone. Nevertheless, the Crown as an office continued. It had by no means yet become, in 1689, a fiction maintained merely for the purpose of continuity in government. Administration was still in the hands of the Council which permanently surrounded the King, and the King was present at that Council whenever he was in England. His ministers were men who sat at the table with him and who conferred with him; and he could dismiss them at pleasure. They were usually great and wealthy men standing for greater and wealthier interests even than themselves; interests which were politically much more powerful than the Monarchy. But still the Monarch counted. He was not a name or a symbol as yet, though he had already sunk to be a salaried man in an aristocratic State. He could still act; his personality counted; and no one was as yet consciously alive to the tendency by which the King was to become, within the lifetime of a man, negligible in power compared with the great moneyed interests of a commercial state.

So much being said we must next turn our attention to the existence of a division between the wealthy and powerful men who were the chief element in the government of the time. This division has handed down the names by which it was distinguished to pos-

The
"Whigs"
and the
"Tories."

terity, and though those names no longer mean anything resembling that for which they originally stood, there has been since this establishment of the new England of the Restoration, a continuous and uninterrupted tradition perpetuating the division in question and the titles distinguishing it; for one group of Statesmen had already acquired the nickname of *Tory*; the other the nickname of *Whig*.

The distinction was not one of definable principle. It was rather one of "kinds of men"—where opinion was sincere. For many it was not even this, and a Tory or a Whig was one who professed for his own advantage the views of another. There were Tories who would certainly have defended the new dynasty against any attempt at Stuart restoration, however much that restoration might have been guaranteed by checks and counterchecks preserving the Protestant religion and the subserviance of the Throne. There were Whigs, even typical Whigs and powerful ones, who were strict defenders of the established Church and who would, had history developed upon different lines, have accepted a carefully guaranteed Jacobite restoration. But, roughly speaking, the Tory was a man who regretted the necessity (if he honestly thought it a necessity) of calling in William of Orange and, what is more important, who gravely suspected the power of the Nonconformist in the State. He would, if he could, have imposed a united religious ritual upon every subject of the King and he had, as a rule, a strong attachment to the past. The Tory of that time was a man of whom you may say in general that he had not grasped how much the strength of England was commercial, and how the

greatness of England in future was to be founded upon adventure and success in oversea trade.

The Whig, on the other hand, though to us to-day the less sympathetic was, we must never forget, the more national man at that time. The Revolution itself had been Whig in political theory—so far as it can be said to have had any definite political theory at all. Great merchants were in the main Whig, and the landed aristocrats who led the Party were more alive than their opponents to the commercial essence of the new England. The Whigs in Foreign Affairs were, mainly from an instinct of trade, very largely also from an instinct of religion, strong opponents of the French King. They were the active and conscious force which continued to restrict the remaining power of the Monarchy at home, and their strength lay not only in the fact that they stood for the main stream of the national life and for its chief activity in the towns—especially the great seaports—but also in the fact that they had a positive theory of the State where the Tories had but a negative one.

A Tory was at this moment, and was bound to be so long as a Jacobite restoration was possible, in something of a false position. He was always under some suspicion of wishing that the great change had never come about. He had always to be excusing himself for his sympathies with the past; he had not the advantage of a clear and single purpose. The Whig had all the strength of an opinion in consonance with things as they were. His political theory had been accepted and registered in the Revolution itself and in the settlement which accompanied it. He was under no necessity to compromise or to explain him-

self. He stood for accepted results and for one fairly united policy at home and abroad.

It must clearly be understood, if we are to grasp the complexity of this period, that the powerful men who supported William in varying degrees (and who intrigued with James) cannot simply be regarded as divided into these two groups of Tory and Whig. Every man considered the possibility of a Restoration; all were therefore prepared in the interests of their own fortunes either to negotiate with James directly or to have a foot in both camps, or, at the least, and in the case of the most tempted of them, to guarantee their possessions in the event of his return. We perpetually see in these dozen years, and especially in the central and most critical part of them, plots, double dealings and secret informations which are quite inexplicable upon any straightforward division between Whig and Tory, but which are both highly human and clearly comprehensible if you take care not to read history backward, but to remember that the greater part of the Oligarchy were men in middle life with habits formed under the long-acknowledged rule of the Stuarts and with a particular regard for their material fortunes. Of a very few it can be said that they had a personal loyalty toward the house of Stuart and the legitimate King, a feeling in those days still sanctified by religion. Of none can it be said that they had any personal feeling of loyalty to the saturnine cunning and perhaps vicious character of William.

Position
of Queen
Mary.

Mary did indeed form a strong support for the new state of affairs. She was an English lady. She was connected, through her mother's family, with the new native aristocracy, and though her character is not a

sympathetic one—far from it!—yet she had that tact which is usually found in women of good birth and training when they are also intelligent. Above all, she was a Stuart; and she formed a bridge, as it were, between the old state of affairs and the new.

It is apparent, then, that we must consider two factors in the confusion of the time apart from the division between the Whigs and the Tories. First, the Stuart tradition embodied in Mary herself though not accepted in her father, a tradition which might make possible at any moment the restoration of James. Secondly, the anxiety men felt in a time of revolution and proscription, which was also a time of newly made fortunes and great financial opportunities, for their material wealth.

Many other lesser factors were present: The great dislike of the Dutch, and particularly of the Dutch favourites at Court with their titles, and of the Dutch troops present in the island: The intense dislike of Catholicism, especially in the great towns—a repugnance which might be half forgotten when James's cause was falling, but which was immediately remembered whenever that cause was rising and threatening an invasion: The antipathy to the Irish (old men could remember the abhorred presence of Irish troops in England and Scotland and the threat of their power), etc. But the two factors I have named—the Stuart tradition and the anxiety of a wealthy Oligarchy for its estates—were the principal ones in the domestic problems of those twelve or thirteen years.

On this account three dates and two foundations must be thrown into particular relief because they determined between them the successful issue of the Revolution from its perils. These three dates are the

Death of Mary upon the 20th of December, 1694, the Plot to Assassinate William upon the 15th of February, 1696, the Death of James II. on the 16th of September, 1701; while the two institutions which so profoundly, though less conspicuously, affected the settlement of that time, were the institutions of the *National Debt* (January 20, 1693), and the establishment of the *Bank of England* in the following year (Incorporated July 27, 1694).

With those three political dates and those two institutions well in mind, the scheme of the reign can be made tolerably clear.

The first
five years
of the
Reign.

The first five years of the reign, that is the period stretching from James's flight in the December of 1688 to his daughter's death in the December of 1694, formed one continuous effort for the restoration of the legitimate King; an effort in which, as I have recounted, every family of the new Oligarchy was concerned at one time or another. The military side of this effort and its effect upon Foreign Affairs and upon the Irish and Scotch policy of William, I have already described; on the domestic side of it the first figure to note is that of Churchill, the Earl of Marlborough. His conspicuous military talent, coupled with the extraordinary baseness of his character, are the pivots upon which most of the intrigues turn. But he could not have played the part he did had not his wife, a well-born woman of violent character, tenacious will, and particularly lucid intelligence, obtained a complete ascendancy over the Princess Anne. It was evident that those who effected the Revolution and set up William of Orange could not expect a direct heir to the Throne. Anne was the heir-apparent. But not only was she the heir-apparent, she was

also a Stuart, and when she came to reign she would reign as a Stuart *only*. There would not be by her side, as there was by the side of her sister Mary, a powerful and conspicuous consort counting high in the general policy of Europe. She would be English in tradition and an unrivalled representative of the ancient house. More than this, the character of Anne (which was far more generous than that of her sister) inclined her to some repentance for the wrong done to her father, James.

All this combined gave Marlborough the ambition to rule, and his first opportunity for fulfilling this ambition came two years after the establishment of William and at the conclusion of the Irish War.

During that struggle and while the issue of the conflict was still doubtful, a definite Whig policy had dominated all that was done, and had consolidated, under the pressure of necessity and with the active fear of Irish success before the nation's eyes, the position of William. Thus, when the first Parliament met in October in 1689 the Earls of Salisbury and of Peterborough were impeached. Danby, the very man who had brought over William (and who had now been made Earl of Caermarthen), was attacked. So was Halifax. It was even attempted, while restoring the Town Charters which James had forfeited, to make all who had taken part in the surrender of those Charters incapable of holding an office for seven years. Here was a deliberate attempt to cut off the provincial Tories from that local government which is of the essence of aristocratic rule. So extreme a measure was defeated. It led to a rally upon the part of the Tories in a House of Commons which was still a free council, and in which each member voted

without regard to any other tie than his conscience or his purse. But this rally of Tories in the Commons was in its turn unable to pass measures that would have counteracted the Whig domination.

William, who combined with his wakeful cunning a curious misapprehension of things immediately to his hand, was bewildered by the violence of these factions. He threatened to leave England and was retained by the insistence of his two secretaries of State, Nottingham and Shrewsbury, the one a Tory, the other a Whig. In the first month of the next year (January 27, 1690) he dissolved this first Parliament of his and summoned a new one, preparatory to his departure in the spring for the Irish War. His second Parliament which met eight weeks later (on March 20, 1690) was less violently factious than the first, and a piece of policy that was cardinal with William was registered during its session. For, upon the 20th of May, 1690, the same day that Parliament rose, was passed the Act of Grace from the Crown which protected from pursuit all save a very few of those charged with political offenses; and even these exceptions—some thirty in number—were not troubled by prosecutions.

I say that this determination against any form of vengeance was the cardinal point in William's English policy. The man was as narrow as he was taciturn, and in ascribing to him the character of cunning we have a fair clue to his intellectual activity. Not much of a soldier by temperament he yet had one object in view which made him a soldier of necessity—the leading of the coalition against Louis XIV. Ignorant and perhaps contemptuous of the English he yet, with the advantage which comes from a narrow

vision, saw one thing very clearly which was that he could not lead the coalition if he lost the English throne. And in his bewilderment at the complexity of private intrigue, political theories, material ambitions, avarice and the rest, which had led the Oligarchy to summon him to England, he saw that his throne, morally most insecure, would be quite untenable if he attempted to rule as the nominee of one set against another. On this account William persistently refused to allow an act of vengeance of Whig against Tory, or individual against individual. He as consistently refused to support too conspicuously even those who had best served him. The motive was mean, but the policy well founded.

It is from this moment, the late spring or early summer of 1690, that the Jacobite effort to recover England through English channels begins, and we must carefully note the way in which this effort cut across the conventional lines of Party, every prominent man having some sort of attraction toward it, until we get in the next year what is sometimes called the Treason of Marlborough.

The two chief members of an Administration in those days were the two Secretaries of State and, as we have seen, William had chosen for those posts the Tory Nottingham and the Whig Shrewsbury. Shrewsbury, upon the eve of William's departure for Ireland, mysteriously resigned, and it is certain that he resigned as part of an intrigue with James. Here was a very troubling matter for William just on the point of leaving the kingdom and of abandoning the whole government into the hands of his wife during his absence. Mary was surrounded by a council of nine, in which the two factions nominally divid-

ing the Oligarchy were carefully balanced, five Tories to four Whigs. She was to rely chiefly upon the advice of Danby (now Lord Caermarthen), a man whom she did not like in spite of all he had done for her husband and herself. Russell was to be her adviser on Naval and Marlborough on Military matters; and Marlborough being, through his wife, the master of Anne (with whom Mary had quarrelled), was another hindrance to her action.

It was at this moment, and following significantly upon Shrewsbury's resignation, that an organised Jacobite plot was discovered, at the head of which was Lord Clarendon, the Queen's own Uncle. It failed, and Clarendon was for the moment imprisoned; but it showed how the new reign reposed upon no fixed foundation and what elements of good fortune were necessary to preserve William upon his throne. The Battle of the Boyne in that summer and the complete French naval victory off Beachy Head, with the burning of Teignmouth that followed it, precisely opposed in military result, were of identical political effect. They strengthened that support of William in the mercantile classes which, perpetually rallied throughout the reign, was his chief asset; and William, returning to England from Ireland upon the 6th of September, reached Hampton Court upon the 10th to find that the Government of his wife, though menaced, still stood. Marlborough's subsequent offer to complete the work in Ireland removed to that country and out of England another doubtful element, and it seemed for the moment as though there was some prospect of continued security for the throne.

The prospect was an illusion. Not three months after William's return another Jacobite conspiracy

was formed with Lord Preston, the last of James's Secretaries of State at its head, and it was Preston who sailed with the plan and with letters from his principal supporters for France in that December. Among those letters was one which incriminated Sandcroft and certain of the Bishops. The captain of the ship betrayed Preston; and he and his papers were seized upon the last day of the year. In the trial that followed, Preston, though condemned to death, was pardoned and set at liberty within six months; no cleric was arrested, and Clarendon, already imprisoned for the former plot, was also let free. Ashton, Preston's confederate and a former Secretary of James's Queen, being a man of no importance to the Oligarchy, was executed; and in this series of executions and strangely lenient pardons you have the whole of William's policy at the time. Note, if a better example is needed of the way in which all men discounted a restoration, Godolphin, whom William had just placed at the head of the Treasury Commission. We know him to have actively negotiated with James for his pardon in case that restoration should be realised; and Russell, William's Admiral, was behaving in precisely the same fashion.

Marlborough was engaged in similar negotiations at that moment, but his action was of so much greater weight than any other man's that we must follow it separately.

Marlborough had, as we have seen, deliberately designed to make himself the master of English policy. Through his wife, Anne was persuaded to a reconciliation with James. She wrote penitent letters to her father. She was almost in the Jacobite faction for a moment.

While William was away on the Continent in the summer of that year, 1691, Marlborough's plan was pushed forward. He knew his own countrymen thoroughly and he was behind the demand raised in Parliament that the King should discharge his Dutch troops. These once gone Marlborough could make certain of the English regiments. With *those* behind him he would declare suddenly for James and effect the restoration without the doubtful accompaniment of French aid. The man was in every fibre of his nature so treasonable that we must be guided as to his real intentions not by these admitted (though secret) promises of his, but by what we should imagine his ambition to counsel him. Like all men with one great and active talent he hungered for its exercise, and we must believe that he did desire the restoration of James at this moment in order that he, Marlborough, should be virtually master of the English forces in the Continental coalition and perhaps the chief man in Europe when he should appear on the field of the Continent under arms. Ten years later this ambition of his was to be gratified, but in a lesser and a different fashion.

Whether he might not have stopped half way, and, just keeping James out, have put Anne upon the throne to the exclusion of William is debatable; that he planned the exclusion of William and his own supremacy is certain. The Dutchman Bentinck (Lord Portland as he now was) was informed of the plot and upon the 25th of January, 1692, Marlborough was at one unexpected blow stripped of his office and dismissed from the Court.¹

¹ A few months later he was imprisoned for a short time on the denunciation of yet another plot, but was shortly afterward released.

Anne was ordered also to be rid of Marlborough's wife. She replied by confirming her friendship with that lady, leaving London, and breaking openly with her sister the Queen.

After this critical moment William's whole energy, so far as England was concerned, was directed to the choice of men whom he might hope to be a little more trustworthy than their fellows. He was already fortified by the singular adhesion of two men who had hitherto lived as exiles because they had been openly the supporters of his opponent. Sunderland, one of James's Catholic Council, had come back, sworn allegiance, and abandoned his Faith; Dover had also returned and had been reconciled with William. But we must particularly note in the new men upon whom William now relied, the two names of Montague and Somers. Montague, born a member of one of the great houses—that of Manchester—was, whether of his own initiative or not, the founder of that financial policy which so profoundly affected for the better the future chances of William. He had already been for some months in the Administration.

William III., thus fortified (the corresponding military effort upon the Continent in that year, 1692, has already been dealt with), Montague, at the beginning of the next year, completed his plan for the loan which originated the *National Debt of Great Britain*.

Montague
and the
National
Debt.

Montague's first proposal was made upon the 15th of December, 1692, but we must take the 20th of January in the succeeding year as the date of inception from which revolution in finance should count.

The institution of the National Debt, though England was not here a pioneer in any way, must yet be specially remarked in connection with the history

of the country. For in England that institution was organised and perfected more rapidly than in any other country, and the English example in this, as in so many other matters, was destined profoundly to affect the rest of Europe.

One may with justice take this year, 1693, as the starting-point from which to trace the whole system of national debts with their far-reaching and fundamental results in the structure of European society.

It had been, from Roman times, a maxim of the government in every Christian land, whether that government were vested in a person or in an Assembly, that the Sovereign Power should never be held in permanent subjection of any sort to any other temporal power within or without the State; and this was held true of economic power as of every other.

The King, or the Senate or the Emperor might be indebted, but that debt was always regarded as something ephemeral. It was to be paid off as soon as may be. And when such debts were incurred through disaster or under a special strain, their abnormal character was always insisted upon, they were paid or repudiated within a limit of time shortened by every expedient to the least possible, and never regarded as capable of indefinite extension.

You will find in the records of centuries many an exorbitant loan by which the sovereign power bound itself to its own subjects or to some foreign lender. You will always find it accompanied by an equally enormous effort to repay by abnormal taxation or by a shaking off of the bond through repudiation however disguised.

With the institution of the English National Debt there entered a new principle—now almost run its

course—by which the sovereign power of a state came to be regarded as in a natural and permanent manner the economic subject of moneyed interests which, having a mortgage upon the resources of the community, held for an indefinite period a lien upon the taxation granted by or wrung from the general citizens. Upon the way in which this principle has led to usurpation over weak States by stronger, to the substitution of cosmopolitan for national interests, and to the grievous overtaxation of the populace, I have no space to digress. But two things must be noted in connection with this first establishment of an English national debt. First: That the principle was so novel (and was regarded in each man's breast as so immoral) that it was, like most evil innovations, introduced but gradually. Secondly, that its unexpected effect was to create a powerful new body of support for William, bound to the Revolution and to his throne by quite a new type of material interest.

I say that the introduction was gradual, by which I do not mean that the institution of a debt came imperceptibly, but that the method of the loan partook of the old idea of a temporary debt, and that this only gradually became a permanent one.

Montague proposed, for the raising of the last million of the total sum demanded by the Government, a loan from such wealthy men as would advance money, the interest upon which should be secured from new Excise Duties affecting the whole population. The money-lenders were not at first intended to have any *permanent*, but only a lengthy, hold upon the government of England. The scheme was one in the nature of a tontine, that is, a lottery in annuities. The lender received very high interest (three times what he would

get to-day), but the debt was extinguished with his life, and as the number of the original money-lenders grew less, all that would have been due to those who had died accrued to the fortunate survivors until these should number no more than seven. After that limit had been reached, with the death of each his seventh portion was to be extinguished.

It is evident that Montague had the wisdom—and, indeed it was in the morals of our ancestors—both to envisage the ultimate extinction of the debt—though he put it some way off—and to introduce the element of gambling which, whether in the form of a lottery, or in any other, so heavily favours the borrower as against the speculative lender. Men would subscribe to such a loan each in the hope of being himself a survivor, or would put down the name of a younger son almost certain that in this case their family would reap an advantage.

But the principle of a lengthy indebtedness by the State to private money-lenders once admitted, the return to older and saner methods was impossible. It was like the breaking of an embankment, the water pouring through which broadens and deepens its own channel until there is no closing it. Hitherto, whenever money had been needed the Government had had to count the cost; that is, the power of the citizens to pay their way had been the first consideration. Now that it was possible to effect a mortgage upon the whole of society and with every temptation to extraordinary expenditure, the first recourse was, of course, to a loan. The thing was done, as I have said, in 1693, to the tune of one million, a sum which could have been repaid at a pinch within the twelve months; when four years had passed this million had become

twenty millions; in twenty years it exceeded *fifty millions*, and though it was but reluctantly accepted that such charges should be a permanent feature in the life of a modern State, though it was not until the great wars of the French Revolution that England admitted such a charge to be irredeemable, yet the thing in practice was established as a permanency almost from the moment of its first experiment.

The State was always in moment of stress tempted to borrow; the possessors of accumulated wealth were only too glad to get a grip upon that best and ultimate security for the money-lender—the State's power of coercing all its citizens to pay; and we have lived to see in our own time loans forced upon reluctant nations by foreign usurers who would subsequently order (through bribed politicians) the armed forces of their own countries to act as debt collectors for them, and even to occupy the territory of those who would not or could not pay the interest demanded.

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The effect of this experiment—which was at once successful—extended beyond anything that its promoters had imagined. Montague and his advisers were considering nothing beyond the immediate financial needs of the Crown; but from the establishment of the National Debt two powerful factors converged in support of William. The first was the fact that a number of wealthy men were now pledged to the new state of affairs, the upsetting of which would destroy their fortunes. They were pledged to it in a much more absolute way than the landed gentry, who would, after all, remain seated upon their land, and

who had but to obtain promises of pardon from James. The payment of the annuities upon money openly lent to help William was contingent upon a continuation of William's rule and the advent of James would cause them to cease. Secondly, the class thus appealed to were largely the merchant class, which already had a general policy in support of William, and which now found added to that general policy a definite stake which would be forfeited by the restoration of the legitimate King.

Nineteen months after this first great step came, upon the initiative of the Scotchman Paterson (the same whom we saw in the Darien scheme) the incorporation of the *Bank of England*.

The Bank
of England.

To put it briefly, the Bank of England was an institution consisting of a group of money-lenders who should receive a certain valuable privilege in return for an immediate advance made to the Crown. This advance was in the sum of one million two hundred thousand pounds, and the privilege granted against it was the right to issue notes of credit, and to do, under something like a State Guarantee, all that had hitherto grown up as the private banking business of the silversmiths and goldsmiths. When a private silversmith or goldsmith signed on a piece of paper a promise to pay and issued that note of credit to his advantage, this extension of the man's credit depended entirely upon his private ability to meet it. Bankruptcies were frequent, for the paper varied in value with the man's backing in cash or friends, and the terms upon which such paper was accepted would of course always be higher than the terms upon which the established Government, with its powers of taxation and coercion could issue paper. When all these

powers were known to be behind a particular institution, that institution would always have an advantage in its issues over those of private men. The bank once established, therefore, was bound to extend its operations very largely, and every one who either invested in its stock or did continued business with it was bound by material interests to the new reign.

Meanwhile, during those eighteen months William was coming more and more, in spite of his confusion of mind in the face of English factions, and of the uncertainty in the loyalty of every man, to depend upon the Whig group. We have seen what the campaign of 1693 was, and how it had lowered William's prestige abroad. We have further seen how his Navy failed him in that year. It was—how characteristic of the time!—the renegade Sunderland who gradually led William to the conception of a united Whig council, but his progress toward it was very slow. On April 26, 1694, Montague was made Chancellor of the Exchequer, but the Tory Godolphin was still First Lord of the Treasury, and the Tory Caermarthen (Danby), now made Duke of Leeds, was still President of the Council. Somers had become Lord Keeper. The tendency toward Whig administration was seen in the passing, at the close of the year, of the Triennial Bill, which limited the duration of any Parliament to three years. This had been a traditional Whig policy; William had opposed it in his jealousy to preserve his prerogative; that he did not oppose it now was proof of the way in which he was coming to rely upon the Whig group almost entirely. Incidentally this new departure of his, this reversal of his old plan of disregarding domestic factions in

England, helped to consolidate the beginnings of a system of regular parties in Parliament; it tended to consolidate into the form of an "Opposition" the members with Tory sympathies, and things were in this state when the Queen, Mary, upon the very day the Triennial Act was signed, the 22d of December, 1694, was found to be seriously ill. Her disease was discovered to be the small-pox. Within a week (December 28th) she was dead, and thus with the close of the fifth year the first period in the domestic history of the reign, that which is characterized by the presence of a Stuart Princess upon the throne and by William's reliance upon that presence, comes to an end.

The period
between
Mary's
death and
the Assas-
sination
Plot.

William's prostration upon the death of his wife, certainly the result of a sincere and personal grief, was also due to the grave danger in which he, a man unpopular in himself, and having foreign aims dissociate from the needs of England, now found himself. Yet another crisis in the chances of the Revolution was apparent. It was tided over mainly by another of those sharp changes in the attitude of Marlborough which distinguish the whole of this period.

It was but six months since this man had deliberately betrayed to their death the British soldiers at Brest. Now, upon Mary's death, he saw another avenue to power, though one in which his action must be deferred. William, thinking of Anne's estrangement as principally one caused by a personal quarrel with his late wife, reconciled himself with that Princess, and Marlborough could count upon a secure position, though one the fruition of which must wait for the death of the King and the accession of Anne. He could afford to wait. The King, though

but forty-five years of age, was notoriously weak in health, and Marlborough, though of much the same age and even by a few months the senior of the King, gambled upon fairly sure ground. With this defection of Marlborough (if we may so call it) the Jacobite efforts were reduced to an abortive plot against the life of the King, the development of which we will follow in a moment.

The year 1695, which, as we have seen, was marked by the recapture of Namur, saw the triumphal re-entry of William into England, a new zeal for the war, and the erection of a new Parliament (which met upon the 22d of November), overwhelmingly Whig. Caermarthen, the last of the great Tory figures remaining in administration, had been thrust from public life upon a proved charge of corruption in connection with that East India Company, the growth and importance of which to English history I will deal with upon a later page. In the following year, 1696, came the failure of that important Assassination Plot which, having failed, did so much to secure the position of William. These are the details:

The Duke of Berwick, James's young natural son by Arabella Churchill, Marlborough's sister,¹ went to England, in the month of January, 1696, to sound the chances of a restoration. He was not led to hope much from what he discovered, but meanwhile a French force of about 12,000 men was secretly gathering near Calais, and if an invasion could be effected with this aid of the French, James was to accompany that Army. Among those who had come over from

¹ For Marlborough had plied this trade among the other disreputable activities of his life.

the Continent to work for James in England was Sir George Barclay, and the initiative of an attack upon the person of William III. seems to have been his. He conceived that if this attack were made fairly openly by men under arms it might be construed later as an act of war rather than assassination. There is not sufficiently conclusive proof that Berwick was privy to the plan. He may have been so. There is no proof at all that James was. At any rate, Barclay's design was to attack the King with a force of about thirty-five men led by himself, and that in a lane which led from Turnham Green to the river.

The King was in the habit of hunting upon a Saturday at Richmond, of crossing the river in a boat to this lane, and of so returning to the palace, and the Saturday fixed for the attempt was the 15th of February (old style). Once again Bentinck received information in time to prevent the fulfilment of the plan. William put off his hunting upon that day; the plot was publicly announced; the various conspirators were for the most part captured, and three of them put upon their trial. The event, grave enough in any case, when it was thus publicly emphasised by William's supporters profoundly moved public opinion and created yet another of those reactions against the restoration of James which were so useful to William in his personal unpopularity. In these proceedings a man of some station, Sir John Fenwick, was involved as possibly connected with this plot, and certainly with a Jacobite plot of two years before. His trial and execution afforded an excellent test both of the strength of the reaction in favour of William at this moment, and of the power of the Whig party at the

close of William's reign, as of the whole Oligarchy, Whig or Tory, then and henceforward. Legally, Fenwick could not suffer, for, of the two witnesses necessary to convict him, one he had managed to get out of the country. But the animosity not only of the Whigs, but of the Oligarchy in general, against Fenwick was intense, because he had in a confession of his told the truth with regard to the intrigues of Marlborough and of Russell, of Shrewsbury and the rest with James. William, fixed in his policy of conciliation, allowed this confession to appear false in public, though he knew perfectly well that it was true and that these rich men had continually betrayed him. He was careful to have Fenwick put out of the way by an arbitrary execution. Since the man could not suffer by due process of law, the Commons brought in a Bill of Attainder against him, and Fenwick was put to death under this special law framed for him only (January 21, 1697).

The Cavendish family, with whom Fenwick was connected by marriage, made some attempt to save him, but William had here one of those personal animosities which, though he dared not revenge them upon any of the great, he thought himself safe in satiating against a lesser man. For Fenwick had, shortly after the Queen's accession, insulted her, and William remembered it.

From that moment William's position was secure. And from that moment also he relied entirely upon a formed and more or less conscious Whig Party. It was the moment of the Peace of Ryswick which, though very far from marking a success in William's foreign plans, did, as I have said, mark a reduction in the old position of Louis XIV.

Secure as William now (1697-8) was on the throne, his misunderstanding of the English character and his permanent quarrel with it was never more apparent. The question of the Spanish Succession, which we have already followed, was pressing, and promised the largest Continental issues in the near future, yet the Peace just concluded warranted not only the Tories, but the old traditional feeling which all the aristocracy felt against the permanent forces of the Crown in demanding the disbanding of the army. It was Robert Harley, a man of whom we shall hear more in the future, who proposed this policy. The motion was carried in both Houses and had this further effect, that Sunderland, for so many years the closest adviser of William, was openly attacked as the man who had helped James to arbitrary government through a standing army. Sunderland resigned. William found his forces cut down to 10,000 men in England and his rooted unpopularity with his subjects was increased by a tactless and lengthy visit to Holland.

These absences of his had hitherto been excused by war. The present one, lasting throughout the whole summer and half the autumn of 1699, had no such excuse; and the new Parliament, which he met in the November of that year, was personally hostile to him, though his Crown was now in no danger. It attempted to resume the lands granted by William in Ireland, especially to his Dutch favourites; at least, the House of Commons made this attempt, and, fearing the Lords might reject it, they even tried to pass it through tacked on to a Money Bill, because such bills were the affair of the Commons alone. A conflict between the two houses—the allied organs of aristocratic


government—which, had William been wise, he might have used enormously to his own advantage and to that of the Monarchy, was only prevented by William's own prorogation of Parliament in the April of 1700. He did not meet Parliament again until the February of the next year, 1701, and in the interval, upon the 29th of July, 1700, the heir who would have made the new succession secure, the little son of the Princess Anne, called by the title of the Duke of Gloucester, was dead. This opened up at once the old question of the succession, and in the Bill of Succession which followed, clause after clause was obviously directed against the habits and the unpopularity of William: as that forbidding the sovereign to go out of England without leave of Parliament; that forbidding any one not born an Englishman to receive a grant from the Crown, or to hold a position of trust; that affirming that England should not engage in war for the defence of any dominions not belonging to the English Crown; that insisting that matters of government should be transacted in Privy Council and, what was very important as a form of aristocratic control over the Prince, countersigned by such Ministers as should have advised or consented to each measure.

The succession to the throne, which will prove of such importance on a later page, was made securely Protestant by its settlement in remainder upon the Electress of Hanover, Anne's cousin: a candidate who had to trace back through three generations and to James I. her connection with the throne of England, but who was the nearest Protestant claimant in the absence of heirs to Anne's body and in the rejection of James's young son and of all progeny of his

The
Protestant
Succession.

sister Henrietta, upon the grounds of religion, as the annexed table makes clear.

GENEALOGICAL TABLE SHOWING THE PROTESTANT CLAIM OF
THE ELECTRESS SOPHIA TO THE THRONE.



The Commons, as much in their mistrust of William as in their leaning toward the Tory faction in this Parliament, proceeded to impeach the old Ministers and tried supporters of William, including Lord Somers. But the opposition of the House of Lords, who would have been the Judges in such a trial and who were predominantly Whig, made the scheme fall through. While things were at this curious criss-cross in England—a House of Commons personally hostile to William and yet William's throne never more secure; the check to the ambition of Louis XIV. successfully delivered and yet the Peace newly menaced by the enormous extension of Bourbon power in the acquisition of Spain;—William—forbidden to engage England directly in the cause of Holland in the coming new wars against Louis and yet sending his English troops to the Continent under the command of Marlborough and actively engaged in the formation of what was later called the Grand Alli-

ance—heard, nine days after that instrument had been signed at the Hague, that his rival and father-in-law was dead.

James had died at the Palace of St. Germain upon the 16th of September (new style) of that year 1701.

Death of
James II.

For the third time in the history of all this labyrinth of plot and counterplot there came a stroke which raised a solid body of feeling in England against the restoration of the Stuarts and in support of the Revolution, and this stroke was the act of Louis XIV.

He acknowledged James's young son, James Edward, a lad of fourteen, as King of England under the title of James III.

The boy was immediately, on his father's death, received in the Palace at Versailles with all the marks of royalty. The English Ambassador was as immediately withdrawn by order of William himself, then in the Low Countries. What is more important, Parliament and the great mercantile and landlord interests in England were moved by this formal act upon the part of Louis to rally to William.

The speech in which William addressed the Lords and Commons of the new Parliament was perhaps the first which had been received with any sympathy by its audience. It not only emphasized the insult offered by Louis, but pointed clearly toward an approaching war.

In the first two months of 1702, a Bill of Attainder was carried through the Commons against James III. for adopting the royal title. All holders of office, members of Parliament, clergymen, and even lawyers were required to take an oath abjuring him by name. Forty thousand soldiers were voted to the

Crown (as well as an equal number of sailors) and every preparation was made for war.

It was precisely at this turn in his fortunes, when accident seemed at last to have given him the very position he had so long desired—real support in England, and a free hand to act abroad—that William, who had long been ill, fell from his horse upon the 21st of February, as he rode out from Kensington to Hampton Court. His fate was uncertain for a fortnight. The malady consequent upon his accident (he had broken his collar-bone) waxed and waned; but on Saturday, the 7th of March (old style) it was evident that he was near his end, and in the morning of Monday the 9th he died. With him ended the main line of the House of Orange.

Charac-
ter of
William III.

His character (the qualities of strength in which have been absurdly exaggerated by those who hate the Catholic cause) was one whose chief power lay in his confining its energies to one narrow idea. His military capacities were in no way conspicuous, but in the pursuit of his single hatred of Louis XIV. and of the Catholic culture in general, he schooled himself to a high degree of self-control in which his natural taciturnity was not unhelpful. To such men as preserved the older and more chivalric traditions of the English gentry he appeared odious in the extreme, and even those of the new mercantile sort which had more largely supported him, supported him rather as an instrument or an emblem than as a leader.

He has been accused of cruelty and, perhaps unjustly, of worse vices. One may truly express the main drift of his unfortunate soul, imperfectly but in one word, by saying that he was inhuman.

CHAPTER II.

THE REIGN OF ANNE.

So much space has been given to the twelve odd years of William's reign because they form the prologue to the inception of, and therefore the explanation for, the Constitutional and social development which followed them. Under William England became in every organ Protestant and an Oligarchy; especially a trading Oligarchy. Under William she cast in her lot finally against the Catholic civilisation of Europe, and especially against the French Monarchy. Under William began that necessary decline of the Crown from at least a national though a degraded office to the nominal function it later became.

The reign of Anne covers almost exactly the same period of time. She began to reign in the March of 1702; she died upon the 1st of August, 1714, in her sixtieth year. But though the length of the reigns was the same, their weight in the formation of England was very different; and apart from the high literary splendour of that time it is almost true to say that an account of Marlborough's Campaigns and of the Union with Scotland covers its interest for the student who follows only the general lines of European history. For the student of English history alone its domestic side merits closer consideration.

Reversing the order which I thought necessary to explain the reign of William, I will first very briefly sketch the Domestic History of Anne, and I will at

the close set out the conditions which led to so active an attempt at a restoration of the Stuarts upon her death; next describe Marlborough's great epoch of victory; last the negotiations for the Scotch Union.

Domestic
History of
Anne's
Reign.

The Domestic History of Anne's reign is a mere confusion of intrigues in the eyes of the reader, unless he grasp certain features of the time which lend it cohesion and a meaning.

These features were all inherited from the previous reign and from the great decisive issue of the Revolution of 1689; but they had become a little clearer and had, so to speak, a little "hardened" in the process of thirteen years.

The first point to seize is, of course, as in all English history from the Revolution forward, that you are dealing with a government in which power has been captured by a clique of rich men. I need not weary the reader with a repetition of this, but I would beg him to keep it closely in mind. You are dealing with a society in which the Crown still has some strength—especially as the occupant of the Throne is still a Stuart—but in which that Crown is quite overshadowed by a *system* whereby a small number of wealthy families hold all the avenues of Executive action, admitting indeed into their vaguely defined but none the less exclusive body such new members as compel or persuade an entry, but normally recruiting themselves from the younger members and connections by marriage of their own houses. In this organisation of political society the nation—in so far as it is articulate—dully acquiesces: at least there is no active opposition to it apparent. And the great merchants in a period of hugely expanding commerce, the moneyed men of the middle class in a period which

founded Capitalism, are actively in support of this aristocratic conception of the State.

The next point to seize is that the principal defined organ of Government is the Parliament, which consists in two Committees of the wealthier classes, called the House of Lords and the House of Commons. Of these the House of Lords is a small, permanent Committee of the very wealthiest; while the House of Commons, though necessarily consisting of wealthy men and largely of men appointed by men wealthier than themselves, has still in it an element of popular election and is nominally dependent upon a sort of distorted and restricted popular election.

The third point we must grasp is that the restricted electorate (such as it was) behind the House of Commons, was not even a true sample of the nation. It was a capricious assemblage of all sorts, forming together only a small minority of the people. In one town it would be the Mayor and Corporation, in another the widest possible popular franchise; in a third, larger than either of these two, there would be no representation at all: the town would simply count as part of the countryside, and the qualification for voting in the countrysides was restricted to the few possessors of land in absolute property. You would get whole districts where a few large land-owners and one or two yeomen surviving among them were the only electors; others again where as much as one-tenth—or even in very rare small and isolated districts up to a quarter—of the whole population owned land. There were many boroughs which were singly in the gift of a rich man. There were some that had not even a dozen nominal electors. A violent feeling common to the whole people would have some effect

upon a general election, but in most disputed issues the House of Commons was and knew itself to be something exceedingly different from the people at large. These last two points must be regarded as the dominant constitutional truth in England throughout the whole of the eighteenth century; and the farther the century proceeds the less representative does Parliament become. At last, when reform came it came too late and was applied to a people who had forgotten the spirit of popular initiative.

Next, and the 4th point, we must recall what we saw in the last reign, the presence within the Oligarchy of two groups, Whig and Tory. The Whig theory was the heir of the Revolution and the supporter of its settlement, the true Tory at heart inclined to the old Stuart state of things; but we must further remember that hardly any man within the Oligarchy was straightforwardly a Whig or a Tory. Each was playing for his own hand, and while perhaps decisively Whig or Tory in temperament was perfectly capable of compromising with the schemes of supposed opponents and usually of going over to the other side at short notice. There were very few Whigs who did not dabble in the chances of a Jacobite restoration, and no Tories at all who were not prepared when it was necessary to betray the Jacobite cause. I need not repeat that the whole group, Whig and Tory, was closely allied by marriage, friendship and patronage, and that no social line of cleavage distinguished one party from the other.

This fundamental characteristic of English aristocratic Parliamentaryism, which later produced what is known as the *Party System*, is one exceedingly difficult for the non-English observer to grasp. It is only

to be understood by a clear recognition of the fact that we are dealing with a society in which political power is the acknowledged privilege of wealth combined with intrigue. And it is absolutely essential to recollect that this superficial division in the English aristocracy in no way disturbed or affected the profound unity which aristocratic institutions—so long as they are vigorous—*always* produce throughout the nations they order, and that particularly in the face of a foreign foe.

Lastly, we must consider what the attitude of the nation as a whole was toward the great quarrel of the time; for it is evident that however much a populace may have lost the conception of self-government it is impossible long to rule in direct opposition to its active instincts.

Now the populace of England combined in the matter of the dynasty two not contradictory but conflicting appetites. They were attached—as every populace always is—to tradition. They instinctively revered the legitimate Royal House; and Anne's own personal popularity, which was high, was due not only to the excellence of her heart but to the fact that she was a Stuart, and that of the two sisters she had proved the less criminal in her treason to her father. She was known to have repented of it and to have tried to undo it. Similarly, the mass of the people though already indifferent to religion were in sentiment attached to the established Church, and to that Church in its "High" form. We must never forget that England at that time was agricultural. The Nonconformist was in the main a product of the urban middle classes. There were great rural districts of England where Dissent had a strong hold—notably in the Eastern

Counties—but the populace as a whole disliked and suspected it.

On the other hand, this same populace, traditionally attached to the legitimate family and supporting the established Episcopal Church even in its strongest claims, were enthusiastically Protestant in the sense that they were enthusiastically anti-Catholic.

The very rare examples of Catholicism which they could discover in their midst provoked in them violent reactions of disgust and animosity. The inherited legend upon Catholic things which all Englishmen had now made part of their blood, lent to this sentiment a vast significance. The conception of a Catholic King was therefore odious to them; the actual imposition of a Catholic government and the fostering of Catholicism through that Government they would not tolerate. It is this appetite which chiefly accounts for the successful reactions against attempts at a Restoration. For though it must be obvious that any King again proposing to act as James had—i.e., to govern with Catholics—would be attempting the impossible, yet the fear of that impossible attempt was not the less vigorous on account of its unreality.

At the same time the populace, like every populace throughout the world, was naturally and immediately inflamed against the pretensions of the foreigner. The threat of a Jacobite succession imposed by the military qualities of the Irish or supported by an invasion of the French, was something which at once united the whole nation in support of any Government or dynasty which would prevent such evils; and while it is always easy to inflame the mass of a nation against the mere name of any foreign country, it was particularly easy to foster animosity against

France which, opposed to Britain in religion, was also an aggressive and a very powerful neighbour. The war against France may not have been popular in itself, but victory was. Military service was wholly alien to the ideas of the people, and the armies, excepting certain chosen corps, were recruited by ruse, by gaol delivery, and by hunger.

These various elements in the situation of Anne's reign explain not only the nature of the intrigues between the great with which it was filled, but also of the ultimate success obtained by one general policy—the Hanoverian Succession—and the failure of the High Tory tradition.

The Queen herself was moved by two strong emotions. First, she was strongly attached to the High Church with all its claims, doctrines, discipline and universality. Dissent repelled her; Latitudinarian indulgence repelled her still more. Next, she was at the moment of her accession entirely under the domination of that violent termagant and most intelligent woman, Sarah Jennings, Duchess of Marlborough. For the first years of her reign Marlborough relied for power wholly upon this influence of his wife. Adding to this the prestige of his great victories abroad he very nearly achieved his object of ruling England. His conception of Government was to form mixed Ministries of Whigs and Tories, just as William had; and to use these for the furtherance of that Continental policy in which he played so magnificent a rôle. He was hampered in this design by the High Tories, the right wing of the party, who still maintained a traditional sympathy with France, a traditional dislike of the Dutch and of the vulgar Protestant German Princes, and therefore an aversion to

the war. At the head of this group was Rochester, the Uncle of the Queen.

Rochester had behind him, as had Godolphin and half a dozen of the great political names of the time, the weight of a long experience in public life. He had already sat on the Commission of the Treasury under Charles II. thirty-three years before, and from that moment had never been absent from the intrigue and counter-intrigue which had made and established the Revolution.

The first Parliament of Anne, which met in the autumn of 1702, was Tory in feeling. It was in reaction against the memory of William III. and desired, if only by way of contrast to the doubtful military reputation of that unpopular Monarch, to magnify Marlborough. It therefore played straight into Marlborough's hands even in matters where it should in theory have supported Tory leaders against himself. And Marlborough's first action when he felt this strength behind him was to get rid of Rochester, the chief opponent of the war. This was effected by naming Rochester Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, an office which he thought beneath him and which he delayed to take over. His remaining in England afforded an excuse for giving him a sharp order to take up his duties. He lost his temper, as it was calculated that he would, sent in his resignation, and found it accepted in 1703. In the next year it was due to Marlborough's plan (though Marlborough himself was absent upon the Campaign of Blenheim) that Rochester's remaining supporters in the Government and opponents of the war, Nottingham and Jersey, were dismissed.

The particular point upon which Nottingham fell

is interesting. It was proposed by those who urged to an extreme the struggle against Louis XIV. that the Protestant rebels in the Cevennes should be fostered and supported by England. That was not a palatable policy either to the standards of national honour at that time or to the personal inclinations of Anne. Nottingham helped to oppose the scheme, but he spoiled his service to Anne in the matter by a personal arrogance toward the Queen which she resented. Her resentment was made the most of by Marlborough's Duchess and by her son-in-law Godolphin, and it was in this mood that she dismissed Rochester's chief supporter and Jersey as well.

This was in the spring of 1704. There entered the Ministry as a consequence of the change two men destined to a great part in the politics of their time, Harley (whom we have already seen "arriving" during the reign of William, and who was at this moment Speaker of the House of Commons) and St. John.

Harley was of that unfortunate type which always takes so considerable a place in the public eye when Committees rather than persons have power. He was a shifter and an intriguer of a sort that we call to-day "the professional politician," entirely without principle, of mediocre intellectual attainment, interested in private hobbies, but more in public advancement. He had been brought up in Dissent and had learned cunning at the law. He carried these various qualities, noxious to the State, under the cover of an even and judicious face.

St. John, the man who entered with him at this moment, was of quite another kidney. He deserves the particular attention of the modern reader not only because he was the most able man of his time in English

politics, and one of the really great Englishmen of history, but much more because he had the exaltation of spirit to conceive a reëstablishment of personal government, and almost the energy, even in such a time, to realise his idea. He spoke well and wrote better, carried himself well and possessed what is impossible to the lower type of politicians, a decisive will. When he thus entered the Ministry (as Secretary for War) he was only in his twenty-sixth year, while Harley was in his forty-fifth. He was of the gentry though not of its wealthier set. He had travelled in his youth and had already sat in Parliament for three years.

We shall see in a later page not only how great a thing this man did, but how much greater things he might have done in a society more alert and more alive to the ultimate social consequences of that rule of parliamentary wealth which he perceived to be a destruction of popular power.

Harley and St. John, then, are the distinguishing figures at the end of the second year after Anne's accession, the year marked by the fall of the High Tories with their opposition to the war, and marked also by the inauguration of Marlborough's attempt to rule (through Anne) as William had ruled: that is by a Cabinet chosen from the apparently most pliable men among the rich. In the Parliament which Harley and St. John had to deal with five months after they had joined the Cabinet (it met upon October 29, 1704) there was a strong Tory majority and it is important to seize the reason that made this Tory majority at such a moment critical in the history of the country. The majority meant that a great number of the squires and of the magnates in the provincial towns were still half regretting the Revolution. It particularly meant

that all public feeling, so far as it could be represented by the whimsical electorate, was increasingly irritated against the middle-class or dissenting power to which the increase of commerce was daily adding economic strength. The mark of this feeling was a Bill called "The Occasional Conformity Bill." This bill had for its object the exposure and nullification of a trick whereby Dissenters in corporate towns managed to keep the local power in their hands although the law would admit to local office none who were not members of the Church of England. The Dissenters would take the sacrament according to the law in order to qualify themselves for Municipal office; once qualified they went back to their Conventicles. Already the Bill had been brought in and dropped on account of the opposition it found in the House of Lords. For the House of Lords, representing the very wealthiest men in the country and the men most devoted to the Revolution, knew that the Dissenters of the urban commercial classes were their strongest support of the new settlement. It was pressed once more in this Parliament of the autumn of 1704 and was again thrown out by the House of Lords.

The Tory House of Commons challenged the House of Lords thereupon in a matter of a year's standing known as that of the Aylesbury Election. The market town of Aylesbury was a borough returning two members to Parliament. One of its little body of electors, a certain Ashby, had found his right to vote denied by the Returning Officer. He sued that officer in the Courts, got a verdict, suffered an Appeal to a Higher Court where three of four Judges consulted decided that the House of Commons was its own Judge as to who had and who had not a right to vote

for the election of members to it. Ashby had carried his case to the House of Lords and that Tribunal had given it in his favour. Relying upon this, other men who believed themselves to be possessed of the strange franchise of the time in Aylesbury, also went to law in the matter; the House of Commons ordered them to Newgate; the Judges would not release them, and there was such a quarrel between the two Committees of the Oligarchy, the House of Lords and the House of Commons, as compelled (March 14, 1705) the prorogation of Parliament by that Royal power which was still sufficiently strong to act thus, upon certain occasions, as a true organ of the State.

I have begged the reader to fix his attention upon that year 1704 and its important session of Parliament, because, eccentric as the formation of the electorate already was, that Parliament had stood more or less in sympathy with the mass of the nation; not exactly desiring a Jacobite Restoration, but strongly attached to the Stuart Princess upon the throne and to her defence of the Established Church; strongly averse to the growing wealth of the middle-class Dissenting group, and upon the whole but fitfully in favour of the Continental War in spite of the great victory of Blenheim.

When the three years which were the legal limit of a Parliament had expired, the composite Government, with Marlborough as its true directing force, was so alarmed by such an expression of national feeling, that it put out its strength to secure a subservient House of Commons. The phenomenon had appeared before since the Restoration, though in a less acute form; and of course in the old age of Parliamentaryism which we are witnessing to-day, a Parliamentary body

is the mere creature of the real forces that govern the country. But the year 1705 is a pivot in English constitutional history, because it was the test occasion which proved that a House of Commons could be moulded by some yet smaller committee of the Oligarchy alarmed into decisive action. For under the direction of a composite Ministry which had found itself shackled by the last House, the next House of Commons appeared with a large Whig majority.

Marlborough, to whom such a majority was all-important to support him in continuing the war, had a son-in-law Sunderland (Charles, the third Earl, a man of thirty) whose family, since the treason of his father, had constantly called itself Whig. This man Sunderland was in 1706 made one of the two Secretaries of State, Harley being still the other. In 1707 certain new Whig peers were created, and, to strengthen the new party and Marlborough, the old High Tories were not admitted to be any longer members of the Privy Council.

Now the Monarch's Privy Council, to-day a mere title of honour, was in those days a reality. It met and acted in support of the sovereign; it might almost be called the Executive itself. John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, was now supreme: he found himself the master of a pliable coalition, which was only a coalition in name, for its various members were his servants; two of the small group of Ministers, Sunderland and Godolphin, were his sons-in-law; the only exception to his complete domination lay in St. John who waited his time.

It was at this moment that Marlborough might have discovered the error he had made in trusting, in spite of his ill-gotten knowledge of men, such a man as

Harley. Harley imagined that he might step into Marlborough's shoes so far as Civil Government was concerned, and with that passion for intrigue which was the very inheritance of the Revolution, he set out to undo the General his Chief.

The Queen was despised for many reasons by those who managed her and yet depended upon her constitutional power: for her simplicity, for her goodness of heart, and for her difficulty in reading men. But she was despised for nothing more in that wealthy and unbelieving society than for her strong High Church principles. In these Anne was inflexible, and the Churchills for all their power over her could not comprehend how deep-rooted her religion was. Harley took advantage of it.

He had a cousin, a certain Mrs. Hill, whom the Duchess of Marlborough had thoughtlessly advanced. He caused her to marry—with the Queen's consent—a member of the Consort's household, a Mr. Masham. This woman gradually supplanted the violent Duchess of Marlborough in the Queen's affection.

Meanwhile, Harley perpetually played upon Anne's clerical feeling. Though he may not have seen that religion was at the root of all these matters, the instinct of cunning guided him. It was relying upon his support that the Queen nominated to positions in the Church without consulting her Whig Ministers. These Ministers and the men behind them in the Commons and in the Lords succeeded by adverse votes in Parliament and by pressing the discovery of treason in one of Harley's clerks, in causing Harley (and St. John with him) to resign. He did not go without a struggle. The Queen was loath to lose him. A combined threat of resignation upon the part of her other

Ministers and a relic of her former dependence upon the Churchills persuaded her, and the resignation of the two Ministers (on February 11, 1708) is remarkable for nothing but the introduction as Marlborough's man in the Secretaryship for War of a certain Robert Walpole, the son of a Norfolk squire, but thirty-two years old, and now for seven years sitting in Parliament at the bidding of his family. To this man more than to any other, as we shall see some years later in this history, was due the gathering of all the harvests the Revolution had sown; the contempt of the Crown; the capture of power by one small privileged class; the regulation and legislative omnipotence of Parliament.

The triumph of the Whigs meant the personal abasement of the Queen. The Crown was still strong enough to take its revenge. Marlborough, and those with whom he worked, had gone too far in thus compelling a Stuart Princess to act against her better judgment. The Duchess counted less and less at Court. Marlborough, whose ambition was wholly personal, cast about for some means of survival. He listened to proposals of bribery from Louis XIV. He rejected them as insufficient; he fought the Battle of Malplaquet in the hopes of dazzling opinion by a victory, and achieved nothing but a most unpopular slaughter. He even applied to the Archduke Charles for the post of Governor in the Netherlands! and he had a second string to his bow in the expectation of being made Captain-General for life, by Anne, of the English forces.

The end of the Whig domination, of Marlborough's use of it, came through one decisive incident. A parson of the name of Sacheverell having preached two

High Tory sermons upon the rights of the Crown, the one at Derby, the other at St. Paul's in London, the Whig party (against the advice of their wisest man and most experienced lawyer, Somers) proceeded to impeach the cleric, that is, to summon him to his trial before the House of Lords. He was condemned, but punished with no more than three years' suspension. The violent feeling of the nation in favour of the culprit—that is, against the pretensions of the Whig theory of Government—was unmistakable. Anne acted upon it. She created Chamberlain the Duke of Shrewsbury (whose nervous temperament and repeated infidelities made it doubtful whether he were Whig or Tory at heart and only certain that he would always obey what he thought strongest or most profitable to himself), and she made the appointment without consulting Marlborough's son-in-law, Godolphin, the First Lord of her Treasury and the nominal head of her Council. She dismissed (upon August 8, 1710) Marlborough's other son-in-law, Sunderland, and next Godolphin himself. She recalled Harley, and in the November of that year Harley formed a completely Tory Ministry to which even Rochester was recalled and in which St. John was Secretary of State.

With that moment begins the negotiation of France for peace and that last period of the reign which led up to the Hanoverian Succession. It must be dealt with separately and as a whole.

We have here, of course, in the question of Anne's Succession, the same elements that had been present twenty years before in the question of a Jacobite restoration under William III.: elements which not ten years before had produced the short reaction in favour of William when Louis XIV. had publicly acknowl-

edged James's son to be King of England; elements which had none the less made William himself unpopular, produced loyalty to a Stuart Princess upon the throne, and made of intrigue with the Jacobites in France a permanent occupation for English statesmen. But these elements in the problem though the same as ever were now arranged in a different *proportion*; and it is the *proportion* in which the various factors of a political situation are arranged, the increase of strength in one, the decrease in another, which constitutes all the changes of history.

In the eight years that had passed since William's death, the effect of time had been felt and had worked both ways. On the one hand it had made the Protestant succession a familiar thing and had given it momentum; on the other hand it had put the unpopular side of James's action so far back into the past that the active memory of it was dulled. Men quite young when the crisis caused by James's three years of active rule was stirring the wealthier classes in England, were now men of fifty. Men old enough to weigh in political councils when William III. was summoned to England, were now elderly or dead. Danby, now Duke of Leeds—the first figure perhaps in that old crisis was now eighty years of age. Godolphin himself was sixty-five. Even Marlborough, still so actively commanding in the field, was but five years younger. On the other hand, political life was filling with the younger members of the Oligarchy who were inheriting, or seeking coöption into, the places of their elders. Walpole was but thirty-four. St. John was two years younger. Neither of these men had an active memory of the Revolution. Few of their surviving forerunners had retained it.

Again, in the time of William and Mary, the succession of these two sovereigns, one of whom was the daughter of James, the other his nephew and son-in-law—two sovereigns childless and therefore to be succeeded in any case by Anne, a Stuart Princess—was a very different thing to the succession of a petty German Prince, second cousin once removed even in blood to the remaining monarch, and in habits, speech and culture as alien as though there were no connection at all.

Again, the young man who had inherited the legitimate claim to the throne and was living in France under the protection of Louis XIV. was not weighted as his father had been by known faults in judgment and policy. The consequences of his advent could therefore be imagined less offensive to the national temperament and religion. You have further the strong popular reactions toward the High Church and the instinctive popular mistrust of that middle-class Dissent which was so closely allied with the rising Capitalism, and which was in fact destined to submerge the mass of the people.

It is true to say with strong reservations in the matters of religion and of the now habitual antagonism against the French Monarch—that the confused and indecisive mass of popular opinion was now—in the end of Anne's reign—rather in favour of a Jacobite restoration than against it.

What really counted on the other side was the equally instinctive but much more conscious organised and decisive attitude of the Oligarchy. Members of the great landed class and members of the wealthy mercantile class which was so closely allied with it,

both knew that a Jacobite Restoration might mean real Kingship, with its power to lead the popular mass, and to back the small man against the great, and that is naturally the chief dread of any Oligarchy. There were very few men in that class, in England at least (there were more in Scotland), so Tory that they would risk an actual Restoration when it came to the crisis of a decision; though there were some capable of this greatness of vision and of will—and chief among them St. John.

On the other hand, there was not a Whig who was not clearly determined to maintain the Protestant Succession; and those with the clearest sight among them deliberately desired the presence of a coarse and incompetent German, who would leave the English wealthy class now fairly in the saddle, unhampered in its ruling of the country.

In this year, 1710, when the issue between a possible restoration and the Hanoverian Succession is joined, the Electorate under the direction of the Government and somewhat inflamed by the excitement of the Sacheverell trial, returned a strongly Tory House of Commons. The news from the seat of war in Spain had long made it clear that Louis XIV. could not be absolutely coerced. This again was an influence in favour of peace, and with peace for an understanding with Louis and therefore with the Pretender.

So far as a man of Harley's temperament can be said to have wanted anything at all except his own advantage, Harley the head of the Government leaned to the Jacobite cause. The contemporary letters of the French Priest Gaultier, which deal with the advances and temper of the English Ministry, are fairly con-

clusive upon this point. Nor is it very doubtful that Anne in her heart preferred her half-brother to an odd and unknown stranger from the Germanies.

It is here important to appreciate what the Hanoverian personalities concerned really were.

George, the Elector of Hanover, was now a man of fifty years of age. He had long been the unlimited ruler of a little Court and a fairly compact Low German people: his capital a small German provincial town, and all his habits those connoted by his provincial environment. His features were exceptionally rude and expressionless. His speech was a degraded form of French. His experience of life exhibits one act of energy relieving a record otherwise null; it was an odious act of cruelty. With his knowledge (for he gloried in it) and presumably by his orders, the lover of his unfaithful wife was killed under horrible circumstances, and the poor woman herself imprisoned forever. His mother, the Electress Sophia, though throughout a whole long lifetime steeped in the same atmosphere, inherited and displayed far greater culture. Her mother, Elizabeth, had been Charles I.'s sister, the daughter of James I. and a Stuart. She enjoyed a wide and active correspondence. She was not without wit. Her character, though thus more vivacious than that of the loutish family into which she had married, was now of insignificant effect upon the crisis, for she was in her eighty-first year, and if not decrepid, highly enfeebled.

The pivot of the business was, of course, Marlborough. His great military successes, his command of the army, his close association with the politicians recently dismissed, his known indifference to the fate of his country, his known readiness to serve any

cause which might advantage himself, and his prolonged intrigues in the past with the French Court and with the Jacobite cause, coupled with his lively talents and their unceasing activity, and the enormous wealth of himself and his wife—all these coming upon twenty-six years of intermittent power gave him this position.

Marlborough's ambition, wholly personal, was chiefly to keep his place at the head of the army and to continue the war. If that were impossible, then to secure himself in some high lucrative position for the rest of his life.

It was at this moment that Anne broke finally with the Churchills. Marlborough's undignified entreaties for his wife were unavailing. She was thrust out of the Court and the Duke was glad enough to find himself still left in charge of the Armies and of the Foreign Campaign. He desired in the next year, 1710, to prolong by active efforts the now unpopular and perhaps useless war. It will be seen when we come to the military side of the reign how he failed. But his political failure, even had he been more successful in the field in this his last year of soldiering, was certain because the Government had now entered into active correspondence with the French Monarch for peace. The terms of that peace so far as England was concerned were to leave Louis's grandson in possession of the Spanish Crown, to secure to England her conquests of Gibraltar, Minorca and Newfoundland made during the war, as well as the monopoly of the lucrative slave-trade across the Atlantic.

When Marlborough returned to England at the end of 1711, he found himself, in spite of a characteristic set of double intrigues with the Whigs and their

opponents, and in spite of a temporary majority in the House of Lords against Harley's government, powerless to withstand its animosity. He might indeed have worked openly with that Government—but he hesitated, and as a result he for once, and the first time in his life, fell between two stools.

Harley and St. John took advantage of the report of a Commission that the Duke had taken large bribes from a Jewish contractor to the Army, as well as secret commissions upon the subsidies for foreign troops, to deprive him of all his offices. The command of the Army was given to the Duke of Ormond, an Irishman, the grandson of that Ormond who had commanded in Ireland under Charles I. This man had a long military career. Five years younger than Marlborough, he had led the Guards at the Battle of the Boyne and the troops which had accompanied the Navy in its attack on Cadiz eight years before. He had further occupied, under Anne, the post of Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. He, at least, was a strong and pronounced Jacobite. His commission included the instruction not to prosecute the war with vigour, but rather to treat the Campaign as though the two Crowns of France and England were passing—as in reality they were—through a period of truce; and on June 6, 1712, the Queen appeared in Parliament to announce the proposed Treaty of Peace with Louis XIV.

Prince Eugene, who was still carrying on the war for the Empire, saw the contingent of 12,000 British troops withdrawn from his alliance. St. John (who had been raised to the peerage under the title of Bolingbroke) visited Paris, and on the 31st of March, 1713, the great struggle of the Spanish Succes-

sion was determined, so far as England was concerned, by the Peace of Utrecht. Eugene had already been defeated at Denain by the French Armies. With the next year, 1714, the new Emperor (who, as we have seen, was the old claimant to the Spanish throne, and the unison in whose hands of Spain and of the Empire would have been as dangerous to Europe as the unison under one Crown of Spain and France) came into the arrangement by the Treaty of Radstadt.

Meanwhile, the Queen's health was failing and the negotiations for a succession one way or the other grew to be of pressing importance. Harley and his Government had been reinforced in many ways during the last two years, apart from their victory over Marlborough and the Whig Opposition. An attempt to assassinate Harley had failed and had added to his popularity. He sat in his seat in the House of Lords, to which he had raised himself under the title of Oxford. He it was who negotiated the financial scheme for a company to trade in the South Seas—for the further history of which we must wait until the next reign. He had achieved a reputation of financial genius; he had been made Lord Treasurer; and it is significant of the strong Tory feeling in Parliament—which for the moment was in sympathy with the country—that the Occasional Conformity Bill, though a matter upon which Harley himself can have had no strong opinion, had at last become law.

Now, in the summer of this year, 1713, his insufficient character was really put to the test. As the law stood the Electress Sophia and her son George of Hanover were heirs to the throne. As opinion in England largely stood, the Queen's half brother, James III., the refugee at the Court of Louis XIV.,

was expected to claim the succession. It remained only with Harley to make up his mind. But the insufficiency of Harley's temperament resided not only in its commercial meanness but also in a nobler quality of indolence, and many years' pursuit of petty intrigue had unfitted him for action in a grave moment. He certainly had given the Pretender to understand that he was upon his side, and yet he feared to take any act which could be placed on record.

It was far otherwise with the manlier and in every way stronger and more worthy mind of Bolingbroke. Bolingbroke maintained an unbroken correspondence with young James. He cast about him for support among the politicians immediately around. He knew that he could trust Ormond; he hoped for the support of several others. But no one knew better than a man with so clear and wide a vision that the success of the plan depended upon an exact and very carefully managed coördination of tactics.

The process might be compared to the cure of a sick man whose sickness caused lethargy; who desired health; but who feared both the pain and the danger of an operation, and who had already openly published his intention of refusing surgical aid. The mass of the nation might vaguely desire to have a true King, one with a legitimate claim, native, a gentleman, and one who was a member of that family which still sat upon the throne and had behind it a tradition in England of more than four generations; in Scotland, of centuries. General sentiment could at once be aroused by the fear of any preponderant Catholic influence, but for the rest it was Jacobite. So much for the mass. Meanwhile Bolingbroke had to consider another very different difficulty; the well-

defined appetite of his own class for the continuance of their rule, for the increase of their wealth and for the concomitant abasement of the Crown to a lower level than it had even yet reached.

In the month of February, 1714, a new Parliament assembled. Not only was it Tory, but during the elections James had written from overseas urging those who favoured his claims in the country to work for the return of members who would support the Government. Wyndham, who stood for the same cause, was given the Chancellorship of the Exchequer. In Scotland the Duke of Athole and the Earl of Mar—the latter a man unstable in his allegiance but for the moment certainly Jacobite—were entrusted with power. The all-important work of testing the lower commands in the Army was begun with the object of eliminating as far as possible that minority of officers whose sympathies would have been opposed to the restoration of James III.

The very rapidity and completeness with which Bolingbroke worked in these early months of 1714 put his plan into grave danger. Unlike a general (and he was a man of military temper), the unknown factors with which he had to deal included one which neither he himself nor his opponents could command; and that unknown factor was the date of the Queen's death. He dared not work too slowly lest the succession should fall before his plans were completed; and yet rapidity of action was bound to arouse suspicion against him upon the part of those who ardently desired to prevent the recovery of the Crown and who had behind them the existing law and the general sympathy of the all-powerful wealthier classes.

This party, which we may still call for shortness the Whigs and which included, of course, every Tory who either feared risk or saw the advantage to his class in the Hanoverian Succession, were soon so menacing that Bolingbroke countered by moving in Parliament a resolution that the *Protestant* Succession was in no danger. He obtained but a small majority, and the move was a bad one. Even at this moment, however, if James III. had been prepared to abandon his religion, the scales of chance would have inclined to his side. But the young man would not do so. Against Bolingbroke's move the Oligarchic opposition wisely suggested the actual presence of George of Hanover upon English soil. He was technically a British peer under the title of Duke of Cambridge. They suggested to the Hanoverian minister that he should demand the summons of his master as a peer to the House of Lords. It was a direct insult to the Queen, and one which the Ministry much hesitated to inflict upon her, but their enemies had them in a cleft stick. To refuse the granting of the writ would be very near to a premature admission of the plan for a Restoration. The writ was therefore issued; but Anne, though so near to her death, wrote in company with it and had delivered to her second cousin, the aged Electress Sophia, so vigorous a letter that this Princess died upon receiving it (June, 1714).

The current of events was moving now with the swiftness of a torrent. They were very nearly decided by the attempted betrayal of Bolingbroke by Harley. The technical point upon which this betrayal took place was a proposal that the Church of England should have the monopoly of education. Harley re-

fused to support the rest of his colleagues in this High Church measure, and he undoubtedly had behind him the mass of opinion. He relied upon that to break Bolingbroke whose high culture remained, of course, indifferent to the quarrels of Protestant sects. But Harley reckoned without the real clericalism of Anne and without her Stuart blood. The Queen in these last days of her life broke with him and dismissed him from the Lord Treasurership. That danger therefore Bolingbroke escaped, and his power to negotiate with James continued.

Anne's ill health though pronounced was not yet an acute illness, and Bolingbroke still thought he had before him a sufficient time to bring to a point the various parts of this scheme when, just before his now unchallenged power had been able to mature all, the Queen was taken with a sudden illness.

Bolingbroke's victory over Harley (for so the dismissal of the latter was everywhere regarded) had secretly united against him many of his colleagues. At their head was that nervous and vacillating man, the Duke of Shrewsbury; not placed there by any effort of his own, but granted leadership because men not wholly intimate with him trusted his reputation both for timidity and for kindness of heart. He it was who betrayed Bolingbroke. He consented secretly to a plot whereby, in the very act of the Queen's death, the Whig nobles should triumph. The Council was sitting, in the absence of the Queen, to decide what should be done in view of her illness; when the two Whig Dukes who were the chief authors of the plot, Argyll and Somerset, suddenly demanded admission. The Duke of Shrewsbury, traitorously pretending to be giving honest and unpremeditated

advice, urged the Council to admit them, pointing out their constitutional claim as Privy Councillors. Upon their entry these leaders of the wealthiest Whig nobility proposed that the honest Shrewsbury (as one who divided men least) should be given the Lord Treasurership which carried with it the headship of the Government, and from which Harley had recently been dismissed. A deputation was formed; the Duke of Shrewsbury was himself a member of it. It reached the Queen's bedside. It seems proved that in a moment of consciousness Anne did grant the appointment and hand the wand of office to Shrewsbury.

That done, all the issues of power had passed in a moment into the hands of the Whig clique. Shrewsbury, acting as a sort of weak Dictator (because he now had behind him coupled with the nominal headship of the Government the massed wealth and organisation of the Whigs), took military measures, summoned the Elector of Hanover to appear at once in England, and, when the last legitimate Queen of England died upon the 1st of August, sealed packets nominating a Council of Regency in the name of George of Hanover were opened and discovered eighteen names. The names were all but two of the Whig faction, who, with the seven officers of State specifically mentioned in the Act of Succession, were, under the title of Lords Justices, to be the government of England until their puppet should arrive and take over the nominal Kingship to which he was summoned.

Bolingbroke had failed.

To understand the reign of Anne in full it is necessary, before dealing with the fortunes of her successors, to touch upon other than its English domestic

policy and to consider its effect abroad and the conclusion of the Union with Scotland.

First, then, let us turn to that action in it which not only most affected the general history of Europe, but also began and was the principal cause of the great reputation England was to enjoy for over a hundred years in the field of arms.

Foreign
Military
History of
Anne's
Reign.

This action is inseparably connected with the great name of John Churchill, Lord Marlborough, of whom so much mention has already been made in my account of the previous reign, and whose detestable character appears sufficiently in the last pages of Lingard's work.

This man, among the vilest of God's creatures, was endowed by his Creator with talents not only extraordinary in themselves, but destined, by the opportunity under which they were used, to affect most gravely the course of history. He, more than any one general, was responsible for the restraint of Louis XIV.'s influence and with it of Catholic culture in Europe, and, though in command of troops mainly foreign, his success shed glory over English arms for full three generations. It is of supreme importance in considering his career that the student should learn from it the diversity between genius and virtue. There are few vices (especially among the more debasing) to which Marlborough may not plead guilty. There are few captains in the short roll of the great captains of European history who can rival those various faculties which in him combined to make him a leader in war. Those peculiar marks of genius which distinguished him in the field were as follows:

First, that he had, as every great commander must have, a grasp of "*country*"; that is, he saw not only

in the map but also in the landscape the opportunities which slope, obstacle, cover and means of communication gave for the achievement of any plan.

Secondly, what is also necessary to any military success, and what perhaps most distinguishes the great captains from their inferiors, he enjoyed an astonishing *elasticity* of mind; that is, he could immediately change a plan however detailed and far-reaching, and convert it from the suiting of an expected imaginary case which did not happen to the suiting of a real one which did.

Thirdly, he could retain, as such minds can, a vast proportion of *detail* side by side with his general scheme. Great captains must always delegate the mass of detail to subordinates; but to recall particular instances in minor matters and to discover obscure points which may prove vital on the day of action, belongs to the chief commander. Nor is it possible to arrange in war (easy as it is in commerce) a rigid scheme the subsidiary parts of which may be left to inferiors.

Fourthly, Marlborough possessed what victory easily gives but what only a particular character can retain, the capacity for inspiring enthusiasm in others and of convincing men under stress and despair, as during elation, that under *his* command their ultimate success was secure. I do not mean by this that he received from the men of his great armies that sort of worship which many more worthy have deserved. Some few of his equals—especially the great imperial general, Prince Eugene—were struck on meeting him not only with confidence but with admiration; in others disgust at his character prevented a just recognition of his talents. But though we do not find in the

heterogeneous forces, Dutch, Prussian, Suabian, British, etc., which he at various times commanded, any worship of him, it is certain that his presence with an army confirmed its military power, not only through his reputation but through his talent for command.

His activities in the field (and therefore his place in the reign) cover rather more than seven out of the twelve years during which Anne was upon the throne. It was in March, 1702, that she had succeeded, as we have seen, to the Monarchy. The war which was declared immediately afterward saw Marlborough appointed Commander-in-Chief over the English and Dutch forces. He remained the chief figure in the struggle or at least an equal figure with Eugene, until, more than seven years afterward, in the September of 1709, his great tragic and barren victory of Malplaquet closed the story. Though Marlborough took the field after that date and accomplished—at murderous expense—in the summer of 1711 one of his most remarkable feats in the conduct of an army (the march upon the lines of Villars in the night of August 5th), yet his career was at an end, and the list of his great actions was not to be added to. We have seen how the Government with which he was connected fell, and with the last day of that year his military command also terminated.

Eight years then—seven summers occupied with as many campaigns—mark the passage of Marlborough as an European commander through history. In 1702, the first year of the war, he laid upon the Meuse the foundation of what was to come. In 1703 he continued these successes, though but partially, and somewhat hampered by the divergence between him

and his allies. It was in 1704 that he first startled Europe; coöperating in the plan of Eugene he marched across the Western Germanies from the Rhine to the Danube, and was chiefly instrumental in deciding against Louis XIV. the great victory of Blenheim. Checked in 1705 he stamped the campaign of 1706 with the name of Ramillies. In 1707 the mixture of a French rally and of a diplomatic knot held him again, but 1708 is famous for Oudenarde. And 1709, as I have said, is the year of Malplaquet. It does not diminish the reputation of this soldier that as the victories proceeded and as Louis XIV. was pressed back upon a last line of resistance, his personal genius and his individual power of command played a smaller and a smaller part. Marlborough counted for more at Blenheim and at Ramillies than at Oudenarde or at Malplaquet; but if this was so, it was partly because he had helped to teach other men, and partly because his first successes had permitted the general revival of the Allies. Neither does it diminish him in any way that the forces under his command were but in a small proportion British by origin. The fame of Marlborough's genius in the field reposes upon his vision, his rapidity of judgment, his organisation, and his eye; and such small proportion of troops as were of his own nationality, distinguished themselves under his command most brilliantly, and nowhere more brilliantly than in the action that made his name upon the Danube.

In 1702, the first year of the war, the difference made by Marlborough's presence in the field was apparent in the clearing of the line of the Meuse.

Until that moment Louis XIV. had overrun the Spanish Netherlands, which to-day we call Belgium.

He was master of the Low Countries up to, and threatening, the Dutch border. Had he received no check at this moment it is probable that the immediate future would have seen the fall of Holland. The list of the places which Marlborough "rolled up" in his occupation of the Meuse Valley may be followed by following the stream of the river. Their line constitutes a piercing of the whole French position and the relief of the Dutch border from pressure in the future. He occupied Venloo, Ruremond, and ultimately Liège. Driving a wedge like this into an enemy's line, means, of course, that the whole line must fall back, and so the French did and Holland was disengaged. It was this first great success which was rewarded by the granting to Churchill, its author, of the title of Duke.

In the next year little was done save to maintain the positions occupied and to press forward by a few miles. An attempt to seize the seaports of Antwerp and Ostend failed.

It was in 1704 that was fought the campaign and the action which have done most for Marlborough's fame. The plan was not his (it was Prince Eugene's) but the execution, with its perpetual care for detail and its triumphant conclusion, was mainly Marlborough's. Abandoning the Low Countries he worked right across the Germanies for the Valley of the Danube and for Bavaria, the Elector of which country was working in alliance with the French against the Empire. The action which concluded this movement and determined its success was fought on the 13th of August and engaged, all told, over 100,000 men. It takes its name from the village of Blindheim, of which custom has made in English the world "Blen-

Campaign
and Battle
of Blenheim.

heim." It is more familiarly known on the Continent as the Battle of Hochstadt, a small town lying just behind the field.

The Battle of Blenheim is so simple in plan as to permit an easy description of it. The Danube runs along the south of the field, to the north of it, some three miles away, is a line of low wooded hills. Between these and the river is a plain. Running from north to south, that is, from the hills to the Danube, is a little brook called the Nebel, which falls into the Danube just where Blenheim village lies. Behind this brook lay the French and Bavarians facing eastward with their left therefore against the hills and their right against Blenheim and the river. Opposite them, across the brook (and therefore facing west), lay in approximately equal force the Germans, Dutch and British, of whom more than a sixth but less than a fifth were Marlborough's own fellow-countrymen. Marlborough commanded that half of the line which reposed upon the Danube; Prince Eugene that half which reposed upon the hills.

The action opened between seven and eight o'clock in the morning and consisted in an attempt upon the part of the allies under Prince Eugene and Marlborough to force the enemy's line at some point while that enemy under Marshal Tallard and the Elector of Bavaria stood upon the defensive. The first phase of the Battle consisted in an attack upon the village of Blenheim itself: that is, an attempt to break the Franco-Bavarian line at its extreme right near the river. This attack, which was delivered by the red-coated English contingent, was conducted with memorable courage, but the position was too strong for them and they failed—not before they had lost in little

more than half an hour, near one-third of their number. The next effort was made against the centre, Marlborough pushing his troops across the brook Nebel, using his cavalry in particular with great effect and happily reinforced by Eugene's horse at the critical moment. In this attack upon the centre he was successful. He broke the Franco-Bavarian line late in the afternoon and hemmed it in between his successful troops and the river. All the body thus enclosed was compelled to surrender. It included Marshal Tallard himself and some 11,000 prisoners with one hundred guns. The other half of the defeated line was able to retire. But of the total Franco-Bavarian force, counting prisoners killed and wounded, much less than one-half remained intact in the days following the disaster.

This victory of Blenheim is of first-rate importance in European history because it marks the turn of the tide in Louis XIV.'s fortunes. The French armies operating against the Empire withdrew beyond the Rhine and the whole story of the rest of the war is a gradual pushing back of the French Monarch's forces until the fringe of France itself was invaded and the nation stood at bay.

In this same year, 1704, a week before the Battle of Blenheim was fought, an English fleet under Sir George Rooke, returning from an unsuccessful attack upon Barcelona, surprised the Rock of Gibraltar with a small force of Marines. The fortress was not made in the name of the English but in the name of the Austrian candidate to the throne of Spain. It was none the less retained by the English Crown and remains a British possession to this day. It is for experts to debate how far this point has proved of

strategical value to British fleets during the two hundred years and more that it has been occupied by a British garrison. But the striking character of the isolated rock, the sieges it has successfully endured, its position at the very gates of the Mediterranean, and its unique future—that it is the one portion of Continental land still in the possession of Great Britain—have combined to render it a symbol in the minds of Englishmen of that naval power which is a condition of their independence and of their power in the councils of the world.

The year 1705, marked by successes in Spain and in particular by the capture of Barcelona for the Austrian candidate to the Spanish throne, was not one in which any great blow was struck by Marlborough. But in the next year, 1706, on the 23d of May, he defeated, upon a field which takes its name from the village of Ramillies, another of Louis XIV.'s armies, with the effect of opening Brussels, the capital of the Spanish Netherlands, to the allies, and of allowing the Austrian candidate to the Spanish throne to be proclaimed there as King. The French later (upon Sept. 7th) suffered a much more severe defeat at the hands of Eugene in the Italian portion of the wide field of war. They were driven out of the valley of the Po, and this accumulation of disaster in the south as in the north caused them to treat for Peace. Their terms were rejected. The rejection of them was unwise, for, as matters turned out, Louis XIV., driven to bay, was finally able to obtain better terms and in particular to keep Spain—which, in 1707, he was prepared to abandon—for his grandson.

Upon the rejection of his terms then, Louis XIV. proceeded to considerable successes in Spain itself,

and never afterward gave up his grandson's claim to the throne.

In the next year, 1708, upon July 11th, Marlborough again defeated the French Army at Oudenarde in the Low Countries, close to the modern French frontier, the consequence of which victories were the invasion of France and the siege of the great French fortress of Lille. Before the end of the year Lille had fallen and, what is more, the English naval power had asserted itself by the capture of a great harbour, which, had England retained possession of it, would have had a strategical value far superior to that of Gibraltar.¹ This was the harbour of Port Mahon in the Island of Minorca off the Spanish coast.

Again Louis XIV. offered to treat for peace. His subjects were exhausted, his resources almost at an end. So keen was he upon peace that he approached Marlborough with an insufficient bribe. This time his proposals were listened to, but the Allies insisted upon the hardest possible terms, including that which is a capital error in all negotiation, to wit, an attempt purposely to humiliate an opponent without a tangible object in the insult offered. Louis was asked to aid the Allies in turning out his own grandson from the throne of Spain. He replied in a memorable fashion by a circular letter addressed to the whole French people, and determining upon a final resistance. Once more, upon September 11, 1709, his armies in this crisis of French history met the combined force of Marlborough and of Eugene just in front of the hamlet of Malplaquet upon the present Franco-Belgian frontier, a few miles from the town

¹I can believe that with Port Mahon in the hands of England the French Revolution might have failed.

of Mons. Louis's generals, Villars and Boufflers, strongly entrenched themselves in a gap about a mile wide between two woods. From this, after a whole day's fighting in what was by far the bloodiest action of those wars, they were at last dislodged, but with a loss in the forces of Marlborough and Eugene amounting to at least a third of their total number, and so exhausting to the victors that they were unable to follow up their success. The French retired in perfect order, carrying with them perhaps as many trophies as they had themselves lost to their enemies, and this battle, often called upon the Continent the "block" of Malplaquet (a term which well describes its nature and its inconclusive result), was proof that the end of Louis's misfortunes had come.

The last of Marlborough's campaigns, that of 1711, famous as it was for one of the greatest feats of marching in the history of the world, ended in nothing, and all Marlborough's attempt to continue the war upon the part of England after this proof of its uselessness failed. We have seen what followed: The Imperial forces under the command of Eugene were defeated. Louis was able to treat upon better terms; he secured for his grandson the Crown of Spain and signed with England the peace which has already been described in connection with the domestic history of the reign.

The Act of
Union with
Scotland.

We must conclude our survey of Queen Anne's reign by a brief summary of the important political decision known as the Act of Union with Scotland.

The Union with Scotland, though an act of high political importance, has suffered historically from an exaggeration of that importance.

In the first place, even had Scotland remained pos-

sessed of a Parliament of her own, it is improbable that any wide divergence would have appeared between herself and her wealthier Protestant neighbour to the south. Both nations had taken, a century and a half before, the decisive step that was to lead at last to industrial Capitalism. Both nations were to discover, as a particular economic basis for that development, great stores of coal. Both nations had set their faces in the same direction toward the future, and from material circumstance as from the more important factor of a common religion, one may be certain that no serious friction would have arisen as the development of each proceeded upon similar lines. I say "of a common religion," for though the type of Protestantism prevailing in the one country differed from the type prevailing in the other, yet we know now from the experience of centuries that Protestant development as a whole is the same and everywhere ultimately leads to the control of the many by the few, to Capitalism and to the establishment of plutocracy.

In the second place, the effect of the Union has not appreciably distorted such separate current of life as Scotland had and has. Scotland possesses, in spite of the Union, a National Church consonant to her own tradition, national universities of the widest effect, a national law, national magistrates to administer that law.

In a word, the problem of Scotland as a separate feature in the congeries of the United Kingdom is an insignificant cause of disturbance compared with the mighty problem of Ireland. For those who, like the readers (and the writer) of this book are concerned with the underlying realities of European civilisation,

it is but a detail to note the adjustment of two neighbouring Protestant societies easily united under one Crown; it is fundamental to note the divergence of a Catholic society artificially and with increasing difficulty connected with that Crown.

Such as it is, however, the Union with Scotland should be known in its main lines by every reader of British history. It is the story of that usurpation which a Parliament can always exercise over the body of a nation.

In the Scottish Parliament one group represented definitely Jacobite opinion. That opinion was, of course, the stronger for the fact that the Stuart dynasty was Scotch in origin. At the head of this body was the Duke of Hamilton. Alongside with this extreme form of opposition in the new Scottish Parliament (which was summoned for May, 1703) was another extreme body, that of the Ancient Covenanters, Republican in theory and having at their head Fletcher of Saltoun.

The Dynastic or Governmental party representing English official life was headed by the Duke of Queensberry. Between the two, if one may so express one's self (though the expression is not accurate), was the body known as the *Squadron Volante*, an Italian affectation characteristic of the time and meaning no more than "the Flying Squadron." It was a more or less indifferent and highly corrupt group which, by voting with the one side or the other, could command a majority. If this "Flying Squadron" had any mixture of real purpose other than personal advantage, that seems to have been the control of the national Government by the principal great land-owners. As a fact it was certain from the

first that this third body would ultimately side with the British Crown and its policy; for, being mainly plutocratic in motive and having behind it such a name as that of the Duke of Argyle, it was bound at last to agree—at its price or a little lower—with the English party.

At first it seemed as though the Extremists would control the Parliament; widely divergent as was the composition of the two wings of the Opposition, the Covenanters and the Jacobites, they forced through an “Act for the Security of the Kingdom,” generally known as the Act of Security, providing that upon the Queen’s death the succession should not follow the English model, but should descend to some Protestant successor of the national line to be chosen by the Estates of the Scottish Realm. The British Ministry set to work upon the usual instrument for coercing a people through the means of its Parliament: it bribed. We cannot, of course, trace the particulars of the bribery, but bribe it did. Public opinion to the north of the Border was awake to this attempt. The national hostility to any compact was aroused. The mood of the people was insurrectionary throughout that winter and spring, and in the ensuing summer, in August, 1704, Godolphin persuaded Anne to give her assent to the Act of Security, a course which she had hitherto refused to pursue.

The next move was that of Commercial Retaliation. Scotland was then by far the poorer country in proportion even to its population. Unrestricted trade with England and her colonies, naturally desired and not yet granted, was one material object of Scottish policy. It was not given; upon the contrary the restrictions were increased. And the quarrel led in the

spring of 1705 to a very violent act of exasperation upon the part of the Scotch. A Scottish vessel having been seized in the Thames upon the demand of the English East India Company, the Scottish East India Company arrested for piracy and murder the captain and fourteen of the crew of the English ship "Worcester," found in Scottish waters. They were condemned to death, and three of them were executed for alleged actions on the high seas and in the Southern Hemisphere, although it was believed in England, and has been subsequently proved, that they were innocent. It is highly significant of the oligarchic temper already dominant in North as in South Britain that in the midst of such an exasperated national feeling the commissioners to arrange the Union were publicly nominated and set to work. Not a year after the execution of the "Worcester's" men, the Scotch Commissioners were named to treat for the Union, thirty-one in number. They met in Whitehall during the month of April, 1706, a similar body of thirty-one which had been nominated for England. These consisted of Ministers, certain Whig aristocrats, the Speaker, the Chief Justices, the Archbishops, etc.

The first Scottish proposition was for a Federal Union, Scotland to retain her Parliament and the Scotch to enjoy unrestricted trade with Great Britain. The English Commissioners met this with a refusal, and offered the great inducement of the English Colonial trade only on condition of a united Parliament, and upon the acceptance of the English Act of Succession. The Scotch Commissioners—chosen of course for their pliability and having but one member a Jacobite (though far more than *half* the Scotch nation was so!) gave way. The proportionate peer-

age and commonalty of Scotland in the Union Parliament, the usual financial arrangements were concluded and, on July 22, 1706, the articles were signed.

In the autumn of that same year the last Scotch Parliament met upon October 2d. Queensberry was High Commissioner. The Flying Squadron had been bought over. The populace, though it had risen, proved impotent; and in the first days of November, by a majority of sixty-four, the principle of the Union was agreed to. The unscrupulous and treasonable Stair had said truly that as the debates proceeded "the ferment would abate." He knew the powerlessness of a people in face of a Parliament. Even the clause in favour of accepting the English Act of Succession was passed by a majority of fifty-nine, and upon January 16, 1707, the treaty for the Union had received the royal assent by the form of the "Touch of the Sceptre," which was the procedure of the Edinburgh Assembly.

Exactly a week before, Stair had gone to his reward. He was found dead in his bed after a violent debate heard upon the previous day.

Upon the 6th of the following March the Bill for the Union received the Royal Assent in England, and the Act came into force upon the 1st of May, 1707.

CHAPTER III.

THE REIGN OF GEORGE I.

WHEN George I. landed in England on September 18, 1714, it was to show by his first actions how well he understood the position he was to hold as puppet of the Whig aristocracy.

No dignity was expected of him and he showed none. His mistress (or mistresses) were of his own kidney. His whole demeanour that of one careless of taste; his principal constitutional care, effacement. He early ceased to preside at the Cabinet of which he was the nominal head; as his reign proceeded he constantly absented himself from England.

In March, 1715, the new Parliament summoned for the new reign was, of course, after six months of Whig dictatorship, wholly Whig in tone and the servant of the governing clique. It had not long sat, nor had the supposed security of the new settlement fully felt itself established when there broke out in the Scotch Rebellion the first event of any magnitude in the reign.

That abortive movement for the restoration of the legitimate King, I must next trace in summary.

When Queen Anne died on the 1st of August, 1714, she died, according to Bolingbroke, just six weeks too early for the success of the Jacobite plans. The army was officered largely by Jacobites; the Highland Chiefs had been subsidised in the interests of the Pretender.

The Rebel-
lion of 1715.

In Scotland the proclamation of George I. had taken place at Edinburgh four days after the Queen's death, and there had been no rioting, nor protest.

The elections came in the February following and they were in Scotland, as indeed in England, unpromising for the Jacobite cause.

Yet by July the state of things was such that the King *de facto* had to tell the country that it was in danger and that it was necessary that preparation should be made to avert threatened evils; the *Habeas Corpus Act* and the Scottish "Act for preventing wrongeous imprisonment and against undue delays in Trials" had both been suspended, and £100,000 had been offered for the Pretender's person should he land in the country. Further, the army and the fleet had been overhauled and put on a war footing.

These preparations may not have been too soon made, for at the beginning of August, 1715, the Earl of Mar was on his way to Scotland to head a rebellion.

John Erskine, sixth or eleventh Earl of Mar, had been born in 1675, and was therefore a man of forty at this time. He had, as we have seen, assisted Queensberry to bring about the Treaty of Union between England and Scotland and had been handsomely rewarded. Yet his character was such that it was no surprise to any when, a few years later, he supported Findlater's motion for the Union's repeal. He had written to George I., a month after Queen Anne's death: "Your Majesty shall ever find me as faithful and dutiful a subject and servant as ever any of my family have been to the Crown, or as I have been to my late mistress the Queen." And as well as giving assurance of his own loyalty *he vouched*

for that of a large number of the most powerful Highland Chiefs.

These, he said, had desired him to assure the new government of their loyalty to his sacred majesty King George. George knew how to value the professions of this "Bobbing John" (for so Mar was nicknamed), and withdrew from him the offices which he held. He was deprived of his Secretaryship of State and the hereditary custodianship of Stirling Castle was taken from him. Still he was an obsequious courtier and attended a levee at Court on the evening before he left for Scotland to place himself at the head of the rising for King James. He left the Court on the evening of August 1st, changed his dress for that of a working man, went aboard a ship at Gravesend, and in about five days landed at Elie in Fifeshire.

At the house of Betheene of Balfour, near Nearkinch, Mar met some of the friends of the Jacobite cause and from thence he passed to his own house at Kildruming on the Braes of Mar, whither he had invited to a "*Tinchal*," or hunting, such noblemen and chiefs as he thought were favourable to his project. About eight hundred accepted the invitation, and these included some of the most powerful of the nobles of the highlands, together with not a few Lowland Lords and Lairds.

Mar addressed them, told them that he was sorry for the wrong he had done in supporting the Union, but that he now saw with clear eyes that the ancient liberties of Scotland had been delivered up into the hands of the English, who meant yet more to enslave them. The success of his speech was immediate, for the Union was at this time very unpopular and the

clans were athirst to avenge certain remembered wrongs.

The Standard was set up on the Braes of Mar on September 3d and James VIII., of Scotland, III. of England, France, and Ireland, was proclaimed.

Mar afterward protested that he had in his premature action been misled. There certainly had been mistakes and bunglings not all his. The English Jacobites were dead against the rising, save in certain contingencies not present. Mar himself, so far as his letters are to be taken as evidence, was with Ormonde against action. But Ormonde had changed his opinion more than once and had, it appears, sent a certain Father Callaghan to James with a message that was encouraging. James, at the time affected by the Duke of Berwick's letter of July telling him that his honour was at stake and that his friends would give over the game if they thought him backward, did almost undoubtedly on July 15th send to Mar in London a message fixing August 10th for the rising. On July 26th, James, however, received from Ormonde and Mar combined a new memorandum very different from Callaghan's message in its tenour. Ormonde and Mar now saw nothing but difficulties in the way of that instant action which Berwick was urging upon James. But both Ormonde and Mar left room for action. *If* James meant to come then it were well that he should do this and that. It was hoped, by the way, that he would attend a Protestant place of worship on Sundays and of course if the King should come Ormonde and Mar would act.

In all that took place James seems to have acted well. When he had received this second dispatch,

that from Ormonde and Mar combined, he endeavoured to recall that order which he had sent to Mar fixing the 10th of August for the rising, and in all he did he seems to have taken his counsellors into his confidence.

But Ormonde had done wrong in sending Callaghan with the encouraging message. Berwick had done wrong in saying what he said to his King, namely, that his honour was pledged. James had sent word to Mar fixing the rising four days before consulting Berwick or Bolingbroke, though it is true he had tried to follow Mar with a message contradicting his first. Mar was to blame because he had not stopped to get a reply to his letter, and in his persevering after Ormonde had, in effect, withdrawn.

These were the causes of the premature movement and the failure of 1715.

Mar announced on the 9th of September, that is, three days after the unfurling of the Standard at Braemar, that King James had been pleased to instruct him with the direction of affairs in Scotland. He himself proceeded with some chiefs and followers to Kirkmichael, and the other chiefs went back to their lands to gather their clans. A few days later he reached Dunkeld, now with 2,000 of a following and so passed to Perth, already seized by Lord John Kare, brother of Kinnoul, for the Jacobite cause. Perth was the key to the north. But Stirling was the key to the south, and George had had the prescience to relieve Lord Mar of the custodianship of Stirling Castle, which was now in the hands of Argyll.

While Stirling was held by Argyll, Mar could not pass to his friends in the North of England. But he sent out from his main force a detachment under

Brigadier Mackintosh which was to pass from Perth by Fifeshire across the Forth and seize Edinburgh. Argyll prevented the seizing of Edinburgh by setting out from Stirling with five hundred men against Mackintosh, and this body from Mar's army after many divagations eventually passed near to the Border to join Mr. Forster of Bamborough. With Forster, "Borlum" (for so Mackintosh is best known) marched into Lancashire. With Forster at Preston he surrendered. It is perhaps truer to say that by Forster at Preston he was surrendered. When General Forster and the Brigadier were together prisoners in Newgate their quarrels over the conduct of the campaign are said to have afforded much amusement to fellow-prisoners and to the public who at that time were admitted to the common-room of the prison. In May, 1716, "Borlum," his son, and several others of the prisoners escaped, the father and son eventually reaching France. The bill issued by the corporation of London offering £200 for his capture, described him as "a tall, raw-boned man, about sixty, fair complexioned, beetle browed, grey-eyed, speaking with a broad Scotch accent." He returned from France to take part in a rising in 1719, was captured, sent to Edinburgh Castle as a prisoner, and died there in 1743. Mackintosh had graduated at Aberdeen, may have been at Oxford University, married one of Queen Mary of Modena's maids of honour, a lady of a well known Oxford County family, and knew and often quoted the Hon. Robert Boyle. Yet his reputation is that of a rough soldier of the type of Dalyell of Binns. The fact seems to be that he was a man of much sense and of considerable culture.

When Mar had sent forth "Borlum" with the

Highlanders he himself feinted on Stirling. This brought Argyll back from his successful mission of keeping the Highlanders under Borlum out of Edinburgh. Mar now returned by way of Auchterarder to Perth and engaged himself in the work of levying money, collecting forces, and, as much as possible, playing the part of King's Lieutenant. It was not until October, however, that he actually received James's commission appointing him "Our General and Commander-in-Chief of all our forces, both by sea and land in our ancient Kingdom of Scotland."

On November 10th, he broke camp at Perth and marched to Auchterarder where he met the Western clans who had been trying issues with Argyll's people in Argyll's own country and that not successfully. It was the 13th of November, 1775, that Mar and Argyll encountered at Sheriffmuir, in forces, about 12,000 men. Had Mar had any knowledge of generalship he could not have failed. But he had none. The right Highland wing indeed outflanked the left of Argyll's forces and drove them into Dunblane, but the left Highland wing was itself outflanked, the Highlanders could not get near enough for their broad-sword charge, wavered under the musketry fire and were charged by cavalry while still in process of trying to reform. They broke and ran and were pursued by Argyll. Returning from the pursuit the victorious portion of Mar's army was encountered posted on the top of Kippendavie Hill—but when Argyll essayed to march into Dunblane he was not prevented. This day was, though neither Argyll nor Mar can have known for some days later, the very day of the defeat at Preston. Mar having gone northward again now began to ask Argyll what terms he might make.

Argyll had no commission to treat and his government gave him none. On December 22d, the Pretender himself landed at Peterhead, and Mar went as far north as Stonehaven to meet him.

Together king and general came to Scone, the old crowning place of Scotland's kings near Perth, and here the King issued a proclamation appointing the coronation for January 23, 1716. Mar, to keep ground between him and Argyll, ordered or got leave from the King to order the burning of the villages and towns on the line of march and all the corn and forage, lest they should be useful to the enemy. But long before Mar did this thing he had resolved on abandoning Perth. On January 31st the march out began. The Highland Chiefs had failed to induce Mar to risk a battle. To Mar's credit it may be said that the retreat from Perth was well managed and when he and his King were at Montrose with the retreating army Argyll was two days' march behind, although when the start had been made from Perth, Argyll was no farther off than eight miles.

At Montrose the army was instructed to set forth in the morning for Aberdeen, where it was to meet reinforcements from France. But ere the morning came Mar and the King had gone aboard a French ship lying in the roads. With that date of James's flight, February 4, 1716, the rebellion may be said to have ended. The army, abandoned by its general, did march to Aberdeen where it was disbanded. Of the prisoners taken in England twenty-six were executed and many hundreds transported. Three peers, Derwentwater, Kenmure and Nithsdale, were also condemned. The first two were beheaded, the last escaped—and for thirty years no serious Jacobite ris-

ing was thought possible. It is a memorable matter that the death of those brave men was made the occasion by George of a public festivity and of his presence at the ball.

The rising of 1715 having failed—mainly through the apathy of the North of England—the Whig group of masters hastened to confirm their power. By an act which emphasizes extraordinarily the negligence men were growing to feel upon the methods of government, the Parliament obeyed an order (in 1717) to extend its life from the three years—the existing legal limit—to seven; and so to secure as long a time as might be for the riveting of the new power.

The Sep-
tennial
Act.

The same year saw two other matters of great importance: the alliance with France which secured so long a peace—and incidentally terminated an attempted resurrection of Spain—and the beginning of Walpole's career. For it was in January, 1717, that Walpole's brother-in-law, Lord Townshend, the man by whom he was to rise, accepted office. He lost it again in a few months. Stanhope succeeded him, and Walpole with his family connections might have remained for years awaiting his opportunity had it not been for the enormous accident (and origin) in English history of what is known as *The South Sea Bubble*.

The South
Sea Bubble.

The history of this vast stock enterprise must be grasped at the outset of the great change in English Politics which is marked by the rise, career, and fall of Walpole.

The South Sea Bubble is worthy of very particular attention, both because it is a landmark from which we may date the supremacy of Walpole—with all the consequences attached to that supremacy—and

also because it is the first example and the model as it were of all that speculative spirit which has in modern times and in industrial countries taken the place of use as a motive for production.

The nature of the disaster (for it was no less) was as follows: That institution of a National Debt, upon which I have commented on an earlier page, had risen with the great wars of Marlborough to something over fifty millions. This sum had been borrowed at high interest, much of it in the form of annuities of ninety-nine years. It was a charge upon the English people at large for the benefit of a few Capitalists, and that charge we must reckon at no less than three million, nor more than four million pounds. It was a charge averaging something over two pounds upon every family in the country. We are paying much the same tax to-day to this particular form of Capitalism in England, and we all know how the system of national debts has bound Governments of modern countries to mutually financial and often cosmopolitan interests.

To this evil we are now so accustomed that we note it but dully. Our forefathers saw it in all its magnitude, and there had been, during all the generation in which the system had grown up, a permanent conception that the debt should be as soon as possible repaid.

Now, of the total debt when Harley had power during Queen Anne's reign, in the year 1711 (when he was Lord Treasurer), there was a floating debt of ten millions. That is, of all the money owed by the Government upon the security of its power to tax the nation at large, and owed to a few wealthy Capitalists, ten millions could be demanded for immediate repayment at any time by the Government's creditors.

So large and immediate a claim was an eminent danger, and Harley proposed to mitigate that danger in the following way. He would call together these creditors of this particular ten million, give them certain advantages by incorporating them as a company of merchants and by giving them the monopoly of certain commercial advantages acquired by England at the Treaty of Utrecht. He would further foster their foreign trade to the best of the Government's ability, and especially any adventures in the South Seas, and finally, if they would consent to forego their right to immediate payment upon claim he would earmark the customs as a guarantee to pay them interest upon the sum owed. In this way Harley proposed to "fund" this floating debt; that is, to make it irredeemable and to feel secure against any sudden claim for it. The Company thus privileged, formed of the old creditors of the ten millions, was called "The South Sea Company."

So much for the original act done in Queen Anne's reign in the year 1711. Now, in the new reign, and after the suppression of the dangerous Jacobite rising, Walpole proposed to secure yet further the Government against what was very properly regarded as the danger of its great debt. He had been at the Treasury from October, 1715, up to the moment of his resignation which, as we have seen, followed upon that of Townshend, and took place on the 10th of April, 1717. Just before resigning he had completed a plan with regard to the debt, the chief elements of which were these:

The debt standing at forty-seven millions at that moment and costing the Government anything from 7 per cent. to 9 per cent., Walpole proposed to borrow

(as could be done in the now established security at home) at a lower percentage, and with the money to pay off such of the annuitants of the Government as would consent to receive cash. To find that money at a lower percentage than the Government had originally pledged itself to when borrowing he had turned not only to the Bank of England but also to this now strongly established South Sea Company, and had raised nearly five millions. The great South Sea scheme which matured three years later was but an expansion of this policy.

It was in the end of 1719 that Sunderland as head of the Government and Aislaby as Chancellor of the Exchequer had put before them a proposition for reducing—one might almost call it for paying off—the National Debt. The scheme proposed was that the South Sea Company should take over the whole debt as it stood—it amounted at that moment to over fifty-one million pounds. They should approach the various creditors and in particular the two groups of annuitants (redeemable and irredeemable) who between them accounted for much the greater part of this great sum, and suggest to them an exchange of their claims against the Government for South Sea stock. It was imagined that the greater part of those approached would assent to the bargain in view of the vast unlimited prospect of future gain open to the great Company. The Company consented to receive from the Government 5 per cent. only for seven years, after that 4 per cent. and further to allow this debt to be redeemable at the pleasure of the Government. Here then are the elements of this financial transaction: there was obviously advantage to the Government which would find itself paying first 5 and

then 4 per cent. upon a redeemable debt, instead of an average of 8 per cent. upon a debt largely irredeemable, and to have to deal with but one creditor instead of many. The advantage to the Company was that it would receive a regular income from Government securing its permanent prosperity, and meanwhile would become the one great financial agent in the State with apparently unlimited opportunities of future gain. But what was the advantage to the annuitants who should be approached? If the Government is pledged to pay me 8 per cent. why should I exchange my Government stock for stock in a company to which the Government is pledged only to pay 5 per cent.? The answer to *that* question is the key to all that followed. Trade and production were both expanding rapidly, as was the exploitation of new territories by European capital. There was a vague confidence in the air that any powerful financial group would be able to increase its dividends almost indefinitely in the near future if it had anything like a monopoly of exploitation in any field. And the man relinquishing his 8 per cent. was *guaranteed* 5, but looked forward to 10 per cent., 12 per cent. and 20 per cent. in the near future as the result of his temporary sacrifice. We have seen exactly the same thing in our own day in South Africa, where men have paid fantastic sums for a right to the imaginary opportunities which a chartered company was expected to discover in certain future operations for which it had been granted a monopoly by the State.

There were certain other details in the transaction with which I will not burden the reader, the extreme importance of this episode compelling me, as it is, to

deal with it at great length—notably over seven millions had to be raised by the company in cash to pay a premium which it had offered the Government in order to obtain these privileges. The Act confirming this financial deal received the royal assent on the 7th of April, 1720 (it is known as 6 Geo. I., Cap. 4). All during the negotiations the price of South Sea stock had been very rapidly rising. The affairs of the Company were in any case normally prosperous, and the shares had stood at 25 per cent. premium before the matter was at all certain. A week after the bill had passed a £100 share was greedily bought for £300, and within two months the South Sea Company had persuaded two-thirds of the annuitants to give up their claim upon the Government and had stepped into their shoes.

As may readily be imagined, a thing of that kind was not put through in that day any more than it could be in this without wholesale bribery of the politicians, but this (though in *those* days punishable and reprehended by public opinion) was a small matter compared with what followed. The investing public, seeing so enormous and sudden a rise in the principal stock of the day, was in a mood for believing that almost any proposal put before it would mean vast profits in the future. Companies of every kind were floated, many grotesque, some mad, and a few simply comic (such as the Company for the Importation of Spanish Donkeys). But at the bottom of the whole mania lay this astonishing rise in the South Sea Company's shares.

Many of these subsidiary speculative ventures existed without due incorporation. It was the jealousy felt by the great company for these which

provoked the crash. Upon June 11th a royal proclamation was issued, to take effect in ten days and laying very heavy penalties upon any promoter who should issue for public subscription any scheme not duly chartered. The King was absent in Hanover. The Lords Justices who were ruling the Kingdom had "pressure" brought upon them by the South Sea Company to proclaim no less than eighty-six of their rivals as illegal and to abolish them. The immediate effect of this was indeed to raise the value of South Sea stock still further—there was a moment not quite a month later when it reached a thousand pounds, or ten times par—but the next and most permanent effect was of course to create a panic. The loss sustained by those who had invested in the proclaimed companies, the doubt as to what companies might not be next proclaimed, the collapse of stocks in legitimate companies falling in sympathy with the stock of the illegal ones, all hurried on the crisis. Yet the South Sea Company itself did not fall for yet another month, and the final explosion was due to the action of the company's own directors. There would have been no difficulty in getting in the last of the annuitants upon reasonable terms. Indeed most of them had paid far more for their stock than the stock was worth, even those who had come in early in the year. There was now, thus late in the year, in August, a number of annuitants who had not yet received South Sea stock but who had already deposited their securities with the Company. The Company informed this unfortunate residue of the old Government creditors that they must receive their stock written at the price of 800. In other words, where a man who had received his stock in May got, say, for £20,000 claim

upon the Government, 6,000 shares in the South Sea Company (which then stood at a premium between 300 and 400 per cent.) another man paid as late as August would have to be content with less than 3,000 shares of the company's stock. These late comers in natural indignation demanded the voiding of their contracts. They were met by the terms of the purchase they had signed, which gave nominees of the Company power of attorney to fix the price. They complained, of course, that they had not noticed this clause, but they could obtain no redress. Their dissatisfaction and anxiety spread to others and the quotations for the shares began to fall. The Directors declared a dividend of 50 per cent. payable by the end of the year, but the shares still fell and a month after the ill-advised allotment they were at 400. Walpole, on account of his original association with the model whence all this had developed, was asked to help, and did attempt to get the Bank of England to come to the aid of the Company. But as the shares still fell and as the Bank refused to complete the proposed contract, it was Walpole's own personality and position in Parliament which really completed the ruin of the South Sea scheme and at the same time put him permanently in power. It was Walpole who pressed in the original debate the danger of so great a capitalist force overriding the Kingdom. It was Walpole (already taken back into the Government, as we have seen, into a minor post during the height of the speculation in June) who now, in the session which began upon December 8th, let the South Sea Company down into the pit, *but not before he had sold his own shares to the duped public at the top quotation of £1,000.* The King had been

urgently recalled from Hanover in the hope that his presence might restore credit. It had failed to do so. Walpole had passed an act permitting the Bank and the East India Company to come to the aid of the South Sea, but it only *permitted* them—and they did not come. The ruin of so many private fortunes and the violent indignation it had provoked led to the appointment, under a Bill brought in in January, 1721, by Jekyll and passed without opposition, of a committee to examine the accounts of the Company, while the directors were at the same time forbidden to leave the kingdom, and were further ordered to declare the value of their own estates. What was more, a further Bill, introduced by the same man, demanded an inquiry into all stock bought or sold by or on behalf of the politicians of the Treasury, and of the Exchequer.

The violent quarrels aroused shattered all the structure of the Ministry, and for that matter of its opponents. Stanhope fell with apoplexy in a violent effort at defence upon the 4th of February and died the next day. His cousin Charles, a Commissioner of the Treasury, was discovered to have received ten thousand pounds worth of the stock; Sunderland, fifty thousand; and the ladies of the Court ten thousand each—with further sums to their relatives. The two Craggs, father and son, the one Secretary of State, the other Postmaster-General, men who had largely negotiated these corruptions, died: the younger indeed of small-pox, but the elder probably by poison.

Walpole, during all this time, was playing heavily the game of moderation, which can so surely kill opponents in times of fever. He, it was, who largely

secured the acquittal of Charles Stanhope, but by a majority of three. Aislachie, who had, of course, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, had his hand deepest in the till, he did not save. The man was declared, in the sincere language of those days, guilty of "most notorious, dangerous, and infamous corruption." Sunderland, Walpole rescued by Parliamentary wire-pulling, threatening if he fell the incoming of a Tory Ministry. What will surprise the modern reader, the chief culprits were made to disgorge and more than one million and a half pounds were restored to some of their victims! The financial crash was, so far as it concerned the credit of the State, more or less arranged by an Act providing the old Annuitants (who were now destitute) with about half of their former incomes. In *their* eyes this relief was robbery; in those of the Government, who could plead that the South Sea Company was worthless, it was a generous gift. The victims mobbed the lobbies of the House of Commons but to no effect, and in the political sphere the prime effect of all this deluge was the emergence of Walpole. Four months after the opening of the session and at the close of his carefully calculated policy to moderate and to ride the storm he was, upon the 3d of April, 1721, made at once the head of the Government and the new Chancellor of the Exchequer. Sunderland, of course, had been compelled to resign. He died the next year, and, two months after him, his father-in-law, the broken Duke of Marlborough. So ended that vile great man.

Out of all this wreckage then it is only Walpole that stands. Hitherto he has been but a notable man climbing on the shoulders of his noble brother-in-law. Now his immense illgotten wealth sets him above all

rivals, and from this date, in the spring of 1721, to his resignation twenty years later, Walpole, an almost autocratic representative of the Oligarchy, an incarnation of its parliamentary government and its destruction of the Crown, sums up like a symbol the domestic history of England. It is he who bridges over that space in eighteenth century time *before* which the Restoration of Monarchy and of the popular voice was still possible; *after* which it was certain that Oligarchy, leading in slow process to mere plutocracy, would be the political development of English society.

Walpole and Townshend, then, were the two heads of the Ministry which followed the crash of the South Sea Bubble; but it was Walpole, with his new great fortune, robbed from the deceived public, who was now by far the first figure; his brother-in-law, by whom he had risen, was in fact, though not in name, his subordinate.

From the year 1721 for over twenty—or nearer twenty-one—years, Walpole governed, and for the first six, to the death of George I., he governed absolutely. The King was wholly ignorant of English; Walpole, of French and German. He has been represented as ruling the King in private—as a fact he simply neglected him. A few words of Latin were their only medium of conversation, and Walpole's Latin and George I.'s must have been worth hearing.

Much that passed in these six years I shall deal with later under the special heads of the Church of Ireland and of Commerce and Finance. Apart from these they were insignificant at home, save for this continued mastery exercised by Walpole over the Commons, the Lords, the Court, and therefore the

Country. The elections at the end of the first septennate he managed at will. Before the end of the second, on Wednesday morning, the 12th of June, 1727, George I., travelling back with his German mistress to visit his German Dominions, died in Osnabruck.

CHAPTER IV.

THE REIGN OF GEORGE II.

THE end of George I.'s reign and the accession of his son marks a critical moment in Walpole's tenure of power. He had now for seven years established his dominion upon his ability to control the curious figure who had nominally stood for English kingship. There was a gap, and Walpole had stepped into the gap. But when that figure disappeared, it was not so certain that his successor would provide an equally convenient nullity. True, the new King was as German as his father and had inherited all the negative incapacities which historians must permanently attach to this house. But he had also inherited his mother's faults and therefore something a trifle superior. He was in looks more refined and, while ridiculous in stature, somewhat more vivacious in deportment. But more important than his insignificant personality was the character of his wife.

Caroline of Anspach, whose position at the old Court we have seen, was a woman of considerable attainment. She had been in correspondence with more than one of those who affected the thought of Protestant Europe, and had in particular been thought not unworthy of the friendship of Leibnitz. She had some dignity and a great measure of tenacity in purpose. What was perhaps most important of all, she could manage her husband and yet exercised upon him a continual pressure, which those who were to

depend upon her husband's nominal authority at once recognised and used.

Of these, of course, Walpole was the chief. He was in Chelsea when he received news, forty-eight hours after it had happened, of George I.'s death. His first interview with the new King showed him the danger in which he was, for he was coldly received, and he was bidden to take his instructions from the Treasurer of the household (who was also Speaker of the House of Commons), Sir Spencer Compton. In these first moments of the new reign Walpole might have fallen had it not been for the action of the Queen. It was she who recognised the all-importance to the Court of Walpole's power in the House of Commons, and that especially in the matter of the Civil List. Nor was Walpole backward in discovering his opportunity. To Compton's suggestion of £50,000 for the Queen, Walpole replied by a promise that the House of Commons should find double that amount, and when Parliament met a week later it was to discover Walpole once more in the saddle, with his brother-in-law, Townshend, still nominally at the head of affairs. The House voted the sums demanded of it (Walpole's bribe to the Queen passing without a division!), was dissolved, and the General Election following was even more successfully arranged by the Ministry than the preceding one. When the new Parliament met on the 23d of January, 1728, it contained an Opposition as vigourous as the last, but one which could have no hope of immediate power, though it acted with somewhat more discipline and cohesion than had hitherto been the case. Wyndham was its principal spokesman, with Pulteney as his coadjutor. The name of Sandys must also be noted, for it was to

be of future significance, and a merchant with a high reputation for financial power, Sir John Barnard, stood out among the rest. In the House of Lords, where the Opposition was far weaker, it was represented by Carteret, and by a man famous in another sphere as Lord Chesterfield. Bolingbroke's pen and wholly superior intelligence were still the directors of that Opposition, and Bolingbroke alone perhaps understood and was capable of intellectually deploring what the continued domination of Walpole meant for the future of England. He remained what he had been for so many years, the consistent and powerful reactionary who would, if he could, have restored the Monarchy. There was no Jacobite action upon the transition to the new reign, such as had been expected. Atterbury had abandoned the Pretender. The young and courageous Wharton was now negligible through a decline in his capacity and his will—he had not four years of useless life before him. And the Pretender himself, largely lost by the scandal of his wife's withdrawal two years before, was in retirement at Rome. Abroad, therefore, the position of England was confirmed, and it was in the third year after the King's accession (upon the 9th of November, 1729) that the Treaty of Seville confirmed Great Britain in the possession of Gibraltar, or rather, that in that Treaty the demand for the retrocession of that fortress was dropped. Nor should the modern reader forget that the original determination to retain so important a point was due to the foresight of Bolingbroke, while the Government of Townshend was even now indifferent to its retention—as George I. had been—and was only moved to see the importance of the matter by a belated appreciation of popular feel-

ing. It is in domestic policy that we chiefly trace the action of Walpole during the next few years.

His first business was to be rid of his brother-in-law Townshend. There had been friction between the two men, due in the main to jealousy felt by the nominal head of the Government for his too powerful lieutenant. The Queen's marked appreciation of Walpole increased the tension. She visited him at his private house and dined with him and gave evidence in every way of her reliance upon his judgment, particularly during the King's absence in 1729.

To those who can conceive how the history of prominent men is at bottom a domestic affair, the moment represents the final ousting by Walpole of the relative upon whose shoulders and through whose connection he had climbed. First as dependent, next after his disgraceful coup on the Stock Exchange as his equal, now as his master, Walpole's relations with his sister's husband had run their full course.

Upon May 15, 1730, Townshend found a majority in the Cabinet against him, and retired, and Walpole, in the reconstruction of the Ministry, pursued his constant plan of supporting himself by men of conspicuous mediocrity. He had already secured the reversion of Townshend's position as Secretary of State to Harrington, a man of diplomatic experience but of no training in domestic politics. The foolish Duke of Newcastle was characteristic of the men so chosen, a man whose prominent external characteristic was fuss, and Hervey, a courtier. To render his position not only secure but incontestable, Walpole commanded the House of Commons by an organised system of bribes. It is unintelligent to contrast the

conditions of those days with these. Corruption is the common vice of every Parliamentary system and is the necessary accompaniment of Oligarchy and of a weakness in the central government. But the conditions under which Walpole's corruption was exercised were so different from those of a modern assembly that we can establish no parallel. It was on a far smaller scale than our modern bribery. It was far more open and it had singularly less result upon the affairs of State: securing the career of a man but not the policy of a nation. Oddly enough that corruption was most openly denounced and was the favourite theme of the Opposition.

Perhaps the most comic evidence of Walpole's personal use of corruption was the fate of the so-called Pensions Bill. It had long been law that no person enjoying a pension under the Crown could be elected or sit in Parliament; and this Bill, put forward by the Opposition under Sandys, required a declaration on oath from members that they were not in enjoyment of such moneys. Walpole procured the rejection of this Bill not in the Commons but in the Lords.

What the Opposition really did by their constant exposure of the man was gradually to undermine his public position. In the House itself they could do nothing. But "The Craftsman," their chief paper outside and Bolingbroke's organ, kept vigorously alive the attention of the public to this too facile method of administration.

I repeat (for it is of great consequence to seize this), Walpole's organisation of corruption only secured his personal power, and the Parliamentary institutions of England had not yet reached, nor were to reach for many generations, the stage from which they

now suffer of corruption affecting the House from outside, subjecting what is nominally a representative body to great financial interests. Indeed, it is evident that this latter stage in the history of such an institution can only come in its extreme old age and preparatory to its disappearance from effective action.

The Domestic and Financial Policy of Walpole is best seen in the matter of the Excise Bill; his Commercial Policy—for which great credit must be given him—in his action toward the American Colonies and the East India Company.

As to the first: The landed Oligarchy of the country, now the only centre of political power, had by various stages reduced the burden of taxation reposing upon it. It had first, two generations before, abolished the Feudal claims the Crown had upon it and compounded for these by general taxes imposed upon the whole people and, on its own side, by the imposition of a land tax at four shillings in the pound. This, though appearing to us heavy, was a relief from older conditions. But though a relief it still left the landed Oligarchy mainly responsible for providing the revenue. In 1730, this tax, which had already been halved, was proposed by Walpole to be *quartered*, and he and his like were to pay in future but a shilling in the pound. To supply the deficiency so occasioned Walpole proposed, of course, to extend the taxation imposed upon the mass of the people, and this, in the absence of any Income Tax or Poll Tax, could only take one of two forms in indirect taxation—either the extension of excise, that is, a tax levied upon goods consumed internally within the country, or by the raising of a tariff, that is, a tax upon goods coming from abroad as they entered the country. Nowhere

did the Opposition show its wisdom more than in its resolute and angry defiance of this plan on the part of Walpole to augment not only the taxation borne by the mass of the people, but to increase enormously at the same time the Government's power of inquisition and control over the subject. Englishmen are to-day so used to the vastly increased bureaucratic powers of those who command them, that it is with difficulty they can comprehend the storm which the Opposition raised against Walpole's proposals in the Excise Bill. That Opposition, composed for the most part of landed gentry like himself, stood of course personally to win by the change, yet they led the nation in resisting it, moved not only by the private considerations of jealousy and animosity against other politicians in power, but also by what long remained the life of an English Opposition, to wit, the knowledge that it was expressing popular feeling. It was on March 13, 1733, that Walpole introduced his Bill. It was whittled far down from its original proposals. The main objects he had selected were but tobacco and wine. The Court supported him, but they had, of course, been bribed by a promise of an increased Civil List. But Bolingbroke and his men were vigorous in their leadership of public opinion. The majority in the House of Commons, as the clauses were debated, fell continuously, and at last some of Walpole's own lieutenants, notably Chesterfield, prepared to abandon him. It was upon the 9th of April that Walpole consulted the King and Queen upon the menacing activity to which public opinion had now been raised, and that he desired, with their leave, to drop the Bill. That was on Monday. Upon Wednesday, the 11th, foregoing the habitual weekly holiday, Walpole an-

nounced, in the quaint forms ¹ already fixed by tradition in the House of Commons, that he had given way. There was a private scene of considerable import to English history consequent upon this defeat. The Queen had received it with passionate tears, and the little King with equally passionate oaths against the Opposition. Walpole gave them a hypocritical offer of resignation, was assured by his nominal master that they should "stand or fall together," *and used the occasion to acquire from his sovereign the right to demand complete homogeneity in an Administration.*

Now this step was capital in its results. Hitherto, in theory at least, and largely in practice, each Minister was individually the servant of the Crown, nor was a disagreement between two Ministers regarded as necessarily fatal to an Administration. A man might vote and act differently from his colleagues upon one point and yet agree with them upon another. Henceforward the Cabinet took on, as it were, a corporate existence, and the scheme of oligarchic government was complete. The change had to come; the vital forces of the Crown were gone, and some united organ had to replace them. That united organ remained for one hundred and fifty years the Cabinet, a body largely self-appointed, but, under the general direction, stronger or weaker according to its character, of an acknowledged "Prime Minister" and, in

¹ He moved that the Bill "Should be read a second time on June 12th," which was equivalent to moving that it should be read during the recess when Parliament would not be sitting, and when, therefore, it could not be read. These quaint devices and forms, of which there have accumulated a vast number, sanctified by time, are among the few remaining interests of life in the House of Commons to-day: men will spend a life-time acquiring an exact knowledge of them.

the main, formed by him in its personnel as in its views. Latterly this aristocratic organ of English Government has in turn lost vitality, and sovereignty resides in England to-day in a few members of the Cabinet, an inner ring, who continually consult and act with those who have been members of former Cabinets, in what is still nominally called "The Opposition," and sundry of the greater financial powers of the country, together with an occasional outside legal, military, or other adviser.

The effect of this new model in Government was immediately felt. It was upon Friday, April 13th, that Lord Chesterfield, much the ablest in intellect, morally among the least respectable of Walpole's clique, and the man who had openly acted against the Excise Bill in the Lords (he was Lord Steward of the household at the time) was going up the stairs of St. James's Palace when he was met by a message which demanded his resignation. He returned home and tendered it. Sundry minor members of the Ministry suffered the same fate.

The Opposition was immediately swelled, not so much in numbers as in talent, and particularly in the House of Lords. It made a trial of strength upon a proposal to abolish the Septennial Act and to go back to the popular Three-year Parliament, and that proposal, of course, like all profound things of the time, emanated from Bolingbroke. Needless to say the idea had no chance among the Parliamentarians themselves. But that same year, 1734, an election was due. It was again "managed" with complete success by Walpole, and the event marks the end of Bolingbroke's great efforts for his country. By the early summer of that year, 1734, the result was known.

The Opposition had been strengthened indeed in the House of Commons, but Walpole was still supreme. The defeat after so many years of effort was attributed, even by his own followers, to Bolingbroke himself, and that great man, now in his sixty-sixth year, gave up the struggle. He retired to France, and when he returned to his own country seven years later, it was to live in retirement from public service. The seventeen years of a long life which remained to him he occupied more usefully, perhaps, than he had occupied those devoted to an attempted restoration of the older English traditions, for it was during these that he composed his letters upon the study of history, upon the spirit of patriotism, and his great "Idea of a Patriot King." These letters it would be well for any one to read who desires to understand not only the fortunes which England has achieved, but those which her people have hitherto missed. With his fall there ends the long and successful attempt at some reaction against the effects for good and evil upon the mass of Englishmen of the Revolution, of the Protestant Succession, and of the decay of the Crown.

It is unwise to regard Walpole's action over the Excise Bill as an isolated matter, still more as a purely selfish one. Though it contained a main element of selfishness it was also part of a general commercial plan wherein the man's judgment is not to be despised, for it contained a certain measure of foresight. Walpole's commercial policy aimed at a freeing of Colonial trade, at the continual expansion of Colonial adventure, and especially at the attraction to the ports of Great Britain of as much international exchange as possible. In this triple policy the Excise

Bill was designed to create foreign ports. The consumer would pay more if he paid through customs duties, but he would pay within the country, and the foreign importer who landed a cargo which might later be re-exported would discover English ports to offer the least inconvenience and delay. He had a set plan for establishing bonded warehouses, and thus a policy which proved of such high material profit to the trade of this country is first to be found, I think, in Walpole's brain.

As to his Colonial Policy—the best example is the removal of one important restriction on Colonial Trade. Carolina, hitherto compelled to export her rice to England only (whence it might reach foreign markets) was, in 1730, liberated by Walpole to the extent of a permission to export directly subject to an English tax of sevenpence a hundred weight, and so much was this regarded as a privilege that five years later Georgia petitioned for and obtained a privilege of the same kind.

Finally, it was Walpole who confirmed at a moment when it was in grave peril, the monopoly of the East India Company. That monopoly was terminable at three years' notice from Lady Day, 1733. He renewed the Charter until 1766, in spite of the natural and vehement opposition of competitors, demanding, as the price of the extension, no more than £200,000 and the reduction of the Government interest paid to the Company for money lent, from 5 to 4 per cent. The concession was probably venal, but in its effect it was wise.

Fall of
Walpole.

We have next to trace how, from the summit of his power, Walpole fell.

I have said that the real effect of the opposition

to Walpole was not to be found in that political world where his capacity for intrigue made him a mover. It was not even to be found in the electorate which, though it be restricted and capricious as the English Electorate then was, can nearly always be bribed as to its "leaders"; and managed as to its mass by those in power.

It was to be found rather in the force of what is called "opinion," a sort of atmosphere which when it is created in any society, though not extending to the whole of that society and though perhaps chiefly centred in the small, cultured minority, is the only thing a statesman can breathe, and which may, if it is inimical to him, poison him at last.

All schemes of intrigue in politics fail at last from the simple fact that intrigue is a second-rate activity, while oratory, reason, indignation, courage, are of the first rate. As an example of this, Walpole produced his own ruin precisely by his own plan of only using mediocrities. In a time when the mass of the people were rapidly sinking into the condition where we now find them, but when the wealthier classes were far more alive to argument, wit, and rhetoric than they have ever since been, Walpole had, by his own action, carefully ranged against himself the wit, the rhetoric, and the solid reason of his time.

The process of his fall took seven years. We have seen how the Opposition failed—as they were bound to fail—in the elections of 1734, and how early in the next year Bolingbroke had retired. This crisis from the declared subjection of the Cabinet to the retirement of Bolingbroke may be indifferently regarded as the summit of Walpole's power, or the beginning of his decline. Coincidentally with that moment in

domestic politics he had, in his Foreign Policy, saved England from a grave danger of war when the King, as Elector of Hanover, had sent his contingent, an Imperial army under Prince Eugene to engage against France. Upon the whole, Walpole's successful opposition to any participation by England in that brief period of hostilities was popular. Above all it showed his power, because he had managed to act against the King and yet to persuade the King. For the next year or two he was occupied in abortive regulations of popular habits, such as the Gin Act, and in the management of a riotous ill-ease which particularly distinguished the year 1736.¹ The populace was ill affected toward the beginnings of that bureaucratic restriction to which it later became thoroughly tamed and which was, of course, but part of the growing commercialism of the country and of the sacrifice of the many to the few. In particular, the feeling against indirect taxation and against the prying and power of even the few officials then existing, was strongly felt and was the immediate cause of all the trouble. But it was none of this which shook Walpole's supremacy.

The first blow to that supremacy was delivered by the insignificant but socially important Frederick, Prince of Wales. He had always been at odds with his father—it was an Hanoverian tradition—his mar-

¹This was the year of the Forteous Riots in Edinburgh. The execution of a smuggler, Andrew Wilson, upon the 14th of April, had led to some effervescence, for the Customs Officers were detested. Stones were thrown at the City Guard. Its commanding officer, John Porteous, fired into the crowd without warning, killing six men. He was tried for murder, convicted, and put down for execution upon the 8th of September. A respite was granted him, and the mob on the 7th broke into the gaol and hanged him themselves.

riage with a Princess of Prussia, which he greatly desired, had been prevented and had soured him. He was beginning to talk openly and violently against Walpole. Chesterfield pushed him on. A new group of younger men, organised more by Chesterfield than by any other man, swelled with talent, energy, and numbers the growing strength of the Opposition. It counted the Duke of Bedford, his brother-in-law, the third Duke of Marlborough, the Grenvilles, their cousin Lyttleton, and a younger man of twenty-seven, *William Pitt*. He had just entered Parliament for Old Sarum, the property of his family, a purely nominal constituency the possession of which gave such power of appointment. The first quarrel concerning the Prince's allowance (he was now married to a wife his father had chosen for him, the Princess Augusta of Saxe Gotha) saw Walpole still in command of the majority of the House, but only a majority of thirty. The Prince's opposition to his father was not healed. Before the end of the year 1737 he was turned out of St. James's Palace and was in a sort of exile at Kew, and more than ever the centre of the determined attack upon Walpole. Just at this critical moment came the heaviest blow that statesman could have suffered, the death of the Queen. It was through her more than through any other agency that Walpole had ruled, at Court at least, and he failed to find any other fulcrum for his lever in the management of the King after her death. The energy of the Opposition redoubled, and in the violence of their determination to succeed they were not only self-contradictory but they somewhat imperilled the nation. They seized upon the violent popular feeling against Spain in the early part of 1738, which had been

aroused by Spanish search of English trading vessels, revived and fostered every story of cruelty or insolence in connection with such search, and in particular an assault committed upon one Jenkins, seven years before, in which that seaman had lost an ear.¹

Walpole's whole efforts were generally concentrated upon preventing hostilities. When Parliament met on the 1st of February, 1739, it was presented with the result of the negotiations with Spain, and that result was so unpopular as to furnish the Opposition with a very powerful weapon; for Walpole, in his desire for peace, appeared to have given way inexplicably. In the House of Lords the convention with Spain was carried by a small majority. Upon the 8th of March the Convention came before the House of Commons and it was upon this occasion that young William Pitt made his first deep impression upon his contemporaries. His speech rendered him famous. Walpole carried his point, but only by a majority of twenty-eight, and on the other hand, growing resentment in Spain against the popular attitude in England rendered war more and more probable. So much was Walpole opposed to it that he offered to resign. The King pressed him and persuaded him to remain. The Opposition marked their indignation by a general but not universal abandonment of Parliament. The stroke was too dramatic and, if anything, played for the moment into Walpole's hands.

Upon the 23d of May, 1739, when the last ratifications of the Conventions with Spain were to be

¹The ear, carefully preserved, was produced before a Committee of the Commons, which sat to investigate such matters, and the war that followed has been called "The War of Jenkins' Ear."

exchanged, it was discovered how high Spanish feeling had risen, and what was more, Walpole's authority in the Ministry was so considerably shaken that war was determined on. It was initiated before declaration by a sudden raid upon Porto Bello, the port from which the Spanish coast-guards were fitted out, and therefore symbolic of the whole quarrel. As a military act it was like all such symbolic acts, perfectly useless.¹

A month after this declaration of war and about the time that Porto Bello was captured, Parliament met again. The Opposition had returned to their seats. They naturally triumphed in the success of their war policy, and Walpole, who was known to have acceded to that policy against his judgment, fell yet another step from his old position of isolated supremacy. Further, his health was now giving way. He was a man of sixty-four years of age and suffering both from gout and from the stone. It was even believed that he would not live. It was this same war, which his judgment had denied, that hit him most. There was a grave shortage of seamen. Walpole's Minister for the Navy proposed a measure of conscription. It may be imagined with what violence the Opposition seized upon such a proposal and what popular support they found in their destruction of the Bill. When, a month later (in March, 1740) the news of Porto Bello at last reached Europe, it was not only magnified to a great victory but directed as an ex-

¹ War was formally declared in London on October 23d, but no news of it had reached the Caribbean Sea at the moment of the attack upon Porto Bello; and Vernon, the English Admiral, had been instructed months before to open hostilities without awaiting any declaration of war, and to act by surprise.

ample against Walpole's whole known policy of peace. The Ministry had no choice, France now having joined, but to attempt some great stroke at sea. The whole of the Spanish War was an example of how a man once abandoning his own policy will be dragged down by the consequences of his weakness.

A great fleet under Ogle, consisting of well over one hundred ships, whereof thirty-three were ships of the line and manned by perhaps 25,000 soldiers and sailors, joined Vernon in the first days of 1741 in the West Indies and attacked Cartagena. The attack failed; an assault on the 9th of April was repulsed; an attempted blockade in the rising heat failed as much from sickness as from military incompetence. The siege was abandoned. A further attack upon Santiago in Cuba also failed. And by the end of that year, 1741, the once popular war with Spain was an admitted failure. As was inevitable, the effect of that failure reacted upon the man who, had he acted originally in consonance with his own judgment, would have prevented hostilities altogether.

War of the
Austrian
Succession.

Apart from this major peril, which faced Walpole at the close of this year 1741, there had arisen yet another of those perpetual Hanoverian questions which were the bane of English Ministers at the time. The last Hapsburg Emperor of Austria, Charles VI., had died the year before. He had, by a Convention known as the Pragmatic Sanction, secured the succession to his daughter, Maria Theresa. That succession was a perilous one. In the confusion, Frederick of Prussia had thrown an army into the Austrian province of Silesia. It was the first of those many acts performed in contempt of European morals which at once founded the Kingdom of Prussia and ultimately

the universal conscription of Europe. The policy of a generation by which England had helped to match the Continental powers against France was imperilled, for the English Government had acceded to the Pragmatic Sanction, and must apparently defend the Austrian succession.

It was consequent upon all this that in the early part of the year 1741, in February, the Opposition had raised a great debate, both in the Lords and Commons, arraigning the whole policy of Walpole. He might have been defeated or at any rate damaged in the Commons but for a singular incident. Shippen, leading thirty-four Jacobite members, walked out of the House.

The student of history must be careful to remember, if he would appreciate Walpole's character and the character of the times, that this act was due to a false intrigue between Walpole and the Pretender, a correspondence with whom had been going on for six years with the knowledge of the Hanoverian King.

No better illustration could be given of how political life then stood than this deliberate duping for the sake of one man's personal power, of the most sincere fraction of the minority, coupled with the peril of civil war, which it entailed.

Walpole thus still controlled a majority, but immediately before the dissolution of Parliament, in the April of 1741, the king, acting independently and probably from panic, had refused to support Maria Theresa against France, and had declared the neutrality of his German possessions. The news of that Treaty for the neutrality of Hanover which, again, Walpole had not designed, and which he would, if he

could, have prevented, was the final stroke which decided his fate. The time had come, under the Septennial Act, for another General Election—it was seven years since his successful management of the Elections of 1734. With the Ministry divided as it was and Walpole sunk in power, the Electorate could no longer be managed as it had previously been. The results were so even that the trial of election petitions would determine a majority one way or the other.

When the new Parliament had met in December, 1741, there were found tiny majorities of six and of four against the Ministers. These were used for the unseating on petition of sundry ministerial members to the huge joy of the populace. Walpole made a desperate fight for his position, and even managed before the end of January to obtain another tiny majority upon his side, a majority of three. A week later, upon the question of yet another Election Petition, he was again in a minority of one, and the final vote upon this point (it was the representation of Chippenham that was at stake) was to be taken upon Tuesday, February 2, 1742. The position was no longer tenable. Upon Sunday, the last day of January, Walpole determined to resign, and allowed the rumour of his decision to spread with the expected result that he was immediately decisively defeated by a majority of sixteen. In the next week he gave himself a peerage (the Earldom of Orford) and on Thursday, the 11th of February, 1742, he resigned all his offices.

As we shall see in the next division of this book, the fall of Walpole was not so complete, nor its effect so immediate as might be imagined. Nevertheless, this date of February 11, 1742, marks the term of all the period which we have had under review, and which

will always be marked in English history by Robert Walpole's name.

With the fall of Walpole we have reached to the true watershed of the English eighteenth century, or, to be more accurate, of the period of 126 years lying between the Revolution and the Battle of Waterloo. Walpole's twenty years of power made, as I have said, a bridge joining the early period when the political fate of the English was not certainly determined, to the later period when it was irrevocably fixed in the form of a commercial and oligarchic state. It is from Walpole's tenure of power that we date the organisation of Parliament in its present form, the fully organised Cabinet, the developed oversea commercial policy of Great Britain, and twenty other marks of the State as we have known it for a century and a half. Nor must it be forgotten that the same twenty years largely coincide with the industrial revolution which after the foreign commercial policy of Britain has been the chief economic mark of our history. For, though the great development of production both in the extraction of minerals and in the textile industries dates from a generation later, yet the first use of the steam engine appears at this time, and the two fundamental inventions which lie at the great changes in spinning and in weaving (Paul's Patent and Kay's Shuttle) date respectively from 1738 and 1733.

Another most important point for the student of history to note in connection with this critical date, the fall of Walpole in February, 1742, is that feature which will always illuminate history for those who

know where to fix it: I mean the passing of a generation. The men in the vigour of their age at this moment were men who could only remember as boys the period of Anne and the serious prospect of a Catholic succession. Those whose memories still stretched to the Revolution were all of them old men. Some precocious youngster who had been able to appreciate the gravity of 1688, though then but just a man, would now be over seventy years of age. Much the most of those who could remember with any significance those critical years were dead. The date of Walpole's resignation, therefore, may be compared to the date of the Armada in connection with the Reformation of the sixteenth century. It was the moment when those few who could still remember the cataclysmic origin of a great change had, all but a few, passed away and had, even in the case of those few, lost all direction over the State. We are at the present moment in Great Britain assisting at a third of these turning points in the history of generations, for we have just arrived at the time when only a few old people can still remember an England that was not urban, policed, and dependent upon mechanical and centralised communications. We have just entered the time when all *living memory* of the older agricultural England is passing away.

Character
of Walpole.

We must not, in judging Walpole's position and character (which are the two outstanding political features of the time), fall into either of the two errors, one of which is commonest in English history, the other occasionally apparent in foreign criticisms of England. We must not, as is the too common fashion in the school histories of his own country, make out the man to be great or to have had any highly forma-

tive effect upon his country. On the other hand, we must not make him the cause of the many evil features in the change, which features are only now after so long a period beginning to bear their worst fruit. It was more a coincidence than a sequence of cause and effect which unites the name of Walpole with the transition between the old English and the new.

In character Walpole was tawdry but not vile; an intriguer and a corrupter of other men, but that only where the unpleasant trade of politics was concerned. It is true that his position was largely due to his great wealth, and that without his fortune talents far superior to his own would have remained unused or unrecognised. It is also true that this fortune was exceedingly ill gotten. But on the other hand we must never forget the permanent friendships by which he bound to him men to whom he had given service. He was really and constantly liked by men who were his daily attendants, and when we know that about any prominent historical character, we know a great deal in his favour. We shall also understand him better and judge him less harshly if we appreciate that there united in him two qualities always respectable in themselves and when found in conjunction a mark of character. These qualities were first an intellectual indolence which is never found save as the product of imagination, and secondly, a cool, industrious and solid despatch of business. One might put it in a modern phrase by saying he was a good man to work with, hated to work, and did work.

As a statesman he merits a considerable place because he was guilty of no very grave errors of judg-

ment to the detriment of his country. It is negative praise, but praise only too rarely earned. He was singularly wise in his forecast of what policies would be to the advantage of England, and never wiser than in those policies which he was unable to carry out. He had a fine contempt for disconnected Jingoism, and a clear appreciation of what was to the material advantage of the country and where it could be pursued. Finally, we must always remember with regard to him the important personal fact that he was a true squire, a man who side by side with the avarice and pettiness of his class enjoyed its sports and its vigour and, as were all the old squires, was fairly indifferent to those fears for health and those affectations of manner which are the curse of a gentry. It is noteworthy that the mid-week holiday of Parliament on a Wednesday, but lately abolished, dated from Walpole's habit of hunting on that day with his beagles at Richmond. Perhaps the worst, and yet unfortunately the most characteristic thing to be discovered in all his actions is his deliberate selection of mediocrity in those who were to share with him the task of administration. This fear of talent (and fear is at the bottom of that feeling and that action everywhere) was also characteristic of the class to which he belonged.

This period of English history, during Walpole's supremacy, curiously inactive on most of the spiritual sides of the nation, saw, the more striking by way of contrast, one of the most extreme manifestations of religious energy; for it was the moment which gave rise to Methodism, and these are the years that will always remain associated with the name of Wesley. The dates

are curiously significant, showing how we have here an origin (just as in the case of the industrial change); but while the chief effects were felt after Walpole's fall, the beginnings of them are to be discovered before that date. It was not ten years after the bursting of the South Sea Bubble and the beginning of Walpole's complete domination that the word *Methodists* is found applied to the group of men at Oxford who surround the Wesleys. It is ten years later again, and but three years before Walpole's fall, that we may find the date from which John Wesley's great influence springs. For it was upon the 2d of April, 1739, that he preached to that great open-air crowd outside Bristol and began the thirty years of effort which have stamped half the succeeding history of England. In the interval he had paid a Missionary visit to the American Colonies, not a successful one, and in the year before (May, 1738) he had taken that memorable journey which had put him under the Moravian influence in Germany, from which country one may say, with a little exaggeration, that a sort of second Reformation was thus introduced into Britain. These are the years also in which the strong personality of Whitfield is influencing both the brothers Wesley and secretly moulding the religious future that sprang from them.

The limits of this book forbid my dwelling further upon a moral revolution of the utmost consequence and one which no student of English history can neglect without misunderstanding the whole range of peculiarly national spiritual phenomena proceeding from that day to this, and affecting the most intimate part of the country's *commercial* character. For the Methodist revival, and the other ultra Protes-

tant movements allied with it, revived in a singular degree the influences of the Capitalist middle classes and were associated until quite recent times with the mass of English speculative Capitalist action and of English commercial policy abroad.

Meanwhile, we must mark under Walpole another process utterly divorced from the new fire of Methodism and utterly ignorant of the popular movement around it. This was the wholesale decline (but not the extinction) of that kind of spirit in the Church of England which may be conveniently though roughly and rather inaccurately called the old Tory sentiment. It was destined to revive in our own day under a novel form and very largely to account for the High Church development, whose point of departure is the Oxford movement.

When Walpole achieved complete power but five years after the Jacobite hopes and rising of 1715, it is accurate to say that the mass of the Clergy of the established Church belonged to that Tory tradition. It is perhaps not true to say that the majority were Jacobite, but it is true to say that the very great majority disliked the tone and meaning of the Hanoverian succession. Had the Church acted at this moment as an independent body in the State, had it possessed the power of appointing its own officers and of developing upon lines laid down by its own will, the history of England would have been very different. As it was the appointments to the Bench of Bishops lay in "the Crown," that is, in Walpole, and he consistently procured for the general staff of the established Church men Whig and Hanoverian in sympathy, or at least in service. He not only secured an official Episcopacy, so to speak, of this kind, but

he founded the tradition of it and from that day to this, in spite of the vigorous efforts of High Churchmen and their very wide effect upon the opinion of their countrymen, especially in the middle and latter part of the nineteenth century, administrative heads of the English Church have never as a whole reflected any spirit very different from the Whig official spirit inseparably attached to the presence of the German Royal House. It is a matter the effect of which has been so subtle that perhaps due regard has not been paid to it by historians. Coupled with this policy was, of course, a policy of perpetual support, rather than toleration, of Dissent. The Dissenting bodies, small in number compared with the general population, unpopular with the mass of Englishmen and segregated and urban in an England that was still almost entirely agricultural, owe their great power and the colour which they have given the State to many other more vital forces than the mere administration of Walpole. They owe it in great part to the Methodist movement which was at first disconnected with them, but later their principal ally; they owe it to their commercial strength; they owe it also to their tenacity in preserving their ideals. But they owe it also to Walpole's deliberate judgment that the Dissenters as the backbone of the Hanoverian dynasty must be given free play. Walpole's method of effecting this was characteristic. He let them know that in his private opinion the Test Act should be repealed. At the same time he told them that his duty as a Minister forbade any such revolutionary action, and when they turned from him to the Opposition and obtained from Bolingbroke's Party a Bill for the Repeal, Walpole characterised that Bill as ill-timed and it was lost, as

it was lost again three years later. The Test Act continued in force, but from the beginning of George II.'s reign a Bill of Indemnity was passed almost every year in favour of those who had evaded the Test, and by this indirect weapon Walpole secured a very high degree of toleration exactly consonant to his ecclesiastical policy.

I have said that Walpole's twenty years were coincident with, rather than the cause of, the commercial development of England, and it is worth while presenting to the reader a single example of this, which is very striking. At the moment of the Revolution the outward bound cargoes of English ports were estimated as amounting to four million pounds in value, the tonnage was some two hundred and eighty-five thousand, of which not quite a third was carried in foreign vessels. By the end of George I.'s reign these figures had so changed that the tonnage had risen to four hundred and fifty-six thousand, and the value of merchandise carried had actually doubled, while the proportion of foreign vessels engaged had sunk to less than a ninth of the whole. By the end of Walpole's administration the tonnage had passed to half a million; only a twelfth of it was carried in foreign vessels, and the value of the merchandise had actually reached ten millions. These figures alone—and they might be supplemented by many another accessory illustration—are sufficient to show what I mean. It might be imagined that coincidently with so great an expansion of trade the naval supremacy of Britain was being founded, and, indeed general historical statements are often made to that effect. Oddly enough this was not the case. The doctrine of naval supremacy which is exactly bound up with

the commercial policy of England during the last one hundred and fifty years did not spring into existence until Walpole's régime was over. It was principally the creation of the Seven Years' War, which did not break out until more than ten years after Walpole's death. And if we consult the figures of the naval establishment during the first part of the eighteenth century we find the total tonnage and the numbers of the Royal Navy to have remained but little changed between the time of Anne and the death of George I. and increased by not more than 10 per cent. in all the twenty years that Walpole was responsible for the Government. With the Seven Years' War, as we shall see later, came the great change, and the accession of George III. found England with a navy almost doubled, and France, her only serious rival at sea, in such a position of inferiority that, quite apart from other factors of strength, Louis XV. had in mere numbers less than half the naval fighting power of his chief opponent.

A parallel story can be followed in the matter of India. This prime foundation of all England's great commercial development is the affair not of Walpole's twenty years, but of the period immediately succeeding it. The occupation and conquest of Indian territory to the exclusion of England's French rivals is not apparent before the date 1742. What is apparent is the very great expansion of commerce which the activity of the English merchants produces in the East. While Bombay was securing itself by successive alliances precariously enough against the pirates that threatened it, while Calcutta, even as late as 1742, could suffer from a Mahratta raid, and was submitting to the taxation of the virtually independent Vice-

roys of Bengal; while the Carnatic with the English establishment at Madras was threatened as late as 1740 by the Mahratta with destruction of the stable native dynasty—the trade of the English merchants was perpetually advancing. To take but the single example of Calcutta, a population numbering but ten thousand in the year 1706 and granted rather more than ten years later its establishment by the Government at Delhi, had, by 1736, grown to one hundred thousand, and its trade was reckoned to amount to at least a million. It was this supremacy of English trade which at bottom rendered the French efforts, brilliant as they were and dependent upon a strong centralised government at home, ultimately futile. Had France enjoyed supremacy at sea the end might have been different. But in the absence of that factor the preponderance of English trade perpetually told. Exact figures are not obtainable, but our best authorities presume that at the end of Dupleix's vigorous efforts and at the close of Dumas's governorship of Pondicherry in this same year of 1741, the total of French trade was certainly not one-third of the English, and may very possibly have been little more than a fifth. It was this economic factor which was largely to decide the military result to follow in the next generation.

I will close the review of this period by considering the state of Ireland.

Ireland.

There is no period in the whole history of the English connection with Ireland more critical to the fate of both countries than the period of Walpole's administration. There is also no period of which we know less.

It is the most critical period in the history of the

relations between the two countries, because in it were dissolved the last structural parts of ancient Irish society, the last hardly perceptible relics of the tribal system, and, it must also be added, the last of the fatal divisions which that system had presented in the face of the invader. There disappears the old national structure which had continuously stood up against alien influence. This, of course, had gone legally after 1690. But what I mean is that it was during the period 1720-41 that the last of the old men who could remember a better state of things died.

Just as the ancient history of Ireland loses its material relics in these twenty years, so they are the germ of the new Ireland which has become, if we consider the race as a whole, so immensely more powerful in our own day. It is from this darkest period in Irish history that you may date the beginnings of a consolidated national organism bound together not only by common memory of evil but by common experiences of foreign incapacity and cruelty; by common experiences of unparalleled persecution, and by common experiences of what tenacity of purpose will do. If a man were to draw a parallel between the general history of Europe and that of Ireland, making of the latter a little model of the greater thing, he might compare the middle of the eighteenth century to the Dark Ages into which disappeared antiquity, out of which came the strength of the Middle Ages and of the modern world.

Let us first of all survey the prime facts of the situation. Ireland counted at the beginning of this twenty years, which were the beginning of the nadir or lowest point of her history, less than three million but more than two million inhabitants. It is cus-

tomary to estimate them at about two million and a half. She counted, therefore, about one-third of England.

I would here interpose for the reader the remark which I believe to be of great historical weight, that mere numerical comparisons, a modern trick, are deceptive. It is agricultural Ireland that must be compared with agricultural England as a whole; the permanent Ireland with the permanent England: ephemeral accretions of urban population though considerable in effect must never be taken at their full numerical value, and the immense increase of urban England during the last century must not disturb our general judgment as to the relation between the two islands.

If the comparison between agricultural Ireland and agricultural England be followed, it would be found that the ratio of population between the two islands permanently considered stands normally in this proportion of one to three, and that proportion will be exhibited in many other forms besides the number of souls. You will find it, I think, in the number of distinguished men in various professions, in the less calculable effect of opinion, speech, and writing upon Europe.

To leave this digression—the Ireland of the time we are now concerned with numbered about one-third of the corresponding English population, and was about, or perhaps a little superior to, two and a half million. Of this number certainly more than three-quarters, but probably less than four-fifths, were Catholic. It is here of immense importance to appreciate historically what the division between the two religions meant as the middle of the eighteenth cen-

ture was approached. We live to-day in a time when the Catholic Church is triumphing in Europe after long peril. No educated man seriously thinks of religion save in terms of the Catholic Church or its negation. The last of the great heresies is obviously failing. But in the middle of the eighteenth century it was not so. Protestant culture was then a living thing. Its dogmas were still accepted sincerely by masses of highly cultivated men. It was not unjustly connected in the minds of many with something renewed and fresh in polity, something exact in the administration of law, and above all something strong in the citizen. *It connoted Freedom*. It is in the large Protestant countries of Europe to-day that citizenship has sunk to the lowest ebb and that private men have least power to mould the conduct of the State. But a century and a half ago it was not so. *Then Catholicism connoted*, as a rule, absolute government; popular no doubt, but deprived of any full organs for its control and criticism; while Protestantism connoted no small independence of the judges from the Government, a strong and valuable respect for law as against the will of the Prince and the singular aggrandisement of the citizen's civic power to resist administrative oppression.

All this is so remote from us to-day that I have to emphasise it, and many of my readers will have difficulty in realising it; but it was so. In the middle of the eighteenth century Protestantism had not yet led to the dispossession of the masses; it was still a living philosophy, and its natural self-sufficiency was backed by very real temporal advantages which it has since lost.

To this truth add another: the Catholic Church was

at that moment intellectually "under the weather." Mediæval philosophy was almost forgotten. The great names of Europe were either anti-Catholic names, or, if Catholic, were the names of men not concerned with any defence of the Catholic Church. All the temporal inducements men now have for loyalty to their Catholic upbringing were then lacking; not only in persecuted populations like that of Ireland but in the ordinary run of European society. Educated France, for instance, which is now so largely Catholic in conviction, and of which so great a proportion is passionate and loud in the defence of Catholicism, was then wholly biassed against the Faith. It was thought old-fashioned and irrational.

Appreciating those two European things, the fact that Catholicism was out of fashion with those who desired an intellectual reputation, and that Protestantism was then a living force, we can better understand what had happened to Ireland. To-day we think of the Protestant minority in Ireland as something separate from the nation and obviously inferior to it, but in this period of the eighteenth century any one who desired any form of social success, any one who desired to make a fortune or a name, that is, all the active, ambitious, and directing part of the nation, was not only directed toward Protestantism as its only hope, but was beckoned toward that goal by the general and European, quite apart from the Irish and local, influence of the time.

To put it in one sentence: A Catholic to-day turning renegade for a worldly purpose looks a fool. In those days the Catholic seemed a fool for standing firm.

As a consequence of this state of affairs you had

a steady drift of all the capable, organising, and ambitious men out of the Catholic mass into the Protestant ruling minority in Ireland. You had not at all an alien Protestant minority over against a solid Catholic national majority; that is a hundred miles from explaining the real state of affairs. What you had was a Protestant minority including what is now called the garrison, the descendants of the English colony or "Planters," the alien officials and place-holders sent over from England AND (that is the important point) a perpetual recruitment of the most energetic and the most worldly, ambitious, acute, men away from the Catholic into the Protestant camp.

I need not here reiterate the truth which all educated Europe has long since appreciated, that if under such circumstances the Irish race and its faith survived (as they did) that survival is historically unaccountable. Personally I regard it as miraculous.

Next let us consider the situation of the two sections into which Ireland has been thus divided. A Catholic could hold no profitable lease of land. His tenure was necessarily precarious. Should he by chance be an owner of land, a renegade heir stepped into possession in the place of the rightful owner.

He could not sit in the national Parliament. He could take no part in education, he could not receive any education. If he accumulated wealth it was at once at the mercy of those who made his laws and administered them, who occupied every seat of judgment and every municipal position. His ordinary acts of daily worship and custom were criminal acts, and it is sufficient to say that if the penal laws could have been applied as they were intended to be applied and as it was attempted to apply them, if

they had had behind them the modern machinery of a police and of rapid communications, every Catholic in Ireland would necessarily have become within a generation a man not only dependent upon a small weekly wage, but utterly incapable of rising out of that condition. As things then were, the situation admitted of exceptions. But, in general, there is no example in the whole history of Europe of so determined an effort to destroy a Nationality and a Religion as that made against the Irish and the tradition of European culture which they preserved.

When we have fixed firmly this first point in our minds, there is a second quite different point we must consider, which is too often confused with it, but which we must keep separate. There was not only this determination on the part of English and Irish Protestants combined to destroy the Irish race and its remaining possession of Catholic culture, there was also the rooted idea in the minds of the wealthy English Oligarchy, mercantile and territorial, that Ireland as a whole, Catholic or Protestant, was to be used by them for purposes of exploitation. Merchants cannot govern. It is a principle I have repeatedly put forward in this book. Ireland seemed to commercial and territorial England of the eighteenth century not something out of which they could make what they would—for a mercantile State is uncreative—but something which they could live upon; and weighted by this conception, which cared as little for the prosperity of the Protestant Irish as it did for the lives of the Catholic, the English Government has been short-sighted enough to destroy what it would of Irish industry and in particular the woollen trade.

The principle upon which commercial England here acted was a simple one common to all commercial communities which possessed the power to act upon it and one which is the only dominating factor not in national policies to-day but in the struggle between our great industrial combinations, which are more powerful than national Governments. "Where you find a competitor, if you have the power to destroy him, destroy him." This, in the case of Ireland, was done by the simple process of passing laws which forbade the English market to some Irish produce and any market at all to other Irish produce. Had Ireland been a country separated from the fate of England and one whose ruin would have involved no appreciable consequences to England, the policy though cruel would have been economically defensible, and no one but a superstitious Free Trader will deny this. But Ireland being most intimately bound up in her fate with that of Great Britain, and an impoverished Ireland being the most permanent and the most dangerous foe Great Britain could have, this policy was a mere negation of statesmanship. It was a further example of the principle which I have insisted upon throughout this book, and which best explains—after religion—the misrule of Ireland. I mean the principle that mercantile States cannot *conquer*. They can adventure, they can found colonies, they can administer areas particularly peaceful, and tax them moderately, but of conquest, that is, the imposition of a national will so that it shall incorporate and deflect the will of another nation and build up through such assimilation a greater and a greater image of itself, of that no mercantile state has ever been capable. The military States alone have achieved this supreme

task of politics. Now in the relations between England and Ireland everything turned upon an attempted *conquest*. If a conquest had not been attempted there would have been no problem. If the conquest attempted had been successful—like the Roman conquest of Gaul, the French conquest of Alsace, the Spanish conquest of Central America, the problem would have been solved, and England and Ireland to-day would be one body mutually prosperous. But that would have meant perpetual vigilance, a generous outlay of the conqueror's capital and the formation by England of public bodies determined to develop and not to exploit. England having become a commercial Oligarchy found such a task alien to her genius; she could think of Ireland only as an area to feed upon, and yet at the same time (with grave lack of economic logic) a competitor to be eliminated.

Of that spirit Walpole was the very embodiment. Two matters in his policy, the one but an incident, the other a general plan, will illustrate what I mean. The incident was that of Wood's halfpence, the general plan was that evidenced in the appointment of Boulter, and in the policy pursued by that official.

The story of Wood's halfpence may be briefly told. Ireland suffered from a grave depletion in her metal currency. To augment this was, of course, the business of the State, and any statesman acting for the State as a whole would have provided the currency required (as all States always have and must if they are even reasonably administered) by the work of the national mint. Any other method of providing currency through a private contract, means, of course, the taxation of the people in general for some private

interest. But Ireland was not, in Walpole's eyes, a part of the State at all. It was a foreign adjunct to be exploited, and the need for currency he met by giving to the King's mistress, Von Schulenberg (who bore the English title of Duchess of Kendal), the patent to provide coinage. The metal might cost £70,000 to £80,000, and he provided the patentee with the right of forcing this upon the Irish at legal tender in the value of £108,000. The woman did not, of course, intend to undertake personally the trouble of the exploitation. She at once sublet or sold the privilege to one in the trade, a certain Wood, an iron master in Bristol, who had the implements wherewith to strike the coins; and of the enormous profit expected she extracted from Wood £10,000 down as her price. The matter was launched, to his perpetual shame, with the connivance of Isaac Newton, who, as Master of the English Mint, gave his approval to the scheme. But Jonathan Swift, luckily for Ireland, though not perhaps from any true patriotic motive, defeated this one out of so many methods for the impoverishment of the country with which he was accidentally connected. In a series of letters known from the signature as the Drapier Letters, he so instructed and aroused public opinion in Ireland (reviewing at the same time many other grievances) that Walpole bowed to the storm and dropped the scheme. This was in 1724.

Walpole, defeated in this particular instance, pursued the general policy which I have called the second point in which his attitude toward Ireland may be examined. He appointed a certain Boulter (the Anglican Bishop of Bristol), Archbishop of Armagh, and clothed him with all the powers at his disposal

for the government of the country. Boulter's administration corresponded almost exactly with Walpole's in England. He died in the year of his master's fall, 1742, having for eighteen years pursued consistently the policy his creator had intended; by which I do not mean that Walpole had laid down any strict lines for the misgovernment of Ireland, but that Boulter's spirit jumped exactly with the intentions of the English Oligarchy, and that his actions were a personal epitome of their general desires.

His main object was to complete the action of the penal laws and to destroy such slight remnants as remained of opportunities for Catholics. With this end in view he prepared two Acts, the one three years after his appointment, the other seven years later.¹ The first of which took away the Parliamentary franchise from such Catholics as still had the social position to exercise it. The second of which closed to Catholics the exercise of the legal profession. These Acts mark the completion of the fifty years' policy whose object was the complete ruin of the native population. They had already been driven wholesale into destitution. It was hoped in this fashion to destroy the power of the small minority that had escaped that fate. It need not be added that Boulter at the same time packed the benches of judges and of Protestant bishops with men who would keep his end in view. A further and characteristic instance of his aims, luckily unsuccessful, was his attempt to proselytise wholesale by the establishment of the Charter Schools. In a word, Boulter represents the extreme limit of that intention which, had it been finally pursued and

¹I. Geo. II., Cap. 9, and VII. Geo. II., Cap. 5.

imposed with permanent capacity, would have destroyed the Irish people. And it is under him that we find that people at the lowest ebb of their fortunes.

It is necessary in judging this man to remember all that I have said above concerning the remaining vitality in this generation of Protestant doctrine and of a conscious Protestant civilisation. He doubtless thought it possible to create, in the place of the Irish nation, a sort of dependency ultimately Protestant in general tone, and he certainly could never have envisaged the powerful reaction toward Catholicism which has been the mark of modern times. It must further be granted that he regarded some alleviation in the economic position of Ireland as necessary, and did somewhat, though little, and that blunderingly, toward restoring the agricultural system which had been so effectually ruined.

For what had happened to the soil of Ireland was briefly this: When toward 1716 the old leases granted at the Revolution began to fall in, the English interests, corporate and private, which controlled Irish land found their most immediate profit in farming their rights through middlemen who should provide them with a direct and secure payment in money. They were not upon the spot. They had neither the patience nor the opportunity nor the ability to develop the soil. But these middlemen had, over the great mass of Irish soil, no one to deal with save the ruined Catholic peasantry *who were not permitted by law to obtain any lengthy and secure lease*. The system inevitably turned land that should have been under the plough to grazing land; that is, it inevitably demanded the largest immediate profit for the least immediate outlay, and Ireland, as a whole, fell out of till-

age and was given up to pasture, the scattered human agents of which needed but a plot of ground near the cabin for their grossly insufficient support. Districts where even grazing was a precarious resource were the refuge of a population still more destitute, existing as best it could upon tiny plots in the mountains and wild land and paying for these the heaviest tax obtainable for a mere right to live. So enormous a calamity was met by nothing more practical than an Act demanding that five out of every hundred acres should be put down to tillage, nor was it possible for such an Act to be thoroughly enforced, and the general state of agriculture may be best discovered in the simple historical incidence that with so small a population Boulter's administration was marked at its origin and at its close by famine. The year in which he withdrew the franchise from such Catholics as still possessed it, was memorable for the first of these famines, and two years before Boulter died, the second famine, that of 1740, testified to the statesmanship of himself and his master.

Take then these years which close this division of my work and are marked by the fall of Walpole and regard them as the critical moment in the story of the Irish nation, in which that nation was almost at the point of death, and from which it must pass either to dissolution or to recovery.

From the fall of Walpole, in 1742, there follows, until the surrender of the British Army at Yorktown in 1781, and the recognition of American Independence in the following year, a period of forty years, which forms a fairly clearly marked division in the history of England.

That forty years must always be associated with

the personality (though they were of course but slightly influenced by the character) of William Pitt. Pitt does not dominate and control English politics throughout as Walpole had dominated and controlled them in the twenty years of his supremacy. He is in full power for but a very few years. He has not achieved even temporary control till fourteen years have past. He virtually retired long before the close of the period. He died four years before the peace with America was signed. Even in his moment of supremacy he is but the chief figure among many, and the national forces which are at work, domestic and international, are so great that they would leave even a man of the highest capacity (which Pitt was not) subordinate. Still it is by Pitt's name and career that the whole period can best be coördinated. He is rising in the House of Commons at the beginning of it. He dies when the issue of the American War is approaching. He is the note of the time.

In the conventional delimitations of history by the reigns of monarchs the period is almost exactly divided between George II. and George III.; but though that break will come in the arrangement of the chapters in this book, it is important to remember that the period was, as a whole, one.

These were its characters:

First, the direction which had been given by the Reformation, developed in the seventeenth century and fixed by the Revolution of 1689 to the political character of Great Britain, now began to bear full fruit. The period opens with the destruction of the last Jacobite rally; before it has closed all question of any strong and native dynasty for this country is quite forgotten. England has become a strong com-

mercial state, growing with great rapidity upon the lines which such a state must follow. It is purely Protestant; politically in the hands of the small wealthy class that governs it and concerned with the enrichment of that class which it proceeds to effect with extraordinary energy.

Secondly: The Crown, after an attempt at reaction in the middle of the period, under George III., toward greater power sinks in reality lower than it had ever sunk before; and though the personality of the Monarch begins to count a little more than it could have counted under the two German Kings, yet the constitutional forms which atrophy Monarchy are forged in this period into their final shape, and by the end of it an observer can see that, for a century at least, the Executive power of the Crown has disappeared. A few remaining vital matters in which the Crown still worked (as in the direct nomination of Ministers, in the control of Foreign Policy and even personal leadership in War) under George I. and George II. are lost under George III., if not forever, at any rate up to and including our own time; and the Monarchical principle finally drops out of English life.

Thirdly: The chief external characteristic of modern England, that which will most strikingly affect a remote posterity and which is the most salient if not the most fundamental to-day, I mean what has been called the "expansion" of England, belongs to this period. It was the period immediately before—the period of Walpole—which had sowed the seed. It was the period immediately succeeding—the period of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars—which afforded unlimited opportunity for progress in this direction. But the great initial things which turned

England from a European State into the centre of "an English-speaking Colonial world" belong to the epoch of William Pitt. Every feature in it is then stamped. The determination of British power in India belongs to this period, the founding of the great Colonies, the confirmation of supremacy at sea, but also, most important of all, *the policy or fate whereby the conception of one government for the empire, one common soul, and one disciplined unity was abandoned*. For it is in this period that the effect of a successful rebellion on the part of the American Colonies initiates that "Imperial" system whose very essence has come to be a lack of definition of consciousness and of control. Of the vast consequences to the fate of Great Britain following upon such a failure to command I must deal later in its proper place. For the moment let us note that, in common with every other aspect of British Imperialism, it is first manifested in these forty years.

Fourthly: It is in these same forty years that England from within becomes industrial, fully capitalist and urban. I do not mean that you will find at the close of the period a majority of Englishmen living in towns, nor even a majority of them occupied in mechanical industry. That climax was not reached until well on in the nineteenth century. But I mean that England was coming to depend more and more for her peculiar position in the world upon her manufactures; that in these forty years the mainspring of her wealth was foreign trade combined with and largely depending on domestic manufacture; that this domestic manufacture became during those forty years something quite unique in Europe; that England in those forty years learnt to make what no one else

could make and to be the factory of the world. It was a position which she maintained for very nearly a century and which was vastly strengthened, as her Colonial expansion had been, by the preoccupation of the rest of Europe in the business of the Great War.

During those forty years began the enclosure of the Commons with its draining of village life; during those forty years arises the large proletarian industrial class. During those forty years you get the beginnings of what may be called the impersonal concentration of capital with its customary accompaniments of a rapidly increasing population and still more rapidly increasing total wealth.

Fifth: Finally, during those forty years you get in a most curious distorted form the first resurrections of Irish nationality. The influx of English and Scotch settlement has ceased; the economic contrast between England as an industrial and Ireland as an agricultural state is beginning to be apparent; and you may trace (though only through the action of a privileged and half alien minority) the turn toward the Irish nation in its modern form; the form which was so nearly to achieve independence, to thrust the problem of Catholicism forward in a fashion hitherto undreamt of, almost to break its back in the awful crisis of the famine, slowly to recover under the conditions which we all know to-day.

The
Fourteen
Years
1742-1756

The confused domestic history of the first few years of the reign, the unsuccessful and last attempt at a Jacobite restoration, the Foreign Wars with their actions at Dettingen, Laffeldt and Fontenoy, together fill the first fourteen years of this period; a division

which is concluded by the admission of Pitt (whose power had all this time been slowly growing) not only to the Ministry but virtually to the command thereof at the end of 1756. I will take these three aspects of these first fourteen years, their domestic history, the rebellions of '45, and the foreign wars, in order.

When Walpole fell it was apparent how purely personal had been the opposition he encountered, for though a Committee inquired into and reported upon the many charges against him, their conclusions were futile. No true opposition either to himself or to his policy succeeded him in power. Though it was his personal enemy Carteret who was the chief of the new Ministry under the nominal headship of Wilmington, yet Carteret himself was compelled to follow the same line in Foreign Policy which had been a chief grievance against Walpole, the "Hanoverian" line; and Carteret had at his side in the Cabinet men who had been, and who still in a fashion remained, Walpole's followers.

Domestic
History.

Chief of these were the Pelhams.

The head of the Pelham family bore the title of Duke of Newcastle; his brother Henry Pelham and he not only sit in this first Cabinet after the fall of Walpole, but are to be remembered as the names which give some unity to the succeeding fourteen years, that is, up to the moment when Pitt takes over full power. Wilmington died in the year after Walpole's fall, 1743, and at his death it was Pelham who was chosen for First Lord of the Treasury; a signal instance of the remaining power of the King to direct domestic affairs. For Pelham was a man of no remarkable ability, unequal to the task of commanding Carteret

who remained in the Administration (and who had supported the claim of Pulteney to the post) and chosen chiefly because he stood for Walpole's old policy of supporting the King in his attachment to Hanover and the Hanoverian interests upon the Continent.

Carteret (who had just inherited the title of Granville) could not indeed long remain under Pelham. In the next year, on November 24, 1744, he was dismissed, and it was Pelham who remained at the helm during the first piece of foreign affairs which came coincidentally with the change in the Ministry. When Carteret had left the Ministry in the Autumn of 1744, Pelham was free to reconstruct it upon his own lines, and it is a sufficient proof of the individual character of ambitions within the oligarchy at that moment, the absence of opposing ideals with corresponding parties, that this reconstruction mainly took the form of giving administrative power and public pay to men chosen because they had opposed the Government. The reconstruction is remarkable for the admission, among others of those who had opposed Walpole, of Chesterfield; he was given what was then the nominal post of Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland (for men then only took the salary and did not visit the island) and was sent as ambassador to open negotiations with the Dutch.

Meanwhile, some kind of negotiation was opened with Pitt; exactly what we do not know. Probably there was bribery in it (the man was gradually accumulating a fortune), certainly there was the prospect of office in the distance. At any rate, Pitt cynically went back upon his constant policy, and now advocated what he had denounced, the granting of

English subsidies for the maintenance of foreign troops in the war which the Empire and Hanover were waging with France.

Pitt was now a man of thirty-eight years of age and ready to watch every opportunity for the concentration of power within his own hands.

This inclusion of Chesterfield and this negotiation with Pitt were done against the feeling of the King.

The two years that follow are the years of the Jacobite rising and of the defeat of the army (which England was subsidising and partly recruiting) under the King's son, the Duke of Cumberland, at Fontenoy. It is not until the early days of 1746, just before the final suppression of the rebellion in Scotland, that we next find a point to note in the political arrangements of the Government. Pelham prepared at that moment—in the month of February—to admit Pitt into the Ministry. The King, with whom Carteret (now Lord Granville) had so great a personal influence, would not hear of it. Pitt's surrender of his old objection to subsidies for foreign troops had not effaced in his mind either the long opposition of the "patriot Whigs" to himself, or the instinct that Pitt's definite views upon Foreign Policy remained. What followed upon the King's refusal is a landmark in the decline of the Crown. Both the Pelhams gave up their offices; as we should say in modern terms (though the phrase would not be accurate), "the Cabinet resigned." The King told Granville, as a personal friend, to form a new Ministry. Had there been left in the Crown only enough strength to command the services of a dozen men Granville could have succeeded in grouping them into an Administration. But the Monarchy had already so far fallen that George II. could not find

those dozen men. All whom he might approach would know that their chances of money, of open salaries and secret payments, of power and the rest of it, depended by this time far more upon the Oligarchy through the House of Commons than upon the Court; and the House of Commons was with the Pelhams. Granville failed to form an Administration. The Pelhams came back triumphantly not a fortnight after the beginning of the experiment, and though the King still forbade Pitt a place in the Cabinet, that politician did not disdain the chance of making yet more money as Joint Vice-Treasurer of Ireland. In the same spring, upon the death of the Paymaster of the Forces, Pitt grasped that further opportunity and rapidly filled his pockets in succession to the dead man. He, like all the statesmen of this time, regarded political life as a means of enrichment; he also knew that no one could rise to high position from the lower ranks of the Oligarchy who did not come forward with his purse well lined. At the same time there entered the Ministry as Secretary of War another man whose name will occupy us later—Henry Fox.

William Pitt, thus in the position of Paymaster of the Forces, was not, however, so foolish as to make no more than a rapid fortune out of the public purse. He had other ambitions and greater objects. He even helped his popularity for the moment by tempering to some extent the corrupt profits attaching to the office and, for a few years more, avoided any violence in action and bided his time; and the Administration proceeded quietly enough under the guidance of the timid and not very confident Pelham.

There was an election to a new Parliament in the following year, 1747. It produced, as might have

been expected, a majority for the Ministry; and the only public feeling of any note for the moment was a dissatisfaction with what seemed to have become a meaningless war. The termination of this and the terms of the Peace I will describe elsewhere.

The remainder of the time between this Peace and the advent of Pitt to supreme power—a matter of seven years—would be little noticeable in the purely domestic history of the country were it not for the formation in 1749 of a Party which was at first little more than a union of malcontents, but which, under the surviving genius of Bolingbroke was to influence—unsuccessfully—the best political minds in England during the next generation.

Boling-
broke's
Final
Effect and
Influence.
The
"Idea of a
Patriot
King."

It may be here remarked how three things combined in this connection which have combined more than once since Great Britain set forth upon her modern career of commercial enterprise coupled with oligarchic government and the gradual dispossession of the mass of men not only from civic but also from economic power. These three things are personal genius, the idea or vision which such genius can entertain and propagate, and the failure of both. Few nations have enjoyed the talents of a greater citizen than Bolingbroke, whether in intelligence, in purpose, or in expression. No great Englishman since the seventeenth century has in politics put forward ideas more lucid and more salutary; none has more completely failed to divert his countrymen from the course upon which they had been launched.

Bolingbroke was now a man over seventy years of age, but his command of the pen, or rather of creative conceptions which the pen can clothe and present, was as great as ever. Let any one who would comprehend

how much he still intended to do read what now became a little text-book for the new Party; the "Idea of a Patriot King." The old man still conceived it possible (and it was to his honour) that a popular sovereignty could be restored in England, and that the broadening and vigorous progress toward commercial plutocracy and a forgetfulness of the populace and their instincts might be arrested. It was in this year, 1749, that the work appeared. It was upon May Day of the same year that a meeting of what was to be a Party supporting these ideas met, roughly grouped as the Friends of the Prince of Wales, and with the Duke of Beaufort in the chair. It was not of ephemeral or accidental interest that the Prince of Wales, in antagonism with his father, should have formed the rallying-point; for, through the influence of these men and their leader upon him, their programme descended to his son who, when he came to the throne as George III., eleven years later, was to make some attempt—though a fruitless attempt—to carry those ideas and that programme into effect.

At the very outset of this movement the fate which has always attached to such attempts (since England changed her ideals with her philosophy and religion) appeared in the death of the two very different men most actively concerned in it. Bolingbroke and the Prince of Wales died in the same year, 1751, the first upon the 12th of December, the second nine months before upon the 20th of March. The Prince left, as immediate heir to the throne, his little son George, the future George III., a boy ten years old. It may be imagined with what zeal the Pelhams and their dependents in the Ministry sought for the control of this lad's upbringing and political nurture. Nomi-

nally they succeeded; for in the struggle as to who should be regent in case of the King's death, their nominee, the Prince of Wales's widow, was appointed. But in fact they failed; for, as will be seen when we come to the reign of George III., the powerful effect of Bolingbroke dead survived in the young man's mind.

For the rest we may note the continued delay in the appointment of Pitt to high office, although his increasing wealth and steadfast tenacity of purpose, coupled with the clear simplicity of his talent as against the confused mediocrities surrounding him made him grow greater and greater with every year in the public eye. It was Pitt who had perceived, and probably Pitt who caused Pelham to decide, that the new expansion of English wealth permitted an extension of the national credit. It is significant of what England was already, and still more of what she was about to become, that after a long war in which she had acted largely as paymaster to the Continental armies, she emerged so much wealthier than before that such a financial policy should be attempted and should succeed. The debt stood at seventy-eight millions. It involved a payment of interest to the bondholders of three million pounds a year, that is, at the rate of about 4 per cent. It was proposed to reduce this gradually to 3 per cent. ($3\frac{1}{2}$ for eight years to 1758, and after that 3 per cent. only), with repayment at par for those who would not accept the terms. The operation was completely successful. But when in the following year, 1751, certain reconstructions took place in the Ministry, it still proved impossible to move the King in the matter of Pitt's further advancement, and he remained dispossessed of any ac-

The
Conversion
of the Na-
tional Debt.

tual power outside of the financial department which was his province.

Certain minor though important measures mark the same moment: the beginning of a national restriction in the licensing of the Liquor Trade, the adoption of the calendar common to all the great nations of Europe to-day, save Russia alone. It is also, we should note, the moment when the first stirrings of the new Irish sentiment are heard, but I must deal with this later when I speak of the Irish question as a whole.

The not eventful Parliament of 1747 came to its natural end after seven years of existence, in 1754. The event which interrupted the facile and somewhat stagnant process of political affairs and prevented the mere continuation in the next Parliament of the Ministerial policy of the last was the death of Henry Pelham. He died upon March 6, 1754, leaving vacant by his death the two chief offices, the Chancellorship of the Exchequer and the post of First Lord of the Treasury.

Now it was Pelham, for all his mediocrity, or rather on account of that mediocrity, who had determined the spirit of so many Parliamentary years. His simple plan of buying talent when he could, and opposition (which was always for sale) when he chose, had given him the facile conduct of his group and a permanent majority. With his death a host of intrigues proceeding from the personal ambitions and private greed of the politicians was bound to arise. Pelham's brother, the Duke of Newcastle, took over the Government; Pitt was still kept out of high office and—this must always be remembered, for it brilliantly illuminates the character of the government at that

time—was dependent upon Newcastle even for re-election to the House of Commons, since he was to return at the General Election as Newcastle's nominee for one of his pocket boroughs.

The Parliament was dissolved just a month after Pelham's death, at the end of the first week in April. The election that followed was foolish enough—there were but 142 seats in England contested—and it was precisely that seat which William Pitt owed to Newcastle which was the subject of a petition in which, upon the first trial of strength, the Ministry discovered that it had a majority of 151.

It was in the very essence of his political career that Pitt should be the more moved to strike at his patron from the fact that he *was* his patron. You have a repetition here of just what Walpole did in his time: a man accumulating money, rising through a great member of the nobility inferior to himself in mental vigour, and at last kicking down the ladder upon which he had risen. It was in the next year, 1755, that Pitt showed his hand. The occasion—which will be apparent when we come to speak of the military history of the period—for new and heavy subsidies to be paid to the Continental powers, subsidies demanded by the King and supported by Newcastle, was seized by Pitt. For the first time after so many years he led the popular feeling against the promise of such sums. Newcastle approached him in vain, he was unable to offer him the high office which alone would now satisfy Pitt's ambition. Newcastle in his attempt to carry the subsidies through the House of Commons gave Fox the secretaryship of State—this was in April, 1755—and Pitt, who had worked in alliance with Fox for the mastering of the Commons (in which

these two men were easily the first, if not in oratory at least in the impression they would convey), broke with his friend and told him that all understanding between them was at an end. Pitt found himself at the end of the year deprived even of the minor though lucrative office which he had held so long. This deprivation was the immediate prelude to his triumph. The following year, 1756, saw the loss of Minorca with its violent effect upon public opinion, the resignation of Newcastle, and Pitt's final opportunity. It lay with the King whether the man who was now clearly the first figure in political life should at last be given full administrative power or no. Of the many concerned it was perhaps the King's mistress, Lady Yarmouth, who decided the matter. Pitt went to pay his court to her in the October of that year. The King noted the visit, felt and expressed his annoyance, but was in the hands, among others, of that woman. The Duke of Devonshire, with whom Pitt was working, had heard from him the words, "My Lord, I am sure I can save this country and nobody else can." The country did not want saving; it was in no peril; but Pitt did have in him, mixed with so much baseness, a genuinely national aim thus oddly expressed. It was upon the 11th of November, in 1756, that Newcastle resigned. The Duke of Devonshire succeeded him as First Lord of the Treasury and nominal head of the Government. He brought with him Pitt as First Secretary of State and from that moment the nation rightly regarded Pitt as the head of the Administration and the commander of its destinies.

Advent of
Pitt's
Power.

What great things he was to do with this power we shall see upon a later page. The date marks the

end of the first period in his career, and we must, before proceeding farther, turn to the story of the rebellion and to the Foreign Policy, the Continental and other actions, which mark these fourteen years.

The long interval of twenty-four years, if we count from the abortive expedition of 1719, twenty-eight if we count from the active rebellion of 1715 rising, during which no attempt at a Jacobite restoration had been thought possible, owed their immunity from such an attempt to the common interests of France and England over that period.

The
Jacobite
Rebellion
of 1745.

But when George II., breaking his neutrality, had led English as well as Hanoverian troops against the French at Dettingen the situation was changed. Indeed it had begun to change four years before, when the Declaration of War by Walpole against Spain had begun to separate French from English Continental policy.

The Old Pretender, James II.'s son, was in Rome, when there had arisen in the late Autumn of 1743 and the early months of 1744 a plan at Versailles for the invasion of England. That plan had been abandoned; but in the meanwhile the son of the Old Pretender, known to popular tradition as "Prince Charlie," had left Rome (January 9, 1744) for France, with every intention of trying the fortunes of his House now that he might hope for the support of the French Government. He had just passed his twenty-third birthday.

Exaggerated reports of the feeling in favour of the legitimate house in England had led the Court of Versailles to their now abandoned scheme of an in-

vasion. They similarly led the Young Pretender to his great attempt and to his disastrous failure. The event of Fontenoy helped to mislead him. He exaggerated the effects of that defeat when the news of it reached him in the early summer. He gathered a small sum of money, an absurdly insufficient stock of arms, and sailed from the Mouth of the Loire on the 2d of July, 1745, upon a ship lent him by a supporter in the town of Nantes. Seven colleagues accompanied him. Another ship, which served as his armed escort, was beaten off in the Channel by the English ship *Lion*, but Charles continued alone with his companions, rounded Lands End and upon August 3d (July 23d, Old Style), landed at Eriska in the Outer Hebrides. Just over a fortnight later, on August 19th, he raised his standard in Glenfillan, having round him but 2,000 men of whom half were of the Clan of Macdonald. The very insufficient garrison of Scotland (three and a half battalions of Infantry and two regiments of Horse under the command of Sir John Cope) failed to intercept him on his march South. Charles was joined by Perth and Murray with some small accession of men. The Forth was crossed upon the 13th of September, and on the 16th the Young Pretender summoned Edinburgh to surrender. An opposing force of cavalry gave way. The Provost had neither the resolution to open the gates nor the force to defend the city. A guard-house was seized by the Camerons in the early hours of the 17th before sunrise, and at noon of the same day the Young Pretender's father, James, was proclaimed under the title of James VIII. throughout the city. By the next day Charles commanded a total force of perhaps 3,000 men, but a force not national

and mainly composed of the clans. Meanwhile, on the same day that had seen his occupation of Edinburgh, Cope coming from the North by sea had landed at Dunbar. Upon the 20th the two little Armies—Cope's command did not exceed 2,000—lay opposite each other, the Hanoverian force being toward the sea, Prince Charles's force inland, and the level ground of Preston Pans, a short day's march from Edinburgh (less than nine miles) between them. Before sunrise upon the 21st, Charles's Highlanders charged and rolled up the forces of the German King, captured their treasure and six guns. The whole thing was over in a quarter of an hour, but history commonly gives to this action the title of "The Battle of Preston Pans."

For a month Charles lay at Edinburgh without making further advance. A secret Embassy from Louis XV. reached him in the fourth week of this delay as did six small guns, a sum of money and a certain consignment of arms; while ten days later Louis XV.'s minister signed at Fontainebleau a secret agreement to support the rising. It was upon the 31st of October that Charles marched out of Edinburgh for the Border with about 5,000 Infantry, 5,000 Horse and 13 guns.

Two things already appeared as the presages of his defeat: first, he could not maintain his forces at their full establishment; and secondly, he found that the Lowland gentry would not support him. It was with the loss of 20 per cent. by desertions that he reached and took Carlisle (after a two days' siege) upon the 15th of November. Meanwhile, General Handasyde, succeeding Cope, was in Edinburgh with two regiments and a little Cavalry. General Wade, though

unable to cross from the East Coast on account of the state of the roads, was present there between Newcastle and Hexham, while in front of the Pretender, at Lichfield, a more formidable force was gathering to oppose his advance. The command of this was taken over before the end of November by the Duke of Cumberland returned from the Continent.

Charles still hoped the Jacobite feeling in Lancashire which, though exaggerated, was appreciable, would be his best support in the coming struggle. He therefore took the main road South marching upon the 18th of November. Preston welcomed him with real enthusiasm upon the 26th. Upon the 29th Manchester received him with an even greater display of loyalty and afforded a couple of hundred recruits under Towneley. He personally believed that the success of the expedition was assured. The situation of the opposing troops upon the map alone should have convinced him of his error, and his officers already knew that retreat would soon be inevitable. Cumberland's command in front of him was now at least 10,000 men strong. It occupied a line from what we now call the Potteries to Coventry, and Wade was marching South through Yorkshire to join it. The Pretender's advance was on Derby. Three days before reaching that town his Cavalry had already come in touch with the outposts of Cumberland. He entered Derby upon the 4th of December, but his officers, already in the mood I have mentioned, had discovered by this time that south of Lancashire they would have no support. Upon the next day, the 5th, they demanded, through Murray, his Chief Commander, a retreat, and on the 6th that retreat was begun.

It was closely followed by the Cavalry both of Cumberland and of Wade. A suggestion that the diminished and retreating force should turn and give battle at Lancaster was abandoned; there was nothing more than a skirmish at Clifton near Penrith until, two days later, upon the 20th of the month, the Border was recrossed and Charles was once more in Scotland. The retreat had left behind it a garrison in Carlisle, a senseless manœuvre; it capitulated to Cumberland two days before the end of the year. Charles reached Glasgow immediately after Christmas, waited there until after the New Year and found that the situation in Scotland at least had somewhat turned in his favour. Further levies had been raised and a few hundred Regulars from France, Scottish and Irish in recruitment, had landed. The Pretender left Glasgow on the 3d of January, took Stirling on the 7th, laid siege to the castle and beat off a force under Hawley that had advanced to molest him. This was on the 17th of January at Falkirk; but a week later Cumberland had arrived in Edinburgh to take command. Charles was for going westward to attack him but his officers again opposed what would have been undoubtedly, or, at least in all military probability, an invitation to defeat. They were moved to this decision by the continuous and heavy desertions which were thinning the Loyalist Army. Instead of getting back again into the Lowlands, where they knew that support was lacking, the Pretender's forces turned back for the Highlands. Between the middle of February and the 1st of March they had seized the two points, Fort Augustus and Fort George, which command the depression and main communication across the Highlands. But meanwhile

Battle of
Culloden.

Cumberland had received reinforcement. He came up along the East Coast and massed all his army, nearly 9,000 strong, at Cullen. Charles at Culloden, still commanding some 7,000 men, failed to surprise Cumberland at Nairn in a sudden attack upon the night of the 15th of April. The failure at once discouraged and tired out the Loyalist body. They lost heavily in stragglers and in deserters as well, and when Cumberland, following them up upon the next day, the 16th, attacked with his artillery, they were already doomed. The charge of the Clans failed against regular discipline and the experience now gained in dealing with a Highland rush; with that action the hopes of the Stuarts ended. Little more than a month later Cumberland, firmly secured in Fort Augustus, was ravaging the Highlands and earning that popular title of "The Butcher" which history or tradition has fastened upon him perhaps unjustly but permanently. And from that moment, the early summer of 1746, a regular policy of "penetration" into the Highlands began. It has not ceased, first in a military, then in an economic, and later in a general and social form, to the present day.

Continental
Policy and
Wars in
these Four-
teen Years.

Having seen what fortunes attended the Jacobite rising we are free to turn to the second military aspect of the time, the Continental.

The operations of the British Army abroad or those connected by alliance with British interests during the period 1742-1756 (which may be called the Rise of Pitt) are discovered in two fields, the American and the Rhine Valley. The action of the Navy which immediately later came so singularly to determine national success, is chiefly remarkable in this same period for the loss of Minorca.

The operations in the Rhine Valley begin with the support of Maria Theresa, the Queen of Hungary, against French pressure and Prussian insolence in her claim to succeed to the Empire as heir to her father. A contingent of 16,000 men was sent to the Low Countries: a large proportion of British for the time and for the interests concerned. For that force accounted for more than a fifth of the total army to be assembled upon the Northeastern frontier of France. But there was delay in furnishing certain of the contingents, notably the Dutch, and the year 1742 passed idly with a British contingent centred round Ghent, inactive. The whole of English diplomacy and Foreign policy at this moment was hampered by the Hanoverian connection. The Government was persuaded to the very unpopular step of spending English money in the pay and support of as large a body of Hanoverians, while the King was negotiating for Hanover a Treaty of Neutrality with that very power, Prussia, which was Maria Theresa's chief enemy. It was not until the next year, 1743, that this confused situation led to anything definite. But in that year George II. broke the neutrality, fought French troops and engaged in an action of no great historical significance, indeed, but to be remembered both for the steadiness which British troops displayed and for the fact that it was the last in which an English sovereign appeared in person at the head of his troops. This action bears the name of the Battle of Dettingen.

It was upon the 27th of April, 1743, just after the rise of Parliament, that George II. embarked for the war. The British contingent in the Austrian Netherlands under Stair had been marching eastward since February, and was fixed toward the middle of

Battle of
Dettingen.

May at Aschaffenberg, a crossing of the River Maine due east from Mayence upon the Rhine and about four days easy marching from that main obstacle in all these campaigns upon the frontiers of the Germans. His force, half Hanoverian, half English, was there joined by the young Duke of Cumberland, the King's son, and there he awaited a further reinforcement of 12,000 German troops which George II. was to bring him.

It was upon the 19th of June that the King did arrive with far too heavy a train of encumbrances. He found the army almost destitute of supplies and the French forces that were arrayed against it cutting off communication from the Upper Valley. That opposing Army under Noailles was somewhat superior in numbers and had a great advantage of position, for the mixed force under the King of England with its British contingent was shut up between the river and the hills, cut off, as I have said, from food and ammunition up stream, and with no opportunity of receiving further resources unless it were to march down the river-bank toward magazines which awaited it at Hanau, some miles lower down the water. Meanwhile the French force was marching from the other bank and, at the first sign of movement upon the part of the Anglo-German command, would naturally go forward upon its own side, cross the stream at the next bridge (about eight miles down, at Seligenstadt) and block the issue of their enemy from the defile between the hills and the river.

That was exactly what the French did. George II.'s army broke camp before midnight, upon Wednesday, the 26th of June, and began its march down the river. Noailles had discovered the move imme-

diately after midnight. He sent 28,000 of his Infantry under Grammont to go forward and cross by the bridge of Seligenstadt and to block the defile. He put batteries upon his bank of the river to sweep the enemy on their march; he arranged for a smaller portion of his forces to cross the river at Aschaffenberg when the Anglo-German Army should have evacuated that place, and so to hold the rearmost or southern end of the defile between the river and the hills. George II.'s command was thus in a trap with a force nearly two-thirds as large as itself holding the head of the narrow way in front of it and another force prepared to block the retreat or, if the defeat were bad, the rout behind it. There was no avenue of egress to the left where ran the Maine nor to the right where the steep Spessart hills were without roads passable to artillery and wagons. Further, this apparently doomed body was in the last extremity for supplies.

The King had wholly misunderstood the obvious opportunities of which Noailles had taken advantage. He never thought the defile would be blocked in front of him. His only fear was lest there should be an attack following up the march upon the rear, and there he had put his Hanoverian cavalry, the English Guards, and a due proportion of guns. It was as late as eight o'clock before the commanders of the Anglo-German column appreciated what had happened and discovered that their issue from the narrow strip between the river and the heights was blocked by Grammont's force. The village lying immediately behind this force and at the mouth of the defile is the village of Dettingen, which gives its name to the action. There was no choice now before George II. but to fight his way out. He deployed his forces in

line with the greater part of British troops upon the left near the river, and his son, the Duke of Cumberland, had the place of honour at the head of the first line and as Colonel of the Grenadiers.¹ These dispositions were finally completed about midday.

Had the King been compelled to fight under the conditions which Noailles had decided, he could not, humanly speaking, have escaped. Though Grammont's force was inferior in numbers to the Anglo-German column, it held the narrow gut between the hills and the river, and in such a position was unbreakable. For some reason that has never been rationally explained, Grammont sacrificed the whole of his advantage and moved forward out of the gut into the wider plain, thus throwing away the whole advantage which the narrow gate he had been holding gave him. One explanation, perhaps the most probable, is that he believed the mass of his enemy's army to have got past him in the night before they had crossed the river and that he had only to deal with and destroy the large rear-guard. At any rate he *did* come forward into the wider open space, and once he had done that his defeat was as certain as his victory had been half an hour before. For he had taken up exactly the position where the superior numbers against him would tell most heavily. After some heavy fighting, in which both King George II. and his son behaved with conspicuous courage, Grammont's force was driven back, the mass of them forced back across the bridges (under galling fire and with

¹ By an unpleasant irony he was wounded in the confusion by a pistol-shot fired from his own side, and the wound proved both severe and dangerous. Wolfe, who was later to conquer at Quebec, was present and was a witness to the young man's gallantry.

the breakage of one bridge), and the Anglo-German army was free to continue its march on Hanau, leaving its wounded and the field of battle to the enemy, but having achieved its tactical purpose. It had lost in this break-out from the trap less than 2,500 men, and had inflicted a loss of more than double that number upon its opponents.

The success at Dettingen had a strong, though ephemeral, effect upon English opinion. For the moment that Hanoverian connection which at once brought English troops into the field against France and diverted English money to the pay of the King's forces, was not only tolerated but almost popular. The permanent undercurrent of feeling, however, remained, and the doubtful advantage to Britain of expending both men and treasure in the Continental interests of her German dynasty was emphasised by the inaction which followed the campaign of 1743.

The fall of Carteret (Lord Granville), which we have seen in the pages dealing with the domestic political history of the period, had been largely due to the support he had given to the Hanoverian policy, and when with 1745 the New Ministry continued, first by indirect,¹ afterward by direct methods, the foreign subsidy and the foreign draft of troops, British opinion as a whole was averse to the new adventure. Nevertheless it was pursued.

¹ A transparent subterfuge was the first refuge of the Ministry. The Hanoverian troops were taken into the direct service of Maria Theresa, but the English subsidy of £ 350,000, which that monarch received from England, was raised to half a million, so that she could meet the requirements in pay and support of this new contingent. Later, the trick was abandoned and the direct payment of the Hanoverian troops with English money was resumed.

The
Campaign
of 1745 and
the Battle
of Fon-
tenoy.

For the Campaign of 1745 the young Duke of Cumberland, only twenty-four years of age, was made Commander-in-Chief of the English forces and the Hanoverian contingent that marched with them. He had under him some 22,000 men, of whom more than three-quarters were the British battalions and squadrons.¹ The Dutch and Austrian Allies more than doubled this force, and it was with but little less than 50,000 that the combined army advanced through the Netherlands in the spring to meet the forces of Louis XV. Those forces were under the command of the greatest general of the time, Maurice de Saxe, the illegitimate son of Augustus of Saxony, the King of Poland, thus a German and a Protestant by origin and one whose talents are justly claimed by German writers as a product of their national culture.

Maurice de Saxe, bringing the French forces to the siege of Tournai, which fortress he rightly regarded as the key to the Netherlands, sent a portion of his command to threaten Mons, another fortress of less importance, a few days' march to the east. The feint was successful; Cumberland, with the allied commanders of the Austrians and the Dutch, imagined the siege of Mons to be the main act of war threatened in the new campaign. Meanwhile Saxe brought the great mass of his troops round Tournai and proceeded to lay siege, the place being defended by a garrison of not more than 8,000 Dutch. Cumberland advanced from Brussels about fifty miles away to the northeast, at first under the impression that Mons must be his objective, and only later discovered that it was Tournai that should be relieved.

¹Indeed, at the beginning of this Campaign close upon 17,000 men and officers, all told, were of British origin.

It was upon the last day of April but one that the Allies left the neighbourhood of Brussels, the capital of the Austrian Netherlands, upon their task, and undertook their march to the southwest. Their progress was exceedingly slow, ten days and a portion of the eleventh being occupied in covering a total distance of forty-eight miles. This tardiness in their advance, though not of capital importance to the fortunes of the campaign—for they were moving against a stationary enemy—was yet not without its effect. It gave Saxe ample time to study and compare the position in which he would receive them; and though the delay may be excused in part by the extreme wetness of the season, and the impassable condition of the fields upon either side of the main road, it certainly cannot wholly be so excused.

The approach to Tournai from the direction of Brussels is covered by a whole half-circle of woods pierced by but few and difficult gaps, most of which are far too narrow to allow an army to deploy. But there is a larger gap than the rest upon the southeast of Tournai, about four miles from the town. It was apparent that the Allies could only come up by this gap with any effect, that is with any hope of drawing up a full line of battle; there it was Maurice de Saxe determined to prepare against their advance. If he could hold this gap successfully he would cover his operations round Tournai behind it completely, and unless that portion of his forces which was holding the gap were broken or turned by the enemy, that enemy could not reach Tournai and raise the siege.

To the north of the gap is a wood called the Wood of Barri. As you follow round in a segment of a circle toward the south—that is, as you follow round

the position which the French would have to defend against the advance of the Allies—you come to the river Scheldt. The total of open ground thus afforded between the wood and the river is about three miles wide.

The position, however, is not a true segment of a circle. The high land of the gap up to which the Allies would have to press, and the edge of which it was the business of the French to defend, has a crest shaped in what is very nearly a right angle.

Take a line from the Scheldt and run it about a mile and a half due eastward, then turn sharp round northward and continue this another mile until you reach the wood of Barri, and these two limbs of the right angle form the edge of the plateau, from which the fields slope gradually down toward the lower land whence the attack of the Allies would come.

At the point where the crest thus sharply turns a right angle, is the hamlet of Fontenoy, which has given its name to the famous action that followed. I will, for the sake of clearness in this brief description of this most important action, call that limb of the road which runs east and west from Fontenoy to the river the southern front of the French angle, and I will call that portion of the crest which runs north and south from Fontenoy to the wood the eastern front of the French.¹ The gradual and uninterrupted falling away of the bare fields below this angular crest to the south and to the east, forms what soldiers call a *glacis*; that is, a field of fire down which the defenders occupying the parapet or upper

¹ For a detailed description of the action, with plans, I refer the reader to Mr. Charteris's work, "The Life of the Duke of Cumberland." London: Edward Arnold.

edge can fire with the most complete effect. For a slight declivity of this sort lies more completely exposed to view and to the action of missiles than does a flat surface; its acclivity is a check to the attack, and at the same time the slightness or regularity of the slope deprives the attack of cover in any form.

Saxe strongly fortified the salient point of Fontenoy village. At the end of his northern front, where it touched the wood, he threw up a strong redoubt called the redoubt of Eu. The guns at Fontenoy firing northward across this front, and the guns of the redoubt firing southward across it swept the whole of the glacis that led up to it.

As to the other southern front between Fontenoy and the river, Saxe fortified it with a line of earthworks. He put upon his northern front the best and the largest numbers of his troops, upon his southern front a smaller number of less carefully chosen men, and kept behind both a large reserve. He further lined his northern front with about one hundred cannon. His camp and the great body of the reserve occupied the plateau within the angle formed by the two fronts, and in the northern part of that reserve was to be found a body destined to play a considerable and decisive part in the action—the Irish Brigade.

The Allies reached the low-lying ground in front of this carefully prepared position upon the evening of the 9th of May, a Sunday, having left Brussels, as I have said, upon the 30th of April. It was a night of torrential rain, but though this incommoded the army and soaked the ground, it had little effect upon the action that was to follow. The next day, Monday the 10th, was occupied in driving back the French

outposts who were watching the villages of the low-lying ground below the position. It was for the morrow, Tuesday the 11th, that the main attack was reserved.

Upon the morning of that day the dispositions arranged upon the side of the Allies were as follows:

The Dutch half of the army, under Waldeck, was to attack the southern front of the French and carry the fortified line between Fontenoy and the river. The English and Hanoverian half, under the command of the young Duke of Cumberland, was to attack the eastern front of the French between Fontenoy and the wood. These two attacks, to be effective, should have been delivered simultaneously.

So far as Cumberland's part of the business was concerned, it was planned with perfect judgment, and that which could be carried out under his own eye was performed with astonishing and unexpected success.

Unfortunately for him and for the cause of the Allies, a subordinate of his failed in what was an essential part of this plan.

If Cumberland was to attack up that long, coverless slope, swept by the guns of Fontenoy on the one side and by the redoubt of Eu on the edge of the wood on the other, he would be exposed to a murderous cross-fire of artillery across which he could hardly hope to lead his troops. He therefore summoned at dawn a brigadier-general of the name of Ingoldsby, gave him four battalions (two English, one Highlander, and one Hanoverian), and entrusted him with the task of going up through, or along, the edge of the wood and carrying the redoubt. This manœuvre Ingoldsby, for reasons that will always remain

obscure, failed not only to carry out, but to attempt.¹

It may be that in the mist of the early morning he failed to find his objective; it may be that the presence of the enemy's troops in the wood checked his advance; but at any rate the position of Eu was never attacked, and was able to maintain its fire across the glacis the whole day.

The whole of the Duke of Cumberland's command, twenty English and five Hanoverian battalions, were drawn up in line in the early morning facing the crest of the French eastern front about half a mile away and above them. Before he moved, a short artillery duel took place, and one of the shots from the English guns killed, in this first episode of the battle, that same Grammont who had thrown away the French chance at Dettingen. This exchange of cannon-shots over, the whole line, in perfect regularity and led by Cumberland in person, began its advance up the hill.

The regular and deployed line began their advance up the slope. What followed was a conspicuous example—the most remarkable perhaps in all the wars of the eighteenth century—of the disciplined tenacity obtainable from the professional armies of that time.

Though the battery by the wood had not been silenced or even attacked, and though, therefore, for a full half mile of the slow upward progress over drowned ploughed land the Anglo-Hanoverian line was subject to the fire of its guns as well as to those of Fontenoy, there was neither wavering nor check

¹In the court martial that followed, Ingoldsby was acquitted of cowardice, but he was suspended from the Service for an error of judgment.

in the deliberate movement. The rents torn in the fabric of that line by the continued cannon-fire were automatically filled by closing up as the line advanced; it triumphantly reached the crest and stood within thirty yards of the enemy's line, which had come forward to receive it, the three regiments of the English Guard facing those of the French King.

In the actions of that time, when a musket-shot at a range of more than eighty yards was wasted, and when the full effect of fire was only felt at the very shortest range—thirty or forty yards—when some considerable time had also to be expended in re-charging one's piece, the advantage of reserving fire was overwhelming; and, generally speaking, that of two opposing lines which fired second and which allowed its opponents to volley before close contact was reached, obtained an immediate advantage which, with discipline, it could preserve. Conscious of this, neither of the two opposing ranks for some moments chose to empty its muskets. It is to this moment of singular silence that belongs the story, true or false, but illuminating of the time, "Gentlemen of the English Guard fire first," and the anecdote of Lord Charles Hay drinking the health of the enemy from his flask.

It would seem certain that some commander of the French line ordered the discharge of a volley not co-ordinate with the rest of the command. It was replied to by a series of regularly succeeding volleys from the English side, running down the line from north to south, before which the French defence began to crumble, and after the effect of which Cumberland's force pressed still farther forward on to the plateau, pushing before it the now disordered regiments of Saxe

and reaching to the very camp of the enemy. The time was somewhere between 10 and 11 o'clock, and it seemed as though the battle was won.

What turned the fortunes of the day was the coincidence of two separate movements. First, and most important, the Dutch attack upon the French southern front—which should, of course, have been exactly coincident with the Anglo-Hanoverian attack upon the northeastern—completely failed. Had it succeeded, had pressure of an increasing kind been felt by Saxe upon the southern edge of the angular crest, it is almost certain that Cumberland upon his side could have got right through, dispersed the weakened French reserves, and won the day. But the Dutch attack was insufficiently pressed, and (if we are to trust the most of contemporary evidence) beneath the military standard that might rightly be expected of trained troops. Cumberland was therefore acting alone and unsupported, and though he had pierced the French line opposing him, had to meet the whole of Saxe's reserves.

Coincidentally with this failure of the Dutch to the south, Saxe launched upon the Anglo-Hanoverian line, as it still pressed forward, charge after charge of his reserve cavalry, and all the while the guns of the battery of Eu and of Fontenoy were tearing Cumberland's troops in reverse, firing upon their rear and exposing them to the most galling and demoralizing type of offence which troops can suffer. Further, the British line was no longer ordered or even. Under the pressure of this fire from its flanks and rear it had bent inward at the right and at the left and formed a denser, a more "bunched," mass as an objective for the attack of the French reserves. The

British advance halted, and as it halted Saxe (suffering at that moment agonies from his illness and performing a miracle of self-control to save the day) launched upon them the four battalions of the regiment called "Normandy," certain other forces in support, and in particular the six battalions of the Irish Brigade. It was this final charge which decided the issue,¹ and the Irish nation, which has regarded the action of its exiles at Fontenoy as an answer to the broken Treaty of Limerick, though it has been accused of exaggeration in its enthusiasm, is historically justified. The result of Fontenoy is largely due to the valor of the Irishmen in that charge.

Cumberland's command, now forced almost into the form of a square by the pressure upon three sides, began first to waver and then to give way down the slope. But even at this moment, after three hours of such punishment as troops had perhaps never before received since professional armies had met upon the levels of the Netherlands, there was no disorder; the retreat was regular as the advance had been. It was covered by well-ordered and duly successive volleys from the battalions protecting its rear, and further protected by the countercharges of the English cavalry. The French pursuit, therefore, which was prolonged into the night, was neither pressed nor dangerous, and it was an unbroken though defeated army which Cumberland retired through the afternoon toward Ath (thirteen miles away) and the protection of its guns. The retirement was continued all night, and the young commander did not put foot to

¹ Coupled with an important deflection of the English fire caused by the sudden appearance of certain guns of the French Swiss Guards upon the English left.

ground until he had spent over twenty-four hours in the saddle.

As trophies of battle the French could boast forty cannon; their losses in officers and men were superior to those of Cumberland's command, though this was extremely heavy, amounting to certainly more than thirty, and probably nearly forty, per cent. of those who had advanced against the French eastern front. As for the Dutch half of the Allies, which had failed before the southern front, not one man had fallen in their regiments to four that had been sacrificed in the all but successful move of the Duke of Cumberland.

The effects of Fontenoy were complete. Louis XV., who had been present with his heir on the field, received a popular support which he did but contrive to lose by indifference and too long a life. Indeed, Napoleon said of this action that "it preserved the French monarchy for forty years. The immediate results were also striking. Tournai fell upon the 20th of June, Ghent afterward with its vast accumulation of stores, Oudenarde, and later Ostend, the British port of communication. By September troops were already being recalled for service against the Jacobite rising. In October, Cumberland himself returned, and just before the end of the year the last contingent of the British-paid forces upon the Continent, a mercenary body of 6,000 Hessians, sailed for Scotland, and the Campaign, so far as Britain was concerned, had come to its disastrous end.

The third action of this unsatisfactory war is known by the name of Laffeldt and both from its nature and results needs far less description than that of Fonte-

Battle of
Laffeldt.

noy and takes a far less important place in military history. It took place after yet another two years had passed and after yet another period of inaction (accompanying an attempt at peace) had elapsed. The French were in this year, 1747, in occupation of the whole of what is now Belgium and was then the Austrian Netherlands. Louis XV. came in person to Brussels on the 22d of June and Saxe's commander-in-chief marched upon Maestricht, the first Dutch town beyond the frontier, and a fortress which commanded the Lower Valley of the Meuse. Cumberland, with the Allied forces, inferior in number to those of Saxe, made a parallel march to intercept them. The armies met upon a confused plain varied by slight undulations. The action has but few tactical points to note and no salient ones. It was fought upon the 1st of July, and consisted simply in the attempt of Saxe to pierce the opposing line which lay extended over a distance of at least five miles. The point at which Saxe intended to effect this was the central point near the village Vlytingen, next to which the hamlet or group of farms called Laffeldt, which have given their name to the battle, was at first but a subsidiary position, the attack on Vlytingen involving fighting around Laffeldt as well.

On that afternoon of Saturday, the 1st of July, little was done. On the Sunday morning, July 2d, in very wet and sodden weather Cumberland retired his centre from Vlytingen, thus leaving Laffeldt to form an exposed point in the line, his object being, perhaps, to draw the French line into the curve thus formed (supposing they were foolish enough to be so enticed), and to bring them under a conflicting fire from both sides. Saxe did nothing of the kind. What he did

was repeatedly to attack the exposed and partially isolated position of Laffeldt, and the column which he advanced toward Vlytingen was halted at that point and pressed no farther, but its guns were ordered to be turned to the right and their fire swept in flank the British and Hanoverian troops still holding Laffeldt and its high-hedged orchards. In the repeated attacks upon the place the Irish Brigade in particular suffered very heavily and showed memorable gallantry. In spite of this concentration upon the point of Laffeldt it was not there that the issue was decided. Indeed Cumberland found it possible after repelling so many attacks to move forward when Saxe charged with his cavalry at a point just to the West of Laffeldt itself. The troops there facing the French Cavalry charge were Dutch; they broke. Laffeldt (with Cumberland present there) was thus isolated and the line of the Allies dismembered somewhat to the East of its centre. A very little more delay would have involved the destruction of all that lay Eastward of the point where the French cavalry had got through, and Cumberland thus defeated was compelled to retreat immediately. The retreat was rendered possible and even secure by a very gallant countercharge led by Kignonier at the head of the Greys and Inniskillings. Its leader was captured, but the charge achieved the tactical end for which it was delivered and Cumberland's command at Laffeldt was able to retire in order. The losses upon the French side were heavy—not far short of 10,000 men; upon the side of the Allies far less severe, perhaps 6,000, and of these no less than one-third came from the British contingent which had borne the worst in the fighting. It is noteworthy that Wolfe, whom we have

seen at Dettingen and whom we shall see later in Canada, was one of the wounded.

Strategically the French victory was of little use to the victors, for Cumberland, having withdrawn Eastward across the Meuse with his forces virtually intact to the immediate neighbourhood of Maestricht, that stronghold which was the object of the Campaign, was not invested. The French later took Bergen Op Zoom, but they could not effect the conquest of Holland. They were prepared, indeed, the next year to march again upon Maestricht, but they were more prepared for peace, and that peace was signed, with the result, in general terms, that the position of both the French Monarchy and of its opponents were in much the same situation as before the war had begun. It is known to history as the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, and from that moment to the great efforts under Pitt ten years later, English troops are little concerned with the Continent of Europe.

The frontier fighting in the American woods during this same period (1742-1756) of Pitt's rise to power, insignificant as military events, but politically of some moment (especially in connection with the relations between England and her Colonies beyond the Atlantic), I will deal with later when I come to the War of Independence and its causes.

With the end of 1756 came, as we have seen, the final arrival of Pitt to supreme power, and his determining effect upon the future fortunes of his country, especially as a colonial and commercial power.

Pitt's combined supremacy and eminence may be summed up in the title "The Seven Years' War." It was the Seven Years' War, that is, the war which engaged all Europe from 1757 to 1763, that coincided

with all Pitt did and stands for in English history. He was, of course, in no way a principal agent therein. He was but the head of many directing minds in one of the many nations whose interests clashed during this great step in the general history of Europe. Nevertheless, they were upon the whole the ideas of Pitt, which not only determined English action during this business but which also were successful, and it was in no small measure the personal decisions of Pitt that brought those ideas into effect. More important still, the English nineteenth century coming at last to accept nationally and unanimously, as it were, without reserve and like a kind of creed, certain political doctrines—that the expanse of oversea trade should be the test of national greatness, that a Navy overwhelmingly superior to that of any rival was a national necessity, that the founding of distant Colonies was at once to the national advantage and a national glory and duty combined; that the presence in those Colonies of men alien or antagonistic to England was of ultimate advantage to the English name—all these things have appeared most strikingly in the Seven Years' War, and to some extent at least in Pitt's own mind.

One must never exaggerate the creative effect of any one man, even if he be a man really great, powerfully influencing his fellows, or possessing a calculation of the future superior to that of his contemporaries. Pitt was certainly not thus great either in the power to impress others or in the power to foresee. But those things which he desired for England, some of them consciously and some of them but half-consciously, turned out to be the very things in which England was to be successful and contented in the

century that followed his own efforts. It is this coincidence which gives Pitt his considerable place in the story of the country.

The Seven Years' War was primarily a final recognition of the intimate distinction which the Reformation had drawn between England and North Germany on the one side, and the old continuous civilisation of the Roman Empire upon the other. It was the first clear grouping of the two principal nationalities—the South German and the French—which had not yielded to the storm of the sixteenth century against the nationalities which had broken away in that storm. The natural sympathy between the Protestant powers of the North has never long been lost from that day to this. To see in any one event such as the Seven Years' War (and the diplomatic revolution which preceded it) so great a thing may seem to many of my readers exaggerated, but I believe it to be a just view. If by some catastrophe our civilisation should fail and Protestant capitalism after its great commercial expansion should proceed to destroy Liberty and the Arts, the material decay would, of course, be traced by an historian of the remote future as an effect of the Reformation, but the moment upon which he could lay his finger and say: "From this moment the danger was apparent," is the moment of the Seven Years' War. It was the Seven Years' War that really made Prussia; it was the Seven Years' War that coincided with the final establishment of Naval supremacy, Colonial expansion and the industrial tide in England. If, upon the contrary, the continuous civilisation of Europe should regain its lost field, the Seven Years' War will appear to that remote historian as the historical point from

which the rally began. Such is the large and, as I am convinced, the fundamental way of regarding those crucial years, which, more minutely examined, are but a tangle of personal intrigues and criss-cross alliances. For it was in the Seven Years' War that the French Monarchy was mortally wounded; that the hegemony of Vienna over the Germanies was mortally wounded, too; that Canada became English; that the five generations of unquestioned mastery at sea fell to English sailors.

Hitherto, from the sixteenth century onward, the polarisation of European energy, at any rate of political arrangement, had been as between the Empire and France, and the Empire was Austria.

This division it was which had permitted the establishment of a strong Protestant North Germany through the policy of Richelieu. This division it was which had reflected on the history of England by leaving successive British Governments in doubt to which side of the great struggle they should lead. It had now brought French influence in with the later Stuarts, now Dutch and North German influence in with the Revolution and the Hanoverians; now brought English troops into the field and English interests through the Hanoverian connection, and again created a reaction (both for and against Prussia) against such foreign adventures and permitted peaceful development under Walpole.

From the year 1756 all that changed. The restless and conquering colonial energy of the English was already at issue with the more formal and intensive French Colonial experiments in North America, when, upon May 1, 1756, Louis XV. of France signed his Treaty of Alliance with the Empress Maria The-

resa of Austria. The first considerable event following that change was the capture of Port Mahon and Minorca. The effect upon Prussia, of course, was immediate. England's action under Pitt developed more slowly.

To begin with, there was a hitch in the securing of Pitt's own position. It was, as we have seen, in the November of that year that Pitt, under the nominal headship of the Duke of Devonshire, took over the administration. This first attempt at a great Ministry inspired by him was short-lived. The animosity of the King, and the still greater detestation of Pitt which the Duke of Cumberland felt, Pitt's own intervention in the attempt to save Byng's life, most important of all, the parliamentary support which Newcastle and the Pelhams had secured by so much corruption over so many years, was too strong for him, and upon April 6, 1757, Pitt was dismissed from power. But Pitt had upon his side from now onward a popular force stronger than all these forces in opposition to him. Several of the great cities, with London at their head, gave their mark of support by voting him a freeman. It looked as though the whole summer would go by without any effective government in England, save that of the Court. At last—largely through the diplomatic ability of Chesterfield—a compromise was arranged, and it was perhaps hastened by the foreign difficulties of the moment which coincided with the bad news from India and the defeat of Prussia at Kolin. Upon June 9, 1757, Pitt's great Ministry was at last formed by his alliance with Newcastle and by his thus securing permanent support in the House of Commons. Pitt was in this Administration no more than Secretary

of State "for the Southern Department." The Navy, which was his chief care, was nominally to be controlled by Anson as First Lord, but Pitt, it was arranged, was to give instructions to the admirals, though those instructions must be countersigned by three of them. And from that moment it is Pitt whom we must regard as the chief operator in the great achievements by which the English Navy was to found, directly and indirectly, the new Colonial Empire of England.

Pitt's direction of the public affairs of Great Britain will also probably appear in the eyes of the future historian to mark the summit of English fortune in the field and against armed rivals. In so far as the greatness of a country depends upon the awe in which it is held by armed opponents, its success over them and the combined strength and vigour of its action abroad, Great Britain has not before or since that date equalled its achievements. In this we must not, of course, ascribe too much to one man. There was a coincidence between the active patriotism and lucid brain of Pitt and the moment when England was in every way best fitted for so singular and striking a period of success. But that period will always be known by Pitt's name, and Pitt will always justly stand as the type of the intensely national oligarchy which was at the foundation of England's greatness in the eighteenth century. It would be an error to say that Pitt appreciated the grave decline of the French Monarchy. It is rare indeed that any man conceives the main political tendencies of his time and the causes of the future. But it would be true to say that he instinctively perceived the opportunity his country had over its ancient rival. His first act,

therefore, or at least his first act of importance, was to join Frederick of Prussia in the great quarrel which had just then broken out on the Continent of Europe.

That quarrel (known in general European history as "The Seven Years' War") was, like all the eighteenth century struggles, dynastic.

Two great forces provoked it. The anxiety of the Empress Maria Theresa to restrain the unscrupulous and evil power of Frederick of Prussia (founded at its origin in the treason against her house and pursued with abominable cynicism during all her early married life) and the determination of the aging and weakening French Monarchy under Louis XV. to support Maria Theresa in her Austrian claims to power against the Northern Protestant Kingdom. It seems to us to-day almost self-evident that the business of an English statesman was to side at once with Prussia against the two Catholic powers of France and Austria. Not only because Europe was now falling into a division of North and South by the new arrangement between Vienna and Paris, but also because the French Navy and French Colonial enterprise was still and was to be for three generations more the only bar to English commercial expansion.

But what seems self-evident to posterity in possession of effects and results requires genius for contemporaries to seize. Pitt had that genius, and it was much more his discernment of the European position than the mere necessity of covering Hanover that determined his action. He saw what a chance Fate had given to the advance of English commerce and Colonial enterprise, and he took it.

None the less, the first year of this great experi-

ment was disastrous—save in India. The permanent and lasting success of England in the East at this moment I will describe on a later page.

The attack upon Louisburg in America failed, so did the attack against Rochefort under Admiral Hawke; and, much the worst of these checks, the Duke of Cumberland was defeated in Germany and was compelled to capitulate in the Convention of Klosterseven, while Frederick of Prussia, the ally, was defeated at Kolin. True, Frederick recovered the position, so far as he was concerned, by his subsequent victory at Rossbach and at Lissa against the French and Austrians respectively. But England—save in her Indian effort—had suffered heavily at this inception of the new forward policy.

With the year 1758 the tide turned, and it was largely due to the untiring energy of Pitt that it did turn. He repudiated the Convention of Klosterseven; he placed in command of the Hanoverian Army a new general, Ferdinand of Brunswick; he attacked the French vigorously in America; and though he failed to occupy that great natural highway between the English-American Colonies on the Atlantic seaboard and the French-Canadian Colonies on the St. Lawrence, which highway was commanded by Ticonderoga, Fort Duquesne, where Pittsburgh now stands, was taken and the communications between the St. Lawrence and the Mississippi were held in future against the French by the English. He sent expeditions against the French ports of the Channel, and while he failed at St. Malo, ultimately succeeded at Cherbourg, though that success in its turn was followed by a local disaster.

In a word, the year 1758 was marked not by a ma-

terial but by a moral retrieval of the failures in the preceding year, and it had all the marks of a new, young, and vigorous effort destined to weigh with increasing force against the decline of the French Monarchy. The next year, 1759, bore the fruit of all this. No phrase is more famous in connection with it or more hackneyed than Horace Walpole's sentence, that "it was necessary to ask every morning what new victory there was for fear of missing one." More striking even than the list of victories was the temper of the people and the confidence in victory which it had begun to feel. Goree in Africa was taken at the beginning of the year, Guadalupe in the summer. On the 1st of August the French were beaten at Minden, in Germany, by a mixed body of English and Hanoverian troops, and at the beginning of the autumn, in October, the great event of the year, the capture of Quebec, took place.

The fame of a statesman very often reposes upon the accident of a future unknown to himself. The immense development in commerce, in economic production, in population of the North American Continent, has made, especially in our own day, something remarkable of the Valley of the St. Lawrence and of its hinterland. This valley, with the French Colony of Canada, with its capital of Quebec, Pitt secured. Quebec fell in one action, the victory of Wolfe against the French commander Montcalm upon the 13th of September, the actual surrender of the town following within a week. Wolfe himself was mortally wounded in the action at the early age of thirty-three. He had the satisfaction of knowing the full extent of his achievement before he died.

The discovery and use of that young and admirable

soldier is not the least of Pitt's claims to the gratitude of his fellow-countrymen.

It is an error to regard this conquest of the St. Lawrence Valley as the chief turning-point in the story of England's increasing power. Only the modern exaggerated and ephemeral view of Colonial expansion would give it such a title. But as an internal sign of the weakness into which the French Monarchy had fallen, the loss of this, its only great plantation, cannot be exaggerated. For a century the French ability in organising an expansion of the French race in the lands beyond the ocean was checked, or, to be more accurate, destroyed. Nor did it recover until our own day when the value of any such experiments to the Mother Country in Europe had become more than doubtful. The result of this signal success upon the part of Pitt was to be found in the English spirit, the conception that national success and national glory were bound up with expansion outside the limits of European civilisation. Conversely, after one of those long periods of hesitation and inward gathering of strength for which the Gauls are particularly remarkable, the efforts of France in this field of colonisation reappeared in the form of a reconstruction of the old Roman Empire and the signal achievement of the French after Canada was lost has been the reorganisation of North Africa, their failure the imperfect experiments to found what are called "New Countries" outside the boundaries of Mediterranean and of European Christendom.

Pitt's achievement in Canada through his recognition and use of the talents of Wolfe were the more remarkable at the time from the fact that they consolidated into one dominion the whole of temperate

North America. If we ask why the mixed population of that vast and open territory is now in the main Protestant, as a whole English speaking, and in so many of its institutions, in nearly all the terminology of its politics English, it is to Pitt's policy that the result must be ascribed. The great bulk of those English Colonies beyond the seas were lost to England in little more than twenty years. By a curious irony, the only directly English possession beyond the Atlantic in the temperate and Northern region was the French-speaking and Catholic Valley of the St. Lawrence, but from and succeeding to the triumph there of Wolfe's military genius and Pitt's genius in policy the power of the French culture to impose itself upon the New World has, whether to the hurt or to the advantage of the French people, been forbidden. Something perhaps more permanent and certainly more significant is to be discovered in the new tone and meaning of English naval policy in this famous year. Everywhere the offensive, and the successful offensive, lay with England, and whoever shall in the future describe the rise, continuance and permanence of English naval power will mark the year 1759 as its true inception. The naval victory off Quiberon, coming just after the capture of Quebec in November, the naval victory of Lagos two months before, are marks of that spirit. Nor does anything more characteristically stamp the breakdown of the French absolute government before the Revolution than this preponderance of the English over the French navies. Until quite modern times that preponderance sufficed to give these islands a complete security.

Coincidentally with this success of Pitt's in his wrest-

ing from the French Monarchy its plantations overseas came another success of very different calibre, and destined to affect much more directly the greatness and future of his country.

The commercial position of England has for the main purpose of its structure the monopoly over administration and commerce exercised by Britain in the East Indies. That this is so not all modern observers would grant in the modern posture of affairs. The sum of all Indian salaries and of all Indian tribute, export and interest, seems but a fraction numerically of modern England's general income. But if ever the Government at Westminster were compelled or persuaded to relax its peculiar position in the East, to give to the native population a larger share in administration and to permit trade there a wider cosmopolitan competition, *then* it would be seen what India had meant in the story of English commercial greatness. Now the tide turned in favour of that monopoly precisely in these years with which we are dealing. English commerce had but one serious rival for the control of the East Indies, and that rival was the declining French Monarchy. The same causes which permitted Pitt to triumph over this rival beyond the Atlantic permitted him to triumph over it beyond the Indian Ocean.

It was before the accession of Pitt to power that the outrage upon British subjects known as that of "The Black Hole of Calcutta" had moved Clive, then Governor of Fort St. Davids, to send a small force to Bengal. It must be remembered throughout the whole of what follows that the British forces in India were as constantly superior to their rivals at this moment as was the volume of British commerce.

But it is none the less true that had not England possessed the maritime power which was the basis of her success, the French might have ended uppermost. At any rate, we have for the outset of the business the date June 20, 1756. Upon that day Clive sent a British regiment, the Twenty-ninth, with somewhat over a thousand sepoys and artillery, to Calcutta. The native army opposed to him was unable to deal even with this small force, and Calcutta was restored to the British in the first days of February of the next year—1757. It was just after this success, however, that the news of a state of war between France and England reached India. The French settlement in the neighbourhood of Calcutta, Chandernagore, possessed but a small garrison. It was attacked and capitulated before the end of March, but the Nawab still having to play one European peril against the other challenged Clive to battle at Plassey, a week's march or less north of Calcutta. His numbers though very much larger than those of the English command were of no military value. He obtained by way of French help less than a company of men and only four guns. The result was that, in the complete success which Clive achieved upon the 23d of June, and at a cost of but seven British and sixteen sepoys in killed, the supremacy of his country in Bengal was secure. Clive placed at the head of the district that subordinate to the Nawab's, Mirjafar, whose treachery had been of signal service to him. Thus in the space of almost exactly one year was played out the first act of the drama. The second act begins with the arrival in Pondicherry of a small French force of just over 1,000 men, under the command of Lally, an Irishman, the son of one of the Refugees from

Ireland of the generation before. This force reached India in April, 1758. The two naval forces, French and English, which joined in issue in connection with the new French effort, did so with the result of again demonstrating the superiority of the English fleet, and the retirement of the French ships to refit in the autumn of that year was perhaps the principal cause of what followed. It hampered Lally in the communication of his instructions and in all his attempts to carry out the policy of the French East India Company, which policy was of course the destruction of the English commercial settlements upon the Coast. It was again the energy of Clive and his judgment of men which determined the next phase in these hostilities.

Colonel Forde, whom he had chosen for the task, took, on the 7th of April, 1759, and that with an inferior force, Masulipatam, capturing at the same time 500 French soldiers, as well as native troops. The immediate effect of this victory was to transfer a whole district from French to English influence. The Nizam of the Deccan handed over for commercial exploitation the Northern Circars to the English East India Company. There remained for the third phase in this struggle a last issue to be fought out between the bulk of the French and the bulk of the English forces. It coincided with the end of George II.'s reign and the beginning of George III.'s, and the summary of that issue is as follows:

Lally, with somewhat over 3,000 French troops and a rather large number of Indian Auxiliaries, attempted in December, 1758, to drive the English from their settlement at Madras, Fort St. George. The stronghold held out under Colonel Lawrence at the head

of a force about half that of the besiegers and was relieved in the middle of February, 1759, by the return of the English Fleet. In the summer of that same year a new French Fleet arriving off the Indian coast, though able to avoid decisive defeat in action, was compelled to retire before the British Naval force and left Pocock, its commander, the master of those seas and therefore the French contingents upon land cut off from reinforcement and succour. Eyre Coote upon November 30th attacked and took Wandiwash, and it was in the attempt to recover that position upon the 22d of January, 1760, that the decisive battle was fought. Coote defeated Lally. It was an action in which the main forces of the two rivals were directly engaged and it decided the fate of the French in India. Within a year Pondicherry had surrendered, and by the Spring of 1761 the secure monopoly of English commerce for the future in the East Indies was achieved.

Not a little of this result was due to Clive's contemporary action in Bengal, for he there crushed an attempt of his native opponents to introduce a factor of disturbance by calling in Dutch aid, and it was Clive's prompt decision to attack and destroy this diversion which made the British position in Bengal certain. But great as was the effect of this settlement of the North the decisive matter was, as I have said, the defeat of Lally at Wandiwash in the South.

It must not be imagined that these successes gave Empire in any modern sense of that term to the commercial settlements of the British in India. India, in all its vast diversity of race, creed and custom, was still an autonomous field in which the

European settlements, British or other, were at isolated points of commercial activity; but what Clive, his colleagues and subordinates achieved was the destruction of that active rivalry which might in the great expansion of European power in the future have interfered with British effort. After the defeat of Lally and the secure occupation of Calcutta there was no serious chance for any other European power to share with the merchants of Britain that gradual extension of hegemony over the whole country which resulted in the great achievement of our own time and what is now called the Indian Empire. And it must always be remembered that this initial and determinant success depended—as has the whole security of Britain in India ever since—upon Naval supremacy. Every point mentioned in the story is either a commercial settlement upon the sea, or one in its immediate neighbourhood; and as the British Fleet fully maintained its constant superiority in Indian waters, the French Monarchy would neither probably have suffered the defeat of its troops on land, nor certainly have permitted the issue to go by default and its hopes of an Indian establishment to be abandoned.

To the years immediately subsequent belong a series of actions in which Great Britain continually extended her power over native territory. The massacre of all the English residents at Patna in October, 1763, was followed by a complete victory over Sujadowlah at Buxar just over a year later, and the entry of the English in the following year again into Allahabad.

In 1756, Clive returned to Bengal, and in the few months before his ill-health again compelled him to

seek England (January, 1767) he had begun that organisation of mixed European and native administration, the extension of which has accounted for all the great and highly successful experiment of British rule.

The further development of Indian affairs in the twenty-seven years between this date and Pitt's India Bill of 1784 I will deal with later.

CHAPTER V.

THE REIGN OF GEORGE III.

THE accession of George III., upon Saturday, October 25, 1760, interrupts artificially the consecutive story of Pitt's Ministry and of Pitt's success in confirming and extending the Colonial and commercial power of his country. But though it is in this sense an artificial date it forms a true line of cleavage in two other very important matters. It is the date of a new reign in which there began and failed an attempt to restore authority to the Crown in this country, and it is further a convenient central point from which to survey the rapid transformation of England from a wholly agricultural to a partially industrial condition.

I will deal with these two points in their order:—

Apart from the great business of the war, then, and the great business of Pitt's rule over England there comes in with the accession of George III. a new factor in English political life, which, difficult as it is to follow and sporadic and ultimately unsuccessful as were its energies, is of high moment, especially to the modern observer who can perceive (as who cannot?) that to-day the future of England depends upon whether or no the power of the Crown can be revived once more. This new factor, brought in by the new reign, the attempted revival of the Monarchy (that is, of a popular and strong central government) would, could it possibly have been

achieved, have begun to undo the work of the Revolution and to transform the oligarchic character of the English polity into a more popular thing. It might have saved the proletariat in the coming century. It might have united the Empire. It failed.

There is something comic about the contrast between the old genius from whom the idea of this last attempt at centralised popular government originated, and the young oaf through whom the attempt had to be made. The idea emanated, of course, from Bolingbroke. It proceeded from that great mind not only generally as the author of such a scheme as a whole, but particularly as one who was credited at least in having helped to choose the tutors of the heir to the throne. It was inspired, then, by the most acute and one of the most generous intellects of English culture. Its agent was the incompetent German character of a young, florid and virtuous boy, too fat at twenty-three. No one less able to restore the Crown of England to some active and moderating influence could well be imagined—save for one notable characteristic: obstinacy.

But George III. upon his accession had two qualities which his grandfather and great-grandfather had lacked for such a task, supposing, by some miracle either of them to have been capable of attempting it. First, he had as yet no vices and therefore no ties; and secondly, he could pass for an Englishman. He could not only speak the English tongue, but speak it clearly and without a foreign accent; and, like all members of the general European cultured class who have been brought up from their first years in any one Province of Europe, he had sufficiently taken the mould of the society around

him to be in all important externals national. As the heavy young man was certainly sincere and virtuous, he was necessarily patriotic as well. And this patriotism may, if we will, be added as a third accident in favour of the very difficult, almost impossible, experiment which was to be tried.

For the rest, he was utterly beneath his task. He could not distinguish between a man of first-rate ability and a man of the tenth rate, unless it were by that nervous mistrust of the former from which denseness usually suffers.

For the first six months of the reign Parliament sat undissolved, but it was already apparent that the young King would attempt personal appointments. The rich Whig men found that they were no longer regarded as sovereign powers who could distribute patronage uncorrected. Newcastle complained that he had not been consulted upon appointments which he found filled, and Lord Bute, the intimate of the King's mother and George's own most trusted guide, the chief officer at Court, told Anson without reserve that he must not appoint without consulting the King. When Parliament was at last dissolved in the Spring of 1761 changes in the Ministry began, and they were changes due to Bute, while Bute himself became upon the Lady Day of that year one of the Secretaries of State.

This last appointment was of great moment; for Bute, a man of not very wide views and moved rather by reaction against the Whig dominance which he hated, really intended to break off England from the support of Prussia.

France treated for peace with the English Government. Pitt, consonantly with his whole policy

of the year past, put the terms upon which he would grant peace very high. He was not supported in the Council (at least Temple alone supported him), and on the 5th of October, 1761, he resigned.

But Bute, who now became the true head of the Government, was not of a calibre to reverse Pitt's policy and to substitute for it anything new. The very necessities of European policy would have prevented a greater man than Bute from reversing Pitt's designs and even for the necessary and reluctant taking over of those designs Bute was not competent.

Thus Pitt had determined just before his resignation upon declaring war with Spain, the Government of which country he knew to be bound in secret alliance with the French. Bute found himself compelled to declare war with Spain in January, 1762. Again, Pitt's dependence upon the overwhelming superiority of the British Navy could not be foregone in any new policy and one victory after another confirmed the wisdom of the late great Minister.

Upon this account the sterile and insufficient views on foreign policy which Bute had intended upon Pitt's resignation to enforce, the mere accomplishment of peace at some great sacrifice in order to be free for a change in the type of government in England, could not be fully carried out. When the preliminaries of peace were at last signed (it is known to history, on its ratification in 1763, the next year, as "The Peace of Paris"), upon the 3d of November, 1762, England kept her conquest of Canada, with the exception of the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon. In the West Indies she only resigned Martinique and St. Lucia. Take the Peace of 1762 as a whole and it amply confirmed Pitt's ambition and Pitt's policy for his coun-

try—but I will return to that point in a few pages—for the moment I must follow the attempt to restore the Crown at the expense of the oligarchy and its Whig theory of government.

With the next year, 1763, the long-planned attack upon the long-standing Whig dominance began. It was at first thorough. The Duke of Devonshire, whose family might be regarded as the type of Whig oligarchy, was dismissed from the ornamental office of Chamberlain, and George III. took pleasure in striking out his name with his own pen from the roll of Privy Councillors.

What was more important, innumerable small jobs, the participants in which owed their places to Whig corruption, were ruthlessly cleaned up, the process extending right down to officers of Excise and of Customs; and this process was, of course, aided by the purchase of votes in the House of Commons by Bute and his party, that is, by friends of the young King. But it was exactly at this moment of his opening triumph that Bute betrayed that lack of capacity in the arrangement of men which was his most obvious weakness, and one of which he was himself perhaps most conscious. The responsibility which he found himself weighted with, his unpopularity with a violent section of London opinion (an unpopularity due both to his Scotch nationality and to the connection of his name with the King's mother) was more than he could bear. Unexpectedly and abruptly, upon the 8th of April, he resigned.

The Ministry which he nominated in his place (for he did nominate it) does not greatly concern history. Grenville, Bute's man, was its nominal head; Egremont and Halifax the Secretaries of State, a

combination which has given to this administration the nickname of "The Triumvirate."

There was for a moment some idea that Pitt would return. He was in negotiation with the King, but the negotiations broke down upon that cardinal point whether the Monarch or the subject should have the last word in administration and in nomination to office.

The Summer of 1763 opens, then, with an apparently successful augury for the success of George III.'s attempt. Bute has prepared the way for a stronger monarchy and yet his own personal influence over the King is withdrawn, at least in an official capacity. The Whig clique of nobles is in disarray and the Whig theory of Government, which called itself representative, and was really unscrupulously oligarchic, stricken no longer by the pen alone but by overt political act. The King was in the saddle. All he had to do now was to ride, if he could ride.

We shall see in a moment how unable he was to follow up this opportunity and by what accidents, first of the Wilkes affair, later of the American trouble, his incapacity was proved. But before coming to the story of the failure let us leave the Monarchy in its initial success and turn to what I have called the second notable point in which the date of the young King's accession forms a true mark in English history. I mean the transition between the old agricultural and the new industrial England.

I have said that the date 1760 is, by a coincidence, useful not only as a division in the dynastic arrangement of eighteenth century England, but in the far more real divisions of social change. It corresponds

roughly with the pivotal moment wherein the industrial fate of England was determined.

Let me make myself clear. When we talk of modern England faced by its terrible social riddles, by the alternative of answering them or of catastrophe, we are speaking of a State as novel as it is imperilled. England to-day is a State in which the mass of men, while still remaining citizens, are dispossessed of all the economic functions of citizenship; a State in which the mass of Englishmen, while ruled by laws deduced from times of freedom, have these laws applied to them in terms of economic servitude; a State in which a people by tradition agricultural and still by lingering appetite so, has become in fact (and alone of modern peoples) almost wholly urban and has, therefore, lost its aristocratic guarantees and its old realities of individual freedom.

Well, the date 1760 is in no sort of way the turning point between the old England and the new in any of these respects.

England, as we shall see when we come to the next part of this book, remained agricultural until the middle of the nineteenth century. Her traditions of individual liberty continued later still. Her aristocratic character but slowly decayed during the long reign of Queen Victoria: it has not yet wholly disappeared. You may still find in the chaos of her modern plutocracy a few families still fairly pure in lineage and still capable of boasting a real tradition as well as some remaining public influence.

But 1760 is the pivotal point in this sense: that it is an origin after which it is evident that England is to enter upon a career increasingly industrial, and after which the orientation of English society toward

its modern achievements and disasters begins to be apparent.

One may say that all the modern fate of England had been potentially contained in the Oligarchy thrown up by the Reformation and confirmed in the seventeenth century; but it is this moment of Pitt's supremacy, of George III.'s accession, of the acquisition of Canada—and the rest—which coincides with the clear emergence of the new tendency.

To adopt a metaphor one may compare modern England to the crowded estuary of a great commercial river, salt in water, to be measured by the mile in scale, occupied wholly in the business of its wares. One may compare the England of the seventeenth century and early eighteenth century to that river running as a broad inland stream of fresh water, with no great ships upon it and no tide. Following this metaphor the date 1760 may roughly be taken as corresponding to that spot to be found upon every great and mercantile river where the tide begins, where the last bridges are encountered, where the most considerable town grows up and where maritime conditions begin to prevail over fluvial.

For many a mile below such a point the river remains a river; broadening but slowly and with waters hardly brackish. But the presence of the tide has marked a certain change, and the future fate of the stream is already determined. The England of 1760 was not yet industrial, but it was set beyond returning upon the industrial path.

I will give certain numerical tests of this.

Though we have no exact statistics the population of England and Wales seems, upon the best estimates, to have increased between the Revolution and the

date I have mentioned by about one-fifth; in the remaining forty years, between 1760 and the first true census taken in 1801, it increased by no less than *one-half*.

Again, the preponderance of South England—of everything South of the Trent—the old cultured, agricultural England,—was so clearly marked at the Revolution that perhaps three-fourths of the population were to be found there. By 1760 the balance had not yet become half and half, but it was already more than in the proportion of one-third to two-thirds, and most probably in the proportion of five-twelfths to seven-twelfths. To-day, as we know, the South is definitely in a minority, and were it not for London would be in an insignificant minority.

It is again about 1760 that we have the great manufacturing towns first established, not indeed upon anything like their present basis, but the impetus toward their astounding growth assured. Thus Liverpool, since the Revolution, is found, in that long lifetime of seventy-two years, to have multiplied by *ten*, Manchester by *six* or *eight*, Birmingham by *seven*, and Sheffield the same.

If we consider the proportion of artisans to the rest of the population—that is, to the professional classes, to the agricultural labourers and farmers, to the shop-keepers, and to the insignificant handful of rich men—we have probably (though not certainly) at the time of the Revolution, the artisan forming no more than from one-twentieth to one-sixteenth of the whole body. But by 1760 the artisans are well over *a third* of the whole community. To-day, even if we exclude the vast scrap-heap of our diseased industrialism, they are far more than the *half*.

Of particular industries, the figures of the iron trade can only be very approximately given, but there again we find this date a sort of turning-point. It is in 1760 or within five years of it that you get the opening up of the Scotch and of the Welsh mines, and though the decay of the old charcoal smelted iron (of which Sussex in the South was the centre) is very slow and the rise of the Northern and Midland iron correspondingly slow, 1760 is about the date on which the two curves cross.

Cotton textiles, produced primitively and never having had more than 40,000 men hitherto engaged upon their manufacture, and only the coarser sort of stuff woven, has the date 1760 for a very definite turning-point. It is then that you get the beginning of the general use of the fly-shuttle in Lancashire and the extension of printing upon cotton goods.

This date is again roughly the central date of change in the system of credit. It is in 1769 that the lower notes of the Bank of England are first issued; sixteen years later that the Clearing House is established.

Meanwhile, the corresponding agricultural decline—the decline, that is, of England as an agricultural state—had begun to appear.

It is universally recognised that it is about this date, 1760, that the small free farmer, the yeoman (menaced, indeed, diminished and burdened since the Revolution and before, but still surviving as a social mass), begins to disappear with real rapidity. That phenomenon, of course, though very imperfectly understood in modern England and especially at the Universities, is the fundamental point of all. How many men own in virtual property the agricultural

soil of a country, how many families are possessed of the surplus produce of land that they till; or, to put it in plain English, how many true peasants there are—what proportion of agricultural population is in the main producing wealth for itself and not mainly for landlords or capitalists—*that* is the one great determinant of national life, distinguishing one clear historical type of society from all the rest. Where there is a peasantry you have one kind of State. Where the peasantry is destroyed, another.

Now it is from 1760 that England begins finally to lose her peasantry. It is not only the free-holders, that is the small owners, who go; it is also the men on a customary rent; it is also the men on a long lease; it is also the men who can subsist because, even though they have not enough of their own to be economically independent, they still have a hold upon the common lands. Of the common lands—which were essential also to the coöperative and democratic system of peasant cultivation—no more than a third of a million acres had been filched from the populace before 1760. In the lifetime of a man *after* that date *twenty times as much* was so taken! Nor is that striking multiple anything like a complete account of the tragedy. What the figures mean is that until 1760 nearly all Englishmen not urban in their way of life could get something of a living if they owned the smallest parcel of English land—and even (by easy custom) if they did not own but were accepted and tolerated in their use of the Commons by their village neighbours. The nineteenth century was still young when already but few Englishmen could live thus: when such as owned land must live entirely off what they owned and had no common grazing or com-

mon wood for fencing, housing and fuel to fall back on. The nineteenth century was not very far advanced when *all* that class of small men, which had hitherto been kept from sinking by common land as by a life-buoy, had disappeared.

Were this history written in greater detail I could exemplify in twenty other aspects the importance of this critical date. It must suffice here to sum up and to say that while England was before 1760 in material though no longer in spiritual communion with her past, she began after 1760 to be something new in body as in soul. It was like the moment in a man's life after which new habits of thought long maturing within begin to impress themselves outwardly upon the features of his aging face.

With the social revolution in mind we can return to the political fortunes of the country, taking up the tale again—where we left it, in the Summer of 1763.

I have already described how, after the resignation of Bute, administration passed into the hands of Grenville, whom Bute had nominated to be his successor, and how, associated with Grenville as Secretaries of State, were Lord Egremont and Lord Halifax, the three men between them forming an administration which was nicknamed the "Triumvirate."

Now, if ever, George III.'s power to carry out the reestablishment of the Monarchy was to be tested. But, apart from the King's own incapacity this not distinguished administration of the Triumvirate, though destined to last for no more than two years, happened to strike upon two accidents, the one of ephemeral importance though a very consid-

erable sign of the times, the other of lasting moment in the destinies of modern Christendom. The first of these two accidents was the affair of Wilkes; the second was the inception of the quarrel between England and her then wholly English Colonies upon the Eastern seaboard of North America.

The incident of Wilkes is of twofold importance. In the first place, it is an indication of the popularity of Pitt's policy and the strength of Pitt's domination over the public mind in direct opposition to the new claims of the King. In the second place, it is a singular illustration of the power held by opinion, custom and the tradition of individual freedom in the old aristocratic condition of England. The incident arose directly out of the signing of the Treaty of Paris, and, therefore, out of the King's new attempt to rule, as also out of Pitt's opposition himself. The Treaty of Paris was definitively signed on the 10th of February, 1763. It had been debated in the Commons and had there obtained a large majority in the preceding autumn. Pitt, though very ill, had spoken against it for nearly four hours and there is no doubt that the feeling of the public was with Pitt and against the Treaty. Though by its terms Canada remained British (an enormous achievement), yet the abandonment of Protestant Prussia, the return to Spain of most of the English conquests and the comparatively easy terms made with France were the causes of this movement of opinion.

When the King prorogued Parliament upon April 19th, his speech alluded to the Peace as "honourable."

John Wilkes, who sat in that Parliament, a man of wit and courage, acting as pamphleteer to the Opposition, denounced the Government in his paper,

ironically termed "The North Briton"—for Bute as a Scotchman was also as much hated as Bute in his character of the King's mother's favourite.

John Wilkes was a man of the middle class, the son of a distiller, wealthy and already at this moment (1763) thirty-six years of age. He had always been brought up with the gentry, was a rake, and had been elected to Parliament six years before for the Borough of Aylesbury, which had returned him again in 1761. He was Colonel of the Militia of Buckinghamshire and a Deputy Sheriff for the County as well. As early as March, 1762, he made himself the mouthpiece of Pitt upon his retirement in a pamphlet against the Government relative to the breach with Spain. It was in June of the same year that he had started his paper. He none the less sought favours from the politicians in power, notably the Embassy at Constantinople, which was refused him.

Upon the 23d of April, 1763—four days after the prorogation of Parliament and the King's Speech therein—appeared in the famous number 45 of the "North Briton" an attack not only upon the Government but upon the King himself. Exactly a week later, upon the 30th, the Government issued what is called a "General Warrant," that is, a warrant for the apprehension of such as may have committed an offence without mentioning them by name, and this warrant was for the arrest of the authors, printers and publishers of the journal. *There was nothing new in such an act* and Wilkes was duly and quite constitutionally committed to the Tower. He applied to the Courts within a week, an action which the Government met by taking away his Commission in

the Buckinghamshire Militia. He was released by the judges upon the plea of privilege as a Member of Parliament. The Chiefs of the Opposition supported him, even visiting him in prison (another example of the great contrast between those days and our own, for the very function of an Opposition was to support private citizens against the arbitrary action of the Executive). His release was received with public rejoicing all over England, not only because Pitt's strong foreign policy was popular, still less because the King was not, but chiefly because the mass of the people were jealous in the extreme of allowing too great a power to fall into the hands of the House of Commons. But both Houses of Parliament were determined to pursue the matter. A loose poem of Wilkes's, privately printed, was brought up against him in the House of Lords, while the House of Commons voted that the famous copy of the "North Briton" was a seditious libel and ordered it to be burnt by the common hangman.

It was so burnt, but there was a riot and the mob threw into the flames a petticoat and a jack-boot as emblems of the King's mother and of Lord Bute, her reputed lover.

Upon the 6th of December an action for damages brought before the Lord Chief Justice Pratt by Wilkes against the Under-Secretary of State (Wood) for the seizure of his papers upon a general warrant resulted in his favour with £1,000 damages. And difficult as it must be for modern readers to conceive the judicial independence of that time, they must, if they would understand the period, apprehend the importance of the Judge's action; for Pratt summed up wholly in favour of Wilkes and against

the arbitrary action of the Government, declaring the warrant illegal and incidentally, as though to emphasise his motives in thus defending individual liberty, concluded his harangue with a panegyric upon English law.

Once more the populace showed their violent sympathy with John Wilkes as the symbol of their liberties against the power of the Executive. The House of Commons met the independence of the Magistracy and the suspicion of the people by expelling Wilkes from their debates on the 19th of January, 1764, while the loose poem privately printed, to which I have alluded, was paraded by the politicians in the hope of destroying his popularity. Meanwhile, he had suffered conviction in the King's Bench, both for republishing his pamphlet and for the issue of the poem referred to. He went abroad, reappeared a few years later, was elected for Middlesex upon that occasion, imprisoned and fined. A fatal riot took place in the neighbourhood of the prison and Wilkes (prison meaning then a very different thing from what it does now) was free to write his comment of the Government's action in firing upon the mob. He was again expelled from the House of Commons, but was reelected in the February of the following year. He was declared by the House of Commons incapable of election to that Parliament and was a third time elected, and upon a further opposition by the House was elected a fourth time.

It would not be to the purpose of a general history such as this to follow the remainder of his career with its moment of intense popularity as the representative of the general suspicion then felt against any growth of power upon the part of political officers.

But the incident should be remembered, as I have said, by all who desire a touchstone whereby to test the great distance travelled between those days and these. To-day it is not too much to say that a modern English Government, or rather those great powers (principally financial), which stand behind and direct a modern English Government, has instruments for the passing of what sentence it pleases upon any citizen, or alternately for giving, to any whom it pleases to protect, immunity from punishment.

Nations in their healthy period, when government is strictly watched by the citizens and the danger of its arbitrary action forestalled by their vigilance, must guard themselves against tyranny in one of two ways.

Either they depend upon customs which shall be inviolable and thus a restraint upon their executive; or they lay down the principles of a constitution and deduce, enact and promulgate from these a code of laws with the same object. The former method is rather common to aristocracies, as a rule, and also to primitive and simple forms of culture. The latter is more common to complex and highly advanced States. In either case the protection of the citizen against an arbitrary exercise of power by the Government is entrusted to magistrates whose chief business it is to enumerate and maintain either the body of custom or the code.

The English, being in the middle of the eighteenth century wholly aristocratic in constitution, depended for their liberties mainly upon customary rules. Their judges laid it down that this or that was customary and, therefore, "constitutional" and a right

in common law. This body of custom was, of course, in its turn largely composed of old and forgotten codes. It was modified by uncoded but definitely established statutes. But in the main an Englishman depended in those days for his liberty, as against the Executive Government and its officials, upon the jealousy of the Judges in maintaining customary rights. It is to be noted that an Englishman of that time was more free, that is, was stronger as against his own Executive than a citizen of any of the great rival nations in Europe. This is not the place in which to describe by what steps the position has been exactly reversed or how a subject of the British Crown, resident in England to-day, has come to be more at the mercy of the Executive than the citizen of any other European nation. But it is important to note that as an historical fact he was *then* free, and the procedure in the case of John Wilkes both illustrates the rôle *then* played by the English Bench in interpreting customary or "constitutional" rights and the alertness with which the populace, as a whole, watched those rights and distrusted the power of the Executive. It is of capital importance to seize the meaning of Lord Chief Justice Pratt's action and of the whole attitude of the lawyers during this Wilkes business. The Lord Chief Justice in his decision made a new law. He declared that illegal which had hitherto been legal; but he acted thus with the object of protecting that individual liberty which is essential in an aristocratic state. He further interpreted the conscience of the nation at the moment. In a word, he used his judiciary function as a Tribunal. And thus to express traditional feeling and the conscience of the moment

as well, was, for many generations, the chief function of the English Judges. The future historian will, indeed, note with curious interest as perhaps the chief mark in the modern change of England, on the constitutional side, the abandonment by the small and enormously powerful body of English judges of this ancient attitude and their gradual absorption of recent years into the general machine of plutocratic government.

Overlapping and following upon the affair of Wilkes came the beginning of that great quarrel with the American Colonies, which must now occupy the reader during the next seventeen years of English history. Wilkes had been expelled from the House, as we have seen, upon the 19th of January, 1764. It was the 10th of March following that Grenville brought before Parliament a list of Port Dues to be imposed, which in some cases raised the indirect taxation levied upon the Colonies through their imports, though giving at the same time several new advantages to Colonial trade. Coincidentally with this change in the scheme of taxation to be imposed by the Government of the Mother Country, Grenville gave notice of his intention to introduce a measure which has become famous in history under the name of "The Stamp Act." The clearing of the Colonies from the pressure of French aggression in their rear had been one considerable item in the very heavy charges of the recent war, and, indeed, after the cessation of direct hostilities with France Great Britain was still at some expense for the defence of her Colonies. A small British force, under Amherst, having during 1763 and 1764 (in the last part of which year Bouquet commanded) defended the Hin-

terland of Pennsylvania in particular against dangerous Indian raids.

These new measures, therefore, which Bute had perhaps had in his mind, and which Grenville now formally announced, were designed to meet an equitable claim to some contribution on the part of the Colonies in aid of the British Exchequer. The opinion of the Colonies was certainly against the change, but no one at Westminster imagined that the proposals, which were listened to with languid interest and passed without appreciable comment, would prove of any importance to public life, let alone that they would be the inception of the greatest business in all the story of modern England.

The English Colonies upon the Eastern seaboard of North America formed in the eighteenth century a body unique not only in that age, but in any other of which we have historical record; for, though separated from the mother country by an ocean the passage of which was ordinarily a matter of several weeks, and cut off, therefore, by material circumstance as no European settlement had ever been before the discovery of the New World, they remained, as did not any other similar experiments upon the part of the Portuguese, the Spaniards, or even the French, homogeneous in blood and social composition with the community from which they sprang. It was the commercial energy of England which achieved this result, coupled with the sparseness of the indigenous population and the lack of admixture with these which was a peculiar mark of the Colonies.

But the great Colonial experiment England had thus made, with its religious experience, political theory, and even social ranks corresponding (in the

main) to her own, was further remarkable in the great numbers of its population compared to that of the Mother Country. The population of Great Britain excluding Ireland was, at the moment of which I am speaking—the opening of the last third of the eighteenth century—perhaps eight million. I say, “excluding Ireland,” because the Irish element, though present in the United States, and about to furnish the best fighting men in the Massachusetts force, was not yet so considerable as to affect the matter I am here emphasising. As against this number, Colonial England (if I may so call it) could probably count over three million—at any rate, more than a third of the metropolis. These figures alone will show the peculiar, the unique, stage at which Colonial experiment had arrived in the history of England at this moment. When we add that the great numbers thus planted beyond so wide an expanse of sea came, speaking generally, with capital of their own, and from classes better possessed of a liberal education than the mass of those at home, the thing is more striking still.

To-day the whole white population nominally under the Crown—independent States rather than Colonies—is not yet, after 150 years, in so high a proportion; the English-descended part of it is but a minority of the whole; and Colonial society very rarely reflects or carries in the English model in social rank literature or religion and domestic tradition.

The first point to seize, then, in the great quarrel is that England was about to fall into something like civil war with something that was not only essentially English (as things then were), but also the one great triumph of extreme English achievement.

But in approaching this capital point in the history of Christendom, the separation of England from her American Colonies, we will do well to keep clearly in view the main effect upon history, both English and general, of the event, and the three *conditions*, without which it could not have ended as it did.

The chief effect of the event was, as I have insisted before in these pages, the decision that English-speaking culture as it spread through the future should not be an *Empire*—that is, a disciplined unity, effective for supremacy over any common foe, and regulated to one end by the immediate decisions of one government—but a sporadic and diverse thing, splitting up (as it swelled) into various nations, vague in definition as in boundary, strong in adventure and the seizing of commercial opportunity, slow and inconclusive in political purpose.

The expansion of a national system, language and culture may be purposeful and, therefore, enduring if it is *military* in method and in motive. Of such a kind were Rome and Spain. All that they were they imposed forever upon all that which they ruled.

But such expansion can also be of another type, not military, not the effect of will and command and the power to dominate, but *commercial*, proceeding half-consciously from a multitude of private efforts, and having for motive not power or glory but gain. Such advances are heterogeneous and ill coördinated, resembling a slow flood rather than an armed approach. Of such were Venice and Carthage—merchant states.

The contrast between these two kinds of expansion, the military and the commercial, is familiar to history. As I have said, there was no necessary fate

which compelled England to the second type. Upon the whole, the best sense and the strongest minds in England itself were for the first type—until the successful rebellion of the thirteen States and their establishment of Independence changed the current of history for England and for the world.

The three conditions, without which the matter would never have been completed, were:

First, an already general (but not yet conclusive or defined) disaffection felt toward England in America; a series of disputes rather local than general which had arisen between the Colonists and the Mother Country.

Second, the obvious military condition. No political movement subjected to the arbitration of arms has succeeded until it has won in the field; and the *military* success of the Colonists with its causes must be examined and understood.

Third, and far the most important, you have what I may call the Creed underlying the whole business. It was a spiritual influence, a democratic conviction, proceeding (as might be expected) principally from the cultured gentry of the South, largely influenced by the enthusiasm of contemporary French thought and the clarity of its contemporary French expression, which gave a moral driving power to the whole business. Lawyers talk about points of constitutional practice; fatalists and materialists of trade rivalry. Legal jargon is of no influence over masses of men, and the vulgar, half-blind movement of commercial jealousy would never have given the Colonial movement its driving power. The separation of the American States is justly called a Revolution, for it had behind it what all revolutions have, a thesis in theol-

ogy: a Creed. What that Creed is any man can discover if he will read the Declaration of Independence or the Contrat Social of Rousseau which inspired that capital document.

For three generations the actions of the new American state followed that Creed rigorously. It still survives and it still informs, though perhaps less actively, the body of American life, and its central doctrine is that highly mystical religious dogma, the equality of man.

As to the first matter, the sporadic disaffection:

Apart from that friction between the methods of a Government beyond the ocean and the appreciation by Colonists of their local conditions, a friction which had produced among other things some contempt for the military action of the regular troops, there are to be found, very shortly after the French Colonies had passed to British rule and English Colonists upon the Atlantic seaboard were free from French pressure, a number of particular incidents. In Virginia, even before this pressure was removed, there had arisen as early as 1755 a quarrel between the local legislature and the Crown. A Bill, which would in practice have reduced the emoluments of the Clergy, was vetoed by George II.; it was, none the less, put into effect and acted upon by the Colonists as though it were in force in spite of the Veto.

Another quarrel, also clerical, arose during the new reign in Massachusetts. It was vague enough and turned only upon the undoubted desire of the English connection to foster the Episcopal Church at the expense of the independent Protestant bodies of the Colony; but, vague as the issue was, it accentuated all differences between the main part of Colonial

feeling and the spirit of English Government. Six years later in North Carolina, the action of the Secretary of the Colony, Fanning—who was accused of corruption—led to resistance in the payment of certain dues claimed by that officer, to riots, to the use of armed force by the governor and considerable loss of life.

Many other instances might be given of the growing disaffection against anything resembling direct British rule. But the matter which history has rightly seized as the culmination of all these was Grenville's policy, the inception of which I have mentioned, and the most marked feature in which was the Stamp Act.

We must remember, in connection with this, Grenville's policy, first, that it was consonant to all the practice of every European nation where the government of distant dependencies was concerned, and, next, a point of great practical importance, that it was only suggested, as we have seen, after the Mother Country had been subjected to very heavy expenses in defending and making possible the expansion of the Colonies themselves by her successful war against the French, and even by defending the Colonists against the Indians.

The form of taxation proposed by Grenville was that of a stamp (payment of which must be paid to the *English* exchequer), attachable to written agreements before they could have legal value. The Assembly of Massachusetts sent a remonstrance to Parliament, and it may be taken that the general opinion of the Colonies, as a whole, was opposed to the suggestion of the English Government.

It was in March, 1765, a year after its first mention, that the Stamp Act was passed at Westminster

—to come into force on the 1st of November of the same year.

The resistance in America to the Stamp Act was not only wholesale but violent. The mob in Boston attacked and ruined the Governor's house. There were similar disturbances in Rhode Island and throughout the North in general. It must be carefully remembered that the astute Franklin was prepared at this moment to aid the English Government. The point is of importance in judging the whole movement. The movement was a popular one and was only brought to success by popular pressure. The "leaders," particularly in the Northern Colonies, would, had their advice been followed, have weakened the cause.

Indeed, the profound spiritual gulf between the aristocratic polity of the Mother Country and the new philosophy which America was receiving from France is nowhere better seen than in the complaints which modern English historians make that the "leaders" of thought and public opinion in America should, or at least could, have worked to maintain the union. English historians perpetually point out the unwillingness of these supposed masters to direct the course of events and to cooperate with the practical statesmanship of the Mother Country.

This complaint proceeds from the conception that a great body of men cannot organise itself and has no true corporate life, but is always in the hands of a few; and that conception is the only one which an aristocratic polity can take of human affairs. How false it is, how much men can organise in great groups from below, those who have lived in democratic polities easily understand, and especially those who have

known the United States; but it is not a power universally present in human associations, and the English statesmen of that time (and of this) cannot be blamed for doubting the existence of a force which they have never experienced at home.

In the South a more pronounced culture affected the resistance, and Virginia in particular gave voice to organised and clear-principled opposition. Of several resolutions carried in the Virginian Assembly and associated with the name of Patrick Henry, the cardinal one declared that no authority save that of her own Assembly had a right to impose a tax upon the inhabitants of Virginia. It was undoubtedly this clear declaration of principle upon the part of the great Southern State which turned the issue, but there came at the same time a very important piece of action: a Congress was summoned at New York, and delegates from a majority of the Colonies (nine out of thirteen) attended it. It met upon the 7th of October, 1765, three weeks before the new tax was to come into force. It claimed Colonial autonomy in taxation and forwarded its declaration to the King.

All this coincided with a political crisis in the domestic politics of Westminster, where the Ministry of which Grenville had been one gave way to the Rockingham administration.

The unfortunate George III., though still a man well under thirty, was struck by his first attack of madness. He recovered, and a Regency Bill was the consequence of that alarm. The King, in spite of his recent and startling disability, desired the Bill so framed that the appointment of the Regent should remain in his own hand. His Ministers desired the choice to be limited, and popular feeling against the

King's mother was such that her name was excluded from those among whom the choice could be made. The insult was patent and the King revenged it by moving to be rid of his then Ministers. For a moment there was again a talk of Pitt, but it fell through and Pitt publicly declared his retirement into private life; whereupon the Duke of Cumberland, the King's uncle and chief adviser at the time, being himself of Whig sympathies, applied to Lord Rockingham (the official head of the Whigs, as it were), to form a Ministry, and from that moment may well be dated the gradual failure of George's original attempt to restore the Monarchy.

Rockingham had, for his own secretary, a man destined to play a considerable part in the great quarrel which was just opening with the American Colonies, and to be regarded later, when he appeared as the opponent of democracy in general and of the French Revolution in particular, with ridiculously exaggerated admiration by the reactionaries of his time.

This man was Burke, an Irishman. He had all the Irishman's supreme political gift of rhetorical form (not in delivery, indeed, but in choice of words and order of argument), as also the Irishman's keen and developed talent for the management of assemblies. Burke was further a man suited in the highest degree to lesser Parliamentary work. He was essentially an advocate in mind; ready, when they had once been proposed to him or forced upon his masters, to undertake the defence of causes which he could never have discovered by his unaided genius to exist; terrified by popular movements, but with a fine perception of the limits which an Oligarchy may not, without peril to

itself, outstep in its ruling of others. He was further, as such men usually are, exceedingly industrious. He had acquired a detailed knowledge of Colonial conditions, such as hardly any other contemporary had, and it was largely through him (though Pitt, returning from his tent, spoke also in favour of the change) that, *upon the 22d of February, 1766, the Stamp Act was repealed.*

It was, of course, a concession to force. The same politicians who had rightly and almost unanimously imposed the unpopular tax took it off because they feared the violence of those whom they proposed to administrate.

To save the face of the Government, therefore, it was necessary to declare that the Government at home, though repealing this particular tax, affirmed its general right to tax Colonies, and this affirmation was expressed in the Declaratory Act. In the course of the debate Franklin gave evidence at the Bar of the House of Commons, on which occasion he again did his best to save himself from the consequences of too conspicuous a loyalty to either side. He ridiculed the claims of political freedom and that perception of the ideal right of a free community to impose its own taxation upon itself by consent or through representatives, and he admitted the right of the Mother Country to regulate Colonial trade. He defended, upon no rational principle, the Colonial desire to regulate their share of what was, in effect, international taxation, and he shuffled upon the main question whether England might not recuperate itself in some measure for the expense of the late war undertaken on behalf of the Colonies.

Meanwhile, in America, men of a very different

stamp from Franklin, more virile and more capable of ideas, were building up the moral strength of the movement by their association of those first and ideal principles of Democracy on which the strength of America was henceforward to depend. Patrick Henry and John Adams were conspicuous among these, and a host of men who both understood the power of enthusiasm and the truths upon which popular power relies arose for the propagation of the Creed without which nothing could be done. Their sentiments, their phrases, their very terminology, was that of the great men who, upon the Continent of Europe, and particularly in France, were forming the generation that should change the world. The "Social Contract" of Rousseau, perhaps the most effective pamphlet ever published, reappears in statement after statement of the time, and one may say with justice that the force which was to drive the political energy of the Convention in '93, and later the armies of Napoleon, first passed from Europe to America, then, having in America next proved its power, returned to France and inspired that nation with its vision of republican conquest.

In the summer of 1766 the Rockingham Ministry fell, replaced nominally by Pitt (now Lord Chatham), but in reality—on account of Chatham's absence through illness—guided by his lieutenant, Grafton. What Chatham's views may have been in this crisis we cannot tell—save that they were personal and confused. But at any rate, Grafton allowed his Chancellor of the Exchequer, Townsend—who had been a member of the Administration that had passed the Stamp Act—to impose new taxes upon the Colonies, the most important of which was a duty on tea.

The Tax, which became law in 1767, was not significant in amount, but the mass of American opinion was now alive to principle, thanks to the zeal and the propaganda of the younger men. The Assembly of Massachusetts drew up a circular letter which was sent round to all the other Colonies, protesting. The English Government ordered the governor, Bernard, to dissolve the Assembly unless it withdrew its letters, which it refused to do. It was dissolved—and thereupon took the quasi-revolutionary step of continuing to sit as a Convention in spite of the orders of the Crown, and the next two years (1768-69) are filled with the quarrel.

In every great event of human history it is one of the principal tasks of the historian to fix clear divisions in its process, for this at once presents the matter readily to the memory of the reader and suggests the main causes of the movement under description. We are able in the case of the American Revolution to establish such landmarks. They are not to be found in the most prominent *events*, but (since an old thing was ending and a new thing beginning) rather in those acts of the *will* which mark each a step taken in the definite adherence of men's minds to the new and their rejection of the old. The transition from an old to a new authority, acceptable as having the right to govern any community of men, takes its first clear step when some organ is devised to act for such novel government, arrogates to itself authority, and is set up (or accepted) as against the former organs of government.

As I shall presently point out, this first and truly revolutionary step was not taken in the case of the American business until the end of 1773. The con-

tinued session of the Assembly at Massachusetts I have therefore properly called not revolutionary, but only quasi-revolutionary; for it did not either formally or practically exercise authority. Nevertheless, it was a symptom of the fullest meaning, pointing out, to all who cared to regard it, the temper now rising upon the Atlantic seaboard of America. Among the preliminaries of the great struggle it is the *second* move following upon the original initiative, that of Virginia, when, as we have seen, it was declared in the Assembly of that Southern Colony that no other authority had the right to impose the tax upon the citizens thereof.

I have said that the two years following the determination of the Assembly in Massachusetts to sit as a Convention without the authority, and in spite of the orders, of the Crown, were filled with quarrel. There were riots which the Governor had not the strength to repress; the townspeople armed themselves, and it was at last apparent to the statesmen of the Mother Country how considerable a force they would have to meet in their continued attempt to preserve the authority of Parliament over all parts of the Empire.

During those same two years (1768-1769) changes had taken place in the English Ministry. Chatham had retired. Grafton was the Prime Minister; and the place of Townsend, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who had imposed the last obnoxious taxes upon the Colonies (and who had died more than a year before), was taken by Lord North.

We must not fall into the facile error of seeing in this man a mere blunderer because the attempt to keep England and her Colonies united failed. He was

as well balanced in mind as he was ungainly in person, and he had what nearly always accompanies a good judgment (in males, at least), which is, a command of his temper. It is a proof of his patriotism and his sagacity that he also desired to increase the power of the Crown. It was his misfortune that the Crown meant at that moment nothing more than George III.

Grafton's Cabinet took the obvious course of conciliating the Colonies and were agreed upon repealing Townsend's taxes. The only question was how the principle of British authority should be retained.

It is here important to think clearly, for there is no historical matter upon which thought has been more deliberately confused upon both sides of the Atlantic. A Colonial system proceeding from any European country proceeded not haphazard, but through the authority of the Government. It depended upon Charters, and its security was guaranteed as against other European Powers by the armed forces of the Metropolis.

Colonial states thus founded have often in the past, morally always may, and physically nearly always can, be capable of severing such a bond. But those who imagine that the bond can be at once retained and not retained, that a Colony can be autonomous and yet in some mystical way a responsible unit of Empire, are intellectually unworthy of consideration. They are consoling themselves with words and forgetting the nature of things.

Great Britain (it is the whole of my theme in this section of my book) has been persuaded, rightly or wrongly, since her American disaster, to abandon the idea of Empire and to supply the place of that clear

idea with confused rhetoric. In the result (and none knows it better—or says it less—than her modern statesmen) she finds herself to-day uneasily responsible for the necessities of some few, small, distant independent States of very mixed race and culture, and receiving from them in return nothing save at the highest prices that she can pay. That this anomalous, unstable, and quite inconclusive arrangement is modified by a diffuse though strong affection felt for England in some portions of these States no one will deny. It is equally modified by indifference, or even hostility, to her in other portions. But the outstanding character of England's present international position resides in this: that her responsibilities are not European alone, but in a welter neither Federal nor Imperial nor anything definite whatsoever.

How to avoid an undignified fate of this kind was the whole instinct of every British Ministry in the eighteenth century. To preserve the unity of the Empire was at once the duty and the concern of English gentlemen. They could not maintain such an Empire upon a Federal basis, for there was no question of the Colonies deciding European affairs. It is possible that a unilateral scheme whereby affairs purely Colonial should be left wholly to Colonial Assemblies, save where the Home Government judged that their decisions were prejudicial to Great Britain, might please the theorist. It was equally certain that in the quarrel now arisen such a scheme was worthless.

There were in Grafton's Cabinet—unanimous for conciliation—two groups. The one had no policy; it repealed Townsend's taxes and let things drift—re-

taining, remember, the whole machinery of governor and garrisons and control of Colonial trade. The other had a policy, and it is North's claim to our respect that that policy was formulated by him. It was a policy for repealing the taxes in general, but of retaining some one of them as a mark of authority. The one so selected was the tax on tea. A vote was taken and North's group had its way by a majority of one. The date of this important decision should be remembered. It was the 1st of May, 1769. In the course of the following January (1770) Grafton, good natured, a little empty, and (as I have said) innocent of any fixed goal, resigned. North took the leadership of the Ministry.

Had North been able to act single-handed he might have saved the situation. It was still early enough for methods to count almost as much as principles; and while North was determined to maintain the unity of the British dominions, he was not only capable of watching every chance for conciliation, but of judging how such acts could be applied to the temper of the Colonists; but North could not act alone—for this was exactly one of those matters in which the power of the Crown was felt—and the whole weight of George III.'s imperfect character, its virtues as well as its weaknesses, was engaged upon a policy altogether too simple. North could never indulge his desire to effect those compromises, temporary or permanent, which would have made all the difference in detail to the fortunes of the British Empire in that critical moment. The King perpetually directed, and misdirected, his efforts.

Meanwhile, time increased the irritation of the sore, and in March, 1770, there took place in Boston one

of those incidents which fasten upon the imagination of men when they act in numbers. It was upon the 3d of that month that the garrison which had been sent to overawe the populace at Boston came into conflict with the civilians, three of whom were killed. The effect upon the spot was enormous. It is useless for historians to insist upon proportion where emotions such as were then aroused are concerned. The thing became known as the "Boston Massacre"; by that name it is still called; and it is the true dividing point after which feeling became exasperated upon the Colonial side. Its anniversary was regularly kept. It became a symbol.

During the next four years Massachusetts and the Port of Boston remain the scene upon which we must watch the approach to Civil War. Not that the South, and in particular the gentry of Virginia, were not following the same road, but that the control of trade, which was the irremovable source of irritation—not to be relinquished by Great Britain save at the expense of her sovereignty: no longer tolerated by her Colonies—was felt at this point with an intensity unknown elsewhere. In the next year, 1771, upon an order that the salaries of the Commissioners should not be taxed, the Assembly of Massachusetts solemnly affirmed their decision that the Crown had no right to establish a tariff in North America. The act, though grave, was not revolutionary—for it was not possessed of authority; but it was exceedingly significant of the distance opinion had travelled in the six years since Townsend's first imposition.

Two years later, after the breach had been further widened by a Government attack upon Franklin, who was in England and who might still have been used

as a force for conciliation, a second incident, in itself trifling, marked a second stage in that progress toward rebellion of which the feelings aroused by the Boston massacre were the first. An arrangement which North had intended for a concession—and one which was in effect a great reduction of the Tea Duty—tempted the East India Company to make direct consignments of tea to merchants resident in America. The mere existence of the tax, reduced or no, was enough to provoke resistance. When the cargoes arrived in the Autumn of 1773, a town meeting of the citizens of Boston was convened, and the Act which that corporate body performed may justly be regarded as the first Revolutionary decision. In seeking a date for the external appearance of rebellion we must fix upon this day as our point of departure. For the first time a body not authorised under the British Government and in direct opposition to it, issued an order, under sanctions in case of disobedience, and found that order enforced. It forbade the obnoxious cargoes to be dealt with by the consignees, and on the 16th of December following a body of the citizens, disguised as Indians, boarded the East India ships and threw the cargoes of tea overboard.

From that moment of the so-called "Boston Tea Party" the Revolution may properly be dated.

The politicians in England awoke to the real danger of which North, at least, had always been aware. It was noted that in the agitation previous to this act of revolt Adams, the leader of local feeling in Boston, had substituted for the word "Colonies" the word "States" in his all-important demand for a *Congress* and for the formation of an *Independent American Commonwealth*.

North met the crisis by immediate and severe measures in the Spring of 1774. The Port of Boston was to be closed until compensation had been made to the owners of the tea, a military governor was to be appointed (the soldier Gage, the son of Lord Gage, was chosen, a man with experience as Military Governor of Montreal and later as Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in America); the Northern Colonies, including Massachusetts, were incorporated in the Province of Quebec (a measure which, oddly enough, was attacked chiefly on religious grounds!); most drastic, and perhaps least statesmanlike, of all, prisoners arraigned for rebellion could be removed for trial to England. This last point particularly inflamed Colonial opinion, and when the momentous step of summoning the first national Congress was taken, North's measures were already known as the "Intolerable Acts."

In all this business the slowness of communications across the Atlantic in those days must be well borne in mind. It was not until May, 1774, that the policy of the "Intolerable Acts" was known upon the western side of the Atlantic. The closing of the Port of Boston was to come into force on the 1st of June. The legislature of Virginia, the other pole of the rebellion, moved at once in sympathy with the mass. The date of the closing of the Port of Boston was appointed for a day of public mourning and, what was of far more practical importance, the Virginians moved for the summoning of a National Congress. It met upon the 5th of September, 1774, in the central town of Philadelphia, passed, upon the 8th of October, a resolution approving resistance to the Acts, and adjourned until the same season in the following

year. But not before it had made an appeal to the Canadians to throw in their lot with the Rebellion, nor before it had issued a formal remonstrance to be presented to the King.

From that autumn the taking up of arms became general, while in the same autumn a general election and the meeting of a new Parliament in Great Britain gave an opportunity for the last efforts at conciliation to be attempted.

The opposition to North had for its chief spokesman Burke, and nowhere did Burke's incapacity for seizing a general principle, nor his fatal weakness of mere advocacy, appear more apparent than in his action at that time. North, with far greater real capacity, put forward what he hoped might be a solution. He proposed that the Colonies should tax themselves under the approbation of the British Government, and that beyond such freely voted supplies no tax could be imposed. But it was too late.

North moved thus in the first weeks of 1775. Already there had been seizures of arms and of ammunition by the Colonials. Rhode Island and Connecticut had raised troops and were drilling them; and in March, Patrick Henry, the most virile, and therefore the most eloquent, of the leaders, had definitely pronounced in the Convention of Virginia for war.

If we count the inception of military conflict from the moment of the first bloodshed we must note the affair at Lexington, where certain militia, men of Massachusetts, on the 19th of April, 1775, fired upon the regular soldiers of Gage, who had been sent to surprise and destroy the munitions of the local Colonial force which was being raised. These munitions were gathered at Concord, some miles from Bos-

ton, and it was at Lexington, four miles beyond Concord, that the British column of not quite 2,000 men under Lord Percy, was attacked. The resistance failed. The stores were destroyed, but in the retreat upon the town the Imperial Regulars were perpetually harassed. They entered Boston at evening with a loss of more than one-tenth of their effectives. A few days later a body of volunteers, under apparently no regular commission and raised in Connecticut, surprised the Fort of Ticonderoga which commanded the road to Canada.

Blood had thus been shed; but so far one cannot talk of any act of regular warfare. That was to come in two months, and during those two months the military as well as the political situation had wholly changed. In the first place Howe was sent out to supersede Gage as Commander-in-Chief. He found himself in the middle of May at Boston, with 10,000 men under him.

In the second place, the National Congress had again met. It assembled upon the 10th of the same month, and set about at once to raise an army. The Colonies were described by it as at once *United* and *Confederated*. The question of supply for the troops was met by the issue of Bills of Credit upon twelve of the thirteen Colonies (Georgia was not yet included). Massachusetts placed its existing levies under the authority of this Congress. Lastly, and most important of all, one man to command the whole of this army was chosen and duly appointed upon June 14th, in the person of a Virginian gentleman, singularly apt for such duties and already of some experience in Colonial warfare—George Washington—a man at that moment in his forty-fourth year.

The first true act of war took place almost simultaneously. Upon the night of Friday-Saturday, June 16th-17th, the first action was taken.

Boston, with its little army of one division under Howe, was dominated by two heights—the Dorchester eminence to the southeast, and to the northwest by the heights of Bunker Hill, to which Breeds Hill is, or was, an outlier still more nearly overlooking Boston. From the jutting-out crest of Breeds Hill, a range of not more than 1,400 yards commanded Boston town across the water, and even the centre of the city was within effective heavy-gun fire at 2,000. To occupy this height was therefore essential to the ultimate safety of the English command. The Colonial forces were determined to forestall them, and a body now acting under regular commission from the Convention of Massachusetts (and therefore forming a true part of the new Colonial army, duly subordinated to Congress by the recent decisions), advanced under the cover of darkness across the isthmus that separates Charlestown with its hills from the mainland, reached the summit of the eminence, and threw up a small earthwork. With this act opens the American War, for this was the first military act of organised and definable hostilities. The first shot was fired in the early afternoon of the following day, Saturday the 17th of June, when the British troops were led to the assault of the position.

At this point I propose to present very briefly to the reader, but as clearly as I can, the strategics of the campaign which had now opened.

I am not writing a military history, and it has been my effort rather to explain the most general civil

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development of Great Britain than to describe even summarily the military operations which accompanied that development abroad. But in the case of the American War the field is not only one of such peculiar interest, but is also one so neglected in our textbooks, the purely military reasons of the British failure and the American success have been so overshadowed by civil and constitutional considerations, that I shall not do ill if I here make an exception and present those highly interesting elements of the struggle as a military problem which the physical and political conditions of the American Colonies afforded 140 years ago.

The Armies of the British Monarch had to deal with the following problem: ¹

A line of ocean coast many hundred miles in length, possessed of numerous harbours, was inhabited by a population largely disaffected to their cause. This population was more dense upon the seacoast and grew rapidly sparser as one proceeded inland. It provided against the enemy a force, varying rapidly in numbers, liable to dissolution after failure and to sudden recruitment after success, as yet ill disciplined and not cohesive. But on the other hand, whatever considerable number of the Colonists might disapprove of the war, few could be relied upon for permanent effective aid by any British Commander.

It would, therefore, appear at first sight (and too many historians have come to some such conclusion) that the task before the Royal troops was that most

¹ The reader will find another exposition of the same features in my monograph upon the "Life of Marie Antoinette." (Messrs. Weltman & Co. and Doubleday, Page & Co.), where I deal with the American War in connection with the fate of the French Monarchy.

difficult, or rather that most lengthy, of military tasks, the gradual suppression of guerilla bands over a vague, vast and undetermined territory: a region extending away indefinitely inland from the points of attack—which all lay upon the coast of the ocean. Such a conclusion would be erroneous.

Three factors in the situation provide a key to the action which the British Armies were impelled to take. The first two of these factors were political; the second physical.

Of the two political factors the first consisted in this: That the centres of the American resistance lay round nuclei of population gathered to the North and to the South of a certain central line, those nuclei being formed round two principal entries of commerce, the ports of Massachusetts to the North, of Virginia to the South.

The second political factor consisted in this: That between these two nuclei of population and, therefore, of military resources, situated the one upon the Northern, the other upon the Southern portion of the seaboard, lay the best of all that seaboard's harbours, the Harbour of New York; and the political condition of New York more nearly approached neutrality than that of any other of the Colonies. The various origin, the conservative habits and the prolonged hesitation of its population were the cause of an opportunity so favourable to the British.

The third (and physical) factor involved was the presence of a great waterway and valley—the waterway and valley of the Hudson, which ran up Northward from New York harbour and *cut in two* the disaffected areas. What is more, this waterway and valley are prolonged across an insignificant water-

shed by a further chain of almost uninterrupted communication, following two long, narrow and deep lakes—Lakes George and Champlain. These led directly, as by one wide open road, to that province of Canada upon the Banks of the St. Lawrence, which was untouched by the moral motives of the great struggle and was, so far as the spirit of its people was concerned, a reliable base for British Armies.

When we add to all this the fact that the climate of the extreme South and of the extreme North virtually confined the maritime zone of operations to a district bounded upon the North by the Harbour of Portsmouth in New Hampshire, upon the South by that other Harbour of Portsmouth at the mouth of Chesapeake Bay—that is, to a distance of less than eight degrees or a little more than 500 miles—the obvious main lines of our strategical problem appear.

Here are two disaffected areas North and South, on a sea-board. They are separated by a medial line, the port of which is largely neutral, and which forms an excellent highway leading back to a base which the British can use almost as securely as they can the sea, where they are supreme.

It obviously lay with the British command to establish itself upon this medial line, Montreal-New York. It had for such a project two secure termini, the towns of New York and Montreal, each open to communication by sea (which communication was under the unquestioned control of the British) and each politically reliable; with the medial line thus held the British forces cut off one from another the Northern and Southern nuclei of the rebellious Colonies.

When this was effected, either section of such divided forces could be dealt with in detail, and

whether Boston with the group of population and resources surrounding it should first give way, or the corresponding Southern pole of resistance (represented by the shores of Chesapeake Bay and of the Delaware), the more resistant would at the end of the campaign find itself isolated from its fellow and be compelled to come to terms.

Such were the strategical elements of the struggle. We shall see how its fortunes followed the necessary line thus laid down by physical and political conditions; how the attempt was made to hold the Montreal-New York line; why that attempt should have succeeded and how it nearly did succeed; how in the issue it failed with the surrender of Burgoyne at Saratoga—and finally, how, after that surrender, the tide of success could not fail to turn in favour of the Colonists, and against the British Armies which had proved themselves unable to maintain those positions upon the Hudson and the Lakes which were strategically the key to the whole field of war.

From the first truly military act at Bunker Hill on the 17th of June, 1775, to the marching out of the troops from Yorktown after the surrender on the 19th of October, 1781, runs a space of rather more than six years.

The
American
War.

As is the case with most wars, the total length of the operations in time gives no indication of their climax. Many a campaign has been decided as a military event in the first few days of a prolonged struggle (the rest of which was mere useless resistance); many another has not been decided at all till the last weeks of an equally prolonged struggle. To understand the rough outline of any campaign it is necessary, therefore, to distinguish its phases not

only as military operations but as political successes or failures. The phases of the American War are four in number:

I. You have first the preliminary actions in which a regular army to serve during the Rebellion is in process of formation and of acquiring the military habit. During this first preliminary phase comes the declaration of Political Independence, and it is marked, of course, by the fluctuating support afforded to the regular forces by voluntary local levies which swell and melt with success and defeat. This preliminary phase may be said to last until the Spring of 1777 and to cover about two years.

II. The second phase is exceedingly short and is the critical phase of the war. It covers only the working dry months of this same year, 1777, opening with the spring and closing with the month of October. In those six months was the issue really decided. The attempt to hold the medial line, Montreal-New York, failed with the disaster of the English General Burgoyne at Saratoga. Coupled with the useless success of his superior, Howe, round Philadelphia, this gave the American forces an initiative which they did not lose, and, at the same time, gave them on the political side the open alliance of England's enemies.

III. The third phase in the War, lasting from Burgoyne's surrender in the Autumn of 1777 to the end of 1780 or the beginning of 1781, is superficially a reaction in favour of the Mother Country. The British Army enjoys local successes throughout the two and a half years, the British plan of a "Conquest from South to North" under Cornwallis is a clear one and largely achieved, New York is permanently

held, the American finances are in disorder and their "morale" depressed. But this success is only what I have called it, superficial. The foreign support which America is receiving since Burgoyne's defeat is bound to turn the scale and does so. The fourth phase completes the success of the Colonists.

IV. This fourth phase, occupying, as did the critical movement in 1777, no more than the dry season of one year—1781—sees a large reinforcement of regular French troops helping the Americans, concludes with the surrender of Cornwallis and the British forces at Yorktown, and ends the war. There had, during the latter part of the struggle, been a real chance for some sort of compromise. It broke down: and it must further be remarked that the last and principal effort of the British, undertaken in the Southern States under the command of Cornwallis, was decided against them by what *always* ruins those who foolishly depend upon a command of the sea—a temporary loss (however brief) of that command. This failure at sea occurred in the course of the Summer of 1781. By September Cornwallis was surrounded and in about six weeks compelled to capitulate. This capitulation, the surrender of Yorktown, decided the struggle for all military purposes. The war was won by the South.

I will now deal in somewhat closer detail with each of these four phases.

I. After the fighting at Bunker Hill, the remainder of the year 1775 was chiefly characterised by the apparent apathy of the small British command, face to face though it was with Washington's activity in beginning the formation of a Regular Colonial Army. The real cause of this curious con-

trast was the conviction in the minds of English administrators and officers alike that reconciliation would certainly be at last effected. The war was not carried on—as all wars should be—with a single *military* purpose: that purpose was compromised and disturbed by a contradictory civilian policy. The small British force lay idle in Boston while its enemies organised. It was not even withdrawn to New York, as the obvious strategies of the campaign demanded. And it was no fault of the British that a coincident attack upon Canada by the Americans failed.

Gage was withdrawn in October and superseded by Howe. But Howe remained almost as inactive as Gage had been, and the principal British achievement during that autumn and winter was the activity displayed by George III. and his government in purchasing foreign mercenaries, German in personnel and largely Hessian.

Before the winter was really over, in the early days of March, 1776, Washington was able to mount heavy guns on the position known as Dorchester Heights. He made the position of Howe's command in Boston untenable, and Howe was compelled to abandon a place which the very A B C of strategy should have shown him to be a trap (and not even a tempting trap) from the beginning. The obvious centre of effort was New York. As to *why* this error of a delay at Boston took place, the answer is what we shall find later in the erroneous occupation of Philadelphia. The heart of American *civilian* life lay in those few seaports, and strategy was sacrificed, as it has so often been, to considerations of social and political "pressure." Politicians imagined that if a

large town and its opinions were overawed by soldiers, such a moral effect was equivalent to action in the field. Luckily for Howe, Great Britain was still completely mistress at sea and he was able to withdraw the whole of his troops (somewhat under 8,000 in number), to sail for Halifax, and there to await reinforcements before he should strike at New York.

In the following summer, in the month of June, the general officer Burgoyne arrived from across the Atlantic with his reinforcement of German mercenaries, and there was henceforward a considerable force under his command able to act from the St. Lawrence Valley. Meanwhile, the political organisation of the Colonists, or rather of that portion of them which favoured active rebellion, was rapidly maturing.

The British move upon New York, which should have been made long before, was undertaken in this same month of June, 1776. It was upon the 11th of this month that Howe sailed from Halifax with 9,000 men, and within four weeks he had occupied Staten Island. He was joined by further reinforcements (brought by his brother the Admiral), and in August he was occupying this central point (which divided the northern from the southern poles of rebellion) at the head of 25,000 men, British and German. Washington, coming down inland parallel with him, was at the head of some 19,000 already organised into the character, if as yet the imperfect character, of a regular army. Howe attacked from the sea-board and, by September, was in possession of New York. The success was further marked by the capture of many of his enemy's guns. As might be imagined, this success not only threw back but to

some extent demoralised Washington's command in its as yet imperfectly disciplined condition. There were numerous desertions and a general disruption of organisation. But the force of Washington's own character, the tenacity of his policy and the lucidity of his military conception prevented any complete disaster. He withdrew his shaken command successfully and easily maintained it in being.

It was at this moment that the decisive blow might have been struck by Great Britain and her Government, had her commanders acted with promptitude and arranged their military combinations in synchrony. With New York and its harbour thus strongly held, an advance from Canada down Lakes Champlain and George and then down the valley of the Hudson would have cut the enemy in two at the very beginning of the war. Nothing was done. The lower part of the Hudson was indeed cleared, but no advance from the North was undertaken to join hands with the large English force then under Howe at New York upon the central point and strategical key of the seaboard.

Meanwhile the critical moment upon the moral and political side of this campaign had also come and passed, in the same Summer of 1776, for the Colonial Congress, sitting at Philadelphia, had, upon the 4th of July, declared the independence of the Colonies from the Crown of Great Britain.

The movements of Washington's remaining and insufficient force during that autumn and winter, though they display the mastery of their General, may be exaggerated in their strategical effect. Washington *did* confine the efforts of his enemies to the point of New York; and his occupation of New

Jersey, his victory at Princeton, his successful crossing of the Delaware and his holding of the line of that river, left the English command wholly dependent upon the sea for its communications. But what he did *not* do was to prevent the approaching advance of a British force from the St. Lawrence Valley down to effect a junction with Howe at New York, which junction, had it been successfully accomplished, would have decided everything.

II. It was then, with the opening of the summer season of 1777, that the critical phase of these hostilities was at last approached. It is to the credit of Burgoyne that he, and not his superior, Howe, was the man who urged upon the Government at home the essential movement which the strategics of the campaign demanded. Returned to England, he put before the Government, in the last days of February, 1777, a detailed plan for an advance south down the Lakes and the Hudson Valley: an advance which connoted, of course, a corresponding advance northward to join him up the Hudson from New York. The central line thus once held, the British would be free to detach such forces as their commanders might think sufficient to act to the north or to the south of it, and to defeat their enemies in detail.

Now what we have to follow in the succeeding five or six months is a British disaster due to two coördinate blunders; the first and the lesser of these blunders was the dilatory character of Burgoyne's own advance from Canada. The second, and much the greater one, was Howe's stupidity in trying to carry out two plans at once, and in diverting a considerable force upon Philadelphia instead of keeping all his command together at New York to join hands

with Burgoyne when the time for effecting that all-important junction should have arrived.

In the history of warfare there are perpetually to be discovered situations where purely military considerations demand one clear course of action, political or other considerations demand a different, a subsidiary or even an opposite course of action. And it is not easy to understand why military success, already within a man's grasp, has so often been sacrificed to non-military objects, unless we are prepared by experience to admit the imbecility with which public affairs are usually conducted, coupled with the lack of simplicity affecting all military operations not subject to one despotic command. This lack of central control is the peculiar vice of aristocracies in the field; and the England of that day was an aristocracy.

As a strategic problem the position was perfectly clear. Howe should have remained at New York prepared to advance (and ultimately advancing) up the Hudson, while Burgoyne was marching down by the Lakes and the Upper Hudson to effect his junction with Howe's forces working from the sea.

Howe disturbed this simple plan (and ultimately ruined it) by conceiving that he might employ his spare time by making an attack upon Philadelphia.

Why did he do a thing which posterity can so easily perceive to be inane?

To answer that question we must consider the very powerful effect which is exercised upon the minds of all but the greatest generals in history by an admixture of civil consideration with their military duties. Howe was only nominally Burgoyne's superior. Both were "gentlemen"—and the plan was

Burgoyne's, not *Howe's*. Again, Philadelphia was the seat of the recent Congress. It was a sort of moral capital of the Secession. Its fall or occupation seemed to promise moral support to the Home Government. It was a seaport and therefore a prey lying easily to hand. Its occupation would have the effect at home of giving *Howe* an immediate reputation for success which he could not but desire. Further, Philadelphia was the largest town in the Union. It was thought to harbour a very considerable influential and wealthy body of men treasonable to the American cause and sympathetic with that of the Home Government.

But there were also present those various excuses upon the military side which a commander can always offer to himself when he is about to commit an error of this kind. Philadelphia was a source of supply to the enemy. It was the most important gate of entry into the enemy's country. Finally, *Howe* could always argue that it was so near to New York (no farther than four days' good marching or a week's easy progress) that a diversion upon it would not seriously interfere with the main plan. This last consideration was probably what turned the scale in *Howe's* mind. Indeed, the existing correspondence upon the campaign sufficiently proves this. At any rate, upon the 23d of July, 1777, he took away nearly two-thirds of the New York garrison by sea for the Delaware, to attack Philadelphia, leaving less than 9,000 men with *Clinton* in New York to coöperate with *Burgoyne*.

Then came the inevitable delays. The naval commanders preferred Chesapeake Bay to the Delaware. The landing was not effected for five weeks—not

until August 25th! Washington, marching out to defend Philadelphia, took up a position upon a water-course called the Brandywine to the west of that town, and was defeated upon the 11th of September with the loss of more than 1,000 men and 11 guns. A fortnight later Philadelphia was in the hands of the British (that part of its population which did not sympathise with the Rebellion loudly acclaiming their advent), and Howe's success in what was to prove his disastrous subsidiary scheme was assured. He was not yet in communication by land with New York, but he drove off the American forces in the first week of October, and Washington retired with his now diminished and again partially demoralised force a few days' march to the westward. He established his camp for the winter in Valley Forge.

Howe, then, by the middle of October, 1777, was thoroughly established in Philadelphia; he regarded himself as almost in touch with New York. He had the folly to demand from that garrison yet another 4,000 men, and to leave Clinton but a handful—making an advance up the Hudson to meet Burgoyne impossible—and it was precisely at that moment, in the middle of October, that his ill-considered diversion had ruined the central plan of the war. For it was in those same days that Burgoyne surrendered at Saratoga.

We must now follow this second limb of the abortive operations of 1777: to wit, Burgoyne's advance from the north to the Hudson, which should, by every rule of strategics, have terminated in a junction with the British forces coming up to meet him from New York, and which *would* have so terminated but for Howe's lack of grasp and simplicity in military affairs.

Burgoyne had started from the St. Lawrence Valley in June. He had with him somewhat over 7,000 men (of whom not quite half were German mercenaries), a few militia and some 500 Indians. He sent a small force round to the west to rejoin him when he should have reached the Hudson (their object was to capture a post that might molest them in the Mohawk Valley), and with the greatest facility he achieved all the first part of his programme.

He took Ticonderoga, the post holding the neck between the two lakes, upon the 6th of July, and at the same time a number of guns. He came, after a march of quite sufficient rapidity, to the head of the second lake at the point called Fort George, and had thus accomplished the first half of the march along the natural highway and depression which, with its prolonged and facile water carriage, cut in two, between the St. Lawrence Valley and New York Harbour, the colonial territory.

Then came the first bad delay. A man can cross the flat interruption of water carriage between the head of Lake George at Fort George and the Hudson at Fort Edward in one day. It took Burgoyne three weeks. That is, it took three weeks for the whole army, counting from the first movement of stores to the last. The road, it is true, was not like our European roads. It was but a rough track. It had largely to be remade for the passage of a numerous artillery and of heavy wagons. None the less, the time taken in making this short passage was altogether excessive, and already the season was too much advanced. July had come to an end by the time the Anglo-German force had reached the Hudson and was prepared to advance down its valley.

Burgoyne, moreover, lost some 500 men in a raid (which he would have called a requisition) for draught cattle among the neighbouring farmers, and it is probable that this diversion—upon which he employed German troops—helped to rouse the irregular opposition which was soon to prove so formidable an obstacle to his advance. The whole of August passed in this very slow and wasted fashion, and it was already mid-September—the 15th of the month—before he had crossed the Hudson to its western bank to continue his advance southward.

But extraordinarily dilatory as the last part of Burgoyne's movement had been, he had but the more right to expect at any moment the appearance in relief of him from New York of men pursuing the other half of the plan. He had a right to expect that such a junction could now be certainly made with him. There was no sign of it. He had lost somewhat, as we have seen, in the course of this march. He had now, if we except his artillery, no more than 5,000 men under his command. He again lost some 500 in his skirmish with the first serious opposition which he met: four days after crossing the Hudson.

The American Irregulars gathered very rapidly upon the news of his difficulties, and coincidentally with his discovering that he had in front of him forces in number quite double his own, he received the first message from Clinton to the effect that the New York body hoped to attack soon the forts below Albany, and later perhaps to effect a junction *with a few men*. Burgoyne replied that he hoped to be able to hold out *perhaps* to the 20th of October, but that this was an extreme date—at any rate,

the very small force which Howe had left in New York could not have done anything useful even if the junction had been effected. As a fact, it never was.

By the 3d of October Burgoyne's provisions were nearly exhausted, and his force was put on half rations. On the 7th he moved forward to see whether he could pierce the lines in front of him, was badly beaten, and fell back on Saratoga. On the 12th he decided to retreat—but it was far too late. The American irregulars were swarming in against him on the news of his embarrassment. Surrounded by forces now three or four times larger than his own, he began negotiating for surrender upon the 14th, and upon the 16th of October, a Thursday, he signed the terms of capitulation.

That was the decisive moment of the American war. For some time past France had been secretly helping the American Colonists with money and with arms, largely through the agency of Beaumarchais. The French Crown had already determined upon an open alliance with the Colonists against England, but though the documents were prepared for signature, it must be conceded that Louis XVI.'s active assent to open alliance was only given after the definite news of Burgoyne's disaster had reached Versailles. With that open alliance begins quite another condition of affairs.

III. Meanwhile in England the politicians, wise after the event, were beginning to appreciate the gravity of the struggle. When the autumn session of 1776 had opened at Westminster the speech from the throne spoke justly of the success of English arms. The American attempt upon Canada had mis-

erably failed. New York was successfully occupied. And though a minority continued to demand conciliation, and though Fox remained as a considerable champion of the Americans, no serious efforts were made to understand the situation.

But at the end of May, 1777, that is, well before the plan for the chief campaign had been undertaken, Chatham, still very ill, *did* appear in the House of Lords (all wrapped in flannel, like the invalid he was), and pointed out the grave danger of an alliance between the Colonists and France.

It is here that the greatness of the elder Pitt appears again, and almost for the last time. Modern sentimentalism has attached to his name a mere defence of the Colonies, and the tawdry itch for comfort at any cost to truth or reality has induced our popular historians to present a picture of this powerful statesman as though he were a mere advocate of "constitutional principles" or of "a people rightly struggling to be free." But Chatham was much more than that. He saw that the pivot of all England's policy must be the reduction of French power, and he foresaw the advantage which the French Monarchy, though then in its last stages of decline, would take of England's difficulties. It was this which moved him to his last, his patriotic and his unfortunately futile efforts at conciliation. In general terms, what he proposed was the granting of nearly all that the Colonists demanded *except* their independence. It is worthy of remark that statesman though he was Pitt would here, had he been in power, certainly have failed. That which was virile, conscious and in the saddle upon the other side of the Atlantic had long ago determined upon a

complete satisfaction. They would be a nation. And that determination was backed by the new democratic creed which already rendered the English aristocratic polity odious to the mass of Americans.

But though Chatham showed lack of judgment in this respect, he was profoundly wise in foreseeing and attempting to forestall the war with France. When Chatham spoke again, six months later, news of Burgoyne's disaster had not yet reached Europe, but he was as active as ever in denouncing the spread of the war and in rousing his contemporaries against the French peril. He was equally energetic in his denunciation of *any* compromise upon the point of independence. Then came the news of Saratoga. A Bill of Conciliation granting everything to the Americans save independence was brought in by Lord North (The Conciliation Bill), and such is the atmosphere of Parliament that upon the subsequent declaration of war with France the Opposition urged the abandonment of the Colonies and the recognition of their independence by the throne of Great Britain!

It was upon the 7th of April, 1778, that the Duke of Richmond moved in the House of Lords this policy of surrender. It is to the lasting honour of the great Pitt—and an episode singularly dramatic for the close of such a career—that he came down to the House of Lords—with one foot in the grave—to see what might be effected for his country by the last of his energies. Though speaking in a low voice and with perpetual lesions of memory, his words remain with us a singular proof of how the man continued to be himself: "If we fall, let us fall like men." Richmond replied in favour of surrender to America. He replied weakly. Chatham rose again to

speak. He fell back in a fit, and five weeks later died.

As so often happens after a political panic, events discredited—for the moment at least—the fears of the Opposition, and on its Military side the war enters that third phase of an apparent recovery, which was only reversed in the very last months by the decisive and final disaster of Yorktown.

North's offers of conciliation had reached America (in May, 1778). They had been rejected. Howe's failure to attack Washington in Valley Forge had given the American forces an opportunity for recovery, and Howe himself was superseded by Clinton.

With Clinton's accession to command the plan of the war changes, and in order to understand that plan we must conceive the political as well as the strategic position.

Great Britain had now, after nearly four years of operations, arrived at something like stalemate against the Colonial insurrection. The British commanders had failed in the one strategic act which would have meant a decisive victory. They had failed in cutting off the North from the South. They had failed (through the surrender of Burgoyne) to occupy the medial line of the Lakes and the Hudson, which would have thus divided the enemy into two. Having so failed, the British forces had none the less proved themselves the easy masters of the sea-coast. They might evacuate one point on the seaboard and pour men into another at will, and as the American Colonies drew their life from the sea, and as all their main centres of population were upon the sea, the Home Government still had its hand upon the throat of the country.

In other words, while England had failed in that which would have brought the war certainly and successfully to a rapid end, the Colonists had found it quite impossible to drive her out or to disestablish her from such centres of occupation as she chose to establish. Had the British Government or the local British commanders done no more than accept this position the war might have been indefinitely continued. They preferred, wisely enough, to attempt a plan of advance which, if slow, promised an ultimate success.

This plan was the holding of New York as the central separating point and the gradual reduction of the maritime belt in progression, point after point, until the whole should be subdued. It remained only to be determined (1) at what *pace* the plan should proceed (i.e., how far the exhaustion of the enemy should be relied upon rather than a forward policy); (2) whether the progress should be from north to south or from south to north.

Clinton rather favoured slow action, his subordinates (and the Home Government) rapid action; but all determined upon an effort in the Southern field. Georgia, the southernmost of the Colonies, was believed to be less disaffected than the rest. Operations could be conducted near its seaboard throughout the winter months. After Georgia, the Carolinas would be absorbed. And when the three Southern States had fallen the reduction of Virginia would complete the conquest of the South. From this conquest, slowly achieved and held as a base, the effort, now narrowed to the belt of the northeastern seaboard, could proceed in regular development. In all this an essential matter was the support of such

Colonists as favoured the Union *and their enrolment to fight upon the British side.*

First of all Philadelphia was evacuated and the British command concentrated on New York. Next a small force was sent down to Georgia in the end of 1778 and captured Savannah, the main port of that State. An attempt to recapture Savannah failed, and with the first part of 1779 the British were already holding the Georgian coast.

They were confirmed in their position by a successful stand against a second attempt of combined American and French forces to recover Savannah in the autumn.

For the French fleet, now entering active operations against the English, came up from the West Indies and landed men to join Lincoln, the commander of the Colonial forces, in Georgia. Prevost, the British General holding Savannah, repelled, upon October 9th, the assault of a much larger combined force of French and Americans. D'Estaing, the French Admiral, sailed back for France; and the upshot of the year's operations was that the British now securely held maritime Georgia as a base from which to advance upon and similarly control the Carolinas.

The next step, therefore, in this clear plan of operations was as follows: Savannah, the chief port of Georgia, being now held, the British could proceed to attack and hold Charlestown, the next considerable town in a northward direction and the chief port of South Carolina, corresponding in that Colony to what Savannah was in Georgia. In the absence of the French fleet, upon the 11th of February, 1780, Clinton landed his men upon the coast of South Caro-

lina. Six weeks later he had laid siege to Charlestown, which Lincoln defended. Six weeks later again, on the 12th of May, 1780, Charlestown surrendered to the English General. Above 5,000 prisoners were taken (some of whom were the French sailors left behind to act with the Americans), 400 guns and all the ships in the harbour.

Meanwhile, of course, with the coming of the fine season, the French were recrossing the Atlantic with reinforcements for their allies. But Charlestown was held by the English, and though Clinton had to return with most of his army to New York (since the French contingent when it arrived would presumably join Washington, in command to the north of that city), he left Cornwallis at the head of about 4,000 men in the South to continue at discretion the plan of a northern advance.

In considering the nature of that apparently doomed advance with so small a force, and its ultimate failure, we must remember three points.

The first point is that Clinton was more and more in favour of discretion and of relying on *time*. Cornwallis, his nominal subordinate, was for a "forward" policy, and once again the aristocratic nature of English government weakened the power of the wiser superior as against his inferior.

The second point is that the European enemies of England, allied with the Colonists, now regarded her hold on the southern part of the Atlantic seaboard as secure. The French Ministry, for instance, envisaged a plan whereby if England should consent to abandon New York she should be permitted to retain what are now called the Southern States.

The third point is that a large body of the South-

ern planters were supposed to be neutral in the struggle. That number was probably or certainly exaggerated by the British Government, but it was an element upon which their plan largely turned. To this I shall return.

At any rate, that plan continued at first its successful progress. On August 16, 1780, Cornwallis, advancing into the interior of the State of South Carolina to relieve a subordinate, met and defeated a larger Colonial force under Gates. He captured its artillery and stores, a number of prisoners equivalent to nearly a fourth of his own force, and inflicted losses in killed and wounded in similar number.

This late summer of 1780 was perhaps the moment when the American expectations of success (not their true military chances) were at their lowest. This mood was not diminished by contemporary treason. One of their Generals, Arnold, negotiated with Clinton for the betrayal of the Hudson Valley to the British. The English officer whom Clinton had used for negotiations with the traitor, a certain Major André, was caught by the enemy. He was hanged as a spy (upon the 2d of October), but this incident—the centre of very strong sentiment then and now—must not be regarded as affecting the military side of the campaign *save inasmuch as Arnold's readiness to betray may be an index of the uncertain feeling in the Colonies even at this late date.*

It is the chief historical problem in connection with the whole of the war, not indeed to discover what proportion of the Americans favoured or opposed direct British rule—nearly all opposed it—nor what proportion were prepared to die rather than accept it—only an energetic minority were so prepared—but

to estimate what number of men in any particular region, at any particular moment, and after any particular set of reverses or successes upon either side, were prepared (a) to take arms against the British; (b) to be neutral; (c) to consent to be enrolled as militia and fight in alliance with the English commands.

Events ending as they did, we tend to-day to exaggerate "a" and to underestimate "b" and "c"—especially "b." It is probable that the English officers at the time exaggerated "b" and "c." At any rate, the interest of the campaign continually turns upon the fluctuations of these three elements. Nowhere, for instance, is that fluctuation clearer than in the absence of effective opposition to Burgoyne in the summer, the swelling of the local forces against him in the autumn, of 1777.

Cornwallis in the South, depending both upon the value of regular troops and upon the body of neutral opinion as well as upon the numbers of Colonists which he could enroll as militia on his own side, entered North Carolina and advanced two days' march into that State to Charlotte. But his force was too small to do what he had intended to do, that is, to sweep up through North Carolina, and to hold it as he already precariously held South Carolina. The hill country to the west, the border as it then was and the hinterland of the rich maritime belt he held, was the scene of perpetual trouble. A body largely composed of militia under Fergusson, whom he had left behind, was wiped out in October, 1780, at King's Mountain, just on the frontiers of the two States. Cornwallis was so anxious, that reinforcements which were being sent him by Clinton under

Leslie and which were to have come to him from the North, he begged to have directed to Charlestown. Leslie joined him in January, 1781; but meanwhile another of those detached forces which he had left behind him to keep down raids from the borderland was destroyed at Cowpens. -

The general situation in the first week of 1781 was, then, that South Carolina was less securely held than Cornwallis had hoped, but that his now reinforced army was strong enough to attempt an advance through North Carolina. He had against him at the head of the regular American forces no longer Gates but Greene, a very able man. Clinton doubted more and more the wisdom of advancing rapidly at such a moment. Cornwallis was eager for it.

Everything depended on the value of Cornwallis's judgment; upon the effect which English regulars could produce; upon the real attitude of the neutral population, and the numbers of these whom he could persuade to fight upon his side. The summary execution of a great body of these by the Americans sharply checked Cornwallis's recruiting. He none the less engaged Greene in action at Guildford Court House, a point which he only reached by crossing the greater part of the State of North Carolina. He was there tactically successful on March 15th; *but he lost so heavily in strength, he found himself so ill-supported by any loyal opinion, that he retreated to the seacoast at Wilmington.*

With that movement we leave the third phase and enter the fourth and final phase of the war.

IV. It is at this point that the difference of opinion between Clinton, in command of the main body in the North, and Cornwallis in the South, long ex-

isting below the surface, becomes apparent to all. Cornwallis still thinks that the conquest from South to North can be proceeded with in a regular fashion if he is lent enough men from the main command at New York. Clinton doubts it more and more and tries to keep the mass at New York: merely holding what is already occupied in the South and satisfied with a defensive upon the coast line. But Cornwallis's idea was backed by the Home Government and Clinton did send a considerable body under Phillips (later Arnold) to the Chesapeake. By May 20th Howe had effected his junction with Arnold and the combined force marched at will through Virginia, Lafayette, who held a command there, retreating before it.

But while Cornwallis could thus boast success and show that he had actually managed to advance from the South northward almost uninterruptedly, while he could maintain that he had traversed successfully nearly the whole of the Southern States, that very South, the holding of which behind his advance was essential to his plan, was breaking from him. In one skirmish after another throughout that summer of 1781 the Carolinas were recovered by the insurgents until the British forces were confined to Charlestown itself. Nevertheless if Cornwallis had been finally successful in Virginia (with its greater wealth, larger population and high moral value as the leader of the provinces in their rebellion), he might still, apparently, have brought the war to an end. The finances of the Rebellion were at their last stage of exhaustion. The insurgents could do nothing by sea and their supplies were almost wholly consumed. If the British could prevent a French fleet from land-

ing further reinforcements and supplies and if, at the same time, Clinton backed up Cornwallis strongly in Virginia, the war might be decided. If, upon the contrary, the French managed to land reinforcements and supplies, or if Clinton was too late with his reinforcements, Cornwallis would be in peril.

Washington, and the French allies already with him, stood threatening New York; but they were ready to march into Virginia if the pressure there should become too strong or the chance of catching a weaker force there should be clear. Clinton decided that on the whole New York was the point which could not be sacrificed. He first—in his anxiety at the growth of the forces in front of him—the French menace—sent to Cornwallis in the month of June for reinforcements; he hesitated, however, and did not press his demand for these (which would have meant the end of Cornwallis's plan), but on the other hand he would not reinforce *him*, Cornwallis, at the expense of New York. There arose that fatal thing in a war, a dual and quarrelling command.

What Clinton did at last was to order Cornwallis to fortify himself on the sea so as to be able to hold out until he, Clinton, should be successful against Washington before New York or in the North, when the forces in Virginia might be relieved and reinforced.

But in the first week of July the enemy in front of Clinton at New York, in a force 6,000 strong (of whom two-thirds were French), decided to march into Virginia, deceiving Clinton if possible into the idea that they still intended an attack upon New York.

Clinton was deceived by fictitious despatches

which he intercepted and which he was intended to intercept.

He did not know that Washington was marching South against Cornwallis until two months later; three days before the American force had reached the head of Chesapeake Bay, and little more than a fortnight before Washington had effected his junction with Lafayette and was prepared to strike the great blow! This junction brought the enemy in the field immediately in front of Cornwallis to a total of 16,000 men, under the command of Washington and Lafayette. It was effected on the 18th of September, 1781, and once effected it was the beginning of the end.

Cornwallis had entrenched himself at Yorktown upon the water, that is, in potential touch with any relief from the sea. He had received promises of relief from Clinton, though he did not know (just as Burgoyne in a similar situation four years before did not know) when that relief might come or whether he could hold out for it. It failed, or rather it came too late, because the fleet had at one moment in the preceding operations been mishandled and because the French had therefore a temporary advantage in all the neighbouring water. It was the French command of Chesapeake Bay following upon a French success at its mouth (after which the English Admiral, Graves, had been compelled to withdraw to New York to refit), which had largely aided the junction of Washington and Lafayette, for it had been made thus possible to transport the troops from the North rapidly by water.

Cornwallis thus entrenched in Yorktown, a position upon the peninsula between the rivers York and

James, could only hope for relief from the sea, and until the British fleet should both return and be successful relief was not to be had.

It was upon October 11th that two works, from which British fire was molesting the Franco-American force in front of the entrenchment, were attacked and captured. The successful assault was divided between the American and French contingents of the allied armies. Within the week Cornwallis effected a sally which hit the French hardest and was not without a particular and local effect upon the enemy's lines; but of general, permanent effect it had none.

In a last attempt to save his command Cornwallis attempted to withdraw it by water to the opposing shore at Gloucester, and if possible to escape by land, but before the experiment could be carried out a storm prevented its conclusion, and on October 19, 1781, Cornwallis surrendered.

I have said that this capitulation was virtually the end of the war, and wholly decisive. It may be wondered why this should have been the case. It was but a small force of a few thousand that thus surrendered; reinforcements came from the North only five days after the disaster, and it was surely within the power of Great Britain, which still held New York and which could be confident of an ultimate command of the sea, to continue the struggle.

The reason it was not so continued is to be discovered in the temper of the English people and their governing aristocracy at this moment. The surrender at Yorktown was not a militarily final act, as was, for instance, the breaking of Napoleon's army at Waterloo a militarily final act. It was only mor-

ally conclusive; but it was morally conclusive because England had been brought into a temper prepared for peace.

The year 1782 was one in which that peace was, as it were, taken for granted, during which all serious hostilities in America were suspended and negotiations proceeded at Paris with the object of recognising the independence of the United States. It was on the 30th of November that the Provisional Treaty was signed. The necessity of concluding negotiations with the allies of the Colonists, with the Spanish, who were at war with England, and, particularly, with the French, delayed the final conclusion of this instrument, but it was at last consummated upon what is known in English history as Cromwell's Day, September 3d. From that first Wednesday of September, 1783, we may date the formal turning point in the commercial expansion of England, the abandonment of conscious central control over her colonies and the origin of that mere drift toward a federalism which becomes at last so vague as to be the negation of all unity.

I have said that in order to understand the mood in Great Britain which led her governing class and indeed the mass of the nation, to desire peace, we must know something of the war as it proceeded between England and the Franco-Spanish alliance outside the field of the American Atlantic seaboard. To this I will now turn.

In the opinion of those days the retention of the American Colonies under the Crown of Great Britain was, when it was regarded in isolation, an all-important matter: but there was now one thing more important, and that was the survival of England as

a European power. The nations of Europe have, since they separated into autonomous entities at the Renaissance, fallen into two fairly clear divisions: Great nations that stand on their own strength: lesser nations more or less guaranteed by the greater ones. To stand in the first rank is essential to any nation that has once occupied that position. It is the perpetual dread of those against whom there exists a strong coalition or who have suffered serious defeat that they should fall from this first rank among the nations. The European situation was beginning to threaten England very seriously indeed with some such catastrophe. Though France had openly joined the revolting Colonists as early as February, 1778, Spain was not at war with Great Britain for more than a year afterward, but as soon as this addition to the naval forces arrayed against England could be felt her position became perilous. To make matters worse, the Government of George III. felt itself compelled toward the end of 1780 to declare war upon Holland upon a matter of contraband as also because there had been discovered a secret "treaty of amity" between Amsterdam and the revolted Colonists.

Throughout all this earlier period of the European struggle Great Britain remained but doubtfully in possession of that superiority at sea without which her very independence is not secure. The first considerable action fought against the French, the battle off Ushant (July 27, 1778), was indecisive. There was, as we have seen in the relation of the American campaign, a steady balance between the two navies, so that the French could perpetually challenge the English naval power off the coasts of the Colonists. This lack of superiority was due to an insufficient

number in units, but much more to insufficient numbers in men and insufficient care in training and equipment.

There had passed over Great Britain in these years a sort of hesitation in the supreme matter of her Naval superiority. It was no more than that. A few years and even months would suffice to restore the nation to its old sensitiveness in the matter: for sensitiveness to the all-importance of the Navy must always be with the English a condition of self-preservation.

The year 1779 did not see the revival. The French were beaten off from Jersey and they lost Goree, but they recovered Senegal, and in the autumn a large combined fleet of the French and Spanish ships allied was able to threaten, but not to attack, Plymouth. The real strain from which England did not emerge defeated but which was so serious as to compel that mood in favour of surrendering to America which I have described, came in the last three years of this critical episode, the years 1780, 1781 and 1782. It is customary in popular histories to emphasise Rodney's great victory in the West Indies at the end of this period and to present as a separate and heroic episode (heroic it was) the defence of Gibraltar. It is better history to couple both these successes with a very considerable disaster to Britain, for if we fail to see the whole of the three points in connection we shall never understand the mood in which the English Government made peace with the rebellious Colonists and thereby definitely entered a new and most uncertain phase in the expansion of the British Colonial experiments. The picture may be presented thus:

Loss of
Minorca

The Mediterranean is the permanent seat of European culture. Even when the east and the south of its coasts and harbours had been lost to the Mahomedan (and thereby ultimately to all productive activity), the Spanish, French and Italian coasts remaining to Christendom furnished a great volume of trade.

It was certain when once the Mahomedan wave began to recede that European culture and Christian activity in production would recapture the southern and the eastern shores of the great inland sea from which we draw our life. This, as a fact, has taken place in our own time, and with each generation since the French Revolution a larger and a larger proportion of the Mediterranean coast line has come under the control of European governments and has passed from the control of the Mahomedan. With the piercing of the Suez Canal in quite recent times another element of exchange has entered the Mediterranean basin. Altogether, then, the story of the last one hundred and fifty years has been a story of continued expansion in Mediterranean trade and of revival in the position of the Mediterranean as the knot of the world. Men do not yet wholly appreciate how far the process has gone. But beyond all doubt the Mediterranean will be to our sons the commercial, as it is very nearly already the strategic centre of the world. To guard, or to hold or to traffic in the Mediterranean will be the business of all great European powers: to command commerce therein the index of general commercial activity. And, indeed, a test may be laid in two particular cases; that of the modern German Empire (if it survives) and that of the rapidly increasing strength of Russia,

Whether either of these reaches the Mediterranean, and if so which reaches it first, will powerfully determine the international arrangements of the immediate future.

Now the great business of the English is commerce; and instinctively the English commercial directing Oligarchy has felt for now two hundred years that a maritime power such as England stood strong if it was considerable in the Mediterranean, should be anxious if it were excluded or was weakening therein. It is no mere chance that even in the last activities of modern England we have had first the jealous protection of Turkey; then the abortive experiment in Cyprus; finally, the highly successful administration of Egypt.

Now the importance of posts in the Mediterranean—that is, of harbours whence commerce could be protected and rivals threatened—is for Great Britain to be measured not in the number but in the position of those posts. And it is not unjust to claim that the magnificent harbour of Port Mahon, that is, the island of Minorca (for Minorca means nothing else), is an index to the strength of the British foothold in that Southern sea. There are those who pretend that a chain of posts in the Mediterranean is a chain of posts on the road to India. Geographically it is so, strategically it is not; for in case of war the Mediterranean would not be the road to India for this country. The real function of posts in the Mediterranean in the scheme of English commercial and naval development is the function of interrupting the communications of rivals within that sea quite apart from the Suez Canal, which is useful only in time of peace. For this purpose Minorca is everything.

Gibraltar holds the Straits, but it is open to menace, for it is not an island. Its docks and harbours, therefore, were always potentially in danger from the north, and nowadays are actually within range of heavy guns on the opposing shore. Had Minorca been permanently held by Britain the French would never have occupied the Barbary States; quite possibly a united Italy would not have arisen. The Government of Great Britain showed a profound instinctive wisdom in its repeated attempts to hold Minorca. The rivals of Great Britain showed (as subconsciously and instinctively) a good sense of their position in their repeated efforts against the British occupation of the island.

Minorca and Port Mahon (a Carthaginian name) were first occupied, as we have seen, in the beginning of the great expansion of English commercial power under Queen Anne. The position had been occupied under the false plea of holding it for the legitimate King of Spain in the first war of the Spanish Succession. It was confirmed to Great Britain, as we have also seen, by the Treaty of Utrecht. It was lost in 1756 by the action of Byng; and the immense importance of that loss was signalised by the quite exceptional act of severity which sacrificed Byng's life to the fundamental policy of this country in the Mediterranean.

The triumphant conclusion of Pitt's great effort, the settlement following the Seven Years' War, restored Minorca to England. During the critical period of the revolt of the American Colonies it was attacked again. Port Mahon was blockaded; and less than four months after the capitulation of Yorktown—that is, while English opinion was still reel-

ing under the shock of the news (which took some weeks to reach Europe in those days)—Port Mahon capitulated (upon the 5th of February, 1782), and Minorca was once again lost—this time for sixteen years—to British commerce and the British Fleet. This loss of Minorca is the key to the understanding of all British policy at the moment. Later, as we shall see, it was reoccupied during the Great War in 1798, and only finally abandoned at the Peace of Amiens. But it was the loss of Minorca in the first weeks of 1782 which gave that impression of peril under which England had to give way and under which the independence of the Colonies came to be finally accepted. The matter is nearly always slurred over in our histories. It is upon that very account the more important to emphasize it.¹

Meanwhile, Gibraltar stood out and was preserved to the dominion of this country through a memorable siege in which it was three times relieved: by Rodney in the first months of 1780, again in the spring of 1781 and finally through the seamanship of Howe in the Autumn of 1782, just before the Peace. That Peace was further rendered possible without too great a loss of prestige and dignity upon the part of Great Britain by a signal victory which Rodney won upon the 12th of April, 1782, over the French fleet in the West Atlantic. The independence of the American Colonists was acknowledged on the 27th of September, 1782, and, a month later, upon the last day of November, as we have seen, preliminaries of peace with them were signed pending a peace between England and France.

¹ At the present day one of the chief (and secret) points in British foreign policy is to prevent the land falling into the hands of any strong naval power.

Not quite two months later, on the 20th of January, 1783, preliminaries of peace were signed with France and Spain, to be finally concluded upon that memorable day which I have already recalled to the reader as "Cromwell's Day," the 3d of September in the same year. The negotiations as a whole resulted in this: The American Colonies were now an independent State, and Great Britain recognised their right to expand as far as the Mississippi—the Mississippi was not to prove their ultimate boundary. Gibraltar was retained by Great Britain but Minorca was lost. The list is insignificant, though it seemed important at the time, including as it did the salvation of a point or two of French territory in India and a complex deal in the West Indies which does not to-day concern us.

One other matter of enormous importance this struggle had brought out, though it has been left to a remote posterity, and even to our own day, to appreciate of what great moment it was. The war had been very costly to the three European powers engaged, the French, the English, the Spaniards. Such was the European circumstance of the time that England was to prove herself easily capable of supporting the debt; Spain bled while under it; France was led by it to the beginnings of the Great Revolution.

With this we end that failure to maintain a centralised Empire, that envisaging of a loose federation which history, however remote, will discover to be the great turning-point in the external fortunes of this country.

I must now deal with the nine years and more that intervened between the disastrous Peace of this 3d of

September, 1783, and the outbreak of the great Revolutionary War upon the 1st of February, 1793.

This interval is marked by the personality of the younger William Pitt, the great Lord Chatham's second son. In occupying the reader with the domestic history of the country I must beg him to bear in mind that the dominating circumstance of those years was, for England as for all Western Europe, not the fortunes of politicians at home but the approach (within 4 years of the Peace of Versailles), the Manifestation (within 6), the violence (within 7) of that Revolutionary storm in France which has transformed the world.

Rise of the
Younger
Pitt.

The end of the American war went with a sort of breakdown in the system of government at home. George III.'s fundamental but ill-executed experiment at personal rule was ruined, and it was during the last months of the struggle that Dunning carried by a few votes his famous motion "That the power of the Crown has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished."

Coincidentally with this breakdown went the elevation both of the Irish and of the Catholic claims; but most significant of all were first the ministerial arrangements, next the regency quarrel, by which the power of a Cabinet and of the Parliamentary Oligarchy as against the Monarchy was reëstablished.

After the disaster of Yorktown, and after narrowly escaping a vote of want of confidence, Lord North resigned in the middle of March, 1782. What had been opposed both to the King and to North was the Whig faction, of which the Rockinghams were the head and which stood for the full oligarchic theory as against the idea of a popular monarchy.

Side by side with this main force of opposition to the King's private views to his foreign policy and to his desire to govern was the personality and tradition of the Pitt family. Lord Chatham was dead, but his second son had joined the House of Commons in January, 1781, as the nominee of the Lowthers, sitting for the town of Appleby in the North of England. He was but in his twenty-second year, of a somewhat repellent character, but evidently inheriting much of his father's talent. This "younger Pitt," as he is called, appears upon the stage of national history thus surrounded by all those circumstances which make for the misreading of history in the matter of its prominent figures: the inheritance of his name, the singular and vivid period through which he was intermittently in power, the foolish adoration to which he was subjected by his followers, much more the finally successful issue of the struggle during which he perished, combine to magnify him out of all proportion to the truth. But it is equally foolish to belittle him. That the younger Pitt had a very considerable gift of oratory, the organ of which was a powerful and well-modulated voice, should not be forgotten. He was secretive and rather mean and, as is so often the case with men silent and masked, he was deplorably lacking in self-control—on which account he has been accused without sufficient evidence of more than one grave moral weakness. In the general vice of his time, drunkenness, he was most unfortunately eminent—and he may, indeed, be said to have died of it prematurely. But with all this, the younger Pitt not only inherited but carried on in practice one supreme quality of his much greater father. He was a pa-

triot who knew what he wanted for the nation and why he wanted it, and he consistently aimed at attaining it. In statesmanship he combined two apparently contradictory but often allied characters: a clear appreciation of and even a prophetic instinct upon, commercial and financial matters: a singular lack of judgment in external and general politics. He was the forerunner of the vast commercial expansion of the nineteenth century, and yet the author of the disastrous act of Union with Ireland, and conceived Europe to have been destroyed at Austerlitz. Such men immediately enrich, ultimately weaken their country.

It was this young man, not yet twenty-three years of age, who was the second part of the opposition and whose support of the Whigs (under his leader, Shelburne) was a sort of attack in flank which completed the ruin of the Ministry. George III., bitterly against his will, sent for Rockingham upon Shelburne's refusing to form a Ministry; and in this new Ministry, formed at the end of March, and having both Shelburne and Fox in its ranks, it is not remarkable that the younger Pitt was absent, because he had refused to accept any subordinate office. The experiment was a coalition. The Ministry was really dual, with a Whig or Rockingham side and a Royal or Shelburne side. It did not last long. Rockingham died upon the 1st of July, Shelburne became Prime Minister and took in Pitt as his Chancellor of the Exchequer, while Fox, the principal adherent of the Rockingham side in the old Cabinet, resigned.

Pitt had already shown the lines upon which his own policy was to move. He had already brought in a motion for inquiry into Parliamentary Reform

and had had it rejected. In the next year Lord North, representing the old system of Royal Government, and Fox, who had resigned from Shelburne's Ministry, combined upon the ground of criticising the terms of the General Peace, especially of the Peace with France. It was at this moment there occurred the first rupture between Fox and Pitt, which was later to play so great a part in English public life. Pitt was sent as a go-between by Shelburne to try and reduce Fox's opposition. He failed; and the failure embittered him permanently against his own friend and former colleague. The coalition of Fox and North triumphed, carried a majority in the House, and formed another Coalition Ministry. After a few months of power (with the Duke of Portland as nominal Prime Minister) it fell, quaintly enough, upon the issue of a genuine attempt to advance and confirm British power in India.

Fox's India Bill (to which reference will be made when I turn to Indian affairs at this moment) was used as a lever by the King for getting rid of the Ministry. Any one, said George III., who voted for the Bill in the Lords, he would regard as his enemy. Upon the Lords rejecting the Bill (in the middle of December, 1783) the King sent for the Seals of the Ministers without so much as seeing them, and Pitt snatched the reward of his intrigue and found himself, before his twenty-fifth birthday, Prime Minister of England. The exact date of this considerable event is the 18th of December, 1783.

When Pitt took over the Administration he and the King behind him had a majority in the House of Lords. There was still a majority against him in the House of Commons—indeed, his first important

measure was defeated by eight votes—but Pitt had behind him a stronger force than the King or the Commons even at that time, *for the City of London trusted that he would confirm and increase the commercial position of its great merchants and money dealers*. Indeed, throughout his career the consistent support of the City is a very noticeable factor in Pitt's success.

Before the end of March, 1784, Pitt advised a dissolution of Parliament. A great deal turned upon the result of the election, for if Fox and his friends had obtained a majority in the next Parliament it would have meant an immediate return to the full Whig theory which had so long prevailed during the eighteenth century. As a fact, they failed. Pitt, the King's Minister, was returned to power with the King's consent, and yet by a curious irony the date marks the moment after which the Crown never recovers its old attempted power.

The point is a subtle one to seize, but essential to an understanding of the English polity. It was George III. himself who, when his direct rule had failed through the loss of America, played into the hands of the Oligarchy by relying on Pitt to oust the Whigs. Pitt represented the Oligarchy just as much as Fox, as was to be seen very clearly in the coming quarrel with the Prince of Wales. But the truth is that the experiment at monarchy, perilous and doubtful twenty years before, had now, in any case, failed.

The electorate, of course, had nothing to do with the nation. It was an irregular minority of the nation, and its vote was no index to national feeling save in this: that certain very large constituen-

cies (Yorkshire, for instance) changed sides. The overthrow of the Whig majority and of "Fox's martyrs" in this important election of 1784 was therefore much more a victory of the new commercial over the old landed interests, backed by the great influence the King's name could wield with many of the rural electors.

The very first note of Pitt's power after it was once thus established by the Royal support (and commercial pressure) in the election of 1784 was a new form of political corruption which was to prove of the utmost moment to the future development of England. The House of Lords had hitherto consisted of little more than one hundred members in probable attendance. The total number was at the beginning of the reign 174, but of these the Catholics were incapable of sitting, some peers were not of age, and a number was always, of course, similarly incapacitated by illness or permanent absence. Pitt deliberately conceived the policy of transforming this member of the Constitution, and it is to him we owe the inception of a peerage depending upon and representing wealth alone. He used the promise of permanent legislative power as a bribe to those whom he would control, and he laid the foundations for that gradual decline in the Second Chamber of which our own time has witnessed the consummation in the open sale of peerages coupled with the destruction of the old veto.

Pitt aimed at two other very important objects, both in the tradition of his great father; the first was the strengthening of the nation's financial position, the second was the support and extension of commerce. In a sort of negative fashion, and because

all antiquated idealism seemed to him to stand in the way of his national object, Pitt was a "modern." He was interested in the idea of Parliamentary Reform; he was interested in seeing whether Ireland could not be better attached to his own country, and he had vague sympathy with such contemporary movements as that for the relief of the handful of Catholics who had continued to survive the stamping out of the Faith in England.

It must be admitted that Pitt's talent was singularly lucid in the matter of finance. He had a clear appreciation of the supremacy which England then held not only absolutely, but potentially, in the economic life of Europe. He was for trusting its certain industrial expansion in the future, and for confirming its credit after the recent heavy strains by a free use of taxation. He was for funding all unfunded debt, and for paying off the existing debt as rapidly as might be, *and for believing the nation could stand the strain*. In a word, Pitt stands at the head of what may be called the "Liberal" tradition of nineteenth century finance in England; for all those theories in commerce and taxation which are still clung to by modern politicians from tradition in spite of the increasing strain, and which were evidently sound so long as England possessed a marked financial superiority over her rivals.

In the reform of Parliament it was the same story. Pitt was "modern" there, too. He proposed in 1785 to suppress a number of decayed boroughs which were virtually private property, and to pay for these like any other form of property, distributing their members among the counties and London. What was still more of a reform, he proposed to extend the

franchise to copyholders in the villages and to householders in the towns, thus adding to the electorate nearly 100,000 new voters. The changes would not, of course, have appreciably affected the nation as a whole. It would have remained content with its old aristocratic constitution and anomalous electorate. But the point is that Pitt's reforms were logically based upon a certain principle the extension of which pointed toward a Continental system of widely extended and later of universal franchise. He failed altogether. There was a majority of over seventy against his even having leave to bring in the Bill. In the point of commerce, Pitt's Treaty with France in 1787, which reduced the duties affecting the trade between the two countries, shows the same spirit.

Pitt's domestic actions, however, are of no very great moment. He would not have the place he has in history but for the Revolutionary War, and in these few years previous to that struggle we have chiefly to consider the settlement of India and the relations between England and Ireland. The aspect of Ireland, as a whole, and the crisis of its history, which was rapidly approaching, I must speak of when I come to deal with the Act of Union, when I shall review the condition of the country between the middle of the eighteenth century and its close. The particular point of Pitt's administration in these years concerns two Irish matters, the legislative independence of Ireland and the attitude of Pitt toward Irish commerce. The difficulties in which England had found herself during the American War had led, of course, to action upon the part of the Irish. Though the Irish Parliament was but feebly repre-

sentative even of the Protestant minority which alone could vote and sit, yet there had taken place what always takes place in Ireland, even among the alien settlers there, when time has had its effect upon them, and that is a Separatist attitude toward England. There had gone with the emphasising of this attitude both an attempt to release Irish trade from the restrictions which England had imposed upon it, and some attempt to restore an element of reason into the treatment of the Catholic and national majority of the inhabitants.

As early as 1778 proposals had been put forward for removing some of the restrictions upon Irish trade. The English mercantile policy was too strong for North's government—which was in favour of the reform—and it was dropped. But in the Irish Parliament itself the first move was taken toward the recognition of Catholics as fellow-citizens. They were permitted to take long leases and the odious provision by which a renegade could dispossess the rightful Catholic heir to land was repealed. To some extent the ferment in Ireland was due to the cutting off through the American War of the principal market for Irish goods (since England refused to admit these), but the movement proceeded much more from a desire to take advantage of England's difficulties than from any other source. Upon the rejection of the trade proposals something like a threat of force was used. Over 40,000 volunteers were enrolled, at first almost entirely Protestant, and the government (partially through the dread of a French invasion) did not actively oppose the movement. Indeed, many thousand stands of arms were distributed among the volunteers by the administration itself

Ireland:
Pitt's First
Blunders.

when the threat of danger from France was greatest. With the volunteers in arms certain concessions were obtained. Ireland's trade with the Colonies was freed, the acts restraining her exportation of woollens and of glass were repealed, and the Government assented to a Bill which released the Irish Dissenters from the test.

In the Spring of 1780 Grattan, the great orator of the Irish Parliament, went a step farther and demanded legislative independence; that is, the abolition of the doctrine that the decisions of an Irish Parliament must be ratified by, and were subject to, the decisions of the English Government. Active corruption on the part of the Viceroy secured the abandonment of this proposal and the Irish Parliament for the moment betrayed the national cause. But the volunteers grew in strength, were more perfectly drilled, and at last, when they had come to number nearly twenty times the small garrison of 5,000 left in the country, delegates from their bodies assembled on the 15th of February, 1782, and passed resolutions demanding the legislative independence of the country. By the time the Irish Parliament met again the Rockingham Ministry had come into power at Westminster. Grattan again leading in the Irish Parliament the demand for independence stood determinedly against all forms of pressure from England, and on May 17th of that year, 1782, both houses passed resolutions which were later confirmed by statute, giving Ireland legislative independence, all control over the forces within the island, and the decision of legal cases arising within the island by its own Supreme Court, that is, by its own House of Lords.

Pitt's administration comes immediately after these preliminaries. We associate the name of Pitt with the worst error in judgment it was possible to commit in the relations between the two countries, and indeed, if Pitt's career as a whole be examined, it will be remarked how thoroughly he misread the future in everything save the commercial character of his country—the one thing he really understood. He was at heart lukewarm on Catholic Emancipation, and showed it at this moment. He was bewildered and frightened by the problem of an autonomous Ireland, even though that autonomy were entirely based upon the Protestant supremacy. But he did at this period in his career attempt one useful reform in the shape of granting Ireland Free Trade with England. Again the British mercantile interests opposed, and Pitt gave way as North had done before him. But he might have succeeded had he not coupled this chance piece of wisdom with a piece of folly; for, while proposing the material relief of unrestricted trade, he tried to bring in by a side wind a renewed control over Ireland to be exercised by the English Parliament; he proposed that the commercial legislation of the Irish Parliament should be perpetually bound by the Assembly at Westminster. Fox summed up the whole misshapen policy and his reasons for opposing it in one admirable phrase: "I will not barter," he said, "English commerce for Irish slavery."

Pitt got his resolutions through the British House of Commons, but he felt the opposition, especially the mercantile opposition, of the country to be too strong for him, and he abandoned his policy.

Until the French Revolution, therefore, the Irish

problem marked time. Ireland was autonomous, but under a completely Protestant supremacy; her trade was still strangled for the benefit of England; her people had learned (many Catholics were now added to the Protestant volunteers) the value of armed insurrection; and she had shown the way toward Catholic Emancipation. But there was nothing permanent or complete in what had been done, and it was certain in whatever new difficulty England might find herself some great change would come upon this unstable equilibrium, a change which would either settle in some permanent fashion the terrible questions which panic and hatred had posed for now a century, or one which should permanently alienate the Irish people. How that solution of an unsolved position came at last in the shape of the Union and all the catastrophe that word connotes we shall see later.

Pitt's
Indian
Policy.

The Indian policy of Pitt did not differ widely from that of Fox, although it was upon Pitt's opposition to Fox's Indian Bill and his support of the King in the matter that the beginning of his career had been founded.

We have already seen how the Seven Years' War had decided British supremacy in India over French. But that supremacy as yet only meant the virtual monopoly to establish new trading stations and to exploit the anarchy into which India as a whole had fallen. The steps whereby these commercial footholds were to be transformed into a general administration of the country came later.

The first advance of the East India Company after the defeat of the French followed upon the abuse by the East India Company's servants of their privileges of free passage for goods in the Ganges Valley.

Mir Kasim, whom the Council of the Company had made Nawab of Bengal, a man of active character and some organising power, determined to resist the abuses, raised an army and attempted to arrive at some firm agreement with the company upon the matter of tolls. Vansittart, who had succeeded Clive, came to such an agreement. The Council repudiated his action and the Nawab prepared to fight. Hostilities opened in June, 1763. By October the small British force under Major Adams had routed the Nawab's forces and taken his capital, but this did not put an end to the struggle. The Mogul Emperor took up the cause of Bengal. Monro, with a force of about 7,000 men, only a thousand of whom were white, was victorious against this alliance at Baxar on the 23d of October, 1764. In 1765 Clive returned, and within two years (he set sail for England again in January, 1767) he had made the company virtually sovereign over the territories it had conquered. But he continued to act through native rulers. He restored Oudh on the payment of a fine of half a million, and to the Mogul Emperor he restored Allahabad and Kora in exchange for a further extension eastward of the right for the company to trade without paying the tolls payable by natives, as also in exchange for the right to administer the revenues of Bengal, Behar and Orissa. Immediately after Clive's departure the company was threatened by the armed attack of Hyder Ali of Mysore, who acted in alliance with the Nizam of Hyderabad. The danger threatening the company was considerable and the terms which they were compelled to make alarmed opinion at home. It was following upon these events that there came North's regulating act

of June, 1773, which is the starting-point for all the constructive Indian policy of the end of the century, and from which we must begin our review of that policy if we are to understand Pitt's conclusion.

By 1772 the continual warfare in which the company had engaged, especially in its last and somewhat less successful phase, coupled with the corruption of its servants and the heavy bribery of native rulers, had brought it to a financial crisis. A famine in Bengal, added to Hyder Ali's attack, had sent the stock down to sixty. The company asked the Government to help it with a loan of a million. What North managed to do upon such an opportunity being offered him was to bring in the control of the Home Government.

The company was lent not a million, but nearly a million and a half, at only four per cent., but got it on condition that it should in future submit its accounts to the Treasury. A Supreme Court was established, the Chief Justice and the three Judges assisting him being appointed by the Crown. The Governor of Bengal was made the Governor-General of British India, and a Council of four was established to aid him. The first Governor-General, Warren Hastings, and his Council were appointed by the Act and not by the Company, though it was conceded that in future the Company should appoint these officers *subject to the approval of the Crown*. Finally, all military and civil matters which came before the Directors were to be submitted to the Crown.

Much was left undefined, and there was room for plenty of confusion in the future, but to Lord North's statesmanship we owe the intervention at just the right moment of the Government in England, and

henceforward its responsibility for India before the world in the graver matters where the irresponsible action of a private company might have thwarted, endangered or confused the general policy of Great Britain.

Ten years later comes the crisis which led first to Fox's, then to Pitt's, action. The war in which France engaged against England in alliance with the American Colonies had for its reflection in the East an attack upon the British dominion in India by the Mahrattas, who were the governing power in the South. They allied themselves with Hyder Ali, whose large army received some sort of European instruction from the French, defeated the troops sent against them from Madras, captured Arcot, and put Madras itself in peril. Sir Eyre Coote restored the fortunes of the British garrisons upon the Eastern Coast. A French fleet sent in aid of Hyder could effect nothing and, on the 1st of July, 1781, the English commander gained his first great victory at Porto Novo, and throughout the remainder of the year maintained an indecisive but on the whole successful campaign. A second French fleet, under Suffren, was more successful, but Coote maintained his position on land up to and beyond the death of his opponent Hyder in 1782.

Hyder's son Tippo continued the war, and when peace was at last signed between France and England, matters were left much as they had been in India at the beginning of the recent troubles. Warren Hastings, who had shown throughout those times an extreme energy, had accompanied it with the grossest tyranny, cruelty and bad faith, and these, together with the ambiguous position of the company, even after North's reform, coupled with its recent

action as sovereign ruler during the wars, had led to a strong demand in England for parliamentary inquiry into its action and that of its Governor.

Two committees had been formed to examine Indian affairs. They reported adversely as to the company's government, and the Ministry at home demanded the recall of Hastings. There was no legal power in the hands of the Crown whereby that demand could be enforced. A bill brought forward in the first days of the Coalition Ministry by Dundas, which would have increased the power of the Governor-General, but at the same time make some prominent English politicians the beneficiary of that appointment, was dropped on the promise of the Government to bring in an Indian bill of its own in the next session.

When Parliament met again in November, therefore, Fox brought in two bills which regarded respectively the Constitution of the Company and the government of India. Burke had the largest hand in the drafting of them.

According to these bills the management of the finances and the territories controlled by the company were to be in the hands of seven commissioners for terms of four years, these commissioners being named in the bill, and they being granted power to appoint and remove all officers subordinate to them. At the expiration of four years the Crown was to nominate the commissioners. The second bill attempted to put an end to the corruption of the company's officers and to secure the estates of the native owners. It was these bills, and especially the first (Fox's India Bill) which were the object of such violent dislike upon the part of George III. The

Opposition pretended that the new policy would give far too much power of patronage to the politicians at home. They meant that it would give too much power to Fox. And Pitt, as we have seen, supported the King unscrupulously in this quarrel, although he well knew that the bill was one for the better government of India, and that the spirit at least of its provisions was an absolutely necessary one.

When Pitt himself had climbed into office by these means he had to bring in a measure more or less upon the same lines. But it was a more cowardly one than Fox's and truckled more to the power of the India House. All the commercial side of the company's activities was to continue, and it was to have the power of appointment of all functionaries except that the Commander-in-Chief's and certain other nominations might be vetoed by the Crown. Only the political actions of the company were to be regulated by the Home Government through what was called a Board of Control, which changed with the change of Ministry at home. Under this settlement of "Pitt's India Bill" in 1784 Indian administration remained until after the Mutiny in the middle of the nineteenth century.

Two matters, one noisy and insignificant, the other of some importance save as an indication of the position of the Crown, are remarkable in the short remaining interval between this moment and the outbreak of the French Revolution. The first was the impeachment of Warren Hastings for the misuse of his power in India. The second, that affair of the Regency to which allusion has already been made.

The charges brought against Warren Hastings were finally formulated in 1787; the trial began in Febru-

Impeach-
ment of
Warren
Hastings.

ary, 1788. It was little more than an exhibition of political fireworks, and public interest in it, enormously excited at the beginning, had gone down to almost nothing before the end. The whole business is interesting only as presenting the question of how far the politicians were sincere in their lofty denunciations of cruelty and theft in India, and in showing how much all political life was already dominated by finance. Long afterward, in 1795, when much more real matters were occupying the English people and Europe, Hastings was obscurely acquitted. He survived until the year 1818.

The
Regency.

The second matter, the question of the Regency, is of interest not only because it had in it the seeds of a future political question and of all the untiring opposition shown to George IV. before and after his accession, but also because it was a measure of the strong surviving democratic instinct, especially among one active section of the wealthier classes for supporting the general idea of popular monarchy as against Parliament.

George III. had shown signs of insanity at the end of 1788. On November 5th of that year he was quite hopelessly insane. It was believed that his life was in danger, and that even if he recovered his health he would not recover his reason. As this danger threatened it had become equally important to nominate and confer powers upon a Regent.

Now, George's eldest son, the Prince of Wales, called by the same name as his father, and at this moment in his twenty-seventh year, was obviously the person to occupy the position. He was the heir, he was of age, and, in case of the King's death (which was thought imminent) he would soon be

King. But against George IV., largely because his character promised vigour, all the instincts of the oligarchy were turned. He was the most nearly national of any man heir to the throne since James II. His vices were the vices of generosity and too vigorous an appetite of body. He was a passionate lover, a gambler, an ardent boon companion within his own set. Such a character was naturally offensive to that of his incompetent father. Once more George III. was the instrument whereby his own theory of active monarchy was lowered. Had he supported his son he would have very greatly strengthened the chances of the crown in time to come, and it is even conceivable that England might have developed a permanent monarchical element in the nineteenth century. But as things were, George III. opposed his son. For such a character as that of George, the Prince of Wales was not only naturally antipathetic to the King's, but could also easily be rendered odious to the middle classes of the nation. The fact that Fox was his prime friend was sufficient to set against him a whole political party and all Fox's private enemies, and round that party and those enemies gathered all the instincts of the oligarchy that could now so easily rule England, and that was determined to debase the Crown. The Prince was further embarrassed by his love marriage three years before to a Catholic widow, Mrs. Fitzherbert, to whom he was very profoundly attached, and who certainly felt for him a reciprocal attachment. That marriage was void in law, and with characteristic hypocrisy those who were most ready to support the immoral provisions of the Royal Marriages Act and the still more immoral enactment that

an heir to the throne could not be legally married to a Papist,¹ were prepared to use the Prince's deep attachment and secret union against him; to call him a betrayer if he did not publicly admit the marriage (and he once had it denied), to wound him, or even imperil his succession if he did.

The future George IV. claimed through his friends, and especially through Fox, the constitutional *right* to be Regent as being of age and heir to the throne. The oligarchy through Pitt and Parliament naturally denied any such right, and said that the appointment of a Regent must be in their hands. The lawyers' talk about the "constitutional" position may be neglected. The "Constitution" was simply anything that might chance to result from the victory of either Crown or gentry, and as a fact the oligarchy was by this time far the stronger. Pitt invented a "constitutional" procedure of his own, whereby the King's authority should pass to a commission, and the upshot was one more victory for the governing classes against what was left of the monarchy.

The young Prince was indeed appointed Regent, but heavy restrictions were placed upon his power, particularly in the granting of peerages and in the disposal of the Royal property. In all this, of course, Pitt was strongly supported by the City of London and the mercantile element. But even as the Regency Bill was under debate, had passed the Commons, and had reached Committee stage in the Lords, George III. was, upon February 19, 1789, declared to be convalescent. On the 10th of March he had let

¹ By the Royal Marriages Act a marriage undertaken by an heir to the throne, however solemnly, was null in law unless it had the Royal Assent.

Parliament know that he was completely restored to health, and seven weeks later, on the 23d of April, he publicly returned thanks in St. Paul's amid great popular rejoicings for his relief from illness and from the more obvious unquestioned forms of mental incapacity.

This date brings us to the opening of the French Revolution, for even as these matters were passing in England the elections to the great French National Congress were ending; not a fortnight after George III.'s Thanksgiving in St. Paul's the Revolution had begun at Versailles.

Advent
of the
French
Revolution.

We now enter the last phase of that first division in modern English history, which reaches from the accession of William III. to the Battle of Waterloo: a phase which may justly be called that of "The Great War," although actual hostilities between England and France did not break out for three and a half years.

Two things concern the reader of English history as he approaches the first years of the French Revolution. The first is the real attitude of opinion in England toward the French democratic theory, the second is the attitude of the English Government toward the following international problem: whether it was or was not worth their while to make war upon the French.

The truth about both these points may be broadly stated as follows:

England being an aristocratic country, there was (and is) below a certain level quite in the upper ranks of society, no opinion upon any external matter (and very little opinion upon any internal matter) save that dictated by the governing classes. Further,

England being an aristocratic country, the democratic theory of the French is alien to it and in practice odious to it. One may put it this way: Supposing the ideal of civic freedom and of equality for which the French Revolutionists were working had been presented clearly and patiently to an audience composed of the English masses, they would simply have been bewildered. They would have thought the French had gone mad.

We need not, then, concern ourselves much with the opinion of anything below those ranks in which alone political discussion, or even reading and writing, were common.

Now, in this leading section of the nation there was, first of all, a clear division. The great majority heartily disliked democratic theory and practice, but a large minority were attracted toward the same, as a considerable proportion of educated men always must be attracted toward ideals generous in themselves, Latin in origin, and glorious in the historical examples of their action—with which examples educated men are acquainted.

It is extremely improbable that the latter section would have finally influenced English opinion whatever had been the course of things abroad. As a matter of fact, their influence rapidly dwindled as the crisis of conflict between the two nations approached, and that for two reasons. First, because the violence and excesses of the French were alien to the temper of nearly every Englishman, whether in or out of sympathy with their ideals—for the French do not fight with reluctance. Secondly, because this minority, which was in sympathy with the democratic effort of the French, was composed of two sections, rooted

in two utterly different philosophies and representing two contrasting and even conflicting systems of civic morals. There was the powerful, wealthy, but restricted Whig section, which still honestly supported in theory the idea of national self-government (in practice they had turned it into an oligarchy). There was the section of true, dogmatic democrats (men spiritually the heirs of the Middle Ages and the continuators of civilisation in every country) whose appetite was not for anything so humdrum as a particular method of government, but for the mystical doctrines underlying every democratic crusade, and in particular that most mystical dogma of all, the Equality (and consequent upon it the Rights) of man.

These two sections could never form an alliance; and between the one and the other the wedge of general opinion must drive fatally in.

To all this must be added certain other considerations which are of great practical moment. Though it was certain that the English masses would never be democratic, yet it was not equally certain that they would not rebel or at any rate produce a riotous anarchy if the emancipation of their fellows abroad became too vivid. Here was a powerful incentive against the Revolution for every man of refinement, of sense, or even of property in England. Next there must carefully be remembered what most modern critics forget, that before the outbreak of the French Revolution, the English Constitution afforded far greater individual freedom than that of any great country in Europe. The French Revolution was breaking out in a country which all had regarded (and properly regarded) as being, in theory at least, despotically governed.

The subjects of the English oligarchy or "limited monarchy" had not been despotically governed either in theory or in practice. Certain guarantees hedging in and protecting individual liberty had been very carefully maintained by the courts, and Englishmen of every class had grown to regard such freedom as they enjoyed as a thing not only actually, but necessarily, bound up with their own particular institutions. This is a consideration of immense importance in the understanding of modern English history: that many a civic good formerly enjoyed in England and surviving to this day is achieved through the working of particular national institutions connected with particular national formulæ, which institutions and which formulæ have been in use so long that the association of ideas between them and the end they are supposed to achieve is perfect. The mind with difficulty undertakes the effort of generalising, and when a body of thought is presented in unfamiliar clothes it seems outlandish and tends to be summarily rejected. Therefore men used to any good, such as freedom, clothed with a particular national institution, will neither recognise nor desire that good when it comes naked or in a foreign garb.

For instance, the English had now for several generations possessed a sort of fossil representative body in the House of Commons. It was absurdly inadequate. It could not pretend to speak for the people. It was a mere warped survival of the mediæval thing, but still there it was: and if Government proposed to do anything too wildly unpopular some Englishmen could under some circumstances give voice in constitutional fashion and in a National Assembly to the grievance. This, again, was based upon the

institution known as the Franchise; highly limited, indeed, anomalous, often grotesque, but still existing. An Englishman, therefore, could understand an extension, or a modification or a reform of his "franchise," but when you talked to him of "universal suffrage" you were talking in a foreign language. In the same way he could understand the phrase "A suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act," but he could not understand the phrase "A state of siege."

In a word, the general ideas underlying democracy had found sporadic and partial expression in a few highly concrete civic habits, and to those civic habits the nation was wedded by custom and by patriotism alike. To propose a vast extension, a universal extension, of such ideas; to present them in their most general form and to attempt to base a wholly new system of society upon their dogmatic expression was the most distasteful picture you could present to the people.

One may take it, then, that opinion in England was bound to be originally opposed to the French Revolution, and was bound to be more and more opposed to it as that Revolution proceeded.

It is idle to debate whether the English, if they had accepted the Revolution might not have saved their own society, prevented the final triumph of capitalism in the nineteenth century, and rescued the dignity and happiness of the populace. Theoretically they might have done so. In practice there was no avenue by which the (to them) novel doctrine of democracy could reach them.

Burke, the advocate, was exactly the man needed to put this national tendency into literary form. From the close of 1790 onward (he published his

“Reflections on the French Revolution” in the November of that year), Burke was the spokesman and the voice of the strong opposition which England made against the French Democratic effort throughout Europe, and the reader of history must take an ironical and perhaps a sardonic pleasure in considering that the text and exposition of so national an English attitude should have fallen to the genius of an Irishman.

Mackintosh, in his “*Vindiciæ Gallicæ*,” put very powerfully the Whig position. Paine, full of that complete Democratic theory which the American Colonists had largely learned from French philosophers and had already exercised in practice, put much more powerfully (in his “Rights of Man”) the complete Revolutionary position. Mackintosh may have shaken the conviction of many, Paine terrified all, but neither succeeded in creating a strong, still less a conquering, current of opinion.

In the second matter, that of foreign policy, a clear answer may equally be given. All the governments of Europe were slow to appreciate the significance of the French Revolution. It was not until ten years of war had passed and until Napoleon was in the full tide of his triumph that the overwhelming nature of the change was seized upon every side. It is not remarkable, therefore, that in the first few years such a Government as the English should have been more concerned with the old international problems with which it was familiar than with the new crusade of the French.

Roughly speaking, the international attitude of England between 1789 and 1792 depended on the following situation;

Prussia, or, to be more accurate, the evil personality of Frederick, its King, had dragged Russia and Austria into the crime known as the Partition of Poland; and the crime once committed the three criminals were henceforward bound by a common interest. That is the fundamental of international politics at the moment; it remains to this day, perhaps, the most enduring single factor in the various relations of Europe as a whole. For Poland has proved immortal; and though the truth is both concealed and forgotten, it is upon the necessity of preserving the unnatural servitude of Poland that the ultimate efforts of Prussia and Russia, at least, turn. It is this which perpetually reproduces after any disturbance a tendency to mutual support between those two Powers. Latterly the Austrian Imperial, Royal and Arch-ducal House has leaned more and more toward the ideal of representing the Catholic Slavs, and it is possible that in the near future Austrian support will help to reëstablish the Poles. But at the time of which we are speaking, the only three great military powers of the Continent besides the French lived in a perpetual memory of this common bond. The English Governments had observed the partition of Poland without protest. They could not have prevented it, but they seemed also to think it indifferent.

The next big factor lay in the commercial condition of the Low Countries. The Low Countries were in two divisions, as they are to-day. The Southern and mainly Catholic part, now called Belgium, was in Austrian hands. It included what may be called the Thames of those regions—the Scheldt—with what may be called its London—the town of Antwerp.

The mouth of the river was Dutch, but all the rest was in the Austrian Netherlands. *And, by international treaties formally ratified more than once, the Scheldt was closed to commerce; immediately, of course, to the advantage of the Dutch, indirectly to the much greater advantage of England.*

The northern part of the Low Countries, Holland, was seafaring. Its ports then, as now, were a menace to England if they should fall into the hands or under the influence of a strong maritime power.

The Dutch had shown some animosity to their hereditary governing house. They had proposed and half achieved a democratic rising. They had seized the person of their Princess, who happened to be the sister of the King of Prussia. This gave the King of Prussia the right to intervene, which he did. Pitt had, of course, heartily supported him, both as acting against a popular movement and as guaranteeing the holding of the Dutch ports and fleet by a friendly power, for the House of Orange was friendly to this country. Further, the anti-Catholic policy of the Emperor Joseph later moved the southern part of the Low Countries to rebel against Austrian domination. With this rebellion, both as a popular movement and as weakening their main enemy, Austria, the French Revolutionaries were in sympathy.

Now, if we put these main things together, what we have during the three years 1789-1792, when war between the Revolution and the old-established European governments was approaching is, from the point of view of the English Government, this:

Pitt feared the growing power of Russia. In this, as in so many other things, he was a forerunner of modern English policy, but he could not get the na-

tion to follow him in an aggressive attitude toward Russia—the matter seemed too remote and he could not detach Prussia from her Russian sympathies. On the other hand, he could depend upon a very lively English feeling against any resurrection of popular power in Holland, or in the Austrian Netherlands, and he would have behind him especially the great City interest that always supported him in vigorously maintaining the artificial closure of the Scheldt to commerce.

When, therefore, there came, after the second year of the Revolution, the attempted flight of the French Royal Family, their recapture and, consequent upon this, an agreement between Austria and Prussia to check the Revolution, Pitt held aloof. He had publicly declared (for what such declarations are worth) that England had no concern with the domestic affairs of France. Prussia, both for general dynastic reasons and on account of the common bond between her and Austria, would and did support Austria in the attempt to coerce the French. Her army, allied with that of Austria, invaded France in 1792. Their attempt failed by something like a miracle, and the invaders retreated after the cannonade of Valmy in September, 1792, the first phase of the war having already lasted five months.

There was a strong body of wealthy men which would have wished England to side with the Continental Allies against the French Revolutionaries at this moment. Many Revolutionary Societies, chiefly in the middle class, had arisen in England. There had been riots, or at any rate violent demonstrations, in some of the great towns, and the Government had been very ready to suppress, by every means in its

power, any expression of sympathy for the French within this island. But Pitt refused to supplement this domestic policy by a foreign policy of war. He stood firm and would not fight. He personally detested the Revolutionary principles, but with his usual lack of judgment (in purely political—not commercial—affairs) he hardly believed the Revolution capable of succeeding, or at any rate of threatening his class.

But it so happened that in the Autumn of 1792 the French reversed the tide of war, crossed the frontier and successfully invaded and occupied the Austrian Netherlands. The war being what I have called it, a crusade, they accompanied this movement by strong democratic proclamations, notably that celebrated Decree of the 19th of November known as the “Edict of Fraternity,” which promised the French alliance to all peoples struggling to be free. It was followed by an arbitrary act upon the part of these French Crusaders, who opened the Scheldt to commerce in spite of former treaty obligations.

Every effort has been made by one school of history to belittle the importance this act must have had in the eyes of Pitt. Such efforts are useless. Pitt’s judgment was a commercial judgment. That the Dutch acquiesced in the opening of the Scheldt was nothing to him. The opening of the Scheldt for the benefit of others, Austria for instance, in the past he might have permitted as against some very great bargain elsewhere. The opening of the Scheldt (without compensation) to *French* advantage—that is, to the advantage of the second great maritime power, the hereditary enemy of England, and her chief potential rival in Colonial and commercial expansion—was quite another matter; and it was the opening of the

Scheldt which we must regard as the definite act which changed Pitt's policy. He knew it before November closed. His note following upon it is a minatory note. In the next month he called out the militia. He had not the necessary decision to force war; he still hesitated; but he was now prepared for war. In the next month again, the January of 1793, came the execution of Louis XVI. The irregular diplomatic relations still continued by the French with the Court of St. James's (regular relations Pitt would only maintain with the true envoy of an accredited representative of Louis XVI.'s power—and that power had not existed since August when the King was imprisoned) were suddenly severed. It was perhaps to the relief of Pitt that the French themselves declared war, but war was in any case inevitable, and it formally opened for history upon the 1st of February, 1793; a declaration of war against Holland by France being made at the same moment. For somewhat more than nine years we have to follow the course of this effort to which Pitt was now pledged, and in which he discovered, as it proceeded, so singular an energy and tenacity.

The Great War in which England took a prominent part against the Revolution and against Napoleon falls, as far as English history also is concerned, into two clear sections, each of them separate wars.

The
Great War.

The first section opens with the 1st of February, 1793, and ends with the 27th of March, 1802, when the Peace of Amiens was signed.

The second section begins with the Declaration of War by England on France on the 18th of May, 1803, and does not finally conclude until the Battle of Waterloo upon the 18th of June, 1815.

In the first half of these operations the general movement is as follows:

The English Government is moved to prosecute the war by two motives. First, the all-importance to England of preventing a great maritime power from controlling the Netherlands; secondly, a desire to take the opportunity afforded by such a war against a colonizing country for seizing Colonial markets. Of these two motives the first was by far the most powerful. France occupied, and retained her grip over, the Low Countries. So long as she was in that position England was in permanent and deadly peril. That is why England was compelled to continue the war, and that is why, after reluctantly making peace (under conditions I shall describe in a moment), her government was so easily brought to renew the war in 1803. If we do not seize this all-important matter of the Low Countries we shall fail to understand either the position or the duties of an English Government during the whole period.

Besides this main clue to the affair other points must be remembered. In the first place England easily established from the very beginning that complete supremacy at sea which she has retained until our own time. This advantage she owed to three forces: The excellence of her marine armament, including not only seamanship but gunnery; next, the appearance of men of peculiar talent to conduct that armament, particularly the supreme genius of Nelson; lastly, and most important, the destruction of all efficiency in the French Navy at the beginning of the period by the Revolution itself.

A navy is efficient chiefly through tradition. The

Corps of Officers which had secured the greatness of the old Royal Navy in France was opposed to the Revolution, and persecuted by it in a special fashion. They were many of them Bretons, and belonging therefore to the most disaffected province of Revolutionary France. They were nearly all of them noble and therefore suspect of the new régime. They were not mixed with politics and had no temptation to join the winning side. The great gaps in the officering of the land armies of the Revolution could be supplied by the rapid promotion of young men from the inferior ranks. With the Navy that was impossible. The discipline of a ship is not like the discipline of a regiment. It rather resembles the discipline of a household, and mere promotion from the non-commissioned or from the subaltern ranks could never supply the place of the old, trained, narrow and exiguous corps of French Naval commanders.

The continuity of French Naval tradition, thus broken at the very beginning of the war, could never be recovered. The English contingents upon land were not large, and the part here played by the British Government was mainly that of subsidising its foreign allies. Indeed, we shall see, as the story of the war progresses, the all-importance to Britain of the unquestioned economic superiority she then enjoyed. It was British money which armed and kept in the field one Continental force after another. But the incapacity or unwillingness to produce great bodies of fighting men upon her own account had already appeared in England. Excellent as were the regiments once formed, and justly as the historian may boast of their quality, especially in the latter

phases of the campaigns (and nowhere more than in the Peninsula) their numbers were always small in comparison with the great Continental hosts at whose side they fought.

The same is not true of their commanders. The despised Duke of York himself was not incapable of forming a strategic plan, while in Sir John Moore England produced a General whom his subordinates at least could appraise at a just value; and in Wellington we have one of the best defensive strategists and tacticians of our history. Indeed, those who, like the present writer, have studied upon the spot the various positions taken up and defended by this great General in his principal actions, must continually wonder that any man should have had the capacity to judge ground with such rapidity and with such unvarying success.

The opening of the war upon land was unsuccessful. In the first year the Duke of York, in command of a mixed force acting in conjunction with the Austrians (whom Coburg led), was occupied in reducing the frontier fortresses upon the Netherland Border, preparatory to an advance upon Paris. The question of whether these delays before fortresses was wise or no has been considerably debated, both by contemporaries and by modern historians, but the verdict should justly be given in favour of the slow but sure progress of the Allies in gradually reducing this belt of strongholds. An advance upon Paris which would have neglected untaken fortresses in its rear, and would have been made through a country largely armed and bitterly hostile, would have failed. In this policy of reducing fortresses, however, the particular task undertaken by the Duke of York at

the end of the first year of war was disastrous. He proposed to lay siege to Dunkirk, because it was one of the harbours upon the Lowland belt threatening England. In that attempt he failed, partly because he quite mistook the nature of the ground, partly because the great levies raised by the Revolutionary government threatened his rear, after the victory of Hondschoote, the first considerable success of the Revolutionary arms in this campaign.

In 1794 the tide was turned by another great French victory at Tourcoing against the Allies. The plan of this disastrous battle was framed by the Duke of York himself. It was too ambitious and it collapsed under the test of realisation. The English contingent under his direct command was isolated, partly through the slowness of the Austrian movements, partly because too much had been demanded of the chief Austrian column in the way of marching. The Duke of York himself narrowly escaped capture. The defeat of the Duke of York at Tourcoing had for its immediate consequence a further and still more decisive defeat of the Allies at Fleurus. The victorious French drove a wedge in between the various contingents of their invaders, the Prussians and Austrians were thrown back toward the Rhine, the Anglo-Dutch-Hanoverian body toward the North Sea, and with the next year, 1795, Spain, Prussia and Holland abandoned the original universal coalition against the French.

But the British Government was determined to continue the struggle, for the French had by this time secured a complete control of the Low Countries and had captured the Dutch Fleet. Further, the democratic principles which they spread wherever

they planted themselves made their grip upon the Netherlands a well based and secure thing which, if England did not ultimately upset it, would threaten her very existence, for a string of ports, running from the Weser to Brest along all the opposing shores of the Narrow Seas would be virtually under one inimical command.

To pursue the war England had now one great ally left in the field, the House of Austria. This ally was heavily subsidised from what was then the bottomless purse (compared with the resources of the Continent) of English industry, commerce and banking. Further, England was at liberty to continue hostilities apparently indefinitely, because she had proved her ability to resist invasion and to defeat the French fleets.

The new conditions whereby the gross inferiority of the French Naval service to the English had been produced were apparent as early as the beginning of the Summer of 1794. In the last days of May and on the 1st of June of that year Lord Howe had met in the Atlantic, off Brittany, a French fleet convoying an import of grain from America. He did not succeed in preventing the food from reaching Brest. But though somewhat inferior in numbers and far inferior in weight of metal, the action proved the complete superiority of English naval gunnery over French and, in a somewhat less degree, the superiority of seamanship as well. Six French ships of the line were taken, one was sunk, and from that moment the unquestioned supremacy of Britain at sea is founded and continued.

An attempt to support the French rebels in the Northwest failed in the following year. It was bun-

gled. The fleet failed to support the French rebel force, which it landed and was to have protected, and the Quiberon expedition, as it is called, ended in disaster.

Meanwhile the war, which had at first been exceedingly popular at home, grew less popular as it proceeded. English commerce was suffering, prices were rising. Amid the mass of the new proletariat in the towns, which the new industrial system had created, misery was acute, taxation was extremely heavy, and there were no tangible results apparent from a continuation of the campaign such as the populace could seize or understand. The continuance of hostilities was further rendered unpopular by the reckless and panic-stricken severity of the government, which prosecuted right and left for anything that it chose to call sedition, which had suspended the Habeas Corpus Act, and which conceived it impossible to save the State save through a further degradation of the mass of the people.

With the end of 1795 Pitt first spoke of the possibility of Peace. It was, of course, to be a Peace based upon the French evacuation of the Low Countries, or, to speak more accurately (since democratic institutions had been granted to the population of the Netherlands), Pitt's demand was that the French should hand back Belgium to Austria and thus cut themselves off from the Dutch and Belgium ports and the use of the Dutch Navy.

Such negotiations could, of course, end in nothing, and Pitt still hoped that the great force of Austria would effect the prime object of his policy, the exhaustion of France. He failed altogether. Austria was beaten to her knees, largely by the action of the

young General Bonaparte, in the plains of Northern Italy, and Pitt, for the second time, in the Autumn of 1796, considered the advisability of stopping the war. But the Netherlands were still the key to the position, and on the Netherlands the negotiations again broke down. Austria, meanwhile, had made peace, negotiating for it in the spring and signing it in the Autumn of 1797. There was, as it were, a stalemate so far as England was concerned. France could not touch her from overseas (abortive and insignificant attempts at an invasion of British soil failed), but, on the other hand, Pitt's confidence that if he held out the Revolution would be beaten upon the Continent, was shattered.

The moment was also critical for the English Government through two perils, one of naval discipline, and one of finance. Neither of these was so severe as the more dramatic historians would repeat. The mutiny that broke out in the fleet was, as all such things must be in an aristocratic country, without aim and without decision. It was a protest against ill-treatment and bad pay, but it was a protest which the protestors themselves did not understand. Aimless disturbances of this sort are always capable of solution by the promise and by the partial performance of better things and by exercising great care to avoid severity in reprisals. There was nothing anti-national in the movement. The mutiny broke out on April 15, 1797, at Spithead. The mutineers were at first pacified, but it broke out again in the Mouth of the Thames in May and lasted till the middle of June. No attack was made upon England by sea during this domestic crisis, and though the Russian Fleet was offered to act in alliance with the British

in the North Sea in case of an attack from the Dutch Ports, no such attack came.

The real temper of the Navy is best shown by the fact that two striking victories were won by it immediately before and immediately after this incoherent demonstration.

The first was that of Cape St. Vincent, in which the Spanish Fleet, which was believed to be sailing to effect a junction with the French in the Channel was checked on its issue from Cadiz off Cape St. Vincent by Jervis with Nelson under him. Of the 27 ships in the Spanish force (larger on the average and more heavily gunned than the English) four were taken and the whole was cast into such disarray that their further progress was impossible. The action is a remarkable one for two reasons. First, it was the turning-point in the Naval history of Spain, which has never since that date been a first-class maritime power. Secondly, it showed to what the British Navy owed its continued and increasing supremacy. For Jervis (afterward Lord St. Vincent) had fought with an inferior fleet and far less weight of metal. But the three factors of British superiority upon the ocean, seamanship, gunnery and command were amply present and contrasted violently with those of the enemy, Nelson in particular showing just that "imaginative courage" which should distinguish a great Admiral or General officer.

The second considerable victory was won immediately after the mutiny as the Battle of St. Vincent had been won immediately before. The Dutch Fleet, which had long been unable to leave the Texel on account of contrary winds, sailed out upon October 6th. Duncan, with his fleet at Yarmouth, had the news on

the 9th. He came up with the enemy off Camperdown on the 11th. The fleets were equal in number, the English Fleet superior in armament, and in the result the Dutch Fleet was shattered.

The financial crisis was a purely monetary one and was therefore in strict economics artificial, wealth was amply present, only the medium of exchange was affected. The difficulty was resolvable by a little patience and wisdom. Pitt, always of first-rate judgment in affairs of this kind, met it with both wisdom and coolness. The only danger the country ran during its crisis was the danger to its credit system. The actual wealth in things, in movable and negotiable things present in the market, was tenfold or twentyfold the obligations based upon them, and since credit only was at stake all that was needed was some form of credit which would for the moment command respect. Cash payments were suspended, the reserve in the Banks having fallen so low as to make that step necessary, and Government paper substituted. It was quite normally accepted and taken up virtually at par. The system was continued until the end of the war and after—for 22 years. And until the last ten years or so of that period there was no depreciation of any consequence in the fictitious currency thus established. In other words, the continued and rapid increase of national wealth at this moment, when England was the one manufacturing centre of the world and the one carrying power, coupled with the confidence of the City of London and of the great merchants in the ability of the Fleet to keep that manufacturing centre intact and to defend that carrying trade made good in all men's minds the Government promise to repay and to honour in real goods at

last what was for the moment a mere obligation. The crisis was over before the Summer of 1797.

France had forced peace upon Austria in this same year, 1797, by the Treaty of Campo Formio, and it is probable that but for an anomalous accident, the motives of which have never been made clear, peace with England would have followed. As it was, that anomalous accident served both to increase, if that were possible, the English power at sea, to prolong the war, and to prepare the advent of Bonaparte to complete power in France. This anomalous accident was Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt.

English history has no concern with the difficult task of guessing (for we can do no more than guess) that General's reasons for creating so useless a diversion. Rhetorical phrases of his about an Empire in the East have perhaps been magnified out of due proportion, as most certainly his foresight of the effects such a strange adventure would have upon his own career are exaggerated by modern historians. At any rate, in the Spring of 1798, Bonaparte sailed for Egypt, of all places in the world, with a small force of 35,000 men.

He conquered Lower Egypt, but at the same time established a strategical condition which should have been overwhelmingly favourable to England.

Those who are so foolish as to believe that superiority at sea is the foundation of all military greatness and the key to all military history should note what followed. By all the rules deducible from this doctrine Bonaparte had delivered himself into the hands of the English Government. He was separating himself from France with his little army (bound to be reduced immediately and enormously by the summer

climate of burning lands) and separating himself from it by hundreds of miles of sea, and that at a moment when the superiority of his enemies at sea had been incontestably proved again and again. In spite of this the opportunity to destroy him was missed. Nelson, who was watching Toulon, did not prevent his sailing; and though the French Fleet was discovered at last in Aboukir Bay and destroyed by Nelson in the famous Battle of the Nile (August 2, 1798), though the rapidly dwindling French force thus cooped up in the Orient was doomed, and its attempt upon Syria checked before Acre (largely by the presence and help of British crews in that seaport town), yet when peace came to be signed the effect of all this was null. Bonaparte himself was able to return. He was back in France by the autumn, and in the first days of November had established himself in complete mastery of the country.

Pitt raised, of course, a second coalition against him; based upon the lavish subsidies which the overmastering economic superiority of England at this date made as easy as ever. Austria again entered upon a campaign, Russia was induced to join, and the Kingdom of Naples attacked the French Power in Italy.

The coalition recovered Italy—all but Genoa; the democratic rising of the Kingdom of Naples was suppressed, and its suppression stained by the nervous betrayal of Nelson who, under the influence of his mistress (the British Minister's wife), handed over to arbitrary execution brave men who had capitulated upon terms. But the coalition was defeated again at last as it had been defeated before. Holland was recovered by the French influence. The Austrians

were beaten at the very gates of their capital at Hohenlinden, and France, in the Treaty of Lunéville (February 9, 1801), recovered the frontier of the Rhine. Russia deserted the coalition, and the whole offensive plan had failed.

Pitt's government could justly boast that it had preserved the integrity of England and of English wealth, but Pitt was compelled for the moment to consider peace.

His domestic policy, the substitution of Addington for himself at the head of the Ministry, his return concern the internal history of the country, which I will immediately deal with in connection with the Irish Union. Preliminaries of peace were signed in October, 1801. England gave up all her conquests except Trinidad and Ceylon, and the Treaty was signed under the name of the Treaty of Amiens on the 27th of March, 1802. With this ends the first phase of the War.

When the Irish nation had reached the last depths of its decline, in the middle of the eighteenth century, the situation of its inhabitants was what has been described upon a former page. The great mass of them, more than three-quarters, the majority that represented the whole tradition of the nation, was forbidden every form of expression and of power. So true is this that it has become almost impossible to write its history with accuracy. We have hardly any elements for that, save tradition. A constant emigration of whatever was most vital in this national body compels us to seek for the history of Ireland in the armies of Catholic Powers abroad.

The minority (divided mainly into Presbyterian and Anglican but consistently Protestant) formed, in

the eyes of the English Government—and, it must be feared, of the world—the world personality of Ireland.

Virtually all the property, actually all administrative power, nearly all literary expression, and by far the greater part of all civic activities, resided in these Protestants and in them alone.

It must further be carefully noted that under a complete system of persecution, the like of which had never been known by the Catholic Church before, even when it was subjected to the Pagan or to the Mussulman, there was a continual flow of talent and organising ability from the Catholic mass into the Protestant minority. A man discovering in himself aptitudes for success in any walk of life must either resolve upon a complete sacrifice of his whole life for a religion that could hardly be maintained, and the rites of which were only followed with the utmost difficulty, or—as would occur to nearly all such men—follow his ambition at the expense of his doubtful Faith. The consequence of this steady drain of ability into the Protestant camp, coupled with the emigration, in great numbers, of the most adventurous and the most brave of the Catholics, left the masses of the nation that still preserved its traditions and its identity a powerless residuum, hopelessly poor, nearly enslaved, and lacking all natural leaders. Now no society can long maintain its continuity without natural leaders; and when we ask ourselves how it was that the Irish people, and in particular the Catholic Faith, survived at all, we find ourselves at a loss for any rational answer.

The truth is that the resurrection of Ireland was a resurrection from the dead.

It is not yet the fashion to admit the direct action of the Divine Will in human affairs, but certainly if there is to be discovered anything approaching a miracle in the political history of Europe during the last two centuries, that miracle is the resurrection of Ireland.

If we take some such date as 1750-60 and survey Irish society at that time, we discover one very clear mark which differentiated it from the generation that was to follow.

That mark was this: A great number of men still living, some occupying the greatest positions in the State, had lived all their lives through a period during which the Protestant ascendancy, or, to speak more accurately, the elimination of all that was not Protestant, had been vividly established by direct acts largely of a military character. This triumph of theirs filled the whole of their memories.

The cleavage was a clean one. You were on one side or the other: Catholic helot or Protestant master. A man then eighty might have taken part in his early manhood in the campaigns of William the Third; he would have been in the full maturity and vigour of his age when the Penal Laws were established, and most of his public life would have been passed in the active execution of that policy which was intended to destroy the Irish people. A close connection with England was normal to him, or at least normal to the decades which he could best remember.

I have repeatedly insisted throughout these pages upon the importance of observing in the course of history the moment when one generation passes away and a new one succeeds it. The critical point

in any political development is not that in which such and such a principle is first successful and first established by law. It is rather the point where those who can remember another state of things have died off and a new generation that cannot remember the old state of things has succeeded it. Thus we are to-day passing in England through a very critical phase of our industrial civilisation, not because that industrial system is new—it has existed for at least a lifetime—but because the old people who can just remember an England mainly agricultural are passing away and those who now direct public life and give expression to public feeling are men who can remember nothing else but an England proletarian, capitalist and urban.

So it was with Ireland at the moment of which I speak. Up to the middle of the eighteenth century the whole note was that of William III. After the middle of the eighteenth century came the great change.

Take as two typical men who may best stand for that earlier and this later Ireland, Swift and Grattan. Swift was wholly English in blood, only accidentally born in Ireland. He lived all through the first period of which I am speaking. He was far the greatest exponent, and enjoyed perhaps the highest intelligence, of his time. Yet you will search his writings in vain to discover the least appreciation of what the Catholic Church may be, or of the old Irish national tradition. He views the mass of the nation as something almost outside humanity. He continually asserts Irish claims in commerce and in other activities, but his life is led between England and Ireland, and the claims he advances are those of

settlers who retain a close connection with the Government at Westminster. Swift was a young man of twenty-two at the moment of the English Revolution and of William III.'s advent. He died in 1745.

Take Grattan for the next generation and you have a complete contrast. A Protestant of course, the son of one of the old placemen (his father was the Recorder of Dublin), studying in London at the Middle Temple, he is none the less entirely Irish. He has no memory of the Revolution, nor even of the last vestige of Stuart reaction, for he was born after the crushing out of the Rebellion of '45. The generation to which he belongs, the generation which saw first the independence of the Irish Parliament, then the Act of Union, and which lived to see O'Connell and the Catholic Association, was concerned with an Ireland whose English "garrison" was once again becoming separate from the English connection. A whole group of men had arisen for whom, though they too were Protestant, England was already a foreign country. At the same time, the precarious survival of the Faith had rendered the Penal Laws often obnoxious to social intercourse, more often futile; while the restrictions upon Irish trade appeared far more monstrous than they had to those men of fifty years before who remembered the reoccupation of Ireland by an act of conquest.

It is with these considerations in mind, with this novel situation of the second part of the century clearly before us, that we can best understand what followed.

The steps by which the independence of the Irish Parliament was obtained we have already seen. It should be further remembered that the moment of

the American War and the years immediately preceding and succeeding it had witnessed a rapid relaxation of persecution. Already in 1771 a Catholic could hold on a lease a little inferior land where bogs had been reclaimed. Three years later the Oath of Allegiance was substituted for the Oath of Supremacy, i.e., a political for a religious compulsory declaration. Four years later again any land might be held on lease by a Catholic; and in the critical year 1782 the common cause which the Catholics had made with the volunteers for obtaining political independence and trade freedom led to a wholesale change. Henceforward they could build schools (though only with the permission of the Protestant Bishop), their hierarchy was no longer subject to exile, and the official bribes were no longer offered directly to renegades. Such relief will seem a very small thing to those who have only studied the hatred of the Church as it has been exercised by the Mahommedan in Spain, or by the Prussian in Poland. But they represented a whole turning of the tide in Ireland. They signified the breakdown of the attempt, the most methodical ever known and very nearly successful, to root out forever in one province of Catholic Europe the religious tradition of our civilisation. More relief was to come.

From the achievement of Parliamentary autonomy in 1782 to the granting of the suffrage to Catholics in 1793 (the really critical date in this period, as we shall later see), is a matter of eleven years.

The story of these eleven years has been called "The digging by the Irish Parliament of its own grave"; but this phrase is imperfect and even misleading, for it suggests a national assembly blunder-

ing on account of some inherent national incapacity. There was nothing of the sort. The Irish Parliament was not yet in any sense a national assembly—far less so even than the English Parliament of the day. And if it failed, as it did fail, to maintain Irish freedom, the chief agent of this failure was not itself, corrupt and wholly unrepresentative as it was, but the Government at Westminster.

The factors in the Irish problem at this moment were as follows: You had in Ireland the mass of the nation—more than three-quarters¹ of it—Catholic; and of these, since the relaxation of the persecution, a certain number could act as leaders, while a larger number of the middle class were beginning to accumulate some substance. But the great bulk were still the disinherited and hopelessly impoverished peasantry. The whole mass of this Catholic body was Nationalist and patriot. The exceptions were quite insignificant. For them the English conquest had been, and remained, an inexpressible disaster, which it was the duty of every honest man to undo by any means whatsoever.

¹The numerical proportion between Protestant and Catholic Irishmen is often made a matter of discussion and sometimes of acrimonious discussion. But the quarrel really turns upon words. If we mean by Irishman the inhabitants of the island alone, then the proportion of Protestants has of course increased in recent years, that is, since the famine. The rough proportion from the Revolution to the Famine fluctuated between more than a fifth and less than a quarter of Protestants to less than four-fifths and more than three-quarters of Catholics. At the present moment the total Protestant population (or rather, the total non-Catholic population) is just over a quarter—26.4 per cent. But if we count the Irish race throughout the world, even if we only note those who are active in their adherence to Irish nationality, the predominance of Catholics is quite overwhelming: it is something like eleven-twelfths of the whole. Even if we con-

Next you have the Protestant minority, but that minority divided in a fashion very different from what we see (or think we see) among them to-day. There remained the old distinction between the Anglican Protestants with their hugely endowed Church, their official recognition, and their virtual monopoly of official salaries and power, on the one hand, and the various sects, of which the largest was the Presbyterian in the North, upon the other. But within this Protestant minority there must first be noted a very greatly preponderant body of men who were now mainly Nationalist in feeling. Their contempt for and ignorance of the Catholic Church—which did not exclude a fear of its power—perverted and warped but did not destroy their patriotism. True, that patriotism was expressed in various degrees, from the man who while English in connection and experience regarded Ireland as the natural field for his career, to the man who, like Grattan, was spiritually and almost mystically inspired with the unselfish love of Ireland. Further, it was evident that if ever religious hatred should be allowed to blaze

sider the British Islands alone, the Catholic Irishman is to the Protestant in the proportion of quite six to one, for the Catholic population of Great Britain, a matter of some two million, is almost entirely Irish. The native English elements being confined to a handful of wealthy converts, a still smaller handful of isolated territorial families quite out of touch with the Catholic world, and a sprinkling of Lancashire and other native Catholics among the populace in certain parishes of the North. It must be admitted in this calculation that the Protestant proportion would be larger if Protestant Irishmen did not merge so easily with any foreign population into which they may emigrate, and so forget their Irish nationality. On the other hand the Catholic birthrate is so high compared with the Protestant that the proportion of Catholics in the whole Irish nation, very high as it already is, must continue to increase.

out again there would arise an inevitable tendency upon the part even of the patriotic Protestants to lean upon England.

With these reservations we may repeat that the mass, though not the whole of the Protestant minority, was Nationalist in feeling. There were subsidiary points. The Presbyterian and to a less extent the other Non-Conformist bodies, possessing, as they did, considerable wealth, were jealous of and could resist the official Church and its beneficiaries, clerical and lay. While the Calvinist Creed, training men as it does in strict and highly rational processes, always inclined the Presbyterian body to what are called "Radical" measures in legislation and even at one moment to Republicanism.

When we turn to the administration of the country we find further factors to be considered. Parliament was based, as yet, upon a very narrow franchise, still entirely Protestant. Even so, quite three-quarters of its members were, in practice, nominees, and not representatives at all. Their seats were in the gift of a few wealthy men, or purchasable as boroughs. More important even than this anomaly was the executive power, or, as it is called in English constitutional phraseology, "the Crown."

"The Crown" means to-day in England a little group of wealthy men and women whose nucleus is a still smaller group of professional politicians (the "Government" and "Opposition" working together) and their financiers. This body gives out the jobs and the salaries, fills all administrative posts, nominates magistrates and judges, directs prosecutions, acquittals, imprisonments, fines and secret pardons, and has recently come to be all-powerful in the fra-

ming and enactment of new laws through the decay of the legislative assembly, the House of Commons.

“The Crown” meant in the England of the latter eighteenth century a sort of compromise between the personal will of the King and that of a few Ministers, especially of the Prime Minister—but the latter, still in some dread of the House of Commons, which was still free and to which a Minister was still responsible.

Now “the Crown” in Ireland at the same time meant something very different. It meant the alien government at Westminster acting both upon, and over the heads of, the Parliament at Dublin. The Lord Lieutenant, the administration in general, all the salaried posts except those few directly connected with Parliament, the Magistracy, and the regular armed forces were *not* under the control even of the native Ministry, still less of the Irish Parliament. Even without corruption this alien administrative power formed a counter-weight against the Native Parliament—such as it was—and a counter-weight much heavier than that Parliament. *With* corruption its power was quite out of proportion to that of the Parliament. It could bribe wholesale, for it held the purse of a country far wealthier than Ireland. It could terrorise, for it made judges and chose juries. And it could and did secure what majorities it chose, even in the Commons themselves, by the promise and the granting of rewards.

A series of accidents led Pitt—who was the active agent of this alien power—to desire the destruction of the Irish Parliament, and the task should have been so easy that one wonders at the tardiness with which it was effected. The first of these accidents

came with the attempt of the now autonomous Irish Parliament to secure a really unrestricted freedom of trade.

It had, of course, been a condition of the political freedom reluctantly granted to Ireland immediately before that her commerce also should be relieved of the restrictions that had ruined the nation. But when the matter was set down in black and white for Pitt to examine, that statesman, acting as the agent of the India House, proposed to forbid Irishmen from trading at all with the East. The government in Ireland was, of course, in the hands of Pitt, but his proposals were so distasteful that it dared not force them through the Irish House of Commons. It should be added that not only a commercial motive but also a political one influenced Pitt in his demands, for he also proposed to bind Ireland to any measures upon a Naval policy and expenditure which the English Parliament might pass.

At any rate, this check confirmed him in the fixed idea which had probably already arisen in his mind, that the Irish problem must be solved for England by the destruction of the Irish Parliament and of all external marks of Irish nationality.

The crass incompetence of such a policy needs no comment. It is almost the negation of policy to attempt political solutions by the crude artifice of mere suppression. And certainly of all Pitt's blunders this blunder has been the most disastrous to his country and the most enduring in its evil effects. But Pitt was a man without vision, and from this moment onward he determined upon what history has since called with unconscious irony "the Union."

The second accident, which still further confirmed

him in this short-sighted piece of simplicity, was, as might be expected of so narrow a man, a personal question. We have seen what Pitt's action had been in the matter of the Regency, his private quarrel with Fox and his pique against the Prince of Wales. In that quarrel the Irish Parliament supported the Prince against Pitt. This, coupled with the snub given to Pitt over his defence of the East India Company and its financiers, made doubly sure the advent of the disaster.

The first task before those men who sincerely desired the permanence and strengthening of their newly acquired freedom was the reform of the Irish Parliament. But the Irish politicians first made the mistake of permitting an increase in the standing forces maintained by England in the country and of allowing the volunteers to dissolve. Next they made the still greater mistake of refusing for the moment to recognise the right of any Catholic to the franchise. That was to come, but it was to come too late. It is notable that Flood, an ardent patriot, shared in this determination to exclude from the franchise the mass of the nation. It was Grattan who, with much more judgment, supported the national convention in that demand. But only 77 votes could be found for it in a house of 234.

Even supposing that the enfranchisement of Catholics must be delayed, it was urgent that Parliament itself should at least be so reformed as to give it some leverage against the bribery and the executive pressure proceeding from Westminster.

To prevent that reform was the main object of the anti-national faction, always supported, of course, by Pitt. The main agent of this faction was a cer-

tain FitzGibbon, himself the son of a renegade, and the most violent opponent of Irish liberties. When the Parliament at Dublin passed a vote of censure upon the Viceroy by failing to transmit their message of support to the Prince of Wales, the simple expedient was adopted of dismissing from all places of honour and profit under "the Crown" of all those who had voted for the dignity of their body. Next, Fitzgibbon himself was made Lord Chancellor. The anti-patriots who had supported Pitt on the Regency question had offices, and particularly magisterial offices and judgeships, handed out to them wholesale, and by the year 1790, when the Dublin Parliament was dissolved and a new election ordered, the disintegration of the Irish Commons had already gone far.

In the new Parliament there sat Grattan, Curran and many other of the old members; Lord Edward Fitzgerald, Arthur O'Connor, and a young man, Robert Stuart, later to achieve an unenviable immortality under the name of Castlereagh. This lad (he was but twenty-one years of age) posed at the moment as a violent reformer. It is impossible and immaterial to discover in a character so insignificant how far the pose was sincere. The curious will note that among those less eminent returned to these Commons was one Arthur Wellesley, a lad like Castlereagh, but one of far superior dignity and power. He was the son of Lord Mornington and a Dublin man; a little fellow with a nose too large for his face. He was in future years to become very conspicuous in Europe and in England as the first Duke of Wellington.

What success this new Parliament might have had in the direction of reform, and how the struggle be-

tween patriotism and alien corruption might have proceeded, we cannot determine; for there fell upon the whole matter at this juncture the full storm of the French Revolution.

That movement had been at work for now a year. It had already developed its two characteristic signs: an extreme democratic theory and a violent energy with which to realize that theory. The theory and the violence behind it had already begun to affect the whole world. The immediate product of the French Revolution in Ireland was an organisation of committees for the practical and immediate effecting of reform, coupled with the spread, especially among the Northern Presbyterians, of what were called "French principles," that is, complete and dogmatic democratic theory. That small section of the Catholic nation which had begun to accumulate some wealth since the relaxation of the Penal Laws, formed and supported a Catholic Committee, having at its head John Keogh. But more to the front of the movement were the Protestant-born Edward Fitzgerald—the brother of the Duke of Leinster¹—and the Protestant Wolfe Tone, a Dublin barrister, of sceptical temper and ardent patriotism.

While an organised and intelligent effort was thus proceeding at the capital, the recrudescence of the religious feud, which was to flame so fiercely in a few years, appeared in Ulster. The cause was this. The great proprietors in Ulster, some quite alien, others planted from England,² had, of course, been

¹ "Protestant born" for many generations past. The conversion had been effected by kidnapping under Elizabeth, for the family was native Norman-Irish and is still distinguished for some measure of national feeling.

² The Corporation of the City of London and the Court pensioners are examples of such absentee rent gatherers,

at issue even with their Presbyterian tenants. For to them, as to all their class, Irish land was merely a source of revenue, and that revenue to be ground out without mercy. There had therefore been a large emigration—often the emigration of a whole countryside—to the new opportunities offered by America.¹ Now the new laws permitted Catholics to hold leases. The landlords, therefore, offered the empty farms to Catholic tenants, and the immediate result was an explosion of resentment upon the part of the Anglican farmers against the newcomers.

The Anglicans organised themselves into a society called “Peep o’ Day Boys,” the Catholics into one called “The Defenders.” Outrages committed upon the new tenants led to reprisals, and thus was the evil reopened which was later to have such disastrous effect throughout the island.

The first strong effort at Parliamentary reform was undertaken by Grattan, who brought in his “Place Bill,” by which members accepting offices under the Crown were to vacate their seats. Unfortunately, Grattan did not so word his Bill as to make it apply to real offices only—offices carrying salaries as bribes. And the unexpected effect of this omission was to give “the Crown” yet more power. When they desired to fill the seat of a doubtful member nothing was easier than to intrigue for his acceptance of a nominal office, and to replace him, if he sat for some borough or pocket seat, by a con-

¹There was a very large proportion of Irish soldiers in Washington’s army, and they formed a powerful fighting element in the Massachusetts levies earlier in the struggle. Thus, though the Catholic emigrants were a small minority of the total, there were probably some two hundred even of those in the small force at Bunker Hill.

firmed supporter to whom a real bribe had been *promised*.

The next step to be taken was the enfranchisement of the Catholic body. Without this it was now quite certain that reform would be so imperfect as to leave Irish autonomy at the mercy of "the Crown." On this account many who were by tradition and instinct violently opposed to the measure, began to lean toward it. Just as the chances of obtaining the franchise for Catholics began to brighten, it is remarkable (but characteristic) that the aristocratic members of the Catholic Committee ratted. The radicalism of the proposal, the sudden accession of a vast number of voters—and these poor men—frightened the rich Catholics more than the proposal to benefit their religion pleased them. Incidentally this breach between the nobles and the mass of the Catholics turned out to be a direct cause of the formation and strength of the society known as the "United Irishmen," with which I shall presently deal.

The Catholic Committee demanded not only enfranchisement but the opening of all professions to Catholics; the Castle refused to admit a deputation from them, and Keogh, their chief, went straight to London. He there received the strong support of Edmund Burke, and it will be remembered how powerful an influence was Burke at this moment: the one great advocate in England against the French Revolution, and the mouthpiece of all the popular and plutocratic feeling against that movement. After the calling of a Convention in the early part of the next year a deputation was sent to London to present the Catholic claims to King George himself. They went

by way of Belfast, the Presbyterians of which town received them enthusiastically, and George III., whose weak and now partially imbecile mind had not yet been terrorised by the suggestion of enemies, received them favourably. Upon their return to Ireland the Government itself brought in a Bill, which indeed fell far short of the full demands, which still, for instance, excluded Catholics from the inner Bar and from Parliament, but which, among other privileges, granted to the Catholic Forty Shilling Freeholders, that is, to all the small Catholic farmers who had a life lease, *the right to vote*. This did not mean the inclusion of the whole Catholic population by any means; only of a minority. But for the first time in a hundred years it recognised the existence as citizens of those men who alone were in the full tradition of Irish nationality. This measure became law in the month of April, 1793, and with it ends the first period in the events that lead up to the Act of Union. It was a turning-point of the greatest consequence. There *might* now come into being an Irish Parliament capable of standing up to "the Crown" and of ultimately representing the Irish nation. The flood-gate had been lifted.

Meanwhile England, as we have seen, had been at war with France for some months. The perils of that struggle were to hasten Pitt's determination to destroy Irish nationality, and we must already ask ourselves at the outset of the next period (which covers but six years, and which ends with the Act of Union), what Pitt's real attitude was toward Catholic Emancipation.

He had permitted a measure of it, as we have seen, in Ireland. He had even supported that measure, or

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at least the Ministry had. It is further true that he proposed in his plan for destroying Irish Nationality to accompany it with, or rather to follow it by, an enfranchisement of the Catholics. There were, at that moment, no Catholics to speak of in England; to recognise them as citizens of a United Kingdom was only, therefore, in practice, to recognise them in Ireland. We have no need to believe Pitt hypocritical in this support—such as it was—which he lent to Catholic Emancipation. He was quite ignorant of the motive power of religion, and his judgment was so deplorable as to convince him that the gratitude of the priesthood would secure national treason in the mass of the laity. He probably conceived of the Catholic as a man whose will is in the hands of another, and he certainly thought of the Irish demand for national autonomy as a Protestant movement. His decision, then, in favour of Catholic Emancipation was genuine; nor need we even ascribe his poverty of judgment to the ravages of drink, for Pitt was still lucid and vigorous on the days following his excesses.

But though he was sincere in his project of Catholic Emancipation, he was lukewarm in his pursuit of this part of his plan and he ridiculously underestimated its importance. He preferred it—but he had no doubt that one could get on well enough without it. Just as he imagined—amazingly enough!—that the Union once effected could be made solid and secure; that the Irish nation would naturally slip into the position of an English province! Such was the calibre of Pitt's discernment.

Further, Pitt leaning toward a Catholic franchise was quenched by the opinion of Great Britain,

He knew that the policy of Catholic Emancipation was for the moment intensely unpopular in England. The relief recently afforded to the tiny group of English Catholics and the proposal to extend that relief to Scotland had already produced (in 1780) the Gordon Riots, when a huge mob of some 60,000 people had run loose in London with no definite aim save arson and the looting of drink in protest against the Catholic Claims. The wretched rioters had been indiscriminately shot down, of course, and no one with the least knowledge of a London mob could fear any serious danger from such a quarter. But the riots were a sufficient indication of public feeling; and Pitt valued popular support very much. In the unreformed state of Parliament he depended upon it, and he could always use it to frighten the incompetent King.

At any rate, while mildly envisaging Catholic Emancipation for Ireland as a future part of his policy, he did intensely fix himself upon the conception of rendering Ireland a province and of destroying every sign of her nationality.

The Catholic Committee, already weakened by the defection of its wealthier and territorial members, was tending more and more to become a political body engaged upon the assertion of the national claims. Keogh, himself a wealthy man, dropped out of it and the secretaryship was given to Wolfe Tone.

Wolfe Tone was one of those remarkable men rare in public life—but, when they appear, of incalculable effect—who really prefer some ideal to their personal safety, and who combine with this hardly human enthusiasm, sanity and the power to organise and to think out details. He was possessed not only of a

splendid courage, but of a creed and of a clear object. That creed was the democratic creed closely in sympathy with what was being preached at the moment in France, and naturally sympathetic to the Irish temperament as a whole. That object was the gradual submission of the alien official element appointed from Westminster, which now controlled all the Executive and administration of Ireland, to a free and really representative national Parliament in Dublin.

Pitt, by prematurely showing his hand, gave this leader his opportunity. For no sooner was the partial relief to Catholics granted with superficial favour than the Government proceeded to undo the most important part of its work. Of the mutual outrages committed between Anglicans and Catholics in the North, those of the Catholics were selected for savage punishment. The new right of Catholics to sit on Juries was ridiculed. Every unfortunate Catholic peasant who fell into the clutches of the law found himself tried by a packed jury of his enemies. The Government further exacted and obtained of the corrupt Parliament they controlled in Dublin various acts in rapid succession by which the gathering of a Convention in future was made impossible, by which the recently granted permission to bear arms was destroyed, by which magistrates could search any house.

The depth of Pitt's betrayal was exposed in one memorable incident. A clergyman of the name of Jackson (suspected, unjustly, of being an English Spy) had come to Ireland with proposals for foreign aid. There was attached to his person a rascally lawyer of the name of Cockayne. This man, ordered to worm himself into Jackson's confidence and to pose

as his nearest friend, was secretly Pitt's paid agent. Feigning this friendship he accompanied Jackson in his interviews with various patriots, took notes of the conversations, and kept Pitt informed. It was the beginning of that system of wholesale secret agency upon which the Ministers at Westminster have since depended. True, the organisation of government spying had not reached anything like the extent which it has come to to-day; for to-day secret agents are everywhere a mark of our government, and the police of London in particular use and depend upon a whole fabric of delation. But it was at the moment we are now dealing with that the principle was established. To Pitt we owe its establishment; to his Irish blunder its origin. It is not least of the many tragic ironies connected with the oppression of Ireland that this crime, which has already rendered impotent our House of Commons, should have given us the first model of those secret methods in government from which Ireland is now nearly free, but with which we have in our turn become permanently infected. The universal use of police spies in modern England is founded upon the conception that the administration, having behind it the public purse and also the power to throw over its incriminated agents, is always strongest when it works secretly and through the purchased information of criminals. The ultimate effects of such a system upon the commonwealth our own near future will show. At its inception, in Ireland, at the end of the eighteenth century, it was only too successful.

Jackson himself was the first victim. He was seized for high treason and saw, to his stupefaction, Cockayne in the witness-box against him. Upon re

ceiving sentence of hanging, drawing and quartering, the unfortunate man poisoned himself.

Another, who had denounced the use of the granting of peerages in corrupting representatives, was condemned to a heavy fine and to imprisonment. Another, who had made a speech to the remnants of the volunteers, suffered a still heavier fine and a longer term. Every action of Pitt's was proving with what rapidity he was advancing toward the reversal of all those solemn acts which had granted freedom and prosperity to Ireland within the past fifteen or twenty years.

But meanwhile the genius of Wolfe Tone had constructed a very formidable instrument with which to combat Pitt's design.

There had arisen among the Protestants of Belfast an association known as "The United Irishmen." Its object was to unite, as its name implied, the democratic Catholic movement of the South and West, and particularly of Leinster, with the democratic Protestant movement among the Presbyterians of the North.

Wolfe Tone early captured this organisation (it numbered, in 1794, 100,000 members), directed it toward the emancipation of his country, and actively prepared to call in foreign aid if necessary.

As the activities of this association grew more and more menacing, and therefore more and more suspect, he converted it from an open society into one bound by oath. The alarm taken by certain of the prelates at this development, and their denunciation of the League, were of no effect. By the beginning of 1795 we have clearly opposed one against the other Pitt's plan (already three-quarters accomplished), for the forswearing of all his previous pledges and

destroying the new Irish freedom, and the now ready weapon of the United Irishmen.

The enlightened Viceroy Fitzwilliam, whose desire it was to save the situation by restoring and protecting the newly gained liberties and nascent prosperity of the island, was recalled upon the 25th of March, 1795, and his recall, observed by all Dublin as a day of mourning and disaster, may properly be termed a declaration of war.

As part of their plan for controlling the people through the priests, and particularly for destroying, as they hoped, the Irish National movement as a whole, the Government at Westminster made grants in the autumn of the same year for the central education of the Catholic Clergy at Maynooth, and toward the Presbyterian establishment in the North. But things had gone too far for the success of such manœuvres. The latter of the two steps was belated and worthless. Already the distinction between Catholic and Protestant had again become, with the recent prosecutions and cruelties, the main division and nearly corresponded by 1796 to the camps of Nationalist and Foreigner.

Grattan and his friends made one more effort at complete Catholic Emancipation—they could obtain but fifty-five votes, and the Parliament at Dublin, under the now all-powerful finance of Pitt, passed act after act empowering magistrates to proclaim martial law, indemnifying them beforehand for any arbitrary crime they might commit, forbidding assemblies of any character whatsoever, and finally suspending the Habeas Corpus Act—in defence of which necessary though clumsy guarantee of elementary freedom only *seven* votes were cast. The Irish

Parliament as a national institution was already dead.

In the next year, 1797, even a motion for the reform of Parliament could obtain but thirty votes; and the few patriots still attached to constitutional action withdrew from the Assembly, Grattan leading them. In the ensuing elections of July neither he nor Edward Fitzgerald, nor Curran, nor O'Connor submitted themselves to the futile ceremony of election to such a body.

Meanwhile arms had appeared. Wolfe Tone in France had got the ear of the government of the Republic and had obtained the services of Hoche. Under the leadership of that general an expedition to Ireland was designed. In the island itself Hell had been let loose. The worst of the regular and irregular forces obtainable by "the Crown," aided by a militia and yeomanry recruited from the most fanatical of the Protestant population, were quartered upon the as yet unroused and wholly defenceless Catholic peasants. The infamous, unheard of, tortures which they inflicted perpetually upon the weak and the defenceless were the least of their crimes, and their unbridled pillage may go almost unnoticed when we remember that their favourite abomination was outrage and assault upon the purity of the Catholic women. Scenes more awful—as awful—are not recorded of any bands in the outermost corners of modern Europe. It is from this foul license of the Protestant irregular troops, more than from any other source, and from those months more than from any other period that dates the permanent and increasing peril England must run from the estrangement of the Irish race. The peril is rendered the

worse from the fact that the schools and the universities of Great Britain are content to ignore the whole story of these abominations, and that the mass of educated Englishmen know less of the seeds whence their present dangers have sprung than they do of any department of contemporary history.

Campden, the new viceroy, a weak man, was the chief responsible in law for such a breakdown of statesmanship, but before history the responsibility must lie with the incompetence of Pitt. Pitt was one of those men who can only see one thing at a time, and his bewilderment in the stress of the foreign war blinded him to the harvest that was sowing in Ireland. To accuse him of deliberately provoking the rebellion is to lend him an energy and a consecution of thought which he certainly lacked. In reality he let the bestiality of the murderers and worse go their way because he thought it immaterial to the remote future of his own country, and for the immediate future rather conducive to his plan of the Union than not.

The French expedition which Wolfe Tone had summoned and which Hoche was to have commanded failed. Nearly 14,000 men with seventeen sail of the line, and a total, counting transports, of forty-three vessels, set out in December, 1796, for the Irish coast from France. By an accident of the weather Hoche, sailing upon the *Fraternité*, was separated from his command. Grouchy, his second, could have led the little force had it landed. But it never landed. Not quite half its effectives reached Bantry Bay, when a fierce storm of a week's duration prevented their landing. They awaited the arrival of their comrades, inexplicably delayed, and when at last the military

leaders decided to disembark the half which was already present, Bouvet, the French Admiral, refused to risk their landing in the face of such weather. Three days after Christmas the wind increased to such a hurricane that certain of the ships were compelled to cut or slip their cables; and on the 29th of December, the last of the expedition turned home again. Not until a fortnight after the return did Hoche himself, who had been blown far out into the Atlantic, land at La Rochelle. He fell within a year; and with him that one of the French Generals who best understood the opportunity afforded by Ireland, perished.

It must always be remembered in the story of the rebellion that followed what terror Hoche's attempt inspired in Pitt and in his colleagues, and how much it was the duty of any English patriot to secure his country from the chances of another such adventure—though the act of Union was no sane way to secure it. Had Bonaparte understood the strength of the Irish movement or even the temper of the Irish people a second departure might have followed, for with the loss of Hoche, Bonaparte remained the one indisputable military leader of the French. But he did not understand that movement, or that temper. As we have seen, when he did propose an excursion over sea, the descent was made not upon Ireland, but (of all places in the world!) upon Egypt.

What followed this failure of Wolfe Tone and Hoche's plan was the insurrection of '98.

Whenever fighting appears in the course of history it renders the events of its moment so vivid that there is a tendency to overemphasise them. The historian can with difficulty escape this tendency. National tradition never escapes it.

It is on this account that the rising of 1798 in Ireland occupies the place it does both in the traditions of the two nations and in the general history of the Irish Union. As a matter of fact, the movement was not one upon a large scale. It was not one which had the least prospect of success. It was not even the direct cause of the Union—a blunder which the English Government would have committed in any case whether they had had the excuse of the rebellion or not. Quite apart from the comparatively small scale upon which action was attempted, three factors in the situation rendered the doom of the Nationalist effort certain.

First, the Nationalists were neither trained nor equipped. Secondly, coördination was lacking—and even such plans as had been made were thrown into confusion before the beginning of the business by the action of the Government. Thirdly, the mass of the people did not move.

As to the first of these points, it is true that the Irish pike, the principal weapon of the insurgents, was formidable enough in a rush and at close quarters, but the firearms in their possession were either few or obsolete or mere shotguns. Quite as important as the hopeless inferiority in equipment was the lack of training. In those days cavalry could often (as they probably can sometimes still) determine an action. Trained and unshaken infantry can always resist cavalry. Untrained men, who did not even know how to form square, were then at the mercy of cavalry.

Indeed, the marvel of the Rebellion as one reads it is not that it should have failed—that was certain from the outset—the marvel is that men could be

found of sufficient courage to rise against such odds and that any Government could have been so scandalously bad as to have provoked them to show such energy.

The lack of a plan was quite as remarkable. It is true indeed that some sort of cohesion was attempted and some sort of synchrony of movement, at least in the immediate neighbourhood of the Capital. But the plans, such as they were, centred in Edward Fitzgerald, and after he had been betrayed there was no possibility of carrying them out, for the point upon which they converged had been cut away. The Rebellion therefore took the form of nothing more than a few sporadic and quite unsuccessful movements in the neighbourhood of Dublin, followed later by an unsupported local movement in Wexford, which was dissociated from any general scheme.

Lastly, it is to be remarked that save in these two highly restricted districts of the Eastern Coast and a partial movement in the North, nothing was done. The nation as a whole looked on.

The short period covered by the effort was almost as striking a feature as the restricted area over which it was made; and even before any action was taken, the plans, such as they were, were in the hands of the English Government. They had been secured, of course, by the weapon which was Pitt's prime instrument: purchase. A man of the name of Reynolds sold to the Government the place and time of meeting of the principal leaders of the United Irish Society. Upon the 12th of March, thirteen of the Leinster delegates were arrested in the house of Oliver Bond, in Dublin, but the leader of the whole movement, Lord Edward Fitzgerald, escaped. The

places of the arrested leaders could easily be filled; what was more serious was the capture of the papers, including many of the plans of the proposed rebellion.

The date for the general uprising had been fixed for the 23d of May; upon the 19th of that month another act of treason (the author of which has remained unknown) led to the arrest of Lord Edward Fitzgerald. He defended himself with the utmost courage, killed one of his assailants with a dagger, but was himself wounded by a pistol-shot and within a fortnight died in gaol.

In spite of this discovery and in spite of these arrests the insurrection broke out in the neighbourhood of Dublin upon the night appointed, the 23d of May, and at the signal which had been agreed to, the stopping of the mail coaches upon the principal roads. Upon the morning of the 24th, the garrison at Naas, in County Kildare, was attacked quite unsuccessfully; and though upon the same day Esmond had a slight success at Prosperous against a small militia force, nearly all the other encounters at this outset of the movement were as fatal to its success as they were ill conceived and unconnected in character. The mounted troops were, after the first shock, almost invariably successful against the untrained and half-armed bodies opposed to them. Every failure was followed, of course, by a massacre, and such slight successes as the repulse of Dundas upon the second day of the rising (with the loss of only twenty-two men) did little more than provoke the forces of "The Crown" to worse reprisals. Nor were these barbarities confined to action in the field. There was a lack of honour in dealing with surrenders, which makes those few days peculiar in the history

even of Irish mal-administration. The most famous case is that of the Gibbet Rath, in Kildare. Three thousand of the insurgents had come in to surrender to Duff, who was waiting at the head of a regular force; panic or mere wantonness led to the massacre of a tenth of them in the actual process of surrender. The rising was only four days old when it was already clear that it had wholly failed; another isolated movement in County Meath, undertaken by about 3,000 men from the historic centre of Tara, being broken up on May 26th. Another blow with a loss of 350 men was suffered at Dunlavin. The whole of this local and fatally unorganised set of actions in the neighbourhood of Dublin were over and decided within a week. It was upon a Thursday morning that the first shot had been fired; before Saturday evening the Government knew that it was again secure.

But almost at the same moment the imbecile cruelty—and still more the sexual filth—of the regulars and Orange yeomanry quartered in another district provoked a more formidable struggle.

The County of Wexford was that one upon which, perhaps, an English Government could most securely count of all Catholic Ireland. It was somewhat differentiated in race from the rest of the population, fairly prosperous, and it was at peace. The outrages committed by the soldiers and Ulster Orangemen upon this part of the coast, their wanton, aimless, and incredible cruelty—worst of all, their unceasing assaults upon the Catholic women—provoked a peril less negligible than the abortive risings in the neighbourhood of Dublin.

I have said that it was upon Saturday, May 26th (Whit Saturday, that year), that the Govern-

ment could feel itself secure after the risings near the capital. It was upon the same day that a certain priest, a Father John Murphy, returning to find his church destroyed (for no conceivable reason save the anarchic hate of the Protestant soldiery), and remembering the innumerable tortures and other abominations which the unarmed countryside had been compelled to suffer, determined that such tyranny was no longer to be tolerated, and put himself at the head of his parishioners. That night these few and brave men, armed with nothing but pitchforks and here and there a fowling-piece, destroyed a troop of yeomanry, under a certain Brodie, which was riding back to Lord Mountmorris's house after its day's work of arson, theft, and rape.

This tiny initial success was the nucleus and the origin of what followed. It gave a small but now determined body of men good mounts, arms and ammunition. They rode on in the night to Camolin Park, Mountmorris's house, and found there a further equipment, including the carbines which were to have been distributed to the enemy. Upon the next day, Whit Sunday, all those parts of the county that were within tidings of this event were upon the move, and Father Murphy found himself at the head of 5,000 men. The royalist troops in the neighbouring town of Gorey retired before this menace (although much the greater part of the insurgents had no arms whatsoever), and the priest marched them to Oulart Hill, about ten miles from Wexford. He was joined by further bodies, and was there attacked in the afternoon of that Sunday by the regular forces. Bringing forward that handful of his men which had firearms, and bidding them draw on (by an opening fire fol-

lowed by retirement) the attacking regiment of regular infantry (the North Cork) he fell upon that force, when it had imprudently advanced too far, and destroyed it with that mass of his men who were armed, if at all, only with rude pitchforks and here and there a pike. The rout was complete and the regiment was destroyed save for five men. The mounted yeomanry, who were to have supported the regular infantry in their attack upon the insurgents, at once fled, massacring the peasants along their line of flight, but refusing to meet the main insurgent body. On the next day, Whit Monday, Father Murphy, having learned that the fugitives had fallen back upon Enniscorthy, decided to attack that town and were successful in storming it. The royalist troops, of whom about a hundred had been killed, retired upon Wexford. The insurgents formed their camp upon Vinegar Hill, the slight eminence which lies to the east of Enniscorthy Town. It was obvious that Wexford would be the next place to be attacked. A futile effort was made to persuade the insurgents to break up their camp when, two days later, upon Wednesday, May 30th, General Fawcett marched to the relief of Wexford accompanied by a little artillery. His vanguard was destroyed by the insurgents as it advanced, and he fell back upon Duncannon, leaving Wexford to its fate. The few royalist soldiers in Wexford retired individually or by small parties, and the insurgents occupied the town. They mustered perhaps at this moment 30,000 in one body, of whom a bare third were armed.

It should be evident that a movement of this sort even though so far successful, could hope for no permanent success against regular forces when there

should be time to bring these in sufficient numbers against it. Even if the other counties had moved there could have been but one end to the story, but Wexford had to fight alone, save that it received some support from the south of Wicklow toward the close of the operations.

The tide began to turn as early as June 1st, when a small body of regulars beat off the insurgents from Gorey. On June 4th an attack was made upon New Ross, the capture of which place (being the bridge over the Nore and leading to the west) might have roused the districts farther inland. But the weakness of all untrained forces was here at last apparent. The town was rushed and even the regular artillery was taken by the pikemen, but after enormous losses and a struggle of many hours the force dissolved, pillaged and failed to hold the town permanently. The regulars in recapturing it once more prepared the future of English and Irish relations by a wholesale massacre of the wounded, and this was avenged by the burning by the insurgents of a barn containing a hundred prisoners.

Father Murphy had by this time ceased to command this section. They were under the command of a far less competent though well-meaning man, a merchant of the name of Harvey who, upon the failure before New Ross, resigned his office. He was succeeded by another priest, Father Roche.

Meanwhile, another section of the insurgents (of whom some 5,000 had firearms of a sort, and three guns) determined to march upon Arklow, in County Wicklow, perhaps in the hope of reaching or raising the neighbourhood of the capital; for Arklow commands the coast road to Dublin and the road through

the interior as well. Before Arklow they failed, and this second failure, combined with that of New Ross, decided the matter. The insurgent wounded left upon the field were *again* massacred. The final phase began when the regular army proceeded to attack the main rebel encampment upon Vinegar Hill. It was with a very large force that this concluding attack was made upon the 21st of June. It was completely successful and the insurgents, now broken as a fighting force, fell back, or what was left of them, upon Wexford. Wexford surrendered. There was the usual breach of faith, the usual massacre of prisoners (which in the town could be excused as an act of retaliation, for thirty-six prisoners had been put to death by the other side), and right on through the rest of the month and even into next month the stream of executions, murders and outrages continued. The man most responsible for these horrors was a certain General Lake.

Not all the insurgent body had been thus destroyed. A remnant of it, under the original leader, Father John Murphy, marched rapidly to the northwest, through the pass under Mount Leinster into Carlow, and successfully defeated or pushed before them the small English forces they encountered. But the inland counties did not rise; neither Carlow nor Kilkenny helped them; they were a wandering body without communication or supply. At the extreme of this westward march their stock of ammunition had fallen very low; they fell back eastward, and at Gores Bridge, upon the 26th of June, were caught and attacked by the regular forces under General Asgill. They were not wholly destroyed, though routed; they continued to fall back eastward through the moun-

tains; they had the crowning misfortune to lose their leader, Father Murphy, who was taken prisoner, and with that disaster the Rebellion may be said to have come to an end. The heroic priest, after torture with a flogging of five hundred lashes, was killed and his body burnt at the door of a local Catholic of prominence "that he might enjoy the smell of a roasted priest." I mention this little incident not because it is unique, but because it is characteristic and will help the impartial reader to understand something of the future relations between the Catholic Irish on the one hand, and the Orangemen and alien government upon the other.

An isolated Presbyterian movement in the North had been suppressed and all that remained between this failure of the insurrection and the Union was the abortive little expedition under Humbert, from France, and the failure of Wolfe Tone that followed it.

The French expeditions of '98, coming as they did after the suppression of the Rebellion, were of no military significance. It must always be remembered that from the time of Louis XIV. onward the French policy in Ireland was not to aid the Irish in recovering their independence, but merely to weaken England. The expeditions, such as they were, were never intended to be more than diversions.

In this year of 1798 Wolfe Tone had persuaded the French Directorate to lend him something like 4,000 men. A quarter of these, under General Humbert, precipitated matters by sailing ahead of the rest. They were landed in Killala Bay, and after a brief series of astonishing adventures (the first of which was the destruction of a force under Lake sent to

oppose them and five or six times as strong as they were in numbers) they were compelled to surrender, with their untrained Irish levies, to forces that had gathered round them and were now forty times their own strength. Wolfe Tone, sailing later with the larger part of the small expedition under Admiral Bompard, was captured in the surrender of the French admiral and his ship to the British naval force. He was taken to Dublin, condemned to death, and with characteristic courage killed himself to avoid the shame of execution. He was upon the whole the greatest, as he was perhaps also the noblest minded of the Irish patriots, and with his passing, upon the 19th of November, 1798, the period of the Rebellion may be said to have definitely closed. It had brought into the country, or armed therein upon the Government side, over one hundred and thirty thousand men; it had cost a sum which will never be determined, but which, when we count the sums spent in the corruption of the Irish Parliament, are certainly more than twenty millions.

The succeeding year was occupied with the destruction of the Irish Parliament, and this act was, from beginning to end, a mere piece of purchase. Numerous and useless posts were created wherewith to bribe the lawyers. Castlereagh, acting as Pitt's servant and as the chief support of the Viceroy, Lord Cornwallis, was sounding the price of every vote when, at the opening of the session on the 23d of January, 1799, the speech from the throne proposed the legislative union of England and Ireland. The debate lasted twenty-two hours. To the proposal of a union, Ponsonby moved his famous amendment, "Maintaining the undoubted birthright of the

people of Ireland to have a resident and independent legislature." It was defeated by only one vote.

Castlereagh immediately prepared for the direct purchase of members. In the second debate, two days later, January 24th, a majority of five was recorded for Ponsonby's proposition, and of the 106 members who voted for the Union upon that occasion, 69 held salaries under the Government, 19 received them later in reward for their attitude, 18 were later created peers, one was openly bought upon the floor of the House.

Meanwhile, the policy of Union was being brought forward also at Westminster, and Pitt made this the public occasion for a hint that he would consider Catholic Emancipation if the Act of Union were carried. During the recess of the Irish Parliament, Castlereagh proceeded to open and secret promises of money. He had a free hand to offer whatever sum would effect Pitt's purpose.

The last session of the Irish Parliament opened its debates upon the 15th of January, 1800. The Government did not immediately reopen the issue of the Union. The negotiations for purchase of votes were not sufficiently matured, though money had already passed in very large amounts. A month elapsed before the Government brought forward its measure in the middle of February, and it was already apparent that the unlimited system of bribery organised by Castlereagh had done its work. Leave to print the articles of Union was given by a majority of 43. Six days later, upon the 21st of February, the articles began to be discussed point by point. They were adopted a month later upon the 22d of March. Meanwhile, a considerable proportion of the

Irish hierarchy were favourably considering the Union as a step toward Catholic Emancipation, and a certain number openly proclaimed themselves upon the side of the new policy. At Westminster, Lord Holland and the Earl of Derby were the principal opponents of the fatal error that was to weight the whole of English policy for generations to come, and the worst effects of which we have not yet perhaps witnessed. But protests of this kind (Grey also made them in the Commons, as did Sheridan), were but isolated examples of sense. The majority for the Ministerial policy was overwhelming. When Holland attempted to pin the Ministry to Catholic Emancipation, at any rate, he failed. Upon the 21st of May, Castlereagh had leave, by a majority of 60, to bring the bill in its final form into the Irish Parliament. The final vote was taken upon the 7th of June. The corresponding act confirming the Union was passed by the English Parliament upon the 2d of July; upon the 1st of August the Royal assent was given, and the Union was law: coming into effect upon the 1st of January of the succeeding year.

This folly accomplished, Pitt, whose true position upon Catholic Emancipation I have already discussed, shirked what should have been the main point of his policy, pleaded publicly (and perhaps to himself) the King's fixed opposition to that relief, and resigned his place in the Ministry, substituting for himself a nominee, the son of his father's physician, one Addington. Leaving this stop-gap Ministry to conclude what had become the necessary peace with France, he awaited a favourable moment to resume the direction of public affairs.

The piece of finesse was accomplished. But Pitt had written ¹ to the King (whose madness threatened again, arrived, and passed) promising that he would never reintroduce the question of Catholic Emancipation—upon which he had nominally resigned! The peace of Amiens was concluded, as we have seen, and we have next to consider why and how that peace was broken, and war with France resumed.

To what was due the termination of the peace of Amiens and the renewal of the war with France? The answer to that question is of course important in European history because it explains the Napoleonic Empire and the final establishment upon an unremovable foundation of the revolutionary principles and especially of naturalism in the modern world. Had Napoleon been permitted or desired to govern in peace we should not have had modern Germany or modern Italy, the coming resurrection of Poland, nor perhaps the present resurrection of Ireland—for that worship of nationality as a sacred, political ideal, which was so marked a feature of the revolutionary crusade, had not yet had time to bite in. It was the wars of 1805-15 that did the business, and the passage of time, the opportunity which these extra ten years gave, for the growth of a new generation throughout most of Western Europe, which new generation had forgotten the old society, and were thoroughly indoctrinated by the French.

Renewal of
the War
with
France,

But while the question is important from the point of view of general European history, it is far more

¹ His apologists say "spoken." Making a foul action with a pen something quite excusable with the lips. So I remember one accused of forgery to plead that "it was not ink, but indelible pencil."

important from the point of view of English history. The deliberate renewal of the war by the English Government, its just calculation that it could defend the seas until the Continent was raised again against France have added immensely to the prestige of this country and to the personal reputation of Pitt. It was not perhaps under the circumstances a very hazardous proceeding—but there was an element of hazard; and wherever a hazard is deliberately undertaken and its issue proves to have been rightly judged, there you have a permanent opportunity for fame.

Moreover, the complete control of the sea which England immediately obtained, coupled with the considerable action of our expeditionary forces upon land, and with the presence of so many British troops under a British commander in the last and most striking action of Waterloo, gave this country a military reputation which she retained throughout nearly the whole of the nineteenth century, or at any rate during the whole lifetime of the men engaged in the struggle. England, after the new declaration of war, appeared as the most permanent enemy of Napoleon and as one not only overwhelmingly successful at sea, but capable of playing some part on land.

In order to answer this question, “Why was the peace broken” (why, that is, the solution of an intense and exhausting problem, a solution greeted with wild enthusiasm in England itself, and regarded as definitive upon the Continent, was abandoned)? we must especially avoid the error of exaggerating individual power, political cohesion and political consciousness. We must not make the thing a deep-laid plot upon the part of Pitt or upon the part of

Napoleon. The elements of drift, of misapprehension, and of conflict between many human wills are as clearly present here as they are in any crisis of modern history.

Roughly speaking, the story of the thing is this: England in 1801, by the defeat of the first Coalition, is left powerless to achieve anything against the French Revolution. She is prepared to continue her subsidies to the allies, but they neither can nor will continue to fight against Napoleon. Meanwhile, she has a secure command of the sea, and if she can get a breathing space she may shortly expect to be able to raise a Coalition again; for at bottom the ideal of every European government is to reverse the brilliant, but (as it is hoped) ephemeral success of the Revolution. But "England" is not an individual. There is no one directing brain, no one memory, no one judgment at work. The populace are deceived into believing that the peace is lasting, and are overjoyed at that prospect. Their masters have divergent views. Pitt thinks that a breathing space is necessary. The City of London, which counts more than Pitt, and which is always behind Pitt, is willing to try the experiment, *but prepared, if it finds the peace hampering its prosperity to renew the war.* One group of politicians, the most conspicuous man in which is Windham, believes the whole policy of peace to be a mistake, does not see why, if England is safe at sea and if the thing is only a truce, any such truce need be concluded. Another group of politicians, the greatest and most generous among whom is Fox, has disliked the policy of the war from the beginning and hopes, rather doubtfully, to maintain the peace permanently. Meanwhile, the mass of educated opinion

and of all those wealthy classes upon which the English polity reposes, is vaguely conscious that sooner or later another coalition can be made against Napoleon and the Democratic and Nationalist ideals for which he stands, but has no idea how soon, or in what form, this coalition will arise.

On the other hand Napoleon does not believe in the permanence of peace with England, because England is protected from the revolutionary armies by her control of the sea. He judges, and judges rightly, that she has no sufficient motive to compel her to a permanent peace. Nothing will convince him of that save her consent to cease all intrigues against him, and indeed to abstain from any interference with Continental and Mediterranean arrangements. He is determined, in any case, to safeguard himself by acquiring control over as many ports and shipbuilding yards as possible upon the Continent, and by fostering trade and industry upon the Continent at the expense of the City of London. He is further prepared to watch English weakness in the East and in the long run to challenge the English monopoly of Pacific and Indian trade if he can.

There, in general, is the situation during the brief two years, 1801-1803, during which hostilities were suspended. It is evident that such a situation would forbid that suspension to be permanent.

Three factors appear from the beginning of the period which, before the close of it, will lead to a renewal of the war. In the first place England affords asylum to those personal enemies of Napoleon who advocate his assassination. The English Government reluctantly and after great delay permits a prosecution of these journalists, but public opinion

is against its action. Next, England is far from admitting, even superficially, that she will disinterest herself in the fate of Continental governments. To do so thoroughly and fundamentally is of course out of the question, for it is toward the renewal of a Continental coalition against Napoleon that all English policy must be permanently directed.

Lastly, in the particular case of Malta, the evacuation of which is solemnly guaranteed by the peace of Amiens, England uses her occupation of that island as a lever against Napoleon's pressure upon the smaller States on his borders. If Napoleon is working for the control of the shipbuilding yards and ports of the Low Countries and of the Western Mediterranean, Malta shall serve as a strategic centre for the renewal of the naval war, and at the same time as an opportunity for declaring it. Meanwhile, Napoleon is actively reconnoitring the commercial condition and the military condition of the Levantine ports and is sending to India, to recover the French commercial posts there (restored by the Treaty of Amiens), a certain military force, and agents whose motives are legitimately suspected. He is further exasperating the City by his commercial policy.

Upon the 18th of February, 1803, Napoleon sent for the English Ambassador in Paris, Lord Whitworth, to protest against the continued occupation of Malta contrary to the terms of the Treaty. A fortnight later the English Government declared in the House of Commons that measures of precaution were necessary against the military and naval preparations of France: the use of the Dutch ports and shipbuilding yards had particularly alarmed it. In the same week

the militia were called out. Napoleon protested to the English Ambassador that these measures surely meant war. That they did mean war and that the City of London and Pitt, their spokesman, thought the moment opportune, was proved by the presentation shortly afterward of an English ultimatum upon the point of Malta. The British Government proposed to hold that island for ten years at least, and when, or if, it should evacuate to receive in compensation another island post. In the early days of May the English Ambassador demanded his passports; he left Paris upon the 12th. Four days later the French Ambassador left London, and two days later again, upon Wednesday, the 18th of May, war was declared by England. Before its actual declaration over a thousand French and Dutch vessels, in value (with their merchandise) some eight million pounds, were seized in English ports; or upon the neighbouring sea, and Napoleon retaliated by ordering the arrest of every Englishman in his domains.

Hostilities thus opened, what remained to be seen was the length of time that it would take to form a new coalition upon the Continent against France. The sea was for the moment secure. It would remain secure for an indefinite period, and every effort must be made while maintaining this defensive to secure offensive action again Napoleon abroad. The petty personal intrigue, and shuffling of politicians which marked the period at Westminster, may be neglected. The policy was Pitt's; and though Pitt's actual return to office in the place of his nominee, Addington, was deferred for a year, though when he did take office he formed a Cabinet which contained men of whom he might not in full liberty have ap-

proved, yet the directing hand throughout the whole business is his own.

Napoleon gathered great forces along the coasts opposite England, from Holland to Brittany,¹ upon the chance or the speculation that some accident of weather, or (by some miracle) a temporary weakening of the overwhelming English naval power, might conceivably permit a descent upon the English coast. Everything in the way of transport and provision that could be utilised in case of such an accident was thought out, but the chances of its happening at all, the chances of an opportunity, however hazardous, arising, were indeed remote; and meanwhile the formation of the coalition was proceeding. If Prussia could be induced to join with Russia and with Austria it seemed certain that Napoleon would fall and with him the French power and the triumph of the Revolution in Europe.

Much at the same time as the formation of the new Pitt Ministry in England, Russia took the first move in raising the new coalition against France. Russia's excuse was the violation of territory by Napoleon. He had suppressed, with his accustomed vigour, a plot (Cadoul's conspiracy) for his overthrow, the figure-head of which was the Duc d'Enghien, at that time in his thirty-third year, and a refugee in the territory of Baden: a Bourbon. Napoleon had seized the person of this prince, thereby violating the neutral terri-

¹The mass of these men were concentrated near the Straits of Dover. Soult was with the camp at Boulogne; Davout close by at Ambleteuse; Ney at Montreuil. But Marmont had a command as far to the East at Utrecht, and Augereau on the Breton coasts. It was a repetition on a larger scale of what had gone on before the Treaty of Amiens was concluded.

tory of Baden, upon the 14th of March, 1804, and a week later he was shot, after trial and sentence by court martial, at Vincennes. Russia took the occasion to issue a first and very violent protest against Napoleon's action and then, in July, an ultimatum demanding the evacuation by the French troops of Southern Italy and of certain posts in North Germany.

Meanwhile Pitt was taking full advantage of such an opportunity and heartening the new coalition with the promise of heavy subsidies. Sweden was promised a first payment before the end of the year and made her alliance with Russia in January, 1805, while at the same moment Pitt suggested to the Russian Government the complete overthrow of the French and the reversal of all their successes since the opening of the Revolutionary War by the combination of *all* the three great Continental powers, Prussia, Austria and Russia against Napoleon. In the month following (having rejected Napoleon's overtures for peace) he procured from the House of Commons a preliminary vote of five millions to be spent in further subsidies to the Continental governments in their coming attack upon Napoleon, who had meanwhile erected the Empire, assumed the title of Emperor and was about to assume the crown of Italy.

If Prussia should join nothing apparently could save the French. They would have against them in the first line half a million men. Even if two powers should combine to attack France, the move against Britain must be abandoned, and in face of such a peril all the offensive prepared against England must be sacrificed. In counterpoise to this peril, and to strike at England before it matured, Napoleon could

only count upon an attempt to create a sufficient fleet. The Spanish ports and building yards were at his service since the destruction of the Spanish treasure fleet by an English squadron a year before. The attempt was hopeless. The creation of a great navy is not like that of an army. It needs at least a generation of tradition and of undisturbed growth, and events were soon to prove that English superiority at sea was not only more formidable than ever, but now absolute. It was hoped by Napoleon that in mere numbers he could have a sufficient fleet by the middle of 1805, and mere numbers, his energy coupled with his now active alliance with Spain procured him. But they could not procure him either a disciplined and united corps of officers of long training and experience, nor such crews nor (above all) such gunners, as they should have commanded. His best admiral, Latouche Treville, had just died. Villeneuve, a man worthy, exacting in duty and universally unfortunate, succeeded him. He received orders to leave Toulon, if possible, in spite of the English blockade of that port, to join the Spanish fleet at Cadiz, to cross the Atlantic and to pick up the French squadron that had been acting against the English West Indies, and to return to European waters and to the Channel, to aid in the plan against England.

Villeneuve escaped the vigilance of Nelson and got out of Toulon upon the 29th of March, 1805, and proceeded to follow his instructions. Meanwhile, on April 11, 1805, Pitt's hopes that a continued coalition might be formed were fulfilled. A treaty was signed between the British and the Russian monarchs with the object of forming a general European

league against Napoleon, and the pith of that treaty was a promise upon the part of Pitt that for every man put into the field his Government would give 12 pounds 5 shillings, that is, for every hundred thousand troops raised upon the Continent, Great Britain would pay a million and a quarter of money. Operations were to begin when 400,000 men had been collected.

Austria, under her new monarch, Francis I., prepared to accede to this policy. The only doubtful point was Prussia. And even without Prussia overwhelming forces could be brought into line by the two great empires against the French.

It was clearly apparent that whatever chance Napoleon may have envisaged of landing men in Britain was now not worth considering in face of this vast preparation for attack coming upon him from the East. He was not fully informed during the early summer of the details of the coalition, but he knew it was there, and that the blow was coming.

On the 13th of August, 1805, at 4 o'clock in the morning, the Emperor summoned his secretary and began to dictate. The document which he thus composed was plainly the result of a very long and minute study. Though he had certainly thought the invasion of England possible the Emperor must have abandoned that idea weeks before. For this plan which he poured out as rapidly as Daru could take it down was a detailed scheme for gathering the whole of the great army from its position upon the northern coast and advancing right about face upon the Valley of the Danube.

Meanwhile Villeneuve and his Spanish ally were back with their ships in European waters, but they

had failed to effect their junction with the French squadron in the West Indies. In a brush with an English fleet off the Galician Coast the Franco-Spanish force had already suffered and had had to put in at Ferrol. It was in no condition for fighting at all, let alone for fighting against the supreme ability in command, maritime tradition, excellence in gunnery, and sufficiency in numbers of the English at sea; and it was to meet the personal genius of Nelson! We have Villeneuve's own judgment in a letter written to his friend, Decrès, Napoleon's Naval Minister, "Our spars are rotten and our canvas, our munitions, our officers and our crews." When he left Ferrol it was only to return to Cadiz and there to be blockaded by the British fleet.

Four days before Napoleon had dictated his famous order the Austrian Government had openly adhered to the coalition and to its objects as defined by the Anglo-Russian Treaty of breaking the French Power and reversing the Revolutionary effort once and for all. Pitt ladled out yet more millions. Three millions to Austria for the remainder of that year, four millions a year so long as hostilities might last. Upon August 28th with his plan for the sea destroyed (now that he knew that Villeneuve was shut up at Cadiz) and with the great Powers rising upon him to the east, Napoleon moved, and the march of the Grand Army upon the Valley of the Danube began—and still, luckily for the French, Prussia had not joined the coalition. Upon the 9th of September the Austrians fell upon Bavaria, seized Ulm, and awaited the shock of battle in the Black Forest. The rapidity and the precision of Napoleon's march to meet them will ever be famous in military history.

On the afternoon of Sunday, the 20th of October, 1805, the main Austrian force in Ulm surrendered; the force marching to its succour had already been destroyed, and the Austrian army that had invaded Bavaria six weeks before, no longer existed as a military force.

Such was the answer Napoleon gave to the new coalition, an answer made possible by the hesitation of Prussia to join the Allies.

On the next day, Monday the 21st, Villeneuve and his Spanish ally, having ventured out of their port of refuge, were destroyed by Nelson in the capital victory off Cape Trafalgar. From that day until the transformation of naval armaments into those modern forms which have never yet been put to the proof of warfare in Europe, the British fleet has held an unquestioned dominion over the sea. Nelson himself fell in the action, but it may be questioned whether the glory with which he covered British arms and the powerful tradition which he founded did not render his glorious death a source of further strength to his country. He was one of those few heroes upon whom the adoration of a whole people is not wasted, and who are worthy of it not only because the genius that is worshipped is of the highest kind, but because the whole character supporting that genius has not been misapprehended or distorted in the public vision. A greater man and a more human one is not to be found in the annals of modern naval history.

Though by this definitive and final victory at sea, the ultimate safety of England from invasion (never really in doubt), was now permanently secured, it was apparent that the larger business of the coalition was

to fail. It was on the evening of the 3d of November that the news of Ulm reached London. Pitt was entertaining that night at his table Lord Halmesbury, who told his host of the rumour. Pitt's health, already long undermined by his habitual drunkenness, was by this time ruined; his nerves on this occasion betrayed him. He lost all calm and judgment and shouted: "Don't believe a word of it!" Next day, when the account was verified, he broke down.

The news of Trafalgar, coming in four days later, could not restore his confidence. It was a glorious and a final achievement, but what effect could it have in deciding the great drama that was playing in Europe, upon the issue of which all Pitt's judgment and all the meaning of his career was staked?

He checked so far as he could by his public utterances the false and too hopeful estimates of the City as to the coalition's chances abroad; he watched with anxiety the continued triumph of the Emperor—for Napoleon was now marching upon Vienna. He did not cease his despairing efforts to bring Prussia into line before it was too late—if, indeed, it was not already too late. He very nearly succeeded. Upon the 5th of December he wrote a long letter from Downing Street to Harrowby, telling him that his efforts at Berlin were invaluable and concluding with the words that he hoped there would be no question of his return until "you have signed a provisional treaty and seen the Prussians on their march against the enemy."

That letter is among the sharpest ironies of history. It was written upon a Thursday; already, upon the Monday before (the 2d of December, 1805),

Napoleon had broken the coalition to pieces at Austerlitz.

Pitt, attempting at Bath to fight the illness which his excesses had produced, heard conflicting rumours, mostly hopeful and all false. As late as the 21st of December we find him writing a letter in which he still believes that "the sequel of the battle terminated in great success on the part of Russia." It was not until the end of the year that the full truth was known. The reader acquainted with the infamies in Ireland will find it perhaps significant of God's promises that Castlereagh was the vehicle through whom Pitt's doom arrived. Whatever passed at that fatal interview has been carefully concealed from history, but it was certainly a death-blow. Upon the 9th of January, 1806, Pitt set off back for London. He was detained for a while, by his increasing weakness, at Reading; he reached his house at Putney a dying man. Upon the 23d of January he was dead.

After the death of Pitt the Ministry of which he had been the soul was no longer possible. Its fall was accelerated by one of those scandals, common to all parliaments, which had broken out in the last year of Pitt's life. It was measured according to the standard of those days; a standard far stricter than our own.

Pitt's friend and colleague, Lord Melville, had appropriated public money to his own use. To cover his theft he proffered the usual excuses (with which our own times are so familiar in England). Vouchers could not be produced because they had been destroyed. His permission of corruption on the part of a dependent of his was due to overkindness, not to any worse motive, etc., etc. The House of Commons

had brushed aside these customary falsehoods and had compelled the expulsion of Melville from public life; subsequent to which disgrace he was (after Pitt's death) duly whitewashed by the House of Lords.

But even if this scandal had not arisen it would still have been impossible for Pitt's colleagues to remain in power after his death. George III. did attempt to continue its policy and character under the leadership of Hawkesbury, but Hawkesbury would not take the Premiership and the King was compelled to turn to the Opposition. Lord Grenville became the First Lord of the Treasury. The old extreme War Party was represented by Windham; yet Foreign Affairs were put into the hands of Fox.

It is pitiful to remember that this great and generous man, having now for the first time after thirty years of disfavour the opportunity to use his talents in administration, found such opportunity offered him when his health had already broken down, and when long war made it impossible to support in full his consistent sympathy with that Revolution which had already transformed Europe and was destined to create the modern world.

It was in vain that Fox opened negotiations for peace with Napoleon. Matters had gone too far; and it was no longer possible for the now triumphant Revolutionary Armies and their leader to believe that a permanent Peace with the Aristocracies or the Kings was possible until the last of them was crushed. Further, the close, cohesive tradition in foreign policy, which is native to an Oligarchy, and which was the strength of England, compelled Fox to follow the momentum of his predecessor's actions.

Fox in
Power.

For instance, Pitt's subsidy to Prussia was on the point of being paid; and when Prussia consented, after the shock of Austerlitz, to a temporary alliance with France—that is, to an abandonment of the Coalition (her adherence to which had been the capital object of Pitt's last days)—the rebuff was suffered by England as a whole. Fox could not but resent it as English Foreign Minister. It was immediately after the breaking off of these negotiations that Fox died, after so few months of office, on the 30th of September, 1806. He was in his 58th year.

We shall never know what the future of England lost by the exclusion of such a man during all his ripest years from administrative power. It is worthy of remembrance that this exclusion was largely due to his loyalty in friendship. Had not Pitt suffered from personal pique against the Prince of Wales, had not George III. suffered from an insane dislike of his son, had not Fox remained the faithful friend of that son, he might have figured in successive administrations which, if they had not prevented the great war altogether, would at least have modified its worst financial consequences, would have modified the permanent division between capitalist and proletarian in the England that was to come, would have strengthened in that same England the tradition of a Free Parliament and would have permitted new experiments in freedom.

Before Fox died and during this brief "Ministry of all the Talents," which is principally associated with his name, the inevitable effects of the French Revolution were already felt in one important measure: the slave-trade, our profits from which had dis-

gusted all contemporary opinion, was abolished. Slavery as an institution under the British flag was *not* abolished, it was to linger until long after the Battle of Waterloo, and when in turn it had become impossible under the restored conscience of Europe the opportunity was taken, as we shall see, for private capitalists to make the best of all possible good things out of its abolition by an impudent raid upon the public purse.

Six months after Fox's death the Grenville Ministry resigned, having held office for little more than a year. It fell upon the point of a minor concession to the Catholics, typical of the whole policy of the Act of Union. Before that error an Irish Catholic could hold in Ireland the rank of Colonel, though there were obstacles in the way of his receiving a Staff Appointment. Now the superior commissions were forbidden him by the Union of England with Ireland. Not only was the King's objection to any Catholic claim insuperable, but the true mind of Pitt was still seen in the action of his followers now that he was dead. To a man they opposed this small but characteristic measure of justice.

The Grenville Ministry was succeeded by one under the nominal headship of the Duke of Portland, but one in which the most important figure was Canning, the Foreign Secretary. Castlereagh (of all men!) was given the Secretaryship for War.

Canning
and Cas-
tlereagh's
Ministry.

In the course of this administration two matters in Foreign Policy are especially to be remembered. The first is the Berlin Decrees, the second the presence of English troops in permanent opposition to the Armies of the Revolution upon the Continent. I say "in permanent opposition"; by which I mean not de-

feated and driven to the sea, as had been the earlier contingents at the beginning of the war, but side by side with their more numerous Allies holding their own against the French forces.

As to the Berlin Decrees, their occasion was as follows:

Prussia, in her vacillating policy, having made a second turn about, abandoned the French Alliance, and declared War on the 1st of October, 1806, and a fortnight later (October 14) was defeated at Jena. Napoleon had entered Berlin upon the 27th of the month.

After his recent defeat of Austria and the domination already established by him over Holland, the Valley of the Rhine and Italy, this victory left Napoleon the unquestioned head of Western Europe. There had already appeared in his mind the conception of a reunited European civilisation upon the Roman model. He had against him, before it was capable of fulfilment, certain undefeated forces.

First and most important by far was the untested but enormous weight of Russian national and religious feeling: the weightier for its organisation under an autocracy. Next came the complete supremacy at sea of the English fleet, coupled with that capital factor in the politics of the time (which must never be forgotten if we are to understand them), the triple monopoly then enjoyed by England in the carrying into Europe of Exotic Imports which had become necessary to European civilisation, in the industrial production of goods which had also become necessary to that civilisation, and in finance. Lastly, there was to appear in the near future one more great obstacle to the reunion of Europe and to the old Imperial

scheme: the incalculable courage and the fierce particularism of the Spaniard.

As to Russia: Napoleon might have ended with a compromise. It was ever in his mind. It was the wisest plan, and had he adhered to it he would not have fallen. For he fell, as we shall see, through the blunder of the Russian campaign six years later. It was a conceivable and enduring solution of his difficulties that he should leave to Russia her hegemony over the Orthodox world, her Asiatic ambition and an Eastern Empire—while, under his own guidance, he restored the Empire of the West. In the matter of Spain (when that trouble should have arisen) he would have had either like the Romans to fight it down at an enormous expense in life and time, or to have excluded from his scheme of a reunited Europe all that hard Iberian land which is quite cut off by the Pyrenees.

In the matter of England it was difficult to see any solution. And here I would admit a further digression upon a matter which has perpetually recurred in these pages, the economic position of England at the time.

We have not to-day any adequate conception of what that position was. We have forgotten it; and comparative statistics do not help us to recall it. The whole point of the English polity up to, and for a full lifetime after, the Napoleonic wars was not so much that it was richer and also more enduring than other States, as that its industry and its finances were, so to speak, in another *world* from that of any rival.

England, to-day, for instance, produces much iron and steel, much coal, and a quantity of textile goods. But there is no nation in the world to-day that would

be "held up" by the destruction of British industry or minerals. There is no nation that is dependent for its necessities upon the cloth, or the coal, or the iron of these islands. All the great nations, our rivals, are now capable of active industrial production. Each has surpassed us in some department of modern industrial production: Germany in coal; France in the internal combustion engine, the aeroplane, the locomotive, the gun, and armour plate; Russia in oil; the United States in all of these. During the Napoleonic Wars England was positively the *only* source from which textiles and machinery could be obtained upon a large scale. The well-worn tag that Napoleon was himself compelled to clothe his soldiers in English stuffs is as valuable and illuminating as it is true.

England at the same time not only began with a partial monopoly of the carrying trade, but through the very action of the French, extended it as the war proceeded. For every fresh alliance which Napoleon procured from, or forced upon, another government gave the British Government an opportunity for seizing the merchant ships of that power and for destroying its commerce by blockade. Napoleon, therefore, in fighting the England of that time, was meeting in the industrial field something corresponding to modern England, modern North America, modern North Germany, modern Northeastern France, modern Belgium, and modern Lombardy combined. And in the matter of communications and carrying power he was fighting something corresponding to a combination of the modern international railways.

The same overwhelming position was at that time held by England in the domain of finance. In total

wealth she far surpassed any rival; in wealth "per capita" she far surpassed them all. But, what was more important, that wealth was *mobile*. It could be used where and at what moment the English Government chose. Hence the unlimited subsidies which the nation poured out to maintain in the field bodies of armed allies and to save itself from the loss to industry and the political danger (in an oligarchy) of conscription within its own territory.

An economic illusion hides from modern scholars the magnitude of these subsidies paid by Great Britain to those who fought Napoleon. The complexity of modern civilisation has created a vast bulk of imaginaries in the assessments of modern wealth. When we hear of Pitt, for instance, promising five million pounds here and three million pounds there to the allies, furnishing £12.5s.0d. a man for every foreigner who would help us to fight our battles, and budgetting for military expenses of 20, 30, and 40 million pounds, we are, through the illusion of our modern figures, surprised at the smallness of the sums required for so great a task. These sums stand for a military effect which would be represented by far larger sums to-day. Like must be compared with like. It is worthy of remembrance that when Napoleon turned to fight the second Coalition (which Pitt was pledged to subsidise to the tune of some eight million pounds) *his* chief resource was ready money to the extent of little more than two million pounds, obtained by the sale of Louisiana to the United States!

To understand what the international power of England meant at that moment on the economic side, we must imagine her to-day capable of supplying the expenses of a whole modern campaign to be fought

by modern France, say, against modern Germany, with the object of crippling the German menace now feared in England. And while England was enjoying this overwhelming international strength in ready money no other rival nation could compete with her for one moment in the offering of such sums.

When we have fully grasped this state of affairs we shall not find it remarkable that the Berlin Decrees failed. It was upon the 21st of November, 1806, that Napoleon issued these orders from the town that bears their name. They declared the whole of the British islands to be in a state of blockade, forbade commerce with them, and had for their declared object at once the annihilation of British exchange through the forbidding of ports of entry to her shipping and the annihilation of British *productivity* through the closure of her foreign markets. But the Continent could not provide itself in those days, and the Berlin Decrees were impossible of fulfilment from the day when they were issued.

With Russia things went thus: In the first shock between Napoleon himself and the Russian armies at Eylau, the Emperor had come within an ace of defeat. The action itself, partly fought in a blinding snow-storm, and before the arrival of his reinforcements, was no victory. It was, in the eyes of all Europe, the first serious check the French had received for now more than a dozen years. But by the summer the balance was restored. Turkey had been persuaded to declare war upon Russia. Reinforcements had come up, particularly from Italy, and on the 14th of June the doubtful Battle of Friedland turned at its close in favour of the French. This anxious, but finally decisive, action of Friedland put an end to the

Fourth Coalition. It was the more decisive from the fact that it reversed the policy to which both the monarchs of Prussia and Russia had pledged themselves after Eylau—to drive the French back to the limits of the Rhine. The direct consequence of Friedland was the Peace of Tilsit, the terms of which may be stated in general language to be the partial re-erection of Polish nationality, the subsequent dismemberment of the Prussian provinces (or rather their reduction to Prussia proper—which was further to be occupied by French garrisons “pending the payment of an indemnity”), but above all what was thought to be a permanent compromise with Russia. The character of the Russian Czar played no small part in this novel, and as Napoleon hoped, stable arrangement. The Russian Monarch had no sympathy with the English character; he detested the English spirit of isolation from Europe; he admired his great rival. This moment—1807—is well fitted for a halt in our historical survey. For it closes the first chapter of Napoleon’s history; it opens the long complexity of his Spanish experiment.

Successive French Governments had had toward Spain, and successive Spanish Governments toward the French, a traditional and fairly continuous policy. This policy had now covered more than three generations of men. Spain, rapidly declining in population, wealth and power, burdened with the proud relics of a past that she could hardly bear; boasting a numerical naval strength to which there was no military aptitude corresponding, leant time and again on France. It was the English sea-power that she feared; it was England that had taken Spanish territory by a ruse and kept part of it by invincible power

The
French
attempt
in Spain.

at sea; it was England that really threatened Spain's future in the Indies. France, as England's one rival, seemed Spain's natural support.

Conversely, the French Government, following a line of least resistance, had tended to meet this Spanish tendency. Only in Spain were to be found the ports and the arsenals and shipbuilding yards which could supplement and increase the French Naval power in its struggle against the preponderant maritime strength of Great Britain. Also Spain, weak and declining, could be persuaded to an alliance while the Eastern and stronger powers at once feared French ambition, and were ready to aggrandize themselves through its defeat.

This intermittent but long-lasting state of affairs was powerfully helped by the connection between the two ruling Houses of Spain and France during the eighteenth century. Both were Bourbon, both had a common ancestor in Louis XIV., the sympathy of blood, manners and even architecture between them was complete.

Napoleon, reëstablishing a French dynasty in his own person, conceived it as a natural continuation of the old relations that he should work with or through a compliant Spain. And indeed Spain had already attempted to help him against England. She had, without complaint, lost her fleet in his service. There were two further elements in the situation which appealed powerfully to his desire for intervention. The first was that which has troubled every Northerner who has immixed in Spanish affairs, whether in arms, commerce or diplomacy: I mean, an itch to develop the abandoned resources of a country which exasperates the Northerner by its apparent lethargy.

Napoleon saw great harbours, vast possessions overseas, a very large maritime population, all wasted by inefficient government and eliminated in the great struggle for sea-power. In his own phrase he "must stir up the Spaniards." That united Europe of his included, as it had included for the Romans, new roads, new buildings, new recruitments in Spain: but he was to find such resistance as the Romans found and without the Roman leisure in which to achieve his plan.

The second element in Napoleon's favour was the miserable character of the Spanish Court. The ruling family at Madrid was exhausted. It was grievously unpopular. Its government was quite exceptionally bad.

So far Napoleon's design of interfering with the domestic affairs of Spain seemed well founded. But his judgment was at fault in exactly those particulars where the judgment of the humblest tourist is nearly always at fault when he deals with the Spaniard. He quite misunderstood the Spanish character. The complete indifference of the Spaniard to the huge Rationalist movement and industrial development of the later eighteenth century connoted for Napoleon mere decay, nor did he comprehend the incalculable *negative* forces with which he would have to deal. The Spanish House might be of foreign origin; it might be as inadequate as you will. But it was in Spanish eyes *legitimate*; it was not the product of usurpation. To touch the royal house, Bourbon though it was and unpopular, was to touch the Spaniards upon a point of honour. Further, the mere presence of the foreigner—even in the pacific attitude of the traveller—is unpleasing to the Spaniard. As an invader the

foreigner is hated with an intensity quite out of proportion to our Northern hatreds. The invader, in Spanish eyes, is a man to be met by any form of ruse, torture or massacre.

The Bourbon House signed away its rights to Napoleon. Napoleon placed upon the throne his own brother, Joseph. He had unwittingly planted by that act in the body of his new Europe the seeds of what he himself so well called "the Spanish ulcer."

There are two powerful national spirits at either extremity of Europe which the rest of Europe can hardly comprehend, which only exceptional and rare observers can sympathise with and interpret. These are the Spanish and the Russian spirits. It was upon his misconception of the two that Napoleon was to shipwreck his Empire.

It was on the famous 2d of May, 1808, that Madrid rose. The insurrection was put down by Murat with abominable severity, but many other towns rose at the same time. The regular army was wholly on the national side in feeling and joined the national revolt by battalions. More powerful than they, innumerable *juntas* (that is, local committees) organised resistance throughout Spanish soil. It was a mere popular resistance that gloriously and successfully defended Saragossa and that compelled Duhesme to raise the siege of Gerona. The Spanish temper is admirably illustrated by an anecdote concerning this latter operation. To the popular leader, who was wounded, a waverer suggested capitulation because food was lacking. He had his answer: "We will fall back upon eating the cowards. Your carcase shall provide the first dish."

The Emperor met this unexpected resistance by

flooding the land with his armies, when there came to him, as he himself was going northward from Bayonne, news quite incredible. At Baylen, in the South of Spain, a regular French Army Corps under Dupont, 18,000 men with their colours and their guns, had surrendered to the despised popular levies?

This was at the end of July. It coincided with the first serious attempt since the earlier part of the Revolutionary Wars to send an English Expeditionary force to the Continent. The Spanish opportunity with its extensive seaboard cried aloud for such a change of policy and, as I have said, England was to raise her prestige permanently in Europe through the success of her contingents so despatched. They were not numerous in comparison with the forces engaged, but they were of excellent quality for they were largely Irish in blood; they were handled (in the Peninsula at least, and by Wellington) at once with caution and with daring; their leader was the best man in Europe for discovering, in a moment of genius, for holding when discovered, a defensive position. He was to remain unconquered until, in the last action of Waterloo, his fame reached its summit.

Negotiations with certain Spanish delegates had begun in London before the capitulation of Baylen. The universal Spanish rising had cut off the French armies under Junot that held the Western littoral of the Peninsula and that were masters of Portugal. On the 1st of August the Emperor's brother, Joseph, evacuated Madrid; on the same day and the morrow Wellesley, later to be the great Duke of Wellington (already remarkable for his achievements in India) had landed in Mondego Bay with 9,000 men. Their

numbers were rapidly swelled by reinforcements to 16,000; they were supported by numerous Portuguese levies. Upon the 21st of August came the first serious shock with Junot at Vimiero. In this, his initial action upon European soil, the future Duke of Wellington brilliantly showed those qualities in generalship which he was to maintain consistently for nearly seven years. He chose with instant appreciation his defensive position; he sustained upon it successfully, and he repelled, the French offensive. The result of the success was the Convention of Cintra whereby the French army under Junot was to leave Portugal for France, with its munitions and arms; and from that moment there was a permanent base in the Western seaboard of the Peninsula for rendering permanent aid to the Spanish resistance against the French.

When the English occupied Lisbon there fell into their hands a squadron of Russian ships which happened to be in the port, and upon such an occasion it may be asked why the Czar, for all his new arrangements with Napoleon, and for all the attraction he felt for Napoleon's character, should have permitted so grave an attack upon the hereditary principle as the ousting of the Spanish Bourbons and their replacement by Napoleon's brother. For the chief cause of this attitude, which Russia was to maintain so long, we must go back to the year before when an English force had suddenly appeared before Copenhagen, had demanded from a neutral country, Denmark, the surrender of a fortress commanding the entry to the Baltic, had bombarded Copenhagen (in the first week of September, 1807) and had seized the Danish fleet and despoiled the Danish arsenals. As English policy the defence of this violation of common right lies in

the fact that Napoleon would undoubtedly have soon used the Danish arsenals and fleet against England. But a blow delivered in such complete violation of law and so near home confirmed Alexander in his determination against the British Government. In the event this attitude upon the part of Russia proved wholly to the advantage of Great Britain, for by permitting the usurpation of the Spanish throne Russia had also permitted the Spanish insurrection, and with it the active and useful intervention of English military forces upon the Continent.

The next step in British foreign policy was a partial failure, but partial failure though it was, it afforded an opportunity for exhibiting just those qualities in the new British system of expeditionary forces which the year had inaugurated. A large body of Spanish irregulars had been raised by the *juntas*, to defend the North against the now inevitable advance of large French forces toward the recovery of Spain. In support of this Sir John Moore was to advance Northward and Eastward from Portugal.

The advance was ill-conceived. Moore was separated from his artillery (which he had sent around by too long a detour) and before he could render any effective aid to the Spaniards Napoleon, advancing in person with overwhelming forces, had broken the Spanish resistance in the North and was advancing on Madrid. He was at the gates of the capital (which had surrendered upon the 3d of December) on the 4th; he remained in that neighbourhood nearly three weeks. He took it for granted that Moore would have retired upon Lisbon, which, had he been wise, he certainly would have done. But Moore, whose artillery had now joined him, conceived some

impossible plan of still moving forward against Napoleon's communications with his small force. He hesitated, therefore, as far inland as Sahagun till two days before Christmas. Napoleon, having learnt that the little English army had thus imperilled itself by pressing too far inland (but misinformed as to the actual distance) marched North to cut off its retreat upon the sea. His advance in blinding Christmas weather over the Guadarrama Mountains is among the most famous of his feats, but whereas he imagined that *two* miles of marching to Moore's *one* was all that was needed to cut Moore off from the sea, the real proportion was more like *three* to one, and after so vigorous an effort he had to abandon the attempt. Moore retired rapidly upon the Galician ports, pursued by Soult and suffering during his retreat the gravest losses in men, horses and guns, all of which—and his precipitate haste—would have been saved had he seen his danger in time. He, none the less, earned for himself, his country, and the British Service, the highest glory in the final action in which he lost his life. Pressed to the very edge of the sea he drew up his command to defend the port of Corunna and the embarkation of his remaining troops and material. The action he then fought (January 16, 1809), which takes its title from that town, successfully checked the French pursuit. He had the good fortune to escape reproach at home by falling himself in the moment of victory. The survivors embarked his army successfully and the unfortunate diversion was at an end.

The episode is fortunate in having given occasion for the noblest passage, perhaps, in all the prose of military history: Napier's immortal page in which

the valiance and death of his generous leader is recorded.

If we consider the next three years as a whole, British military policy, with its failure and success upon the Continent, may roughly be reduced to these three main statements:

1. There is a moment of hope when Austria decides, in Napoleon's present Spanish embarrassment, to attempt once more his overthrow and to accept once more the pay of England. That hope is disappointed. Napoleon crushes Austria at Wagram.

2. A British expedition, undertaken without the help of allies, goes utterly to pieces on the Island of Walcheren.

3. Wellesley, with masterly caution, continues to support the widespread Spanish resistance against the French; fights actions in which he is never defeated, and yet upon which he rarely permits himself to base a dangerous advance; continues steadily to regard his strategical object as the perpetual weakening of the French power, which, as more and more veterans are withdrawn from Spain (and as the quality of the French troops correspondingly declines) he can unremittingly help the Spaniards in undermining. So much for 1809-10, 1810-11, 1811-12.

After these three years are over everything changes. Napoleon has begun his fatal march into Russia, his principal armies are first drawn away thither, then destroyed. He cannot, with the men remaining to him, hold Germany. He is beaten back upon France. Coincidentally with all this the comparatively small English contingents in the Peninsula can advance with their allies almost uninterruptedly, until at last they cross the Pyrenees and enter French territory itself

in the last days of Napoleon's fall. They fight their last action at the moment of his abdication. As to the first division in these: 1809-10. Such is the story of 1812-1814 and the close of the great Revolutionary Drama.

Austria's unfortunate effort was primarily due to a diplomatic error of Talleyrand's. Talleyrand thought the relations between the Austrian Court and Napoleon sufficiently sincere to allow him to communicate to Vienna the hesitation which the Czar felt in supporting Napoleon. This action on the part of Talleyrand was not unconnected with his intrigues for personal safety in case Napoleon should fall. The Austrians accepted, as I have said, the renewed offers of English money, were privately guaranteed by the Czar against serious attack should they move against Napoleon. In April, 1809, without previous declaration of war, they fell upon Bavaria and began their Western advance against the French.

Napoleon detested this war. His genius perceived all the menace which it involved. France was weary of fighting. The conscription was weighing most heavily upon all her dominions. His Spanish blunder was getting more and more serious in its effects. The understanding with Russia upon which the Emperor had based everything was, he could now see, uncertain. The chances of an immediate victory were against him; but even supposing that he won that victory and defeated Austria, there would be a necessity for a rearrangement of territory and almost certainly a further disagreement with Russia, upon whose friendship all his plans for an organised Western Europe, united under his rule, depended. Further, such a war at such a moment meant opportu-

nities for local resistance: for the friction of those local patriotisms with the spirit of which all Revolutionary tradition sympathised, and which were yet fatal to the final success of the Revolutionary armies and of the universal spread of democracy. The Tyrolese gave the chief example of this.

Austria, Napoleon did at last succeed in defeating, but only just. The Battle of Wagram, on the 6th of July, 1809, decided the campaign, and on the 14th of October following, the Peace of Vienna apparently restored Napoleon's position. But in the dismemberment of territory that followed, especially in the increased power of Poland and in the corresponding anxiety of Russia, the causes of the fatal campaign of 1812 and of the retreat from Moscow had appeared.

Meanwhile the British Government had attempted a diversion in favour of the Austrians; they proposed an advance upon the Low Countries and the capture of Antwerp, the great port of that coast. It was the greatest body of men England had attempted to send out—no less than forty thousand. We have a measure of Canning's inaptitude when we appreciate that the force did not start until Austria had signed the armistice after her defeat! We have a measure of the egregious Castlereagh's capacity in the appointment of Lord Chatham to its command, the chief cause, perhaps, of the breakdown of the whole affair. The great force rotted away on the island of Walcheren. The fleet was beaten in its attempt to force the Scheldt. By the end of the year about half of the troops were no longer able to bear arms, and the enormous death-rate had actually destroyed thousands. In Christmas week the remnant sailed back home.

Very different was the handling of British troops in the Peninsula under the genius of Wellesley and under his happy, though partial, freedom of action from the government of the politicians at home. It is always the case that an armed force kept long and successfully in the field hardens into excellence, and no better infantry has perhaps ever been seen upon the fields of Europe than that of the comparatively small forces which Wellington led in Spain and Portugal during these three years. Those who complain (and abroad they are numerous) of his persistent and lavish sacrifice of Spanish life, of his tactics—which invariably consisted in the adoption of the defensive and that defensive guaranteed by great masses of the Spanish or Portuguese levies so placed as to bear or be threatened by the worst effects of the enemy—fail to remark the object of the English Government and of their general. They fail also to remember the first rule of strategy, which is so to use your forces as to achieve your political object. Wellington sacrificed the Spaniards because it was essential to preserve intact the small stiffening force under his own direct command. The supply of half-trained and courageous native levies was inexhaustible; the supply of trained and now veteran British troops was very limited indeed. The object of the British Government (and indeed of all patriots at such a moment) was not the comfort or even the independence of Spain, but the defeat of Napoleon; and with him of the French Revolution, and of that Democratic ideal which threatened the now confirmed structure of English society.

In the first year, 1809, Wellington (then Wellesley) cleared Portugal and with a force of less than 20,000

of his own men supporting more than double that number of Spaniards (largely untrained and irregular) he threatened Madrid. It is true that this advance was made upon false information and was perilous; for though the quality of the French troops was deteriorating rapidly with the removal of the best units to fight elsewhere, and with the Austrian campaign in full swing, yet the numbers of the French were much more than what Wellesley imagined to be in front of him. But the very manner in which he escaped from the danger is proof of his genius. When the shock came (at Talavera) upon the 28th of July, he sustained it successfully (his right covered by the mass of the Spaniards, who took the first blows) and his success was due to the handling of his own troops. He even restored, by the judicious but perilous movement of men from his flank, a broken centre, and was able, after the exhibition of such admirable tactical grasp, to withdraw his army from its entanglement. Though the action was necessarily followed by a retreat—indeed its whole object was to permit that retreat—yet the Government was wise to reward him for his success, and he was raised to the peerage under the title of Viscount Wellington.

In 1810—corresponding to the moment of Napoleon's renewed relief from the Austrian menace—Wellington fell back into the promontory of Lisbon, which he had rendered impregnable, during the autumn and winter before, by works due to the energetic labour the Portuguese, stretching from the water to the water and known as the lines of Torres Vedras. He compelled the complete wasting of the country through which Massena would march, met and checked him at Busaco (with exactly the same de-

fensive tactics as he had used at Talavera) and then retreated within the lines. The lines could not be forced, and Massena, by the Spring of 1811, had evacuated Portugal. During that year of 1811 Wellington had again advanced, tentatively and feeling, as it were, the quality of the steadily sinking troops in front of him. For Napoleon no longer consented seriously to reinforce his Peninsular armies; the guerilla fighting was more exhausting than ever before, and the cloud in the East, which was to burst in the Russian campaign, was already darkening before him.

Just before Napoleon had gathered all his greatest strength into the plains of Poland to begin his advance upon Moscow, Wellington (in the January and the April of 1812) took the two frontier Spanish fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz (in the former he captured a mass of the French siege artillery) and, after defeating Marmont at Salamanca (or rather upon the heights called the Arapiles) on the 22d of July (Napoleon's march into Russia had already begun) he entered Madrid upon the 12th of August.

He was indeed compelled to evacuate Madrid, closely pursued by the French, and to fall back once more upon Portugal; but the raid was the farthest advance yet made from the sea. It was significant of the time of the absorption of the French effort by Russia and of its approaching doom in the snows of the retreat and of the Beresina.

With the next year, 1813, you have Napoleon's great army finally destroyed after the retreat from Moscow, his ruin apparent, and his general falling back upon France begun. Wellington's advance through the Peninsula into France during the next

two years is but one incident in that much larger business, and must be treated so on a later page. Meanwhile one may briefly recapitulate the domestic history of these years, between the accession of Portland's Ministry and Napoleon's breakdown in the Retreat from Moscow in this Winter of 1812.

That domestic history is—apart from Ireland (with which I shall deal in a moment)—of little interest on its political side. As a result of the Walcheren Expedition, and of the competition in folly which Canning and Castlereagh had there engaged, the quarrel between the two men necessitated a reconstruction of the Ministry. This was undertaken in the October of 1809. The nominal head of the Cabinet after the reconstruction was Perceval. Castlereagh left the War Office which was taken by Lord Liverpool and the occasion provided for the entry of Palmerston into public life as under-Secretary in the same department. The most important appointment, however, was that of Lord Wellesley, Wellington's brother, who took the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Domestic
Events,
1809-1814.

A year later the King fell into yet another, and this time a long and alarming, fit of madness. It was necessary once more to appoint the Prince of Wales Regent, and once more was it apparent (even more strongly apparent than before the wars) that the ruling Oligarchy and in particular the great commercial interests of the nation (the City of London, which was always behind decisions of this kind) were opposed to any strengthening of the Monarchical principle. The Opposition betrayed the Prince, Sheridan alone was loyal to him, and he was compelled to accept the old restrictions in their most humiliating form. He continued, of course, the admin-

istration under Perceval, and when Perceval was assassinated by a madman of the name of Bellingham in May, 1812, the policy which had been continuous for now five years was continued under the Premiership of Lord Liverpool. At the same moment came the war with America which was the direct product of those English claims upon the sea which corresponded to the Napoleonic claims on land. England claimed the right of search over neutral shipping, which was as nearly arbitrary as anything subject to the nominal control of tribunals can be. This irritant led to the futile struggle with the United States. An attempt of the enemy against Canada failed, but to the surprise of the British Government it was at sea that their opponents were most consistently successful, and this success was in part due to the great numbers of trained English gunners upon the American vessels. For the moment coincided with the most bitter class feeling at home, and with the greatest harshness of the laws of impressment and discipline in the Fleet. Nothing was effected of any permanent consequence upon the English side; the most inane of many inanities marking the conduct of the campaign being the perfectly useless destruction of the public buildings and of the Capitol at Washington by the British troops. The whole War seems to have been fought without any clear political object upon the part of the Government, as it was certainly lacking in any clear strategical object upon the part of the commanders. An attempt to take New Orleans signally failed, and the operations ended in a Convention signed at Ghent on the 24th of December, 1814.

More important than this side issue of the Ameri-

can War and these arrangements and rearrangements of the personalities at Westminster was the very grave social crisis through which England now began to pass. It was to remain until long after the end of the great War, and our society was to emerge from it already so largely divided into two defined bodies of rich and poor as was to breed within two generations the complete triumph of Capitalism.

The symptoms of this passage between one England and another were severe enough to have excited the comments of all historians. Wheat and bread rising at moments to five times their modern price was one consequence of the war; almost as severe an evil was to be found in the immensely rapid fluctuations in price of that staple commodity. The old Poor Law, generously conceived upon the Christian basis of the family, and proposing relief to men in proportion to their poverty and in proportion to the numbers of their household, was administered by capitalists who could use it for putting wages upon the rates—and they did so without scruple. The unflinching instinct of the populace for the direction whence danger most menaces them led to the Luddite Riots and the widespread destruction of machinery.

The real thing behind all these disturbances was, of course, the way in which the crisis through which England was passing was used to enrich the dominant commercial and territorial oligarchy. The immense financial strain was met by general taxation; never by confiscation, still less by any heavy diminution of capital reserves. If the nation be regarded as a whole the policy was a wise one, for undoubtedly it was this consistent favouring of the rich which en-

abled British trade and the whole English credit system to survive the danger. But if the element of distribution—the chief element in real national well-being—be considered, then the policy was fatal, and we owe to it, more than to any other cause since the Reformation and the industrial revolution, the ruin of the mass of Englishmen, and their reduction to a proletarian condition; in particular the last remnants of the English peasantry disappear at this moment and pass into the ranks of hired labour divorced from the land.

Of the many ways in which this added preponderance of wealth and this crushing of the mass of Englishmen was effected, that of the great loans was undoubtedly the most important. Money was advanced to the State by a small class in whose interest the whole community was burdened to an increasing degree with every succeeding phase in the Great War.

Meanwhile Napoleon had fallen. His fall was due to a miscalculation in the resources, the temper and the very physical nature of Russia. After long hesitation succeeding to increasing estrangement between Napoleon and the Czar, and succeeding in particular to the Russian Monarch's determination to assert his freedom in the matter of trade (and thus to break with the Continental system) Napoleon decided to gather the whole force of his Empire (with the exception of the insufficient and ill-trained troops in Spain) and to stake the final establishment of that completely united Europe (which was his ideal), upon a successful invasion of Russia. He crossed the Frontier—too late—in the last days of June, 1812. He could count upon about half a million men. The Russians had ready to oppose him no more, imme-

diately, than half that number. But time was in every way upon their side. It would swell their numbers almost indefinitely; it would, with the rains of autumn, with the snows of winter, render the progress of the enemy or his retreat equally embarrassed. Napoleon had neither allowed for the gross insufficiency in communications, nor for the insuperable difficulty in such a country of maintaining so great a host. But, most important of all, he had not allowed for the character at once amorphic, homogeneous and devoted, of the Russian State. In what should have been his decisive battle, that of the Moscova or Borodino, the steadfastness of the Russian character was clearly apparent. Napoleon's army of French, Poles and Italians threw back the Russian defensive, but it failed by a whole world from the objects of all great actions, the destruction of the enemy. Moscow was abandoned but destroyed by its own government. The occupation of its ruins by the French brought Peace no nearer. At Malo-jaroslavetz the Emperor decided to turn an undecided movement from Moscow into a Retreat, and it is from the date of that action, the 24th of October, 1812, that we must count the beginning of Napoleon's rapid decline. The Retreat back Eastward destroyed, one may say, the whole of that great Army. The actions and the lack of forage had already destroyed the incomparable Cavalry which had been so great a factor in its success. It is remarkable that in spite of this complete disaster the prestige of the Emperor was still sufficient and his personal genius still so lively as to permit a doubtful resistance. With garrisons gathered throughout Germany, with the help of further levies, by the display of an energy

that still mastered his increasing physical disability, he fought desperately to maintain his grip upon Western Europe. He failed at Leipsic, the issue of which enormous action history must now permanently recognise as the decisive moment of his defeat. In other words, the victory of the Allies round that town (16th to 18th October, 1813) was the capital blow from which it was impossible that Napoleon should ever recover. But behind that disaster, and the sole cause of it, was the Russian Campaign. For Napoleon's failure in the Autumn of 1813—after so nearly reëstablishing himself in the earlier part of the year was due to his grave lack of cavalry more than to any other one military thing.

The Campaign of 1814 was fought with boys and half-trained recruits, for which an insufficient body of veterans, and an insufficient framework of officers, were provided. It marks in its desperation the survival of Napoleon's unapproachable talent in the art of war, but though those who speculate on the possibilities of history have imagined that he might yet have done something by marching directly upon the communications of the Allies after the invasion of France had begun, it is wiser to decide that nothing could have saved Napoleon in those last six months. The Allies entered Paris and the Emperor abdicated at Fontainebleau on the 6th of April, 1814.

Meanwhile, of course, the advance through Spain was open and the end of what is called in English history "The Peninsular War" was the Northward progress of the Spanish and Portuguese forces with their valuable English Allies and the successive victories of Wellington which correspond in their local way to the great drama which was being played in

Germany. This final episode is known to the Spaniards as the War of Independence.

By the middle of 1813 the invaders could not muster half the number of their opponents. A general retreat of the French upon the North, encumbered by a heavy baggage train, was begun. On the 21st of June the Allies caught up with it, with a superiority of about 50 per cent. in numbers, at Vittoria in the extreme North, on the last plain before the passage of the mountains. The French were totally defeated, losing 150 guns and nearly all their train, though the mass of the Army was able to break contact before it was involved, and to continue the Retreat. Within a fortnight it had crossed the French Frontier, and the Napoleonic attempt upon Spain was at an end.

Soult failed to withstand the increasing pressure, though he took the offensive in an attempt to prevent the great numbers before him from proceeding to invasion. He was unable to maintain his positions in the Basque country. He spent the month of September in attempting to create a force with 30,000 raw recruits drawn from the neighbourhood in the South of France, but in the first fortnight of October was beaten back to the French foothills of the Pyrenees.

Coincidentally with Leipsic and the general breakdown of the Napoleonic scheme came the attack upon such fortified lines in those foothills as Soult had been able to improvise. Wellington, about a month after Leipsic was fought, forced the lines with a heavy loss in artillery (fifty pieces) to his enemies. Soult fell back upon Orthez, where, upon the 27th of February, 1814, he was again defeated with a loss of twelve

guns and 2,000 prisoners. Soult fell back farther upon Toulouse, but by this time the whole of the Napoleonic scheme was ruined. The Mayor of the town declared for the Bourbons, that is, for the invaders, and an indecisive battle, fought on the 10th of April in front of the City with extraordinary tenacity and at a great expense in men was useless, for Napoleon had already abdicated as we have seen—though the news did not reach the South until a few days later.

After the fall of Napoleon, his abdication, and his confinement to the island of Elba (where he was granted a sort of mock sovereignty) the diplomatic rôle of England in the rearrangement of Europe was difficult in the extreme, and upon the whole that rôle was well played. She had to make her claims in the presence of great military powers to whose efforts all the recent successes were due, and she had, in the pursuance of those claims nothing to put forward save her power of granting subsidies (which seemed now to be no longer needed) and her command of the sea (which put pressure upon no one but France, already defeated, and Spain, the people of whom were her special allies). An attempt to bring all the allied Monarchs to London on a visit to the Prince Regent, where it was hoped the English claims could be better presented, failed through the refusal of the Emperor of Austria. The Czar and the King of Prussia came, but nothing was done. At last, in the autumn of the year a Congress met at Vienna, to which Castlereagh was sent, and England's chief success in which was the dividing of the forces of the Allies and the consequent weakening of Russia. She retained Malta in the Mediterranean, the Cape, and

Mauritius. Her great object was so to balance the new arrangement that there might be no unexpected coalition against her trade, and in this she was successful.

Were we here considering European history as a whole, much the most important point for us in all these negotiations would be the proposed reërection of Poland; for upon the Polish Problem, upon the crime of Frederick of Prussia when he seized Poland and upon the consequences and morals of that crime all continental diplomacy has, for now more than a century, ultimately turned. But so far as English history is directly concerned, it hardly regards us.

While these things were still being debated, the startling news was received that Napoleon had escaped from Elba and was going to make one more desperate attempt to recover his power in France—perhaps in Europe. The more the details of the time are read and the various forces opposed to him coördinated, the more is it apparent that the attempt was perfectly useless. All Europe would march against him. Of those who had been his principal lieutenants, some had already betrayed him; every Frenchman of position was in grave doubt as to whether the following of Napoleon in this last adventure might not prove to him his own ruin. What really brought the leaders back, most of them with but a doubtful loyalty, was the spontaneous eagerness of the masses, and particularly of the soldiery. It was determined by the allies, with their immense preponderance in troops and with their justifiable reliance upon the divisions among the wealthier classes at least, of the French, that no terms whatever should be made with the restored Emperor. He was not to

be permitted to rule in France over boundaries now nearly restored to their original limits, nor to be given a moment's respite. Every government in Europe began the concentration of its forces against him.

Those bodies of troops which were most immediately ready lay upon the northeast frontier of France, and consisted in two main divisions, the first that of the Prussian Army under Blücher, the four Corps of which stretched from Liége to Charleroi, and a mixed force of Dutch, Hanoverian, German, Belgian and British troops (the latter forming about 37 per cent. of the whole, under the Duke of Wellington) stretched out in various positions from Charleroi to the sea. Napoleon determined to strike at this, the nearest and the first body of the immense forces that were gathered against him. Even had he succeeded by some miracle in defeating it, he could have accomplished little, for there were now rapidly setting to march against him numbers wholly out of proportion to those that France could still produce.

The Campaign lasted but four days. It was fought by an army counting in strength rather more than half, but less than two-thirds, that of its opponents (the proportion was about 18 to 25). Napoleon's success would entirely depend upon his chances of separating the two halves of the Allied line, and dealing with each separately.

He did work with such unexpected rapidity on the 15th of June, 1815, as to partially effect his object. He defeated the Prussian half at Ligny, but Ney, acting against the Anglo-Dutch half at Quatre Bras, some miles to the West, was unable to push it back,

and with difficulty maintained himself. A whole Corps d'Armée of 20,000 under Erlon failed to appear at either action through a confusion of counter-orders. Through this accident (upon the 16th of June) the defeated Prussians were able to escape, and though Napoleon immediately hurried against the Anglo-Dutch half, which was rapidly retreating under Wellington, it was certain that if the Prussians could effect their junction with it the superiority in numbers would be fatal to the French. They were able to effect that junction and the consequence of it was the Battle of Waterloo.

Wellington's mixed command of British, Dutch, Belgian and German troops halted on the evening of Saturday, the 17th of June, upon a ridge which runs East and West in front of the village of Waterloo. The position was one which Wellington had himself carefully surveyed the year before and which he had determined to be peculiarly serviceable to a defensive action. Napoleon drew up his French line about a mile to the South upon a corresponding ridge and left between the two armies what was to be the battle field of the morrow, a broad and shallow dip of ploughed land, the crops on which were at that moment for the most part of standing corn. Wellington had, of course, no intention of fighting Napoleon as he stood or of jeopardising the whole campaign which was now making so strongly in favour of the Allies. He knew—what Napoleon did not know—that the mass of the Prussian Army having got away after its defeat at Ligny was now close by, a few miles off to the left of the Anglo-Dutch position. There was an understanding between Wellington and Blücher that the Prussian contingents should come upon the field

The
Battle of
Waterloo.

in flank of the French and so decide the action, and Wellington was counting upon the arrival of the Prussians not long after mid-day. It was his business to "hold" the French attack (which commanded superior numbers and a far superior artillery to his own) until the Prussians, of whose presence Napoleon had no suspicion, should suddenly appear upon Napoleon's right and rear and so turn the scale and destroy him. The interest of what follows mainly lies in the fact that the Prussians came up much later than they promised and that Wellington was able, in spite of this delay, to hold his own until his allies could make their presence felt.

The first shots were fired before noon of Sunday, June 18, 1815, but the main attack was not opened until half past one. For four hours the Anglo-Dutch line, ordered under the dispositions of the best defensive General to be found perhaps in military history, withstood the artillery fire and the cavalry charges of the numerically superior French force without breaking; and at the end of the four hours the Prussians, though very late, were already upon the field and making their presence felt. By six o'clock Napoleon's position was doomed. The Prussians were closing in upon his right-rear; he had to detach more and more men to keep off the increasing pressure there, and it was already apparent what the end must be. Critics who have judged his action purely from a military standpoint have said that he should, at this moment, have broken off the action—or rather should have broken it off somewhat earlier and have retired. These critics forget the political circumstance which made retirement impossible to Napoleon. As the sun neared its setting he made one

last and desperate effort to break Wellington's line while yet the Prussians were being delayed by the most vigorous efforts upon his right. He launched what had always been the Reserve of his battles, the old Guard, upon the left centre of the crest which Wellington had occupied all that day. The charge failed. The head of it was broken by a Dutch battery, by the steadiness of British Guards against whom the main attack was delivered, and in particular by the bold hazard taken by Colborne, the commander of the 52d Regiment of the British line. He deliberately left a gap in the defensive position (he did it upon his own initiative), swung his men round so as to be upon the flank of the French Guard and, by fire so directed, destroyed their impetus. At the same moment further bodies of the Prussians appeared upon the northeastern corner of the battlefield and the strain upon the French line, already bent back upon itself, reached the breaking point. Just as day closed, its formation dissolved and the retreat became, in less than half an hour, a rout. Few battles in history have been more complete in their tactical result. The whole mass of the French fled in confusion through the night, pursued by Prussian cavalry. Whatever of that command could at last reform upon French soil was no longer an instrument of war capable of resisting the invaders. Napoleon, hesitating between various equally disastrous issues, decided to trust himself to Great Britain, went on board the *Bellerophon* at Rochefort on the 15th of July, and was imprisoned on the island of St. Helena. He had already abdicated four days after the battle. He died in less than six years afterward.

With the defeat of Napoleon, we come to the end of

the Revolutionary Wars and to the close of the first phase in modern English history.

There remains to be mentioned, before we turn to the second phase in that history, the last fortunes of Ireland.

The first effects of the Union, or at least the most apparent, were economic. Now that Dublin had ceased to be a capital its prosperity rapidly declined and the small class which commanded the rental of Irish land, and even much of the profits of Irish commerce, began to absent itself more and more from the country. At the same time the Union saddled Ireland with an enormous debt and began that system of deliberate overtaxation which was perhaps the most foolish of all the foolish perversions of statesmanship connected with Pitt's blunder. One last attempt at insurrection followed. Its leader was Robert Emmett, who had begun to conspire during the Peace, and whose character—enthusiastic, chivalrous and far too sanguine—was ill-suited for such an enterprise. His plan, oversimple, was merely the seizing of the central offices of government in Dublin. He collected a grossly insufficient quantity of ammunition and of arms in the Winter of 1802-3. He trusted, without any sufficient reason, to an immediate and successful rising in the Provinces if the Government in the capital could be paralysed for a short time. He planned the movement for the month of August. He was, though he did not know it, already betrayed in the early summer, and an explosion in one of his depots of powder in July was a further warning to his opponents. The date of the rising was advanced to the 23d of July; it was made upon a grossly in-

sufficient scale and was a complete failure. It was little more than a very partial and quite undisciplined riot. It was marked by the murder of the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Kilwarden, by a bitter irony one of the very few officials tolerable to the Irish people—for he had tried to save Wolfe Tone. Robert Emmett himself escaped from the disaster that overtook his very small and quite untrained mob of followers; he was ultimately captured, and the story of his arrest is connected with the heroism of his servant, Anne Devlin, who though first tortured and then offered a large bribe, refused to betray her master. Robert Emmett was put to death on the 20th of September, 1803, and with him ends the last effort at organised rebellion.

The remaining years of the period are mainly concerned, so far as they regard the Irish people, with the persistent and unsuccessful struggle for Catholic Emancipation. The policy was supported by Henry Grattan, now a member of the Imperial Parliament, by Lord Fingal, and others of the Irish gentry, both Catholic and Protestant, and, of course, by Charles James Fox. It ignominiously failed in both houses. As for repeal of the Union, though Fox spoke warmly for it in opposition, and though the idea became familiar in the British Parliament from within five years of the Union, no one regarded it then—or regarded it for a lifetime, outside Ireland—as a policy to be contemplated in action. And, though the close of this period sees the beginning of O'Connell's career, the activities of the Irish are still mainly directed toward the apparently hopeless object of securing the political relief of their creed. It should be remembered, however, that O'Connell's first great

speech in favour of repeal, was delivered as early as the month of September, 1810, in the Exchange at Dublin, and that the Catholic Committee, which had begun to take the leadership of the nation, stood indirectly for the reëstablishment of a National Irish Government as well as for the emancipation of its co-religionists.

But these last dozen years of our period are in the main a lull in the story of Ireland. They correspond to a moment when the national energies were sunk or crushed under the reaction from unsuccessful armament, the memories of twenty years of tragic disappointment and despair.

PART II.

1815-1910.

INTRODUCTION TO PART II.

THE second part of this volume, in completion of Lingard's History, deals with the course of events in Great Britain and her Dependencies from the Fall of Napoleon to the end of the reign of Edward VII.

This second division of my subject I shall treat—until I near its close—in a different way from the first.

In describing the eighteenth century and its sequel, the Great War, I was following with my readers an unmistakable piece of national development, the characteristics of which are now clearly ascertainable, the actors in which though open to debate are sufficiently removed from us to permit of judgment in defence or in support of their actions. We can also, in the case of that period of one hundred and twenty-seven years, apportion the effect of a man upon his time and trace, because it lies sufficiently far behind us, the historical landscape, the due proportion in which events lie one to the other.

With the nineteenth century it is not so. It is here necessary, if one desires to write impartially, to do little more than set down—far more briefly—the main facts in their order and to catalogue what has seemed important to contemporaries, particularly those fortunes of the political world and of Parliamentary government, though a remote posterity may discover these to be of less moment in the history of the nation than they seem to us.

Again, the characters involved in the relation of these events are too near us for a generally acceptable judgment to be pronounced upon them. I do not mean that a man may not intelligently judge and strongly judge the rights and the wrongs of them; but I mean that his judgment must necessarily have a speculative tinge unfitted to such a text-book as this, because it is not yet possible to deliver a judgment based on known results. There is still too much doubt upon the ultimate effect of their action, while many men still living continue to debate the motives and the decisions of the men we are about to deal with.

Considering that the first years of this period are now nearly a century past, such a precaution may seem extravagant, but it must be remembered that the more active political life of the time, and the modern development which more nearly concerns us, do not begin until several years after Waterloo. It is with the Reform Bill of 1832, with the political movements immediately succeeding it, and with the accession of Queen Victoria five years later, that the main part of this modern section unfolds itself.

Now those years are still comprised within living memory, and one who has heard, as I have from my elders, so much of these matters described and discussed as personal and even acute reminiscences, hesitates to record an historical judgment, and does better to confine himself to narrative.

On this account I have attempted in this second part of the book to preserve little more than order and proportion in the record. I have given to each subsection its marginal title in aid of the lucidity I have attempted to achieve, and I have concerned myself rather with a *précis* of events which shall be accurate in date and consecutive in the due measure of their importance than with a wider or more profound survey.

It is the more necessary, as I have confined this second part to such strict limits of mere political record, that I should present in an introduction to the reader certain main features of the changing national scene upon the background of which the political drama was played.

The first feature to be seized in the story of nineteenth century England, in the story of what is often and not inaccurately called "The Victorian Period" of English History, is one whose various aspects are variously described as the expansion of the Empire, the gradual segregation of the British Commonwealth from the European comity of nations, the Long Peace, the advance of material prosperity, the transformation of Great Britain from an aristocratic and agricultural to a capitalist and urban society—but which may all be summarised in the phrase, "the industrial phase" of our history.

I shall here deal with these various aspects in their turn, premising that all depend upon that one capital and fundamental point, namely the achievement by Great Britain, at the end of two hundred years of development, of a State

whose every action is based upon a commercial interest. In other words, this period will undoubtedly stand out in history in much the same way that did the position of Venice in the fifteenth century or, though it is so little known, the position of Carthage before the Punic Wars. Great Britain, during the period we are about to follow—some-what more than the long lifetime of a man—became and remained a State engaged in the production of wealth for exchange and in the exchange of wealth upon a commission for others, and a State which so regarded this as its principal object that nearly all other activities in the commonwealth were subordinated to it.

The numerical test of this expansion in wealth and in commercial activity is sufficiently remarkable and discovers, I think, no parallel in the history of the world where old and settled nations are concerned. If we consider the Protestant civilisation of Great Britain alone and exclude for the moment any consideration of Ireland we find such figures as these: A population multiplied by *more than three* in that comparatively short space of years, the revenue at the disposal of the Government and of public authorities by a similar multiple, or to be accurate, by a somewhat larger one, by nearly four; the tonnage of mercantile vessels registered in British Ports by a still larger multiple, four and one-half; the imports which (and not the exports) are the test of national wealth, by the gigantic multiple of twenty. This last item must not be taken, as it too often is, for an index of prosperity. But it is so closely connected with this expansion of Great Britain as a commercial State that its astonishing growth must always be remembered when we are considering the transition between the England of the eighteenth century and the England of to-day.

If we attempt from the midst of such figures (available to us in innumerable detail and capable with industry of almost unlimited analysis) to appreciate whether there has been an actual growth in wealth and if so to what an extent, we shall find the answer to the first of the questions simple enough, to the second more difficult. There has undoubtedly been an increase in the wealth per head of the inhabitants of Great Britain, apart from the increase in wealth per head of their white dependencies. The measure of national wealth is the total amount of economic values consumable

within a community over a certain space of time, as a year. It is not what the nation produces, for that may be drained away as interest or tribute or wasted investment. It is not what the nation consumes, for it need not consume all it has by way of national income; it can save and does usually save a part. If we apply the test of objects in common usage of clothing, of food, of vehicles for transport, of fuel, we shall discover that the multiple of British wealth during the period under review is certainly larger than the multiple indicating the increase of population.

But, as I have said, it is far more difficult to establish the multiple than to predicate in general that it is greater than a multiple of four. Thus, if we take the statistics of internal production, subtract therefrom the statistics of export and add the statistics of import, we do not, as might be imagined, arrive at even a rough estimate of the total national income. For of import a very large proportion consists in material to which economic values are added by work within the island and which are then re-exported. Again, in the statistics of production it is inevitable that many forms of economic value should be counted twice over. This is notably the case in the metal trades, but it is an element of error present in every kind of statistics of production.

The only test of total national income which would be really accurate would be a list of the articles passing in retail commerce directly to the consumer—and this is not possibly obtainable. But we may make a rough estimate and say that in terms of articles of ordinary consumption—building materials, vehicles and engines of transport, food, clothing, fuel—which are the great bulk of all national wealth—Great Britain is per head perhaps a third better off than her population was at the beginning of the period under review: that is in 1815.

Meanwhile, another test of national prosperity far more real than the statistical average of consumable values tells a different and less pleasing story. The *distribution* of wealth went steadily from bad to worse during the whole of this period until, at the end of it, with the death of Queen Victoria and the accession of her son, you find certainly one-third of the population condemned to a standard below that which is required even by the inhuman administration of the Poor Law. Of this mal-distribution, which

goes from bad to worse throughout the period of commercial expansion under review, there are innumerable and conclusive tests. It can be proved by these that the mass of Englishmen grew poorer and poorer during the nineteenth century.

The first and most immediate test is the consumption of wheat. The poorer a population with the habits of the English proletariat becomes, the more is wheat the staple of its food, while the wealthier classes consume less wheat per head than the poor. At the same time the great mass of destitute poor never obtain a sufficiency of bread, and bread is the great item in their weekly budget. It is evident from this combination of circumstances that the consumption of wheat in such a country as England is a very exact test of the distribution of wealth. Now, judged by this test, we find that less wheat was consumed per head at the end of Queen Victoria's reign than at the beginning of the period. There was a drop of 15 per cent. And even this striking and ominous piece of national statistics is worse than it seems for two reasons. First, it means a real decrease of over 20 per cent. because both the much higher birth-rate and death-rate of a century ago meant a much larger proportion of infants to the total population. Secondly the drop has occurred *while wheat was getting cheaper*.

Again, to take another test, fortunes considered very large in the beginning of the period seem moderate among the wealthy classes at the end of it. Accumulations in the neighbourhood of a million pounds in value, rare to an extreme in the earlier part of the period, are to be counted by the score and even by the hundred at the end of it.* This concentration of wealth into few hands is, of course, quite separate from the growth of wealth as a whole and is neither a test nor a consequence of it. By far the greater part of great fortunes in the hands of a few citizens represent a corresponding diminution of wealth among millions of their fellows. Thus the enormous increase in the revenues of the great urban landlords corresponds exactly to a vastly greater tribute paid as rent by those liv-

* The average of estates over three-quarters of a million passing at death in any one year is now over *twenty*. Allowing as little as twenty for our multiple of yearly deaths, this gives us four hundred such fortunes. The total number is far higher, for our politicians wink at considerable evasion and the true multiple is also nearer thirty.

ing upon their land, and this tribute increases out of all proportion to the total production of wealth upon that land. But if the most conclusive test of all be required it is at once furnished by the modern statistics of housing. Whole families are herded by the million into single rooms, by the hundred thousand into one room shared by two or more families. This state of affairs in the towns is the touchstone of the ruin that had fallen upon the foundations of English society, while the less important and less cruel but almost equally significant conditions of rural housing tell the same tale. It is certainly discovered with the end of the nineteenth century that to build a cottage for the agricultural labourer is no longer remunerative at the rent the agricultural labourer can afford to pay. This economic statement put into plain English means that the rural population has at last become too poor to afford house room. No comparison between nominal wages paid in the countryside at the beginning and at the end of the period can affect the vivid significance of such a social fact as that; and the truth is that these nominal wages which statisticians of the urban sort draw up and compare tell one next to nothing of the real conditions of the English countryside. At the beginning of the period with which I am dealing, the English peasant though already dispossessed for the most part of capital and land of his own, still had by local custom a number of additions to his income which do not appear in official lists. The Commons though already largely enclosed were more used by him; wood was more freely at his service; his keeping of swine and fowls was easier and more encouraged and, most important of all, the local government he suffered was that of men who condemned him to no further poverty. His children were not taken from him; they were an aid. His customs of living were approved and the co-operative side of village life was still, though dwindling, in existence.

With the mention of the agricultural labourer we are led to a consideration of the revolution whereby this commercial development of England involved her total inversion from being what she had been for so many centuries, a State composed mainly of many thousand villages, to becoming what she is now, a State composed almost entirely of a few large towns.

The transition of England from an agricultural to an

urban society is the next aspect of this great change which we must examine and which must be borne in mind during all our perusal of political events in the nineteenth century.

Let us note at the outset of this that the change through which England went in this respect is quite without precedent in the history of Europe. Those who ascribe, by a false philosophy, the effects of history to material causes alone, have some excuse for their error when they consider such a phenomenon as this.

Here is a people all of whose traditions and institutions were bound up in a peculiar fashion with the tillage of the soil and with life upon the countryside. The English towns, prosperous and active from the earliest ages, were, even the largest of them, London, within daily reach of the fields; and the recreation of their citizens was largely a recreation of the fields. Their institutions were domestic and local. The national tone of England was the tone given by the villages. The type of Englishman recognised as representative of the nation was the English yeoman; English speech is positively constructed upon agricultural experience; the measures of length peculiar to the English (not those common to all Europe such as the foot, the inch, the pound, the ounce, the ell, etc.) were agricultural in origin. The English furlong is the furrow-long. The English unit of assessment was the farm. The English smaller coinage was based upon the plough-team. The English acre was the day's plough work. The English perch was the goad; the bushel, what a man could easily lift of wheat—and so forth. The most of all intimate English domestic things go back thus to the land.

There was more than this. That chief of all events in English history, the Reformation, had at first but accentuated this agricultural character in the English state. The squire, that is, the lord of one village, became through the Reformation the standing unit of English political life. He and his fellows made up the national council and counted more there than the merchant by far. The Upper House of Parliament was based almost entirely upon the land: the Lower House mainly upon the land. The Magistracy was in the hands of these squires. Local peasant custom dictated the most of its decisions. The Englishman was the breeder of horses for Europe, and of sheep.

The English market towns gave the form to English architecture through their churches and their private houses: to English education through their grammar schools.

All this the nineteenth century destroyed—but it destroyed it slowly. Until well past the middle of the nineteenth century, until the middle, one may say, of Queen Victoria's reign, the larger part of Englishmen were still country-bred. Those soldiers of the Crimean War and those white contingents which suffered and achieved so much in India were, when they were not of Irish race, for the most part English peasant in recruitment. The peasant drink, ale, was the national drink; the peasant sports were the national sports; and largely still the peasant character was the national character. But all during the nineteenth century the towns were gaining; until at last by the gradual heaping up in the one scale and the gradual taking from the other the beam of the balance turned and the town outweighed the village. It was in the late sixties that this preponderance first became abnormal. Twenty years later it had stamped the whole of English life with its character. By the end of Queen Victoria's reign the villages were but a small fringe of the national life and all that which had been England had become either a pleasure-ground or a place for careful and exceptional experiment, or a museum, or a field of decay. The squires were now townsmen whose country houses were places of retreat as much as places of residence. Information was from the towns through a few great newspapers; the manifold schemes of governmental experiment in laws that should regulate the schooling of the masses and all their domestic habits were urban experiments. The emigration from England had become an urban emigration and, what is vastly important, the recruiting of the insufficient military force of the country had become an urban recruitment.

By the end of the process the Englishman, whose whole tradition and inherited mode of being was an agricultural thing, found himself living under conditions as novel as they were distasteful to his genius. The urban accent in speech, the urban experience of complete dependence upon mysterious external uncontrolled forces that order the life of the poor in great towns, the urban grinding of humanity to dust with no relations between the various parts of society, these had triumphed.

The towns thus dominating at last were not, most unfortunately, political units. They were not informed by a true local spirit; they did not act with any spiritual homogeneity or corporate pride. They were but areas of land built over with factories and the mean dwellings of those whose manual labour enriched the manufacturer. Many of them, especially about the mining and railway centres, might be compared to camps of which the ephemeral buildings took the place of tents. Some were actually migratory. All were without roots.

The whole business has been a change of environment as rapid and as universal as it has been profound. If we except the Scotch Highlands and the Welsh Hills we shall find that to-day out of a hundred British families ninety take their tone and more than eighty actually take their sustenance from these huge amorphous agglomerations of urban life. The artificial and central provision of water and light and even heat supply has become the only provision of which most men can take account. The fulness of personal experience in immediate things, in varied tasks, in an acquaintance with direct political superiors and in all that is the health of agricultural man is lost altogether; and the Englishman who, at the beginning of the transition in 1815, was still using with knowledge the terms in sport and horsemanship and climate and domestic life which English literature has made famous, was, at the end of the period, in 1910, using those terms as literary expressions alone, with no relation to his actual and physical experience.

The process was masked by the strong affection of the wealthy who were of good lineage for their ancestral traditions and by the affectation of those without lineage for the adoption or mimicry of the old country customs.

But the heart of the matter was gone; the populace had forgotten the countryside.

With this vast change, or rather (as I have called it) revolution in the structure of British life, went three very important things.

First in time as perhaps in importance we note the decay of that aristocratic organisation of the State which the Reformation had established, which had lent such strength to English political adventure and which seemed in a sort necessary, when all democratic tradition was

dead and monarchical power as well), to the health of the State.

Next note the capturing of the masses by a network of official administration and of police control, the like of which is quite unknown elsewhere in Europe, and the degree of which, in the last stages of the process, as we now watch them, seem in their excess abnormal to the point of disaster. Here, again, the contrast is violent. Within living memory the poor Englishman was freer from regulation by State order, escaping State control more than any other man in Christendom. To-day he is far less free—if freedom be so defined—than any other man in Christendom. And the test of this enormous truth for those who may still doubt it is the fact that the control to which he is subject has not only proved itself independent of what used to be called “public opinion” but that this “public opinion” has itself virtually disappeared. One may put it thus: There is no law imposed by five or six men, powerful enough with Government to suggest it, which would not be universally obeyed below a certain level of income. Or, in other words, no reaction against such arbitrary imposition is apparent in the proletariat of English State to-day. The Administration does not watch for the symptoms of such reaction, still less dread them. It is believed, and probably with justice, that no such reactions are now spiritually possible below the wealthier classes in England.

Thirdly, and as a consequence directly proceeding from this last administrative aspect of the great change, the division of Englishmen into a Capitalist minority and a proletarian majority is not only achieved in practice beyond anything apparent in any other industrial country, but is rapidly taking effect in the new laws regulating labour and tending directly toward a twofold end: The achievement of security in employment and in subsistence for the proletarian majority, coupled with the control of their labour by positive law and their compulsion to it for the profit of the few.

I will deal with these three typical developments of the English nineteenth century in their order.

That aristocratic conception of the State, which I insisted upon so continually in the first part of this book, remains the fundamental conception of the English people. Of democratic habits in their public life there is less than

in that of any other European nation; and, what is of greater importance, there is less appetite for it. The nation not only exacts but demands in its every organ that public affairs shall be the business of a governing class. But the aristocratic organisation necessary to give expression to such a political nature is now in full decay, with the result of confusion in the national plans and of a recently rapid loss of moral authority in the government of the commonwealth.

The aristocratic character of government was lost during the nineteenth century in a process of acceleration such as is commonly observed in all political decay.

For the first fifty years, till about 1866, the process was very slow and hardly noticeable; in the next twenty-five till, say, 1890—it had begun to appear to the eyes of at least acute observers; in the last twenty-five it has been quite obvious, and latterly exceedingly rapid.

This loss of aristocratic tradition is closely connected with all the other phenomena that I have noted as marking the fundamental transformation of English society between the years succeeding Waterloo and the present day. It is particularly closely connected with the change which has turned England from a rural into an urban polity.

The first step was that the characteristic difference between the middle-class commercial fortune with the social habits attached to it, and the great landed fortunes of the aristocracy with the habits attached to these, disappeared. It was no longer a case of the aristocracy recruiting itself—as it had for two centuries—from new men who had made money in commerce or industry; it was not a case of amalgamation. The distinctive marks of that small aristocratic body of the past, notably the duel, disappeared. Another striking mark of it—that its strength lay in South England—also passed. The wealth created by the energy and with the metals and coal of North England gradually preponderated. The very distinctive note of aristocracy—that an aristocratic class lives in continual communion with the people—disappeared in the same fashion and was replaced by that mercantile habit (derived from the North of England manufacturer) of segregating and as it were fortifying the rich from and against the mass of the poor. The old conversation of all classes, which was the life of aristocratic England, came at last to linger only in the country habits

of the squires, and even there it has latterly lost most of its vigour. In the towns the rich and poor lived apart.

Of all the effects of such a loss in the aristocratic spirit none is stronger than that apparent in Parliament. The House of Commons has lost its authority of recent years, the House of Lords its dignity, popularity and power, mainly through this cause. Not that the membership of these has sunk in lineage or in wealth, but that they have lost the aristocratic tradition of sacrifice, of communion with the people and of corporate pride.

In this revolution the example of the United States, especially since the Civil War, has been of great effect. Their democratic creed has made, one may say, no impress at all upon the mind of England; but the great industrial fortunes of the new countries, their vastly increased prosperity and numbers, have powerfully affected the thought of the small, dominating wealthy class of Britain, and has had no little part in the decay, now nearly consummated, of the aristocratic spirit.

Of this decay there are a great many evidences. A man having accumulated sufficient wealth and having purchased for himself a peerage* or some other distinction is no longer as anxious as he was to put on the traditional manners and to speak in the traditional accent of a gentleman. At the same time you do not find such conventional marks as lineage, a certain breeding, or a wide acquaintance with the descendants of the old governing class to command the attention they once did. A simple example of this is apparent in the marriage of such men and women as belong to that class but are impoverished. Their social habit no longer attracts an alliance at all, and even so clear a mark as a title of antiquity will, if it is not combined with wealth, have an effect on foreigners far greater than that which it has upon those accustomed to the modern English life. You see the same thing in the elevation of men to administrative posts, notably to the two Front Benches, as they are called; that is, the close ring of politicians who nominate

* One of the methods of acquiring a Peerage, that is, hereditary legislative power in the House of Lords, in modern England is by Purchase. It is perhaps the commonest method. A sum of money, varying inversely with the public position and worth of the applicant, is paid privately to the politicians, and hereditary legislative power is granted against such payment. The custom has been of long growth and is now fully established (1913).

themselves to office and co-opt their successors. Admission to this ring is no longer claimed as a right or even mainly obtained, as was the case for so long, through a connection with the older gentry. It is obtained either by purchase on the part of wealthy men, or by their nomination of poor but serviceable men who have been dependent upon them; and of this modern English politics will show many examples.

It is coincident with this breakdown of the aristocratic spirit in the organisation of the State and in the tone of administration that England has developed in the course of the nineteenth century, and particularly toward its close, a highly organised police system which controls the mass of the populace far more severely and thoroughly than is to be discovered elsewhere in the world.

Of this novel and startlingly complete phenomenon in English life many examples might be given. The most striking, perhaps, are the statistical examples whereby one may see how much smaller the proportion of those who escape or react against the innumerable forms of compulsion exercised upon the mass of the nation are compared with similar numbers in other countries. The complete record which the police are always able to produce of a poor man's movements is another instance. A particular case which the foreign non-English reader will note with amazement and which is perhaps the most instructive of all, may be quoted in conclusion. Every child of proletarian origin upon leaving the elementary school in which his attendance is compulsory is, by the new administrative system, to have his character and habits docketed without notice being given to the parents, and this useful information is to be privately distributed through the new government agencies to the employers of labour.

This brings me to the third of the phenomena I am emphasizing, the rapid approach of modern England to a legal distinction between the owning or Capitalist class and the non-owning or Proletarian class: this distinction being, of course, a step toward the establishment of compulsory labour for the latter, coupled with a social organisation which shall guarantee them secure employment and a sufficiency of food, clothing and house room.

The phrase "of course," which I have used in this last sentence, may seem to many paradoxical. And indeed it

is not the intention of those who have legislated so rapidly during the last few years in England to establish compulsory labour. It is rather their object to stave off a crisis which threatens from the insecurity and insufficiency of the mass of Englishmen and from the discontent which is almost co-extensive with the huge proletarian majority.

Nevertheless the whole tendency, subconscious though it is, is toward the establishment of compulsory labour in Great Britain. Short of influences from outside such as might come from a great Continental War, or from the now rapidly proceeding rehabilitation of the Irish people, we shall at no very distant date have compulsory labour established as a rule and coupled with institutions guaranteeing a greater measure of well-being and above all of security for the proletarian class. The steps toward this change are not resented by the mass of the workers and are warmly applauded by the majority of those great Capitalists, who now more or less directly arrange public affairs. Such an end seems to be the natural term of modern English political development.

While all this was proceeding within the island of Great Britain—the enormous increase of population, the corresponding increase of wealth, the decline of the old aristocratic spirit, the transformation of England from a rural to an urban State, the growth of a vast and closely organised police control over the mass of the people—at last the appearance upon the political horizon of compulsory labour—the extension of areas over which the British Crown both really and nominally ruled, and the sphere of what is loosely called “The Empire,” continually increased, until, by the end of the period, the expansion had reached a point after which its further development seemed perilous and the instinct of self-preservation called a halt.

This movement cannot but be of considerable effect upon the history of the world, but it will be of much greater effect upon that of Britain itself.

In the first place the distinctively British element in the Colonies has progressively diminished. There is a large element of Irish blood, of French descent, of Dutch and even of German. Of the three divisions, Canadian, South African and Australasian, into which the white population of the British Dependencies is best divided, the latter alone, and in particular New Zealand, is still preponderat-

ingly British in blood. But apart from the question of race these communities became, especially in the latter part of the nineteenth century, more and more autonomous, until to-day they count in the various forces of the world as independent nations. The British Government is still responsible, nominally at least, for their defence against aggression and for their international relations. But whenever the reality of this arrangement is put to the test it will be discovered that there is no coercive power left in the central organ. England may indeed be involved in a Colonial quarrel, it is the chief anxiety of her statesmen to-day, but she has neither produced nor attempted to produce, nor at bottom desired to produce, such a system of united government as would bring the strength of these scattered communities into line for any common purpose. It is now too late for any experiment of the sort to be considered; and it is remarkable that when it was desired to use the armed forces of the dependencies (for the first and perhaps the last time), these were hired at the cost of the Mother Country upon terms hitherto unprecedented in warfare. They were required for use against other Colonials in South Africa, but even so they could only be drawn from the English-speaking portions of these heterogeneous dominions. The last example of this process of disintegration was the arrest without trial and the ignominious expulsion by force from South Africa of certain British subjects, whose political ideas were objectionable to the local Dutch and the Jewish mine owners. It was debated in the British Cabinet whether or no this insult should be at least protested against; but, after the manifest reluctance of Parliament to intervene, the action was allowed and the complete independence of the South African States thereby established.

Meanwhile, though the white colonies became virtually independent to the increasing though secret embarrassment of England, the perfection of what is called "Crown" Government—that is, direct and arbitrary rule exercised over Asiatic or African races—developed as rapidly and to the great advantage of English power and commerce.

The Great Indian Dependency is, of course, all that need be considered in this department. The rest is both numerically and as an increment of wealth insignificant. With India England has what has always been known to

mankind as "an Empire"; without India the term would be an empty one. The Protectorate exercised over Egypt is in the nature of a commission receivable upon a large percentage for the collection of interest or tribute from that country, which is payable in the main not to English subjects or to men resident in England, but to European financiers, principally French in origin; while the scattered islands and the half-savage tropical African areas are but negligible portions of the whole.

As might be expected from the nature of the relations between the two countries, the story of Ireland during the period under review has been an exact contrast to that of Britain. The first part of the period, which was marked by so vast an expansion of English commerce and population, was marked in Ireland by the great famine and the subsequent and tragic expatriation of more than half the race. The increasing perils which English society has recently suffered, correspond precisely to a recrudescence of strength and of national sentiment in Ireland. The disappearance of a peasantry from England, and the turning of Englishmen into a proletarian and urban populace, has gone step by step with the resurrection of the Irish peasantry and the long-delayed but rapid increase of rural prosperity in Ireland.

Most important of all the coercive police restriction which is the special mark of modern England among European nations and the power of a small, wealthy class, exercised through the Law Courts, has been in Ireland exactly reversed. The interests of capitalism in that island has, in proportion to the power of national sentiment, found itself progressively weakened and the host of edicts controlling domestic life and enforceable in England by an universal police rule, have in Ireland failed. This is noticeably true of the last experiments in these matters, and it is possible that the future will see this process of contrast crowned by the establishment of a national executive in Ireland and of central self-government. Local self-government the Irish achieved at the close of their first successful struggle a generation ago; national self-government is already prepared at the moment of writing these lines, has been approved at Westminster and, in spite of the modern unreality and folly of political debates in that place, will probably under the threat of further Irish action

be conceded. For it must be remembered that since the last Land Act public credit is not insignificantly bound up with Irish support, while the great money-lenders who were the backbone of the old agrarian oppression in Ireland and of the "Unionist" policy, have now been largely satisfied out of the pockets of the English taxpayer.

With these general considerations in view we can proceed to the details of English political history during the nineteenth century, remembering always that the events recorded are passing upon a stage itself continually moving and subject to the prodigious change which I have here detailed as a necessary preface: the peril and subsequent resurrection of Ireland; the rapid expansion in wealth and commerce, followed by the approaching peril of the English polity; its transformation from a rural to an urban condition; the decline and loss of its old aristocratic characteristic; the enregimentation and efficient coercion of the mass of its population in the interests of organized capital; finally the advent or at least the promise of a society which shall have reached its term and the full effects of the Reformation after four hundred years in the permanent and secure re-establishment of economic conditions, which, by whatever terms the process may be marked, shall be in essence senile.

CHAPTER VI.

FROM 1815-1822.

THE ten years which followed the Battle of Waterloo may broadly be said to cover in Europe the efforts of the Allied Sovereigns to maintain inviolate the settlement of Vienna and especially to crush all attempts to revive the democratic principles of the Revolution, and in England the attempt of the Tory Government which had brought the Great War to a triumphant conclusion to perpetuate its rule in time of peace as against the rising hostility of the populace and of the greater part of the middle class.

The Allies entered Paris on July 7, 1815. In September of the same year the Emperor Alexander, now the strongest of European Sovereigns, issued the characteristic manifesto which called upon the Sovereigns of Europe to enter into a Holy Alliance for the right ordering of the affairs of Europe. Alexander had in him a great deal of the mystic, and the phraseology in which he set forth his scheme designed "to give a lofty satisfaction to Divine Providence" was characteristic of this restless but sincerely religious man. It certainly would not have suited the other leaders of the Reaction. Metternich called it "a loud sounding nothing," and Castlereagh "a piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense." But, however unsuited Alexander's dreams of founding a new and permanent European System on the basis of religion

The Holy
Alliance.

might be to an age in which religion was still almost at its lowest ebb, there were other aspects of the scheme which appeared more acceptable; and however little interested Metternich and Castlereagh might be in the "lofty satisfaction of Divine providence," they were by no means unwilling to take the Emperor's hint and form a League for the defence of privilege throughout Europe.

The Emperor of Austria and the Prince Regent sent sympathetic replies to Alexander's communication and expressed approval of his aims, and on November 20, 1815, the Quadruple Treaty between Russia, Austria, Prussia and Great Britain, embodying Alexander's practical proposals for the regulation of the affairs of Europe by its crowned heads, deprived of the mystical base on which he had founded it, was signed at Paris. The Ministers of the four Powers agreed to confer from time to time on all events that might occur in France or in Europe, to advise the French Government when advice might be needed, and to support each other in maintaining the arrangements made at Vienna. For the better security of the objects of the new League a portion of the Allied Army remained quartered on French soil.

The fruits of the new policy were soon apparent. When Napoleon was making his last struggle against the Coalition of Sovereigns which finally wore him down, many of these Sovereigns had promised free institutions to their people so soon as the French yoke had been thrown off. But the three great despotic Powers of Eastern Europe looked with the utmost suspicion and dislike upon these promises, and were fully resolved that they should not be fulfilled.

They knew very well that the principles of the Revolution though defeated in arms had had time during the supremacy of Napoleon to strike root throughout Europe. They were not prepared to run risks. Under pressure from the Holy Alliance the liberal pledges of the Princes were withdrawn, and Absolutism was virtually established by international guarantee over the whole continent. The Carlsbad Decrees, promulgated at the instigation of Metternich in 1818, received official sanction at the Congress of Troppau in 1820. They were openly directed against any claim on the part of a people to have any voice in its mode of Government. Their promulgation marks the full triumph of the Holy Alliance.

In Germany no armed resistance was offered to the Reaction; but it was otherwise with the Romance-speaking nations, upon whom the doctrines of the Revolution had naturally taken the strongest hold. It was not long before the wide-spread and successful popular insurrections broke out in Naples, in Piedmont, in Portugal and in Spain; insurrections which challenged the Alliance to action and compelled the Sovereigns once more to call upon their armed forces for the suppression of democracy.

Meanwhile in England, where the revolutionary armies had never penetrated, the state of public feeling was in the highest degree menacing. The long struggle in Ireland for Catholic Emancipation, which had begun some twenty years before and was to last through another decade, constitutes a story which must be told in its proper place. But during the period which immediately followed the close of the war, England appeared fully as turbulent and discontented as Ireland. Distress was general and intense.

The State
of England.

Such distress was no doubt in part attributable to the long war and the heavy taxation which it had involved, but a far deeper and more potent cause was to be found in the economic revolution which had been effected by the small rich class which had governed the country since 1689. The confiscation of what was left of the property of the peasantry by legislation, of which the Enclosure Acts are typical, had been ruthlessly carried forward throughout the eighteenth century. During the years of the war the expropriators had been especially active. The peasants everywhere lost their commons and with them their chance of making an independent living on the land. They were forced to part with their holdings to the great landlords, and thus a determining part of them became proletarian. The process thus launched grew of course, as the century proceeded, and within a lifetime English agriculture had largely become a piece of capitalist exploitation, comparable to, though less severe than, that of the new great towns.

We have already seen how those remarkable mechanical inventions which marked the end of the eighteenth century had produced an industrial revolution which, coming upon a society where nearly all wealth was already in the hands of a small rich class, produced inevitably at once a great expansion in industry and its organisation on capitalist lines. This in its turn drew the dispossessed of the countryside into the towns which were everywhere arising and created an urban proletariat whose distress was even keener than the distress of the rural areas.

Both in town and country there was resistance; but the whole power of the state was on the side of the rich. The riots and rick burnings of the peasants

were put down and punished with the utmost cruelty by the same men who had already dispossessed the peasantry and who monopolised the judiciary as they did the legislature. The workmen of the towns gave more prolonged trouble. The first Trade Unions date from about this time. They were, of course, outlawed and persecuted. They were declared to be, in the eyes of the law, conspiracies in restraint of trade, and when the common law failed newer and sharper laws were framed and put into force against them.

But in the main the aspirations of the urban workman took a political turn. The fierce and magnificent journalism of Cobbett had stirred them powerfully, and a number of able Radical agitators, of whom "Orator" Hunt is perhaps the best known, had taught them to attribute their sufferings to class rule and to demand political enfranchisement as their remedy.

Toward such manifestations the policy of the Government was frankly coercionist. Lord Liverpool was Prime Minister. His Foreign Secretary and the most powerful member of his Cabinet was Castlereagh. His Home Secretary was Henry Addington, Lord Sibthorpe. None of these men had anything to offer to the populace but repression.

But the end of the war had effected not a little change in the attitude of the middle class. This class had in the main hated and feared the Jacobins. They had hated and feared Napoleon. From such motives they had acquiesced both in aristocratic government and in the drastic restrictions of personal liberty. But they had never liked these things, and the overthrow of Napoleon seemed to take away their essential justification. An increasing body of middle class

opinion began to lean to liberal ideas and even to look with disfavour upon the means taken by the Government to suppress the populace.

Disturbances began almost as soon as the last shot had been fired at Waterloo. They reached dangerous proportions in the Winter of 1816—a time of exceptional distress. On December 2d of that year a crowd assembled at Spa Fields, in London, under the direction of two prominent Radicals, Watson and Thistlewood, and marched on the Royal Exchange. There was wild talk, probably encouraged by the Government, of an imminent insurrection, but the crowd was easily dispersed and the Radical leaders arrested. Hunt summoned another meeting for the 10th of February and again the alarm became general.

Sibthorpe and Castlereagh met the situation by a series of sharp enactments, suspending (upon March 3, 1817) the Habeas Corpus Act and giving to magistrates the most arbitrary powers.

These acts, though they passed through both houses by a large majority, failed to achieve their purpose of suppressing popular demonstrations. In August, 1819, on the 16th of that month, a great meeting was held in Peterloo, near Manchester. Some 50,000 men and women attended it in a fashion peaceful enough. It was determined none the less by the authorities to disperse it by force, and troops, including a detachment of Yeomanry, were sent to that end. The soldiers charged the crowd and only after some bloodshed succeeded in their purpose. The incident which was called, ironically, “The Battle of Peterloo,” roused the anger of many who had no particular sympathy with democratic opinions.

In spite of the increasing unpopularity which it was incurring, the Government resolved on a further extension of its repressive policy. Not four months after Peterloo, and while the public mind was still strongly moved by that event, Castlereagh introduced the famous "Six Acts," aimed not only at the right of public meeting but at the liberty of the Press and, indeed, at all forms of popular protest. These also passed readily through Parliament; even the Whigs, many of whom had now become alarmed at the spread of democratic opinions, scarcely ventured to criticise them.

One more overt outbreak of popular discontent took place in another part of the United Kingdom. Throughout the long struggle with what was called Jacobinism, the Scotch had always leaned more to Radical, and even to Republican ideals, than the English. Under the old system the Scotch were represented in Parliament in a fashion grossly inadequate, and their protest had been put down by Pitt and Dundas with a severity that even they had not exercised in England. A penal code harsher than the English had been stretched to its utmost against the "Blacknebs," as they were called, and the Scotch critic of the Government had reason to be thankful if he was only thrown into prison and not sent for the rest of his life to consort with felons at Botany Bay. On April 2, 1820, a considerable part of the working population of Glasgow and its neighbourhood rose in something like an insurrection. They were, however, suppressed by the military, after a conflict which was somewhat exaggeratedly called "The Battle of Bonneymuir."

While the English Government thus succeeded for

Continental
Revolu-
tions.

the moment in breaking the opposition of the populace in England, the aspect of foreign affairs became again threatening.

The Quadruple Alliance had been secretly renewed after the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, of 1818, which Castlereagh attended in person; and the adhesion of the Bourbon Government in France had been secured to its policy. In 1820 that policy was challenged in the Romance-speaking States. A mutiny of troops at Cadiz, in July, 1819, led in the following January to a general revolution in Spain. Portugal followed suit, and in July the people of Naples and Sicily rose in rebellion and forced their sovereign to grant a free Constitution; while a concerted movement, organised by a secret society known as the Carbonari, took place in Piedmont.

The Allies met in Congress at Troppau to concert measures for dealing with the situation.

It soon appeared that they were no longer unanimous. Metternich and Alexander were for the immediate suppression of the Italian insurgents by the sword, and the Bourbons were eager to restore the full prerogatives of their family in Spain; but Castlereagh, though he condemned the action of the Neapolitans as "wanton and unprovoked," had no mind to accept personal responsibility. He was certainly no friend to popular liberties, but he probably realised that English opinion—even the opinion of the wealthy—would be decidedly hostile to a mere crusade on behalf of Absolutism such as his allies were anxious to undertake. England therefore stood officially aloof from the military movements that followed.

The parties to the alliance acted vigorously. An Austrian Army completely broke the popular resist-

ance both in Naples and Piedmont, and throughout Italy Absolutism was everywhere restored. Spain still remained to be dealt with; and it was notorious that Louis XVIII., ready to move against the new government in that country, was only waiting until he could ascertain precisely what degree of countenance he could expect from his allies.

On January 29, 1820, the old King, George III., died after having been for many years incapable of exercising the functions of royalty. The Prince Regent, who was already King in all but name, succeeded him under the title of George IV., and the event would probably have left the course of politics wholly undisturbed had it not raised, in an acute form, a problem which was to arouse the strongest public emotion. That problem concerned the new king's wife, Caroline of Brunswick.

The New
Reign.

Before narrating the remarkable crisis, of which the Queen was the central figure, it is necessary to refer to an incident which belongs to the first months of the new reign. In February, 1820, a conspiracy is said to have been formed by Thistlewood and certain other malcontents to assassinate the principal Ministers and then to raise the people of London against the Throne. Whether we can rely upon the truth of the story as presented by the Government and whether, if there was such a conspiracy, it was not in part at least the work of *agents provocateurs*, are questions which admit of considerable doubt. Castlereagh's own correspondence shows very clearly that he had spies in the enemy's camp. Anyhow, on February 23d, the date said to have been fixed for the massacre, Thistlewood and his principal associates were arrested; they were tried and hanged.

The Cato
Street Con-
spiracy.

Whether engineered by the Ministry or not, the incident was of the greatest value to the Government. It at once dissolved the vague half-alliance which had existed between the Radicals and some of the Whigs (such as Brougham), while it made the Republican Leaders odious to the nation generally, and especially to the middle class which had begun to feel a certain sympathy with them. A question was now, however, to arise in which middle class opinion was to prove as violently hostile to the Ministry and to the Throne as popular opinion was. By a curious irony that question was one upon which the Government was certainly in the right; it was the question of Queen Caroline.

Queen
Caroline.

King George had married Caroline of Brunswick in 1795. He disliked her and they had lived apart for many years. In 1806 rumours derogatory of misconduct upon her part had reached him, and he had had inquiries instituted which brought to light much that was highly suspicious against her, but nothing amounting to absolute proof of infidelity. In 1814, she had obtained permission to visit Brunswick and had remained on the Continent for six years, wandering about with more or less disreputable associates and fully justifying the worst suspicions that her husband had entertained of her. He, however, made no move and would probably have continued to ignore her had she still consented to be ignored. She would not so consent. When she learned that he had succeeded to the Crown she returned to England to claim her rank as Queen. The government was prepared to offer her £50,000 to forego her claims and return to the Continent. It is said that the true terms of this offer were never put before her by Brougham, whom she had chosen as her legal adviser. However

that may be, the terms were not accepted and Caroline pressed her demand. The King's Ministers answered by proposing to the House of Lords (on August 17th) a Bill of Pains and Penalties against her in which she was accused of adultery and declared to have forfeited her position both as Queen and wife.

Brougham appeared as her counsel and by his powerful advocacy succeeded in setting the whole country aflame. Of her guilt there was, in reality, very little doubt; but the King was not popular, his private dissipations though not perhaps worse than those of other princes, had been flaunted with a certain ostentation which was offensive to the Puritanism of the middle classes. In the teeth of the facts he was considered a heartless profligate and his wife a victim of his frivolous infidelity. The result was such an explosion of general anger as to compel the ministers to drop the bill. The second reading of the bill was passed on the 6th of November, 1820, by a majority of only twenty-eight. Upon the 8th the third reading could only command a majority of nine. Lord Liverpool was driven to declare the Bill abandoned, and an outburst of public gratification, vividly emphasised by the illumination of London, marked the unpopularity of the Crown.

With this triumph Caroline sank back into insignificance. She only emerged from it for a moment when she tried to force herself into the Abbey at the Coronation in the July of the following year—1821. In the course of the next month she died; but her quarrel had inflicted heavy damage on the prestige of the King and his Ministers; and the moment may conveniently be taken as a turning-point in the domestic and political history of England at the opening year of the Long Peace.

CHAPTER VII.

CONTINUATION OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

1822-1834.

(FROM THE DEATH OF CASTLEREAGH, 1822, TO THE
RESIGNATION OF LORD GREY IN 1834.)

Foreign
Affairs.

A NEW Congress had been called to meet at Verona in the Autumn of 1822, and there to discuss the European situation. To that situation a new peril and a new cause of division had now been added. The Greeks had risen in revolt during the previous year against the Ottoman Empire, and their insurrection had more recently been accompanied with some striking military successes. The Turks had replied, as they have so often done before and since, by a general massacre of Christians. These events were calculated to produce another cleavage in the Holy Alliance.

Alexander's personal and national sympathies were naturally with the Greeks, whose insurrection had been preceded by movements in the north of the Turkish Empire deliberately fomented by Russia. The Turks were the hereditary enemies of his house, and his sensitive religious nature was sincerely moved by the outrages committed by them against his co-religionists. Yet how could the Holy Alliance, without forswearing all its principles, support a popular insurrection against an established Government?

The problem of Greece was thus added to the problem of Spain. Both urgently demanded a conference of the European Powers. It was agreed that the

Ministers should meet first at Vienna for a preliminary discussion and should then adjourn, as I have said, to Verona for the formal Congress.

But at this moment an event occurred which produced a profound effect upon the politics of Europe, and especially upon the diplomacy of England. Castlereagh was anxious and overburdened with work and responsibility. His policy both at home and abroad had ended on the whole in failure. He knew that he was a mark for extreme unpopularity. He was a man of highly strung nervous type and his nerves were badly shaken. To other explanations less favourable to his character I will not allude. But at any rate, just at the moment when all the world was expecting him to set out for Vienna, he died by his own hand.

The man who succeeded Castlereagh in the direction of English Foreign Policy was George Canning, and, though neither man approached greatness (Canning was the less mediocre of the two), it remains true that the change was a momentous one. Castlereagh was, with whatever hesitations, a man both knowing and appreciating the Continental Reaction. He was a man of the Holy Alliance.

George
Canning.

Canning was, with whatever qualifications, allied in opinion to what has since been called in England "a Liberal."

He had, it is true, entered public life as an anti-Jacobin—indeed he may be considered the inventor of the word. As a young adventurer, when he had attached himself to Pitt, he had rendered Pitt great services not only in Parliament, but by the use of his brilliant pen as a journalist and a pamphleteer. But, as was indeed largely the case with Pitt himself, where

the specific quarrel with the French Revolution was not in progress, he leaned to what must be called, not the Democratic but—in the English sense of the word—the Liberal side. For instance, he inherited Pitt's formal adherence to the policy of Catholic Emancipation, and he held to that belief throughout his life with a sincere tenacity which contrasts notably with Pitt's waverings; he disliked the whole scheme of European politics, for which the Holy Alliance stood; he appreciated the claims of nationality; and where Castlereagh, while hanging back from certain of their enterprises, had nevertheless striven to maintain other Continental despots, Canning set himself deliberately against their fundamental aims, which he sought consciously to weaken and destroy. There was in this attitude of Canning's more concern for his country perhaps than for any abstract principles of Liberalism. He followed the traditional policy of separating England from Continental schemes, and of keeping the power of England free to strike when it could in the Continental struggle. But the effect of his decisions were Liberal.

The reshuffling of the government offices which gave Castlereagh's place to Canning also led to the substitution of Robert Peel for Sibthorpe at the Home Office; it is this change which best marks the end of the period of savage repression at home, as the advent of Canning does that of England's association with the Holy Alliance abroad. There were no more considerable state prosecutions. The harsh laws which Castlereagh and Sibthorpe had passed were suffered to rust, and in 1825, the trade unions were for the first time accorded a measure of legal toleration.

Meanwhile (September-October, 1822), the Con-

gress of Verona had opened. England was represented by Wellington; but the words which he spoke were put into his mouth by Canning, and they marked from the first a significant change in English policy.

The Congress of Verona.

Montmorency, the representative of the French Bourbons, came to the Congress to demand from the Allies a promise of moral and, if necessary, material support in the event of his sovereign taking up arms against the new government in Spain. He asked that, in such an event, the powers should consent to withdraw all their ministers and break off diplomatic relations in order that France should be able to claim "the weight and the authority of the Alliance" for her action. He also asked the Powers to say what measure of material assistance his master might expect in support of his action.

Alexander immediately offered to send an army of 150,000 Russians to assist in the conquest of Spain; but such a proposal was naturally as unpalatable to Metternich as to Canning himself. The Austrian Government, however, was as willing as that of Prussia or Russia to give the full, open, and official sanction of the Alliance to King Louis's enterprise, and to consent to a general and simultaneous breach of diplomatic relations with Spain. Wellington, on the other hand, was instructed to offer most strenuous opposition to such a project. He did so—and that in a tone which showed clearly the new temper of the English Government, and which was in marked contrast with that of Castlereagh when he, too, had half deprecated the invasion of Italy. Wellington announced that in the event of any project for joint intervention in Spain being approved by the Powers,

he was charged "come what might, to refuse the King's offer to become a party to it; even if the dissolution of the Alliance should be the result of the refusal." And indeed that result, the dissolution of the Holy Alliance, coming within a very few years of the stand taken up by the English representatives at Verona, was in some measure the result of Canning's new policy of isolation.

The War in
Spain.

Largely on account of England's opposition, the project of a *joint* invasion and occupation of Spain (which had perhaps never been very seriously entertained) was abandoned. But the Continental Allies agreed to the withdrawal of their ministers, and the French sovereign took the field with such prestige as might be supposed to belong to the virtual representative of the European Concert. He was easily victorious; and within a short time the Spanish Constitution was destroyed and the Bourbon monarchy unconditionally restored.

Canning had refused to withdraw the British Ambassador from Madrid, but he had not attempted to give any material aid to the Spanish revolutionaries in their struggle with France. Now, however, that the policy of the Alliance had shown itself completely victorious in arms, he resolved on a diplomatic counter stroke of great moment. All Spain being now at the feet of Ferdinand VII. and his French Allies, he determined to recognise the revolted *colonies* of Spain, which during the recent disorders had achieved the beginning of what was to be their independence. This action had little practical effect; Spain would probably in no case have succeeded in subjugating her American colonies. But its moral effect in Europe was considerable, and it unquestionably did some-

thing to support the prestige of England in her isolated position.

Canning's next difficulty was in Portugal. A rising Portugal. in the capital of that country had, in 1820, obtained a parliamentary constitution from their ruler, John VI., but the French victory in Spain had naturally strengthened the anti-Liberal forces in the adjoining country. King John, under pressure from his wife, a Spanish Bourbon, and his son Don Miguel, dismissed his Minister and re-established an absolute Monarchy.

The Parliamentary Party in Portugal appealed to Canning for military aid. Such aid Canning had neither the power nor the desire to give, but he sent a British squadron to the Mouth of the Tagus nominally "to confirm in the eyes of the Portuguese nation the strict intimacy and good-will subsisting between the two Crowns," but really of course to lend the moral support of England to that party which France and Spain were bent on depressing. King John was now disposed to make his peace with the Liberals, and in doing so quarrelled with his son Dom Miguel, who at once attempted to seize the reins of government. John escaped to the English ship "Windsor Castle" (May 9, 1824), and from that base re-established his authority. The party to which Canning had thus lent the influence of England soon became supreme in Portugal, and those who favoured the French and Spanish policy were dismissed from office. At the same time the Portuguese Government was induced by the same influence to conclude a treaty which recognised the autonomy of Brazil (May 15, 1825).

The partisans of Dom Miguel appealed to Spain, and it is probable that Spain would have made war

in his cause had not Canning announced the despatch of a British army to Lisbon. The success of this, his first bold action, was immediate. The Spanish Government withdrew from the intervention they had contemplated, and the Portuguese Regency (now ruling the country on behalf of John's young daughter, the Infanta Maria), easily subdued its enemies.

The Greek
Question.

Canning had next to turn his attention to the East where the problems raised by the Greek insurrection were becoming increasingly acute. In the earlier phases of the war the Greeks had met with considerable success, had established themselves firmly in the Morea, seized many of the Ægean Islands, and taken Athens and Corinth. In his despair the Sultan called in his powerful vassal Mehemet Ali, the ruler of Egypt, who early in 1825 invaded the Morea with a force of about 20,000 men. He was for the moment completely victorious and his victories were accompanied by every species of atrocity. The Greeks, now desperate and appreciating the independent position of Great Britain as against the Continental governments, appealed to Canning for help. They offered to accept any King that Great Britain might select and to place themselves formally under British protection. Canning dared not accept such an offer; Russia would never have tolerated it. But the fact that it had been made gave him a legitimate ground for acting in the matter.

The course of events favoured him. On December 1, 1825, the Emperor Alexander died. He had long been torn between his religious sympathy with the Greeks (reinforced, as it was, by a personal quarrel of his own with the Sultan in connection with Rus-

sian rights in the Danubian Principalities), and his dislike of popular insurrection and of any disturbances of the Vienna Settlement. His successor, Nicholas, was more of a Russian and much less of a European. He hated the Turks and was disposed to join Canning in a movement for the liberation of the Greek subjects of the Porte.

Canning sent the Duke of Wellington on a special mission to St. Petersburg to negotiate with the new Czar the terms of joint action on the Greek question. The negotiations were successfully conducted, and on April 4, 1826, a protocol was signed. The effect of this protocol was not only to commit the two Powers to the support of Greek liberty, but to make an end once and for all of the Holy Alliance. For Metternich remained unalterably opposed to Hellenic aspirations, and Russia was therefore now placed in a position of definite antagonism to Austria. Austria, however, was not prepared to oppose the action of Russia by arms, while in the Autumn of 1826 England and Russia agreed to take common action with a view to forcing the Sultan to accept their joint mediation. On July 6, 1827, France signified her adherence to this arrangement, known to history as the "Treaty of London." Greece was to be erected into an independent kingdom, the monarch to be chosen from one of the European dynasties. The naval battle of Navarino, jointly won by England, France, and Russia (October 26, 1827), destroyed the fleet of the Egyptian invaders. Russia, acting alone, invaded Turkey in the following year; the treaty of Adrianople, among other effects secured the independence of Greece.

Canning was now at the height of power, fame,

Resigna-
tion of
Lord Liver-
pool.

and popularity; but his position was not without its embarrassments. His policy, though eminently popular in the country, and especially with men of liberal opinions, was detested by many of his colleagues, while a marked divergence of opinion on a domestic question not only separated him from the great majority of his party, but secured to those who were opposed to him a large measure of support in the country. That question was Catholic Emancipation.

On February 17, 1827, Lord Liverpool suffered a paralytic stroke which incapacitated him for public life. He was obliged to resign the Premiership, and the problem of choosing a successor brought to a head the Catholic question, which had slumbered more or less since the resignation of Pitt in 1800.

The Catho-
lic Ques-
tion.

During the first quarter of the nineteenth century almost every public man of any intellectual eminence had declared in favour of the Catholic Claims. On this matter Pitt and Fox, Windham and Canning were entirely agreed. But against this consensus of statesmen, orators, and men of letters stood the obstinate prejudices of George III. (and afterward of George IV.), and these prejudices were shared by a majority, probably by a very large majority, of their subjects.

For a long time there appeared no driving force on the Catholic side capable of meeting the strength and intensity of English Protestant sentiment. The Catholics of England were a very small and insignificant body, living almost wholly by family tradition, a body which had long ago despaired of expansion and was disposed to regard a bare toleration as the best fate that it could expect. The temper of the Catholics of Ireland—a whole nation—was indeed very different;

but their attempts at insurrection in 1798 and 1800 had been utterly crushed and avenged with extreme cruelty. For a time their spirit seemed broken.

The first symptom of its revival, carrying with it the promise of an energy which was eventually to wrest the Catholic Claims from a hostile English Government appeared over what is called the Veto Controversy, which had arisen in this fashion:—

The Veto
Contro-
versy.

The British Government, made nervous by the movements of Emmett and FitzGerald, had desired at the close of the preceding century to secure the right to veto the appointment of Catholic bishops and dignitaries in Ireland. The scheme was especially favoured by those English statesmen who desired Catholic Emancipation. It was also favoured—almost to a man—by the little body of English Catholics, for it was believed that it would greatly facilitate the concession of Catholic claims. Also, seeing that the endowment of the Catholic Church in Ireland out of public funds was proposed as part of the bargain, it was hoped that the Irish Hierarchy would prove not unfavourable; and indeed as early as 1799 certain Irish ecclesiastics had expressed their approval of the scheme.

To the Irish people on the other hand the whole plan appeared as a detestable profanation, and it soon became clear that the bulk of the Irish clergy would be on the same side. The Hierarchy acted in a fashion highly to its honour, and refused the proffered bribe. Its decision met with enthusiastic applause and support from the whole body of the Irish laity, who—before the date at which this division of my work opens (1813)—had at last found an effective

leader in a brilliant young Catholic barrister of Dublin—Daniel O'Connell.

The English Catholics had, however, a very effective card to play. They appealed to Rome for a pronouncement that there was nothing contrary to Catholic interest in the proposals of the British Government. Such a policy seemed to have every promise of success, for the political sympathies of the Vatican were naturally at this moment (the Winter of 1813) with the enemies of Napoleon, and therefore with England as his most determined enemy. Moreover it was quite true that the Holy See had sanctioned arrangements not altogether dissimilar from that proposed. Of the history and feelings of the Irish little was known at Rome; and this lack of knowledge led the authorities there into an error of judgment which might have had disastrous effects upon religion in Ireland. The Pope, Pius VII., was at that time a prisoner of Napoleon's. His functions were being exercised vicariously by Monsignor Quarantotti, who on February 16, 1814, issued a rescript declaring that the proposed conditions might safely be accepted by Catholics.

All Ireland was at once aflame. O'Connell cleverly met the demand that he should submit to the decision of Rome in favour of the British Government by pointing out that that very Government had forced Catholics, as a condition of their qualifying for the electoral franchise, to repudiate any right on the part of the Holy See to interfere in politics. The validity of Monsignor Quarantotti's pronouncement was questioned; and it was eventually withdrawn. Though it was afterward reissued in a modified form, the resistance of the Irish, now strengthened by success,

secured its effective abandonment. It is improbable that this victory had any direct effect either way on the fortunes of Catholic Emancipation, but it is important in that it indicated a new fighting spirit to be abroad among the Irish Catholics, and that among them had been discovered a leader capable of utilising that spirit to the best advantage.

O'Connell was born on August 6, 1775. By the time that the Veto Controversy made him the acknowledged leader of the Irish Catholic laity he was already at the summit of a distinguished professional career. His practice at the Bar was immense, his reputation as a forensic orator having been established once and for all by his powerful defence of John Magee, the editor of the Dublin *Evening Press* who was brought to trial on July 26, 1813, for a criminal libel on the Duke of Richmond, a man just retired from the post of Lord Lieutenant. Not only in political but in ordinary civil and criminal cases O'Connell was recognised as the most powerful advocate at the Irish bar; and his political opponents were only too glad to retain his services in connection with their private affairs; but he was a Catholic not only by upbringing but by passionate personal conviction; and his faith, as things then stood, cut him off from the possibility of official promotion. Catholics were not allowed to take silk, and O'Connell had all the mortification of seeing men younger than himself and immeasurably inferior to him in professional ability become King's Counsel and rise to the Bench, while he, by common consent the most successful pleader in Dublin, had to sit behind them in his stuff gown. His own wrongs made him keenly sensible of the wrongs of his fellow-countrymen, and as soon as the Veto Controversy was

Daniel
O'Connell.

settled he threw all his energy and genius into the struggle for Catholic Emancipation. He brought to the work gigantic physical vigour, a keen understanding of the nation whose cause he was pleading, and an unexampled command of every kind of eloquence that can move the minds of men, rich humour, passionate emotional appeal, the powerful weapon—a weapon peculiarly powerful in England—of invective which would be, and often was, savage.

George IV.
visits Ire-
land.

In 1821 the hopes of the Irish Catholics had been considerably raised by the visit of the new King to their country. It was widely believed at the time that this visit was to foreshadow Royal intervention in their favour. The early associations of George IV. had been Whiggish. His early political associates, Fox, Sheridan, and the rest, had been strong advocates of Catholic Emancipation. As late as 1797 he was known to have shared their views on the subject. It was very generally thought that while Regent he had felt a difficulty in expressing himself favourably toward a change which the old King was known to regard with the utmost extremity of horror; but there was not a few who hoped that now he was king in fact and name he would come forward as the friend of the Irish nation. Accordingly he was received in Ireland with the most sincere welcome, a welcome in which the Catholics, headed by O'Connell, took a prominent part.

These hopes were to be disappointed. George, whose early Whiggism had been adopted mainly out of dislike of his father, had now come round to his father's views, and it was not long before he avowed them.

Ever since the time of Pitt, Catholic Emancipation

had been an open question in all English Cabinets. In the Cabinet of Lord Liverpool (himself an opponent, though not a very vigorous one, of the Catholic claims), the view favourable to those claims was represented by Canning, and round Canning were grouped a number of young friends and disciples—Huskisson, Lamb (afterward Lord Melbourne), Palmerston and others upon the threshold of distinguished political careers. On the other side stood Wellington and young Robert Peel, for many years Irish Secretary and a zealous maintainer of Orange ascendancy, and these were supported by the whole force of that wealthy mediocrity which must form considerable part of every Ministry in every parliamentary country. Such was the situation when, at the word of O'Connell, the Catholic Association came into being.

Hitherto the interests of the Catholics of Ireland had been committed to a Catholic Board. This body (which had been weakened by divisions on the Veto question) in no sense really represented the Catholic populace, rarely met, and inspired little interest. O'Connell, so soon as he took up the Catholic question in earnest, resolved to replace it by a new Catholic Association which should enlist the whole force of Irish Catholicism in the service of the movement. He resolved to enroll therein not only the Catholic gentry and professional classes (whose guinea subscriptions had so far supplied its whole financial backing), but the whole of the Catholic peasantry and of the Catholic workers of the towns, who were to be organised in their parishes with their Parish Priests as officers. He first put forward this suggestion at the beginning of 1823, but only part of it was then

The Catholic Association.

carried into effect. The Catholic gentry objected to the swamping of their party in the inclusion of their poorer fellows, while many of the more timid agitators were afraid of the possible consequences of the violent challenge which O'Connell thus prepared to throw down to the Government. The proposal to include the mass of Irishmen at a shilling a year per head was for the moment dropped, and the Catholic Association was formed without them. O'Connell, however, succeeded in getting through a provision whereby all Catholic priests should be *ex officio* members of the Association; he thus provided the skeleton of the machinery which his own policy required.

The logic of events did the rest. The association, organised on the narrow basis against which O'Connell had protested, failed so completely that it was impossible to obtain at its meetings even the quorum necessary for the transaction of business. On February 4, 1824, a meeting was held at which only eight members were present. O'Connell obtained the necessary ten by dragging in almost by force two young Maynooth priests whom he found in a bookshop downstairs, and who by their office were entitled to membership. He then once more brought forward his original plan for a democratic organisation. It was approved.

The success of the new organisation was immediate. The Catholic peasantry everywhere enrolled themselves in its ranks. The priests preached for it, and collected the subscriptions of their parishioners after Mass once in every month. The "Catholic Rent" soon swelled to proportions which almost satisfied the rhetorical estimates of O'Connell's prophesies. Before the end of the year the Association was receiving

an income of £1,000 a week from the pennies of the Irish poor. But this was the least part of what O'Connell had done. He had now behind him the whole force of the nation, united, disciplined and ready to brave anything for the Faith.

The Government became alarmed. O'Connell was prosecuted for his speech delivered at one of the Association's mass meetings on December 17, 1824. The prosecution broke down, owing to the refusal of the reporters to testify against him, and the Grand Jury were obliged to throw out the bill. The Ministers next resolved to strike at the Association. On February 3, 1825, it was announced in the King's Speech that the Association would be suppressed, and on February 10th, Goulburn, the Irish Secretary, introduced a bill for that purpose. An application on the part of the Association to be heard at the Bar, though supported by Brougham and others, was refused. The bill passed, but it proved a dead letter. A New Catholic Association was formed "for the purpose of public or private charity, and such other purposes as are not prohibited of George IV." And this Association held the same meetings, raised the same "rent" and did the same work as before.

Many of the English supporters of Catholic Emancipation, including Canning and Plunket, had acquiesced in the attempted suppression of the Association; but they were impressed with its success, and thought the time opportune for attempting a settlement of the Catholic question by constitutional means. For this purpose negotiations were opened with O'Connell. It was proposed that a *Catholic Relief Bill* should be introduced, removing the disabilities of the Catholics, while at the same time, in order to conciliate those who

The Catho-
lic Relief
Bill.

feared that the results of such a change might be dangerously revolutionary, it was to be accompanied by two other measures, one making public provision for the support of the Catholic clergy with a view to attaching them to the Government, and the other raising the qualification for the Country Franchise from £2 to £10. O'Connell had come over to England to watch the course of events in connection with the suppression of the Catholic Association. He seems to have been at the moment somewhat out of touch with Irish opinion. He agreed to the terms proposed and recommended them in a public letter to the Catholic Association. The Relief Bill was introduced (in March, 1825) by Sir Francis Burdett, at that time a prominent Radical distinguished for the part he had taken in recent attacks on the Crown; and its second reading was carried (on May 10, 1825) by 268 votes to 241—a majority of 27. At the same time the Bills for disfranchising the forty shilling freeholders and for endowing the Catholic clergy were passed by majorities of 48 and 43 respectively. The enemies of Emancipation were alarmed; and the Duke of York, who was the King's brother and heir to the Crown, presented to the House of Lords (on April 25th) a petition against the Catholic Claims and accompanied it by a speech in which he made the significant pronouncement: “. . . I have been brought up in . . . Protestant principles, and from the time when I began to reason for myself I have entertained them from conviction; and in whatever situation I may be placed in life I shall maintain them. So help me God!” This pointed reference to his own possible accession was not too pleasing to George, who remarked with some humour: “I have no intention of

making a vacancy just yet," but on the Catholic question the two brothers were entirely agreed.

Nevertheless the Bill passed through all its stages in the House of Commons, and was sent up to the House of Lords, where (on May 17th) it was rejected by 178 votes to 130.

O'Connell returned to Ireland on June 1st and soon found that the concession which he had unwillingly and most unwisely made in regard to the disfranchisement of the forty shilling freeholders was intolerable to Irish opinion. At the first meeting, which he held on June 8th, the protests were loud and vehement. From that moment O'Connell dropped a policy to which he now saw that the Irish people would never willingly assent, avoided all reference to the unfortunate compromise which was so generally odious, and devoted his energies to the re-organisation of the New Catholic Association.

It was not long before the forty shilling freeholders had an opportunity of showing how much wiser the Irish people were than their great leader. The proposal to disfranchise them had put them on their mettle, and they were resolved to make their power felt.

The Water-
ford Elec-
tion.

The County seat of Waterford had long been regarded as the property of the wealthy and alien family of Beresford; this family had been distinguished by its violent opposition to the Catholic Faith and to the claims of the Irish to political freedom. The whole population was Catholic, but that population was dependent upon the good will of the Beresfords and their allies for permission to live, and these men—then, as I have said, of great wealth—by every kind of intimidation and corruption had succeeded in fore-

ing themselves as “representatives” upon a constituency which detested them and their followers. In June, 1826, an election took place and Lord George Beresford came forward to claim the seat as a matter of right. The Catholic Association resolved to oppose him and put forward, as candidate, Villiers Stuart, a Protestant supporter of the Catholic Claims. O’Connell went down to the constituency and delivered the most powerful speech of his long career. The whole power of the New Catholic Association was brought into play. The priests everywhere brought up their parishioners to the polls, and the tenants everywhere deserted their landlords. The Beresfords on their side exerted their territorial influence to the utmost, evicting every known malcontent without mercy, and threatening all who should vote for Villiers Stuart with the same fate. Bribes and threats completely failed. The whole peasant population of County Waterford deserted the Beresfords, nominally for Stuart but really for O’Connell. Polling took place during the last week of June, 1826. By the fifth day Beresford found himself in a hopeless minority and abandoned the contest. He and his family took heartless and shameful revenge on those who had defied them, but the Catholic Association had shown its power and the ground so won was never lost again.

In England, however, the elections were on the whole unfavourable to the Catholic cause. They were not fought upon this issue, for the Tory party was divided on the point; but it would appear that the new Parliament contained somewhat fewer supporters of the measure than the old, for when on its re-assembly Burdett brought forward a motion “for

taking into consideration the laws imposing disabilities on his Majesty's Roman Catholic subjects," that motion was defeated by a majority of four. Yet in the following year two events occurred which for the moment seemed to make the prospects of Catholic Emancipation more promising.

First: On January 5, 1827, the Duke of York died, leaving as heir to the throne the Duke of Clarence, afterward William IV., who had already avowed himself a friend of the Catholic Claims. Secondly, on April 10th of the same year Canning succeeded Liverpool as Prime Minister.

The change had not been arranged without difficulties and sacrifices. Liverpool was a man of no intellectual eminence, but he had succeeded as perhaps no one else could have succeeded—at any rate no one else in fact did succeed—in keeping the party together. Canning had been prepared to serve under him, although they differed on the Catholic question; but Canning altogether refused to serve under Wellington, and Wellington was equally intractable. Wellington disliked Canning personally, just as he disliked Nelson and all men of genius who might be of the romantic and imaginative type. He disapproved of Canning's Irish policy much, and of his foreign policy more. With Wellington stood Eldon, the powerful and learned Lord Chancellor—filled with a bitter hatred of the Catholic Faith—and with the two went Peel.

Peel had certainly not in him the stuff of a fanatic, and his action is most easily explained on those personal grounds of petty intrigue for the limelight which is so large a motive in parliamentary action. As Wellington's lieutenant in the House of Commons

he would be the only possible *leader* of that assembly, while he could never be anything more than *second* in command to Canning, who would, of course, sit in the Commons with himself.

Accordingly, when the King, after much hesitation, had selected Canning to succeed Liverpool as Prime Minister, Wellington, Eldon and Peel, with several other ministers, resigned their offices. Canning, thus deprived of the support of his most eminent colleagues, was obliged to effect a coalition with the moderate Whigs; and one of their most eminent leaders, Lord Lansdowne, consented to join the Cabinet.

In the new Ministry Catholic Emancipation still remained an open question; the King would not have suffered it to be otherwise. But the majority in its favour in the Cabinet was now so large, and the predominance of talent was so much greater even than that of numbers, that the friends of Emancipation had high hopes, despite the falling off of support in the House of Commons, that it would soon become law.

All such calculations were upset by the sudden death of Canning. He had taken a chill at the funeral of the Duke of York; he had overstrained his strength during the single strenuous session of his Premiership when he was savagely persecuted by his old allies, including Peel—for whom it is difficult to offer even the excuse of sincerity, for it is tolerably certain from one of his speeches in 1829 that as early as 1825, he had realised that Catholic Emancipation was inevitable. On August 5, 1827, it was announced that Canning was seriously ill. On August 8th he died.

A temporary arrangement was attempted by which Lord Goderich, a supporter of Canning, recently en-

nobled, was placed at the head of the Government; but it soon broke down, and the Duke of Wellington became Prime Minister.

In the new administration, as in the old, Catholic Emancipation was an open question, but whereas in Canning's Ministry the leaning of the Government had been in favour of that reform, in Wellington's the leaning was decidedly the other way. The personal followers of Canning remained indeed for a time members of the Government; but they were soon made to realise the instability and invidiousness of their position, and they took the first convenient opportunity of abandoning it. The question upon which they actually took action was a comparatively small one. Two boroughs, Penryn and East Retford, had been proved guilty of corruption and disfranchised. The more liberal members of the Cabinet were in favour of bestowing the forfeited seats on Manchester and Birmingham, which were then unrepresented. Wellington and Peel resisted the proposal, and after a division in which several Ministers voted against their leader, Huskisson, Palmerston, Grant and Lamb threw up their places; and though a few supporters of the Catholic Claims still remained in office, the Government became, as a whole, decidedly opposed to the recognition of Catholics, and determinedly suspicious of, and stubborn against, the Irish people.

O'Connell had already decided to treat the substitution of Wellington for Canning as a declaration of war against the Irish Catholics and to reply by a counter stroke. This came in January, 1828, in the form of a resolution of the Catholic Association to oppose every supporter of the Wellington Government.

The temper of the new Parliament on the Catholic

question was again tested. A Resolution in favour of Emancipation was moved in the House of Commons on May 8th, by Sir Francis Burdett, and in the House of Lords on June 9th by Lord Lansdowne. The former was carried by just six votes; the latter was defeated by forty. So far the cause of the Catholics looked hopeless enough; but a blow was to be struck for them in Ireland which was to prove of more value than all the lobbyings of forty years.

The Clare
Election.

In June, 1828, William Vesey FitzGerald was invited to become President of the Board of Trade, and accepted the invitation. He represented in Parliament the County of Clare, where he was a large land owner, reputed just and indulgent, and very popular with his tenants. He had been a consistent supporter of Catholic Emancipation, and apparently a sincere one. But he had joined the Wellington Government and thus brought himself within the terms of the Association's censure.

It was decided to oppose him. For this purpose Major McNamara, another Protestant supporter of the Association, was invited by the Catholics to contest the seat. Had McNamara gone to the Polls he might or might not have been elected, but anyhow his election would have made little difference. Happily for the prospects of the Catholics he refused, and the way was opened for the striking act which changed the face of the political situation.

On June 24, 1828, the Catholic Association held a meeting at the Corn Exchange, and that meeting unanimously recommended Daniel O'Connell as the Association's candidate for County Clare.

The stroke was unquestionably one of the happiest that ever determined a political crisis. There was,

as the law then stood, nothing to prevent a Catholic from standing as a candidate or from being elected a Member of Parliament. All that the law provided was that he could not take his seat or vote in the House of Commons without taking an oath specially designed in the form of a blasphemy to which no Catholic would descend. But whether a particular man, calling himself a Catholic, would or would not take this oath could not legally be known until he was elected. The election of O'Connell was therefore perfectly legal, and if the electors of Clare could be induced to vote for him, his subsequent refusal to take the oath would at once force the Government to choose between disfranchising those electors and abrogating the Catholic disabilities.

The resolution that O'Connell himself should stand for Clare was carried on June 24, 1828. Before the end of the month O'Connell had issued his manifesto to the electors. The polling was to take place early in July; and every influence that could be brought into play was vigorously exerted on both sides. FitzGerald was not, like Beresford, a mere oppressor maintaining his position by threats. His personal popularity was great, and he could point to a consistent record of votes given in favour of the Catholic claims. Nevertheless, the force of popular feeling organised by O'Connell soon proved irresistible. The Government (at the request of FitzGerald) poured into the country troops sufficient to garrison a rebellious province, but the characteristic and high discipline of the Catholic Association showed itself in the extraordinary self-restraint of the people. They were strictly instructed to give no occasion for military intervention, not to riot, not even to retaliate

if rioting was attempted on the other side. They exactly observed their pledges, and during the whole contest not a single act of violence was committed. This minute observance of a necessary discipline was in itself a sufficient warning of what they might do should the crisis end, as seemed not unlikely, in an appeal to arms. When the poll was opened the first few days showed clearly what would be the result. The priests marshalled their parishioners and marched them to the polling booth to vote for O'Connell and Emancipation. Landlords led their tenants to the poll, only to find themselves deserted at the last moment. FitzGerald's own tenants, to whom he had been a good landlord and with whom he was popular, broke away from him and, to his intense mortification, voted almost to a man for O'Connell. When the poll closed O'Connell was the member for Clare by a majority of more than two to one.

Catholic
Emancipa-
tion.

It was the Clare election which at bottom decided the success of Catholic Emancipation. Already there was much weakening in the ranks of those who had hitherto strenuously opposed the measure.

Lord Anglesey was the first to change sides. He had been appointed Viceroy of Ireland when Wellington succeeded Goderich, in succession to Wellington's brother the Marquis of Wellesley. Wellesley, who had been Viceroy under Canning, was, unlike the Duke, a strong supporter of Catholic Emancipation; Anglesey, a distinguished soldier who had commanded the British cavalry in the Campaign of Waterloo and had won merited renown in the retreat preceding that action, had voted against the policy of Emancipation, and was said to have declared that the Catholic demands should be met "not by con-

cession, but by concussion." His appointment had therefore been regarded as a triumph for the Orange Party and had bitterly mortified the Catholics. But he was a soldier with a soldier's sense of reality, and as soon as he came to Ireland and looked at the problem with his own eyes, he saw that Catholic Emancipation must come if Civil War was to be avoided. He pressed his view strongly upon the Government, and expressed it with undiplomatic frankness in a correspondence with the Catholic Primate of Ireland. His blunt expressions of opinion were inconvenient to Wellington and Peel and in the highest degree offensive to the King whom they were trying to manage. The consequence was that, although the result of the Clare election had convinced both of them that Catholic Emancipation was now inevitable, they concurred in the dismissal of the soldier whom they had themselves appointed, and whose sole offence was that he had perceived the true state of the case somewhat earlier than they had. Anglesey was recalled in December, 1828. No new Viceroy was appointed. The post remained vacant pending the issue of the contest then going on between the King and his Ministers.

O'Connell did not rest content with his victory. As soon as his own seat had been secured he began to threaten other seats. Galway was represented by two Protestant gentlemen of the stamp of FitzGerald, nominal supporters of Catholic Emancipation, but adherents of the Ministry. O'Connell, backed by the Association, insisted that if they did not pledge themselves to oppose an anti-Catholic government they should also find themselves opposed by Catholic candidates. This threat completed the work of the Clare

Election. What O'Connell and the Association had done in Clare they could doubtless do in every Catholic constituency throughout Ireland. If the Government found itself faced with 50 or 60 Irish representatives who were unable to take their seats on account of their religion there could be no issue but concession or civil war.

As early as August, 1828, Peel had made up his mind that Catholic Emancipation could be no longer delayed. It will astonish the reader to hear that he easily persuaded Wellington—Wellington was and remained much under Peel's influence in regard to all domestic questions and he had heretofore had no idea of the power the Irish could wield—for he was a man of short judgment. But the King was more difficult to persuade, and the King could still rely on the support of Eldon. He struggled hard. On January 12, 1829, Wellington submitted to him a memorandum, drawn up by himself and Peel, urging that the question of conceding the Catholic claims should be taken into consideration. All the Ministers who had hitherto been opposed to Emancipation addressed the King in support of this memorandum. The King, with a bad grace, gave way, and when the House met on February 6th the speech from the throne contained the recommendation that they should take into consideration "the laws which imposed civil disabilities on his Majesty's Roman Catholic subjects" and consider "whether the removal of those disabilities can be effected consistently and with the full and permanent security of our establishments in Church and State."

So complete a change of front produced a furious outburst of indignation in England against the Min-

istry and especially against Peel. He offered himself for re-election to the University of Oxford, was rejected by a majority of 146, and had to take refuge in the tiny pocket borough of Westbury, which a humble but wealthy supporter, Sir Manasseh Lopes, placed at his disposal. On March 3d, he gave notice of his intention to bring the question of Catholic Disabilities before the House of Commons. But the King made a final attempt to oppose the policy for which he had come to feel so intense a dislike. He tried to insist on the retention of the Oath of Supremacy—an oath which, of course, no sincere Catholic would take. The Ministers met his protest by an offer of resignation, which the King at first accepted; but he soon found that it was impossible to form an alternative Ministry which would resist Emancipation, and he was forced to recall Wellington and to allow Peel to proceed with his Bill. That Bill passed the House of Commons by a large majority in spite of the protest of the Orange rump. Before the end of April it had passed the Lords. It received the Royal Assent on April 13, 1829.

But at this critical point in the history of Ireland—and of England's relation to that country—a matter of capital importance came in, a blunder from which our political system has never wholly recovered. This was a measure depriving the Irish forty shilling freeholders, who had really won the battle, of their electoral rights.

O'Connell in vain endeavoured to induce the Whigs and Radicals to offer effective opposition to this bill. The great error which he had committed four years before in assenting to this condition of Emancipation, though repudiated by the Irish people and long ago

also repented of by himself, weakened his moral authority in the matter. The peasantry of Ireland were disfranchised. *The Irish electorate was reduced at a stroke from more than 200,000 to about 26,000.* The thing is so enormous it needs no comment. It has but to be set down to be understood. The consequences of this betrayal, for it was nothing less, were soon felt when the question of Parliamentary Reform came up for discussion. On a just scheme, based on her population as it then was, Ireland should have received over 160 seats in the Reformed Parliament, and those seats should have been held by men responsible to the mass of the Irish people. The surrender of 1829 prevented such a consummation; and as a result Irish popular opinion had during the greater part of the nineteenth century no adequate means of making its influence felt in the House of Commons. Posterity will discover what a disaster England, in particular, suffered from this intemperate folly.

As another concession to the opponents of Emancipation the Government resolved to exclude O'Connell himself from the benefit of the measure which his genius and energy had wrung from them. When he presented himself for the purpose of taking the oaths, the old oaths were submitted to him. He, of course, refused to take them and asked to be allowed to take the new oath imposed by the Emancipation Act. He was asked if he would take the Oath of Supremacy. He read it carefully and said: "I see in this oath one statement of opinion which I believe to be false, and one statement of fact which I know to be false; I cannot therefore take it." O'Connell was in consequence refused admission to the House of Commons;

the elected of Clare was not to be the first Catholic Member of Parliament. That honour was reserved for the heir of the Duke of Norfolk, who was immediately afterward returned for Horsham, a borough which was the property of his father. The English aristocratic Catholics had done nothing whatever to obtain Emancipation. They had done their best to belittle the man and the organisation that had obtained it. They and not the now disfranchised Irish peasants who had risked their lives and homesteads to get it, were to be the principal beneficiaries by it. And they rewarded the man who had emancipated them by immediately blackballing him from the principal Catholic Club in London.

The position of the Government after the passing of Catholic Emancipation was by no means an enviable one. It had bitterly disappointed the great majority of its supporters, who had looked to Wellington and Peel as their especial champions to stand firm against the lawless demands of the Papists, and who now saw them execute a complete surrender to those demands. Among the more extreme of the Protestant Party it had aroused a bitterness which made them regard almost any possible government, even if Whig or Radical, as preferable to the government which had so shamefully betrayed its trust. On the other hand the Opposition were more disposed to feel indignation with those who had stolen the credit of a reform which they had always advocated than gratitude for such belated and enforced concessions.

The Irish Catholics took much the same view. They rightly gave the credit for the carrying of Catholic Emancipation not to Peel but to O'Connell, and

The Position of the Government.

they remembered long and bitterly how everything that could be done had been done to deprive the concession of its grace and of its value. The result was that the Government, though nominally in possession of a considerable majority in the House of Commons, was really faced by two oppositions which when combined could easily defeat it. The only difficulty was to find a subject upon which such extremes *could* combine.

For a time the Government staggered along and contrived to pass one or two valuable measures, the most important being concerned with that humanisation of an abominable penal code, the reform of which had found its most strenuous advocate in Sir Samuel Romilly. During the short interval which elapsed between the passing of Catholic Emancipation and the fall of the Wellington Government the death penalty was abolished for the countless offences against property to which the existing law had attached it. And during that same short period there took place a change in the detail of administration which has proved of the very greatest moment to England and to the contrast between England and her Continental rivals. Indeed, the master change, in mere administration of the English nineteenth century, Peel established, by introducing the Metropolitan Police Act and organizing an efficient police force to replace the old watchmen and runners. From that one act—whose consequence no man foresaw—has developed, as from a small seed, the vast system of Police supervision and control to which the English are everywhere subject in every hour of their lives, which has quite transformed the nature of English civil conduct and which is the astonishment of

every foreign observer who comes to learn the realities of our dense urban and proletarian state.

But of all this the men of the time guessed nothing. The moment was critical in their eyes only because it presaged political reform, and at such a moment the Government lost their last prop, by the death of the sovereign, who, though he had bitterly resented their concessions to the Irish Catholics, still at least preferred his existing advisers to the Whigs. On June 26, 1830, George IV. died and was succeeded by his brother William, Duke of Clarence, who ascended the throne with the title of William IV.

Death of
George IV.

The new King was known to have been in favour of Catholic Emancipation and was believed to be friendly to Parliamentary Reform.

The question of Parliamentary Reform had been agitated for more than half a century. We have seen how Pitt had taken it up in the seventeen-eighties, and had abandoned it only on the outbreak of the French Revolution. During the success of the extreme democrats which followed in France and their armed antagonism to England, it had inevitably fallen into the background. It had revived after the peace and had figured prominently among the demands of the Radicals during the last five years of the reign of George III. When the death of Castlereagh and the retirement of Sidmouth ended the period of extreme repression it ought, as it would seem, to have gained strength; but it was obscured first by the personal popularity of Canning, who had always been a convinced defender of the old system, and afterward by the necessary preoccupation of all statesmen with the problem of the Catholic Claims. When the Wellington Government was forced to con-

Parliamen-
tary Re-
form

cede those claims, the demand for reform burst all barriers and swept the country.

The old system of Parliamentary representation was based upon tradition and custom, dating from the wholly different conditions of the later Middle Ages; these traditions had crystallised in a form already quaint by the time of the Tudors and now almost meaningless. They varied from place to place. In some boroughs the franchise was highly democratic; in others it was restricted to a few privileged individuals. Where it was so restricted the quality of the voters was by no means the same in all cases. Sometimes they were rich men; sometimes quite poor men. But the circumstance which made the demand for reform urgent was the fact that a large number of decayed and in some cases non-existent boroughs had fallen into the hands of great landowners, who nominated their representatives. Thus two members were returned for Old Sarum, which had long ceased to exist, and two for Gatton, which consisted of a ruined wall and two huts—these members being, of course, really returned at the sole will of the great landed proprietors who own the soil of such places. Meanwhile, the great industrial towns which had increased so marvellously during the last quarter of the eighteenth century were almost wholly unrepresented.

Popular feeling was strongly set against what were called the “rotten boroughs,” which gave to the territorial aristocracy, already supreme in the Upper House, a preponderating influence in the Lower. The democratic theories of the French Revolution produced a demand for the alteration of the Parliamentary system which would make Parliament, as was hoped, an accurate mirror of the general will, the

changes most urgently demanded by such a theory being Manhood Suffrage, Vote by Ballot and Annual or Triennial parliaments. Meanwhile, the great mercantile fortunes created by the Industrial Revolution felt that their real power and importance were inadequately represented in Parliament as compared with the power and importance of the landed nobility; and a considerable section of that nobility, broadly classified as "Whig," thought that its position would be better secured by an alliance with the commercial power. All these forces working together produced the reform agitation which shook the whole country during the years immediately following the death of George IV.

The death of a sovereign at that time involved a general election. The business of Parliament was wound up and the writs went out; but before the new House assembled an event had occurred in a foreign country which filled the Liberals of all shades with satisfaction and the supporters of the existing order with uneasiness. During the later days of July, 1830, a popular insurrection, brought about by the obscurantist policy of Charles X., overthrew the Bourbons in France. Louis Philippe, the reputed son of Philippe Egalité, was called to the throne as an elected sovereign. Immediately afterward the Belgians rose against the Government of the King of the Netherlands and secured their independence. These events made an end of what was left of the Vienna Settlement in Europe and gave a great impetus to the Reform movement in England.

During the years which elapsed between 1820 and 1830 regular motions had been made on the subject of Parliamentary reform by Lampton (afterward

Earl of Durham), Lord John Russell and others, but they had invariably been defeated by overwhelming majorities and, what is perhaps more important, had attracted very little attention either in the House or outside it. It was not until the Catholic question had been settled that the importance of the question became apparent.

The first considerable blow came from an unexpected quarter. The Marquis of Blandford, eldest son of the Duke of Marlborough, and one of the fiercest opponents of Catholic Emancipation, proposed on June 2, 1829, a series of resolutions in favour of Parliamentary Reform. Such a motion coming from a high Tory commanded quite a new measure of interest. Blandford maintained that Catholic Emancipation had been carried by the privileged classes in the teeth of English popular opinion, and he demanded Parliamentary Reform as an antidote. He failed to carry his party with him, but in the following year he found an ally in the very man against whose influence he was protesting. His motion in favour of "an efficient and free Parliament" was seconded by O'Connell, and though the Whigs deserted and only eleven members voted for Blandford's Amendment, that Amendment was really the beginning of the resurrection of Parliamentary Reform as a live issue. On February 18, 1830, Blandford introduced a bill for the disfranchisement of rotten boroughs, the extension of the franchise to all persons "paying scot and lot," and the payment of members. It also provided that every Member of Parliament must reside in his constituency. The Whigs refused to support his measure and it was rejected.

The next move came from O'Connell who, on the

28th of May, 1830, brought in a bill to establish triennial Parliaments, vote by ballot and manhood suffrage. Only thirteen members supported him, but his action forced the Whigs to bring forward their own proposals, and Lord John Russell, while rejecting the ballot and Manhood Suffrage, proposed a series of resolutions for the enfranchisement of the great industrial towns. His proposals were rejected by 213 to 117.

So matters stood when on October 26, 1830, the first Parliament of William IV. assembled.

The General Election has shown clearly the bent of the public mind. Its most significant incident was perhaps the return of Brougham for Yorkshire. Hitherto county constituencies had invariably been represented by local land-owners whether Whig or Tory. Brougham, already distinguished by the part he had taken against the Crown in the case of Queen Caroline, and perhaps, with the exception of Lord Durham, the most sincere and democratic of the Whig reformers, had no local influence of any sort. Nevertheless he swept the greatest constituency in England by a large majority. Hume, one of the most prominent leaders of the Radicals, was returned for Middlesex; and in almost all the free constituencies the Reformers carried the day. The Whig and Radical Opposition was far stronger than in the late Parliament, and to the strength of that Opposition could be added those extreme Tories whom Wellington's concessions to the Catholics had disgusted, many of whom had voted for Blandford's Reform proposals, and all of whom were thoroughly dissatisfied with the existing government.

The wisest strategy could hardly have saved the

Government in such a situation; Wellington's characteristic lack of judgment and his utter failure to understand the state of mind of his fellow-countrymen rendered his case and that of his ministry hopeless. Speaking in the House of Lords on November 2, 1830, the Duke committed his Government to the opposition of any kind or degree of reform. He was fully convinced, he said, that the country possessed a legislature which answered all the good purposes of legislation, "and this to a greater degree than any legislature ever has answered in any country whatever."

The effect of this speech was appalling. So strong was the popular feeling that the King would not venture to attend the Lord Mayor's dinner at the Guildhall. Many shops in London closed their shutters. The funds fell from 84 to 77.

On the same night upon which Wellington made his disastrous speech, Brougham had given notice in the House of Commons of his intention to bring forward the question of Parliamentary Reform. November 18th was fixed for its consideration; but before this date had arrived the Government had fallen; for on November 15th, Sir Henry Parnell moved to inquire into the expenditure of the Civil list. This was a matter upon which all sections of the Opposition, Whig, Radical, O'Connellite and ultra-Tory could unite. The Ministers themselves probably preferred to be overthrown upon such a question than, as seemed likely, upon Brougham's motion for Parliamentary Reform. The Government was defeated and Earl Grey was called upon to form a Ministry.

The problem which at once presented itself was "what was to be done with Brougham?" After the

eccentric Blandford and O'Connell, who alone came to the House with the force of a definite Democratic mandate, Brougham was the initiator of the movement for Parliamentary Reform so far as the House of Commons was concerned. His name was inseparably associated with that cause throughout the country, and the Reformers unanimously regarded him as their leader. It was certain that a Reform Ministry from which he was excluded could not stand a month. On the other hand, the Whig aristocrats were extremely unwilling to admit him to the Cabinet; while he, on his part, was by no means anxious to join them at the risk of surrendering his dominant position in the country. He was offered the post of Attorney-General and refused it. He twice announced in the House of Commons his intention of holding himself aloof from the new Government. At last the post of Lord Chancellor was offered him, and was after some slight hesitation accepted.

The Reform
Ministry.

The question of Parliamentary Reform had next to be immediately considered by the Cabinet. The popular demand was primarily for three things, the abolition of rotten boroughs, the shortening of the duration of parliaments, and the ballot. All three were brought before the Cabinet and pressed upon it by Lord Durham, an aristocrat with strong Radical leanings. The matter was referred to a Committee consisting of Durham, Russell, Sir James Graham and Lord Duncannon. Only the first was accepted, and the Government resolved to accompany it by the establishment of a uniform franchise throughout the country.

The plan finally agreed upon fixed the qualification for the Borough franchise at £10, while at the

same time enfranchising all holders of twenty-one year leases. In the Counties copy-holders to the value of £10 were to be enfranchised and lease-holders whose property was worth more than £50 per annum. Boroughs with a population of less than 2,000 were to be disfranchised and those with a population of less than 4,000 were to lose one of their two members. On the other hand, one or more members were to be given to twenty-seven considerable towns hitherto unrepresented—forty-eight new seats in all, while additional members were given to twenty-seven counties—Yorkshire, the largest and most populous, receiving eight.

The Great
Reform
Bill.

The Bill so drafted was introduced into the House of Commons by Lord John Russell on March 1, 1831. Its fate was in doubt up to the last moment, for there were many Members who had not committed themselves either for or against Reform, and many others who, while committed to Reform might or might not approve of the terms of the particular Bill. In the end in a full House the second reading was carried by a majority of one. On April 19th, a Tory member, General Gascoigne, succeeded in carrying an amendment declaring that the number of English representatives should not be reduced. A Cabinet was held the following day, and it was unanimously determined to ask the King to dissolve Parliament. The King, though the sympathy which he had been supposed to feel for Parliamentary Reform was already cooling, consented, and Parliament was dissolved on April 22d.

The new Parliament contained an overwhelming majority of reformers. The Bill, it is true, was no very democratic measure. It not only entirely left

out the working classes whom O'Connell had sought to enfranchise, but where popular franchises already existed in many considerable towns and cities (such as Preston, Northampton and Westminster) it destroyed them, substituting the fixed £10 limit which effectually confined the suffrage to the middle classes. In spite of O'Connell's efforts to secure a measure of justice to Ireland, all concessions in that direction were refused. Ireland not only remained grossly under-represented, but the wrong recently done to her forty shilling freeholders was not redressed.

Nevertheless, the feeling against the rotten boroughs and against the power which the possession of these gave to the aristocracy was for the moment strong enough to carry everything before it. All the constituencies where popular election of any kind existed, returned to the House reformers of one shade or another; and supporters of the Ministry like young Macaulay, who had recently entered Parliament, were able to boast that there were Members on the Reforming side who represented more electors than had returned the whole body of the Opposition. The Reform Bill was reintroduced and carried triumphantly through all its stages. The great majority which the Ministers had obtained was by no means of unmixed advantage to the democratic cause. In the old Parliament the Whig Government, doubtful of its position, had been compelled to court the advanced Reformers. The great accession of strength which it now received made it possible for Ministers to follow their natural inclinations as the members of a privileged class and to retrench on the privileges extended to the people. The Bill as re-introduced after the General Election was decidedly less democratic than the original Bill,

and its scope was still further narrowed during its passage through Committee by an amendment which restricted the scope even of the £10 franchise by providing that the vote should be given only to those who were directly rated for Poor Law Relief. Where, therefore, the landlord compounded for rates, even the £10 tenants were disfranchised.

On October 2d the Bill was sent up to the House of Lords.

The Lords still regarded themselves as an independent Estate of the Realm, with powers equal to, and coordinate with, those of the Commons. In spite, therefore, of the decisive results of the recent General Election, and in spite of an eloquent warning from Brougham, the Lords rejected the Bill on its second reading by a majority of 41 (199 to 158), October 8, 1831.

The action of the Lords stirred the country into the most violent paroxysm of anger. At Nottingham, the residence of the Duke of Newcastle (one of the most influential opponents of Reform) was burned to the ground. Bristol was sacked (October 30th) by an angry populace. At Birmingham 100,000 men were prepared to march on London. All over the country citizens were refusing to pay taxes. The country seemed on the eve of revolution.

The House of Commons passed by a large majority a resolution declaring their determination to stand by the provisions of the Reform Bill and their continued confidence in the existing Ministry. The Ministers on their part pressed the King to give them a guarantee that he would, if necessary, create a sufficient number of peers to insure the passage of the Bill through the Upper House.

The King, a man of small intelligence and no capacity for statesmanship, hesitated. He was quite incompetent to grapple with the crisis; he listened now to one adviser, now to another, and was frightened of every course of action that was suggested to him. However, he suffered his Ministers to remain in office and (on December 12, 1831) to re-introduce their Bill, which was again passed through the House of Commons. (The second reading upon January 18th.)

It was again (upon March 23d) sent up to the Lords.

The majority of the peers still remained strongly hostile to the Bill; but there were now many waverers. Some were moved by the strong demonstration of feeling throughout the country, others by the threat to create more peers to which it was generally believed that the King would ultimately have to consent. These waverers were sufficient to turn the scale, and on the 26th of March, 1832, the second reading of the Bill was carried in the Lords by a majority of nine.

Then came the Committee stage. Lord Lyndhurst, the ex-Chancellor, who was the virtual leader of the Tory Opposition, selected as his battle-ground the disfranchising clauses of the Bill. He moved that the consideration of these should be postponed, and he carried his point.

The Ministers now pressed the King to fulfil the promise which they had wrung from him that he would if necessary create enough peers to save the Bill. But the King was now much under the influence of his wife and of Lyndhurst. He refused to comply with the demand of his Ministers. They resigned

forthwith and the King sent for Lord Lyndhurst asking him to form a Government.

The attempt was a ludicrous failure. Peel, with his keen eye for political strategy, would have nothing to do with it. Wellington consented to accept office, but quailed before the anger of the Nation. The King was obliged to relinquish his plan and to submit to the terms dictated by Lord Grey, these terms involving the promise to create the number of peers required to carry the Reform Bill in its original form.

The battle was now won. The King himself appealed to Wellington to prevent any further opposition being offered to the Bill. His appeal was successful. At Wellington's suggestion a large number of Tory Peers deliberately absented themselves from all subsequent stages of the debate, and the Bill finally passed its third reading in the Lords upon June 4th, by a majority of 84 and received the Royal Assent on June 7, 1832.

It would be very difficult to say for certain whether on the whole the attempt to give English institutions an outward aspect of Democracy gained or lost by the passing of the Reform Bill. Certainly some of the worst anomalies and corruptions in the old system disappeared. The parasites that had swarmed in the House of Commons, mere creatures of the great Lords—men of whom John Wilson Croker was a typical specimen—were to a great extent driven out. The landed aristocracy lost their full control over the machinery of legislation; and the door was opened for the appearance of the wealthier middle class as a distinctive political force. The way was prepared for Cobden, the spokesman of the great manufacturers, and for the Anti-Corn Law League, which we are

about to examine. At the same time, the establishment of a £10 franchise as a dead level in place of the variety of the old national system prepared the way for that degeneration of Parliamentary institutions, especially in regard to their responsiveness to popular will, which was to show itself in so marked a fashion before the end of the century. Under the old system the landed interests had undoubtedly too great a preponderance of power, but other interests existed and found expression. Constituencies where the franchise was popular occasionally sent men of energy, and of true democratic opinion, to Parliament, and even where the franchise was closely restricted, the very fact that a small number of men, not by any means always rich men, were picked out from among their fellows as voters and voted under the public eye, placed upon them something of the responsibility of a jury. Had the rotten boroughs been disfranchised and the irregular system of election left otherwise as it was, it can hardly be doubted that the result would have been more favourable to democracy than was the actual result of the Reform Bill—especially as there existed in England at that moment a distinct though confused and inadequate body of Democratic opinions. Since the Ministers were not prepared to follow O'Connell and the Radicals in the direction of manhood suffrage, this would probably have been the best thing they could have done. What they actually did, not only left the working classes, whose anger had supplied so much of the motive power for the passing of the Bill, wholly unrelieved, but deprived them of such organs of expression as they had possessed under the old system. The case of Preston, whose very wide and democratic franchise the Bill

destroyed, is notable. In 1831, immediately after the formation of Lord Grey's Government, his Irish Secretary, Stanley, was defeated there mainly on the question of the Ballot by the Radical leader Hunt. After the passage of the Bill with the drastic restriction of the franchise which accompanied it, Hunt lost his seat again to Stanley.

The first General Election after the passing of the Reform Bill gave Grey's Government an enormous nominal majority, but that majority was composed of the most discordant elements. It was made up in part of aristocratic Whigs, in part of Radicals of various shades, together with a strong contingent of "Repealers," that is, members pledged to the Repeal of the Union, whom O'Connell, in spite of the restricted franchise, brought with him from Ireland.

In the first acts of the Reformed Parliament there was little that indicated a response to such stirrings of democratic feeling as were still apparent in the nation. The first King's speech of Lord Grey's Government, after its triumph, promised a severe Coercion Act for Ireland. Ireland was indeed much disturbed and thoroughly discontented, the more so on account of the complete neglect of her claims by the Reformers. O'Connell was already organising a new national movement having for its object the Repeal of the Union. In addition to this demand two cognate grievances were bitterly felt by the Irish people. The old agrarian quarrel between landlord and tenant had at this time reached an acute phase, and at the same time the Catholics, encouraged by the success of their agitation against civil disabilities, had begun to organise a general resistance to the payment of tithes to the Protestant Church as by law established.

Lord Grey's Government met the growing discontent of the Irish by a measure which deprived them of all security in constitutional freedom, and virtually placed them under martial law. The first result of this was to create a sharp breach between O'Connell and the Whigs, whom he had supported in the carrying of their Reform Bill, though it fell so far short of his hopes, but whom he now stamped in his famous phrase as "base, brutal and bloody." His opposition was, however, fruitless. The Government in oppressing Ireland could rely on the support not only of the old governing class of England, but on the whole of the newly enfranchised English middle class. The Coercion Act was passed and the resistance of Ireland was for the moment put down.

The Reform Parliament next dealt with two matters of very different interest—the abolition of Colonial slavery and a change in the Poor Law. Its action in this last will be found significant of how little the working classes had profited in influence and consideration by the passing of the Reform Bill.

When the Government proceeded to bring forward its series of resolutions for the Abolition of Slavery in British Colonies, the resolutions proposed were found to be the gradual abolition of the Slave status after a period of fifteen years' probation and a loan of £15,000,000 to the West Indian planters to tide them over any period of difficulty that might follow. It soon appeared that in both aspects the measure would meet with strong opposition. The Abolitionists objected to the long period which was to elapse before Emancipation began, while the planters declared that without slavery they could never repay the loan, and also that its amount was insufficient.

Colonial
Slavery

Both objections were to some extent met, the latter much more fully than the former. Fowell Buxton, the representative of the Abolitionists, moved an amendment to the second reading to the effect that the abolition should be immediate and this amendment was seconded by O'Connell. The Ministers induced Buxton to withdraw his Amendment, but O'Connell was not equally amenable to pressure; he picked up the dropped amendment and pressed it to a division. He was, of course, defeated by a large majority. The pressure, however, was found to be sufficiently strong to induce the Government to reduce in Committee the term from 15 to 10 years and to make some other small concessions to the enemies of slavery. The protests of the planters were met in a much more generous spirit. In the end a free gift of £20,000,000 was made to compensate them for the loss of the slaves. This sum, far greater than the market value of the human chattels liberated by the change, was altogether extravagant and a monstrous tax upon the English people, but as some of the wealthy Abolitionists were themselves interested in slave-owning, it passed without any effective opposition.

The New
Poor Law

Colonial slavery thus disposed of, the Government turned its attention to English affairs. A Commission had been appointed in 1833 to inquire into the existing system of Poor Relief, and its recommendations were embodied in a Government measure which came to be known as the new Poor Law.

The old Poor Law (originating in the consolidation under Elizabeth of the measures for meeting the acute distress which had been caused by the Dissolution of the Monasteries) had been extended from time to time as occasion arose. As England became more

and more capitalist and that determining part of the nation which propertyless grew larger and larger in proportion to the whole, more and more of the working classes came under its provision; but no regular scheme had been thought out, and in many cases the method of giving relief was chaotic and even to some extent mischievous. There were places in which relief was so generally given as a matter of course that it virtually acted as a subsidy in aid of wages, and everywhere the extension of relief was based on the old tradition that a proletarian was something *exceptional*, whereas to be proletarian had now become the normal condition of most Englishmen. This divergence between theory and social reality reasonably called for inquiry and reform; it afforded no excuse whatsoever for the cruelty and inaptitude of the reform actually proposed; a measure which rapidly hastened the already alarming progress of the English masses toward servitude.

That reform was in the main as follows: that any poor person who was in need of relief should obtain it only at the cost of being imprisoned, segregated from his wife, deprived of all rights over his children, and generally treated as badly or worse than a convicted felon. The poor who could not find employment under a capitalist system were in fact to choose between starvation and a slavery worse in many respects than the slavery which the Ministers had boasted of abolishing in the Colonies. Their children were to be most literally slaves and were to be sold as such (under the name of apprenticeship) to any manufacturer who might be prepared to keep them alive for a few years for the advantage of their precocious labour. In this way were recruits found

for those industrial hells of which a vivid picture is drawn in subsequent reports of the Committees on the working of the factories.

Abominable as the measure was it received the support of nearly all the most distinguished statesmen of the day. The Archbishop of Canterbury had signed the report upon which it was based, and, though Hawker, the eccentric parson of Morwenstowe, wrote an imperishable poem in denunciation of it, the Anglican clergy as a whole agreed with the atheist philosophers whose theories were now to be put into practice. Peel was as ready to bless the Bill as the Whigs were to press it through. The list of the small majority that divided against the third reading in the Commons (on July 2, 1834) is instructive. It contains the great names of O'Connell and Cobbett—for the rest a handful of Tory squires and two or three independent Radicals. These were all that could be found in a Reform Parliament to stand up for the elementary rights of human beings accused of nothing but their poverty in a society where the stores of food and of clothing, the land, the implements of labour and every opportunity for production had passed under the gradual influence of false religion into the hands of a small minority of the nation. The Bill received the Royal Assent on August 5, 1834.

**The Tithes
Question.**

Meanwhile the problem of Ireland was again coming to the fore. The Catholic peasantry were compelled by law to pay tithes to the Protestant Church which had been established by force in their country. The collection of these tithes had long been a difficult business; it became more difficult when the high hopes raised successively by Emancipation and Reform were found to end in nothing better than a Coercion Act.

There came, what we have seen was threatened, a general strike against the payment of tithes, and the authorities found themselves utterly powerless. A number of violent conflicts took place all over Ireland between the police and the populace. Sydney Smith reckoned that the collection of tithes must have cost from first to last something like a million lives. But the violence of the peasantry was, perhaps, not more successful than their steady and vigorous use of what long afterward came to be called "the weapon of boycott." The cattle of a recalcitrant Catholic might indeed be seized, but they could not be sold. Troops had to be poured into a district in order that an auction might be safely held; but when the utmost that the military power could do had been done there was no possible means of compelling people to bid for these sequestered goods. In many cases after the ground had been lined with troops to enable a single cow to be sold, it was found that no one cared or dared to make an offer for it. The result was that the Protestant clergy, for whose benefit the tithes were supposed to be collected, were for the most part as badly off as if no tithes had existed. So patent did this eventually become that Earl Grey's Government had to propose to pay over to the incumbents the value of the tithes which they could not get and to take their chance of collecting the tithes from the tenants. As it was quite obvious that they could not so collect them the practical issue was that the British nation was paying the Irish Catholic Farmers' tithes for them.

The patent absurdity of this situation served to draw public attention to the even more monstrous absurdity of the Irish Protestant establishment itself;

and motions began to be made by the Radicals in Parliament directed against the maintenance of that establishment, at any rate in its existing dimensions. One of these, made on May 27, 1834, by Henry Ward, a leading man among the Radicals, was important as drawing from Lord John Russell, then leader of the House, the admission that the Irish Church in its existing position could not be maintained.

The same day Lord Stanley, Sir James Graham, the Duke of Richmond and the Marquis of Ripon resigned from the Government. Of these Stanley was the most considerable loss. He was a brilliant debater, with a touch of genius in his oratory. He had done the best fighting work that was done for the Reform Bill. As Irish Secretary he had introduced the Coercion Bill which caused the breach between the Whigs and O'Connell. But he and those who acted with him held that under no circumstances could the property of the Protestant Church in Ireland be legitimately touched; and as the Cabinet generally, especially Russell and Althorp, were inclining to a reduction in its revenues, they took an early opportunity of severing themselves from the Ministry.

Earl Grey tried to go on without them for a week or two. But new troubles were ahead. The Coercion Act came up for renewal. There was a strong difference of opinion among the remaining Ministers as to whether certain of its more oppressive clauses should be dropped. O'Connell received definite assurances that their abandonment had been decided on, and on the strength of these assurances, which he had obtained from the English Radicals, withheld an address against Coercion. Nevertheless when the time came the original Bill was reintroduced as it stood. O'Con-

nell protested and made public the assurances which had been given him, and these disclosures forced Althorp to resign. Grey felt, with his Cabinet falling away from him on every side, that he could stand no longer, and in forwarding Althorp's resignation to the King, he sent in his own as well (July, 1834).

On the resignation of Earl Grey, Lord Melbourne was instructed to form a government. He was an aristocrat of languid temper and no very definite convictions; he was also a man of good abilities and skilful in tact and judgment where he had to deal with other men. He was not badly qualified therefore to reconcile the disagreements which were at that moment breaking up the Whigs; but he had very little time in which to do so, for soon after his appointment as Prime Minister, Lord Althorp, who was still Chancellor of the Exchequer and leader of the House of Commons, succeeded his father and went to the House of Lords as Earl Spencer. Now the Chancellor must, by a tradition which then had some real meaning (and which still survives as a sham or fossil) be a member of the House of Commons. It was necessary therefore to reconstitute the ministry by appointing some member of the Lower House to the post, and this gave the King an opportunity to use what remained of the powers of the Crown. The vacancy thus caused, Melbourne proposed to fill by appointing Lord John Russell as Althorp's successor. When he went to the King to submit his plan for the reconstitution of the Government, he was informed that the King intended to discard him and to ask the Duke of Wellington to form a Tory administration.

The King had been growing more and more hostile

The Dis-
missal of
Melbourne.

to his Ministers for some time. His mind, peculiarly narrow and ill-trained and, above all, lacking in experience, was much affected by the prophesies of imminent revolution which the Tory leaders were always pouring into his ears. He was perhaps genuinely shocked by the suggested reduction of the revenues of the Irish Church. He had now gone so far as to make an oration in reply to the deputation of the Irish Bishops, which was next door to a public rebuke to his own ministers. On November 14, 1834, Melbourne was definitely dismissed from office.

The Con-
servative
Ministry.

The King followed at first his original intention, and invited Wellington to form a Government, but Wellington was of opinion that no Government could be formed at that moment which would have even a reasonable chance of permanence unless the Prime Minister was in the House of Commons; for it must always be remembered that, until toward the end of the eighteenth century, the House of Commons retained a considerable measure of independence, and this particular crisis would certainly have shown its power if its opinion had been flouted. He therefore advised that Peel should be intrusted with the task of forming a Government, and expressed his willingness to serve under him. Peel was in Rome at the time; he received a letter from the King on November 25th, started at once for London, arrived in England on the 8th of December, and immediately set about the formation of his Ministry.

At the outset he met with a severe disappointment. Lord Stanley and Sir James Graham, the leaders of the Whig secessionists who objected to the proposed partial disendowment of the Irish Church, refused to serve under him. Here again political motive ap-

peared of a kind difficult for us in this day to comprehend. They considered that their consenting to serve under Peel so soon after leaving the government of Grey would affect the public mind—that is, the powerful middle class—unfavourably. And an unfavourable public opinion could, in those days, wreck a man's political career. Peel had therefore to form a purely Tory administration. It was also clear that no such administration could stand a day with the existing House of Commons, which had been elected on the morrow of the Reform Bill and contained a Liberal majority of nearly three to one. Peel therefore resolved to appeal to the electorate, and to this end he issued what has become famous under the name of “The Tamworth Manifesto.”

This document, issued by Peel as an address to his constituents, laid down the model on which the later Conservative party, as distinguished from the Toryism of men like Perceval and Eldon, was built. It accepted the Reform Bill as a “Final and irrevocable settlement, which no friend to the peace and order of the country would attempt to disturb either by direct or by insidious means.” It disclaimed all enmity to “judicious reforms.” It insisted much upon the security of property. It dwelt strongly, though in moderate language, upon the necessity of defending the temporal property of the Church. It was partly an appeal to the new middle class electors which the Reform Bill had (in spite of Peel's own opposition) enfranchised, but to which he, sprung from that class by birth, and, further, an opportunist in statesmanship, now looked for his chief support. As such it was drawn up with masterly skill. It was also in part (a tribute to Peel's knowledge of his kind) a dis-

The Tam-
worth
Manifesto.

covery of what would most strongly bind together the privileged classes in the future.

Parliament was dissolved in December, 1834. The enormous Liberal majority was in the ensuing elections very greatly reduced and the two parties brought much nearer to an equality; but the Liberals still preponderated. The election had failed to give the new Government the working majority it asked for, even if the followers of Stanley and Graham were to be counted among its supporters. As soon as Parliament met, the difficulties of the new Ministry began. On February 19, 1835, the House met to elect a Speaker and the Government candidate was defeated by a majority of ten. Next, an amendment to the address, censuring the dissolution, was carried by a majority of five (with the help of O'Connell and his Irish followers). Finally, in April, Lord John Russell succeeded in carrying against the Government, by twenty-eight votes, a motion in favour of appropriating the surplus revenues of the Irish Church—that is to say, he defeated the Government on a motion which raised the main question between the two parties. Peel felt that it would be dangerous to risk another general election; he resigned, and Melbourne once more became Prime Minister.

The Melbourne
Ministry.

Up to the death of William IV., Melbourne's government had a fair working majority in the House of Commons, but the prestige and popularity of the Whigs was still ebbing in the country. The great aristocratic families which dominated the Ministry had excluded the bitter but exalted genius of Brougham, and he, now detached from all parties, soon became one of the most formidable critics of the Ad-

ministration. The discontent of the disfranchised working classes, which was to culminate in Chartism, was already fiercely rising, while the Protestantism of the English middle class was offended by Melbourne's unofficial alliance with O'Connell.

We have seen that O'Connell had been in vehement opposition to the government of Earl Grey; but he had joined in the attack which overthrew the first Peel Ministry and when Melbourne returned to power it became clear that the Irish followers of O'Connell could be reckoned among his supporters. O'Connell suspended his agitation for the Repeal of the Union, and the Government in return consented to make the administration of Ireland somewhat more sympathetic with Irish feeling. O'Connell himself accepted no post from the Government; but his lieutenant, Richard Lalor Shiel, was sworn into the Privy Council a few years after Melbourne's accession to power, and several administrative posts in Ireland, which had been regarded as the special perquisites of the garrison, were given to O'Connell's followers.

It may safely be said that O'Connell acted throughout this phase of his policy in good faith and with no other object than the well-being of his country. Nevertheless the bargain he then struck was probably bad for both parties. In England it gave a powerful handle to the Opposition which loudly accused the Government of truckling to Popish agitators. In Ireland the hotter spirits, and especially the younger generation of Nationalists, indicted O'Connell and his friends as men who had sold their country's cause for a share in Government patronage. O'Connell never recovered the undivided authority over his country-

men which he had enjoyed so fully at the time of the Clare Election and had retained even as late as Lord Grey's Coercion Act. The quarrel paved the way for the Young Ireland Movement which was ultimately to dethrone O'Connell and to lead to the abortive insurrection of 1848.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE REIGN OF QUEEN VICTORIA.

It was upon the 20th of June, 1837, that William IV. died and was succeeded by his niece, the daughter of the Duke of Kent, who ascended the throne under the title of Queen Victoria. The new monarch was but just opening her nineteenth year, and apart from the immediate consequences of this change in the person of the sovereign, which will be considered in a moment, it must be apparent what vast effects would attach to so considerable a diversion in what had long been the attitude of public opinion toward the Throne. A lady whose youth in itself must appeal to the nation succeeded two men, each of whom had come to the supreme post in government comparatively late in life and each at a moment when the one had forfeited, the other could not even claim, the personal respect of that middle class which then directed English opinion. Her succession to the Throne at such an age further promised what the future was abundantly to give, the fruits which nearly always attach to long and unbroken continuity in the reign of one monarch. Apart from the commercial expansion, the great increase in population and in wealth, the almost uninterrupted domestic security of the epoch now opening, the personality of the Queen was to give unity to a whole period in English history which that history will almost certainly recall under

the title of "Victorian." What fortunes were to befall the shreds of *real* power remaining to the Crown will be seen in the sequel, but undoubtedly the circumstances and character of the succession made strongly though slowly for a recovery in the power of the Crown as a *symbol*: until, at the close of this Victorian period that symbol was quite unquestioned, had become perhaps the clearest expression not only of national but of imperial unity and was perhaps prepared (this only the future can show) for a new period of true executive power.

But apart from these general considerations which will be apparent, in all the remaining two-thirds of the century there were, as I have said, immediate consequences to be noted.

The event was of immediate political importance chiefly because the personal will of the Sovereign, which still counted for much in inner direction of political life, was completely changed by it.

William had been in his later years vehemently anti-Whig. He had hated the Melbourne Ministry; he had especially hated Lord John Russell who had now become the chief public man on the Whig side. He had dismissed the Whigs from power once by an arbitrary use of his authority. It was perfectly well known that he was only waiting for an opportunity to dismiss them again. The young Queen, on the other hand, came early under the strong influence of the Prime Minister's great personal charm, and soon became, if not a Whig, at least an ardent supporter of Melbourne.

A change of sovereign necessitated at that time a General Election. When the returns were complete it became obvious that the Whig majority had—for

all useful purposes—disappeared. The Liberals of all shades, including O'Connell's Irish contingent, still constituted rather more than half the House, but they were far from being united and their numerical superiority was so small that any secession on a single division must mean defeat.

In addition to its weakness in Parliamentary support the Government had many difficulties to settle. During the late reign an insurrection had broken out in Canada where the Colonists, especially those of French blood, demanded an elective legislature; a demand to which William IV. had offered the most obstinate resistance. Civil war was still raging when Queen Victoria ascended the throne. The Melbourne Ministry sent out the Radical Earl of Durham as Governor-General with large powers. Durham succeeded to a great extent in gaining the confidence of the Colonists, but in so doing he was held to have outstepped the limits of his prerogative and to have acted disrespectfully toward the Home Government. He was therefore, in spite of his great services to the empire, censured and recalled; but in fact he anticipated the recall and returned to England as soon as he found that those who had appointed him were not prepared to give him the support for which he asked. He published his report on Canadian affairs, which was prepared by Charles Buller, a brilliant young Radical whose early death alone prevented his achieving a great name. The recommendations of the Durham report were largely adopted by Lord Durham's successors and furthered that constant policy of Colonial Autonomy which, rooted in the experience of America, has since been the fixed rule of British Governments in relation to the Dominions over sea.

The Canadian
Insurrection.

Palmer-
ston.

The Melbourne Government at this moment was also notable for the appearance of Melbourne's foreign secretary, Viscount Palmerston; a man who was to become identified with a whole tradition of active foreign policy during the Victorian Period, and who now first began to take some considerable place in public life. He had begun his political life as a Tory during the Napoleonic wars, entering Parliament and receiving office almost as soon as he was of age. Later, he had been a Canningite and, like most of his friends, had joined the Whigs in 1830. He had even been Foreign Secretary under Grey. But it was not until Grey was succeeded by Melbourne that he had a free hand to put into practice his ideas of Foreign Policy.

Those ideas were in the main inherited from his master, Canning, but they were carried out with a hearty disregard of foreign susceptibilities, which the position of Great Britain in Europe now first made possible and which had formed no part of Canning's diplomacy. It would be a great error to doubt, however, that Palmerston knew his Europe well; and while he was a vigorous and a patriotic, he was also, therefore, a fortunate minister. Like Canning he was a hearty supporter of Liberalism throughout Europe, though somewhat lukewarm in his support of it at home. Unlike Canning he had the advantage of strong support in that attitude from the now enfranchised and powerful middle class.

But the anxieties of Queen Victoria's first Government were not confined to foreign and colonial affairs. The wage-earning or proletarian classes of England, now so largely increased in proportion to the whole, were not only suffering bitter disappointment at the result of the Reform Bill, which had been

carried largely by the exploitation of their anger and enthusiasm, but were experiencing the emptiness of Liberal policy so far as their own prime needs were concerned. It soon appeared that the only effect of that Bill upon the domestic fortunes of the working classes, while it disfranchised those of them who had been able to vote under the old system, was negative and vain. The practical fruits of the Reform—such as they were—meant little to the dispossessed masses—already a considerable majority of the whole people; while the new power of the Liberal capitalists had the worst results for the “hands” that produced the manufacturers’ wealth. The new Poor Law was now fully at work and its brutal tyranny was detested by the populace of town and country alike. Its iniquities were denounced by Oastler, a Tory Democrat who, far more than Lord Shaftesbury, really prepared the way for the Factory Acts. They were described in not perishable language by the genius of the young Dickens. Add to all this that the country was going through a period of bad trade, that food was dear, wages low and unemployment widespread—especially in the great industrial districts of the North—and we may partly comprehend the conditions which reinforced that great popular agitation which crystallised in what was called “The People’s Charter.”

The Chart-
ists.

The “People’s Charter” was in effect a demand for the complete democratisation of English Political Machinery. It consisted of six “points” as they were called. These were: (1) Manhood Suffrage, (2) the Abolition of the Property Qualification for Members of Parliament, (3) the Payment of Members, (4) Equal Electoral Districts, (5) the Secret Ballot and (6) Annual Parliaments.

It is very difficult to estimate what was the actual numerical strength of the active and organised Chartists. Very probably, as is common in such cases, they had among the working class an immense mass of vague sympathisers, who could be relied upon for a demonstration or even a riot, but who had no very clearly defined or considered ideas as to the objects of the movement. But it is certain that they succeeded in giving considerable trouble to the Government of Lord Melbourne in convincing so typical a Whig as Macaulay that the foundations of society were threatened by their actions. They were themselves subdivided into "Physical Force" and "Moral Force" Chartists; that is to say into those who looked forward to a successful insurrection of the masses against the Government and those who believed that the end they had in view could be attained by peaceful propaganda and agitation. The two, however, were closely entangled in the same organisation and the most effective work was probably done by those who were prepared to use the normal human and only finally effective weapon of violence. All through the early years of the new reign there were riots in the great cities which required troops and even artillery to overawe them.

We shall have to return to the history of the Chartist Agitation at a later stage of this narrative; here it is only necessary to mention it as one of the causes that was steadily weakening as well as embarrassing the Government of Lord Melbourne. It weakened that Government in two opposite ways. While the great mass of the still unenfranchised workers were cursing the Whigs for having deceived them with false promises of Democracy only to visit them with redoubled

oppression, those wealthy or middle class electors to whom Chartism meant a terror of anarchy and spoliation, were disposed to listen to the Conservative leaders who attributed its rise and growth to the method by which the Reform Bill had been carried.

In Parliament the Government had to fight a continuous battle for life. It was not long before its members were met by a check which they thought sufficient to demand resignation. Trouble had arisen in Jamaica where the local legislature showed a disposition to defy the Home Government. The Ministers met the situation by introducing a Bill which suspended the constitution of Jamaica for five years. The Bill was opposed by Peel; it was also unfavourably received by a considerable number of Liberals. After the most strenuous exertions the Government could only succeed in passing the second reading by a majority of five. Further progress with a Bill so carried was plainly impossible and Melbourne resigned. The Queen sent for Wellington, who in his turn advised her to request Peel to form a Ministry.

Peel had no difficulty in forming his Government, and on this occasion Stanley and Graham were prepared to act with him; but the project was destroyed by a curious difficulty which arose between the Sovereign and the Prime Minister on the subject of the Ladies of the Bedchamber.

The
Bedcham-
ber Plot.

The ladies at the moment in waiting upon the Queen had of course been selected by Lord Melbourne, and were for the most part the wives or sisters of prominent political members of the Whig aristocracy. For some of them the Queen had formed a strong personal attachment, and her strong dislike, which she frankly avowed to Peel, to parting with Melbourne probably

intensified her feeling of irritation at being asked to discard her personal friends. Peel, however, was resolute in insisting upon their dismissal. He probably believed that he could not safely allow the wife of Lord Normanby, for example, to be in the secret councils of the Queen at a time when he himself was responsible for the conduct of public affairs. Both parties stood firm, and the final issue was that Peel was dismissed and Melbourne recalled to power.

It is believed, and on good grounds, that the private advice of Melbourne himself encouraged the Queen to take this line. But the advice was injudicious from Melbourne's own point of view, as it was from that of the Queen. The Whigs came back to power, but they came back more heavily discredited than ever. No one could think that their position in obtaining office by the good will of the Ladies in Waiting was a dignified one, and at the best their position was not such that they could afford any loss of prestige. The Melbourne Government lingered on, suffering continual humiliations in both Houses of Parliament; but public opinion had already turned against them, and the way was prepared for the electoral disaster which they were about to encounter.

Palmer-
ston's
Foreign
Policy.

Meanwhile, oblivious of the weakness of the Government in domestic affairs, Palmerston was pushing forward his vigorous policy abroad. A dispute had arisen between the Sultan of Turkey and his vassal Mehemet Ali of Egypt, who invaded and conquered Syria and threatened Constantinople. France regarded his operations with a certain measure of favour; but Palmerston set himself against them with more than even his accustomed energy. He negotiated to secure the support of Austria and Russia and en-

tered into a Treaty with these Powers for the protection of Turkey. Throughout the affair he hardly consulted his colleagues. He acted on his own responsibility and he succeeded. Mehemet Ali was driven out of Syria, and Thiers, the French Prime Minister, was forced to resign. By this stroke Palmerston certainly increased the prestige of England and also increased his own prestige among his colleagues. But he bitterly angered them, especially Russell, and laid the train of the quarrel which was to come to a head ten years later.

Another event of the last years of Melbourne's Administration was the first Opium War with China, a war undertaken nominally for the purpose of avenging an insult offered to the British Consul at Canton, but really for the purpose of forcing the Chinese to admit Indian opium to their ports. Of course the English Government won an easy victory. The diplomatic rupture with China took place in March, 1839. By April of the next year the British success was complete, but it is significant that when a vote of censure on Lord Palmerston's policy was moved in the House of Commons by Sir James Graham on April 7, 1840, it was defeated by no more than ten votes.

On October 15, 1839, a betrothal was arranged between the young Queen and her cousin, Prince Albert of Saxe Coburg Gotha, who married her in the following year, and continued until his death, over twenty years afterward, to exercise a great, though gradually waning and on the whole (particularly at first) an unpopular influence upon the policy of the Crown. Melbourne, as Prime Minister, had to arrange for voting the Prince an allowance. He suffered a further humiliation, for the Tories—with the

The Royal
Marriage.

help of a section of the Radicals—succeeded in carrying a motion reducing that allowance from £50,000 to £30,000. The episode is significant in the highest degree of the contrast between those times and our own in the matter of Parliamentary action.

Still the Government did not resign, but held on after several more defeats, until 1841, when the Ministers resolved upon a course which at last brought their helpless government to an end.

The
Corn Laws.

For several years there had been growing up among the middle class, the electors of the towns for whom the Reform Bill had given so large a share of political power, a strong feeling of hostility, primarily to the Corn Laws and secondarily to the whole protective system which still governed English commerce.

The existing Corn Laws—completed in 1828—placed a heavy duty on all imported corn so long as the price of home grown corn was below seventy-four to eighty shillings a quarter. At sixty-two shillings it imposed a differential duty of twenty-four shillings and eight pence, that duty falling shilling by shilling with the rise in wheat until, at seventy-four shillings it ceased to be levied. The effect of this duty, in keeping bread at about double its average modern price, was odious not only to the urban poor but also (what was of more importance in a plutocracy) to the great manufacturing interests which were growing up to their full stature in the North of England.

In October, 1838, seven men met in an hotel at Manchester and formed the Anti-Corn Law Association. Shortly afterward they were joined by a man of genius, to whose powerful advocacy the movement was to owe its ultimate success—Richard Cobden.

As soon as Cobden had joined it, the Association began to show increased vigour. It changed its name to "The Anti-Corn Law League," raised immense sums from the wealthy manufacturers of the North who were soon not only opposed to a protection of corn but Free-traders to a man. They held huge meetings at which the Corn Laws were denounced as the cause of the throttling of the new Industrial System, and to which, as in the days of the Reform Bill, but with a far more obvious appeal, the urban proletariat were summoned to enfranchise their very food.

We must at this point pause to consider one of those ideas which have profoundly affected the history of the modern world. I mean the idea of Free Trade. Its supremacy in Great Britain is no longer unshaken. It never dominated the intelligence of the Continent. Its mastery even over the intellectual field which it conquered in our civilisation has not therefore been very long-lived; but it formed during the full lifetime of a man perhaps the chief temporal doctrine, certainly the chief economic doctrine of nineteenth century Europe. It had upon the fortunes of Great Britain in particular so prodigious an effect, (and the obstinate or necessary retention of it will have so much greater an effect in the immediate future), that one might almost write a history of British commerce during the Victorian period round that one phrase "Free Trade."

The
Theory of
Free Trade.

Briefly, the doctrine was this. Exchange is but a part of the process of production. Men exchange goods to their mutual advantage. To interfere with this process is equivalent to an interference with the production of wealth and is equivalent to a corresponding impoverishment, an artificial impoverish-

ment, of the community. And since it is obviously true that this doctrine applies to two men exchanging wealth one with the other—since neither will part with what he has save to his advantage—it is equally true of any two communities. All restrictions, therefore, by way of tariff or prohibitions which retard, impede or forbid such foreign exchanges as the citizens of a country would make if they were left alone, impoverish those citizens and the total wealth rises to a maximum when all such restrictions are removed.

A brief examination of this fundamental doctrine is sufficient to show wherein it fails to be of universal application. This failure may be discovered in two points:

(1) While freedom of exchange over a given area will tend to produce the maximum total wealth within that area, it does not equally follow that any particular part of the area will be benefited by this freedom of exchange. For instance, if three contiguous provinces, A, B and C, exchange at will, the total wealth of those three combined will tend to a maximum, but there is no guarantee that during the process C will not be impoverished for the benefit of A and B. For three provinces write three independent nations and you may easily have a state of affairs in which it would be to the advantage of A and B to force C into a system of Free Trade, but very much to the disadvantage of C to accept the bargain. When these conditions arise it is correspondingly to the advantage of C to establish what is called "Protection," and so to canalise exchange by artificial restrictions as to prevent the draining away of its wealth toward A and B.

That is the first point.

The second point is that the real advantage of the nation, even when Free Trade makes the total wealth of its citizens a maximum, varies with the distribution of that wealth. If, for instance, in a community composed of one rich man and two poor men I double the wealth of the three combined, but put the whole increment into the hands of the rich man, which increment he may invest abroad or even spend abroad, I have not advantaged the total well-being of the nation. Nor have I advantaged it if my Free Trade policy destroys occupations in which the poor man could maintain a certain level of production and enjoyment for himself, and replaces them by occupations for which he is ill fitted, or in which, while producing more wealth for his master, less falls to his own share. For it must always be remembered that that extra wealth need by no means necessarily be expended or invested in the country of which the wealthy man is nominally a citizen.

While it is thus clear that Free Trade as an abstract doctrine of universal application is false, it remains true that to the particular case of nineteenth century England it applied with all its force. England was then so securely established as the workshop of the world, her imports were, in every form, so clearly either the payment for her manufactures, or the raw material of the same, that there can be no doubt of the immediate—and one may say without exaggeration the prodigious—advantage which the policy she was about to adopt at this moment gave her in the economic field. It may be that after two generations the very success of this system imperilled the future of the country by making it impossible for any return to be made to the artificial restriction of

commerce when or if that artificial restriction should become necessary upon the rise of great manufacturing rivals. But with that grave modern problem this history is not concerned. It must be sufficient to record the wisdom of those who opened by the reform I am about to describe, more than a whole generation of unparalleled industrial and mercantile prosperity for their country.

There was but one evil consequence attached to the change to which I will come in due course; and that was the pushing of the Free Trade dogma to the extreme which permitted the abominations of the Irish Famine. But even that, as I shall show in due course, could have been avoided with the retention of a Free-Trading policy for the country as a whole.

With this digression completed I return to the course of my narrative, only premising that this oversimple economic doctrine had completely triumphed over the intellectual leaders of England at the moment I am describing.¹

The Repeal
of the
Corn Laws.

Neither political party was committed to Free Trade or even to any serious modification of the Corn Laws. Of the two leaders Peel was probably even at this time more favourably disposed to Cobden's views than Melbourne or even John Russell. But the Whig Government was face to face with certain disaster, the Free Trade movement was evidently becoming a force to be reckoned with, and it was decided that a move in the direction of freer trade was likely to be

¹Indeed, in the Old Universities where every doctrine once established lingers longest, at Oxford and at Cambridge, the few who profess some knowledge of political economy have shown themselves unable to this day to grasp any of the arguments for Protection.

the only card that the Government could play with any hope of success.

Russell therefore announced that the House would be asked to take into consideration the question of the Corn Laws. Before, however, the motion could be brought forward, the Government had suffered a direct defeat on another part of their financial plan: the rearrangement of the Sugar duties. The Ministers, as was their wont, accepted the defeat; Peel was not disposed to let them off so easily. He met them with a direct vote of want of confidence which was carried by a majority of one. Even Melbourne could not go on after this. In the Summer of 1841, he dissolved Parliament.

The manœuvre utterly failed. The Ministers appealed to the country to give them a mandate to abolish the sliding scale and substitute a fixed duty of only eight shillings a quarter on all imported wheat. The country refused to respond to the appeal. The Free Traders contemptuously rejected the timid advance which had been made toward them, and though the Anti-Corn Law League captured several seats in the North (Cobden himself being returned for Stockport), the official supporters of the Government found little favour even in those places where Free Trade was popular. On the other hand, rural England was seriously alarmed, and the Counties sent back an almost unbroken body of Tory Protectionists. When the elections were over it was found that Peel had a clear majority of close on one hundred. Thus it came about that a great Protectionist victory inspired by Whig coquettings with Free Trade installed in power the Government which was to repeal the Corn Laws. In order to understand how this strange paradox was

realised in fact, it is necessary to examine carefully the history of the first three or four years of Peel's Government.

The Peel
Ministry.

Sir Robert Peel thus in possession of a strong majority was able to form a strong Cabinet, well supported in both Houses.

Stanley and Graham at last agreed to serve under him and took office respectively as Colonial and Home Secretaries. The Duke of Wellington joined the Government without a portfolio and Lord Aberdeen became Foreign Secretary. The new Ministry was even stronger in talent than in Parliamentary support and conspicuously superior to the late Ministry of Lord Melbourne. But in forming it Peel unwittingly made an enemy who was to have a large share in bringing about his ultimate overthrow.

A young man of Jewish nationality, nominally Anglican in religion, the son of a collector of literary curiosities, by name Benjamin Disraeli, who had already acquired some repute by two or three odd but clever novels, had, after some political coquettings with various parties been returned as a Tory in 1837 for the borough of Shrewsbury.

Though his first parliamentary speech had been very ill received—largely owing to the grotesque eccentricity of his dress and delivery—he had, during the last years of the Melbourne administration, done good service to his party and acquired the reputation of a very brilliant debater. When the change of administration took place he fully expected office; indeed, he had gambled deeply on his chances of political preferment, plunging heavily into debt on the strength of them. But Peel found no place for him.

Disraeli, who had gone so far as to write to Peel

urging his claims, was bitterly humiliated. Though he lay low for some time, there is little doubt that he was already nourishing those resentful feelings which flamed out in the memorable *Phillipics* of 1846.

Meanwhile within the Conservative Party, quite apart from personal resentments, the elements of discord between the Leader and his followers were already apparent. Peel was no hero; but he was of a clear and vigorous intelligence, and an astute observer of both intrigue and tendency; and he had that rarest of gifts in a politician, the power of seeing something of the nation outside the narrow room of administrative action and personal rivalries. He alone of the prominent politicians of the day seems to have had a clear appreciation of the growing strength of the Anti-Corn Law League.

That strength was indeed becoming more formidable every day. It had behind it almost every element that could make an agitation successful, a clear theoretic creed, a plain practical grievance, the support of great masses of the electorate, especially in the industrial North where League candidates had in many places defeated both Whigs and Tories, and the support of great masses of wealth. It had in its front rank of fighters that Richard Cobden whom I have called a man of genius, whose power of lucid and popular exposition was unrivalled. A young Quaker manufacturer who unexpectedly developed splendid gifts of oratory, John Bright, counted as its second force. Cobden had, as we have seen, been returned for Stockport at the general election; Bright took his seat for Durham a few years later.

The Anti-Corn Law League adhered steadily to its policy of strict independence of political parties. In-

The Policy
of the
League.

deed the wisest of the Free Traders expected, and as the event proved, justly, more from Peel than from the Whigs. Peel on his side, faithful to the principles of the Tamworth Manifesto, was most anxious to conciliate and to attach to his own party the propertied, and in the nature of things, Conservative elements which were the dominant elements in the League.

For the agitation for Free Trade did not proceed from the populace. Cobden and all his friends stood absolutely aloof from the Chartist movement and explicitly condemned the growth of Trade Unionism. The more farsighted popular leaders in their turn attacked the League as a purely middle class organisation and while it did make a strong appeal to a proletariat that hungered for cheap bread, yet mobs of working men often broke up its meetings. On the whole, the practical appeal of the leaders, as Cobden himself admitted, was to that urban middle class which the Reform Bill had enfranchised. It was to the success with which Cobden indoctrinated this class with the economic principles for which he stood that the ultimate triumph of Free Trade must be attributed.

The Rise of
Free Trade.

On its speculative side the Free Trade movement rested largely upon the conclusions of the great school of thinkers and investigators, mostly British, who had between the time of the Scotchman Adam Smith and that of the Jewish genius Ricardo built up the Science of Political Economy. It was these great men who had one after another carefully analysed the laws which govern the production and distribution of commodities, and upon their analysis was founded that peculiarly national body of economic teaching, one of

whose apparently clearest conclusions was that of the doctrine called "Free Trade."

It must further be remembered in our estimate of the period and of the causes which led Free Trade to triumph, that while the fallacies underlying the doctrine as a universal truth were vaguely seized by the common sense of many, yet the further economic analysis upon which modern scientific Protectionism is based was as little understood by the defenders of Protection as by its opponents, and the doctrine of Free Trade seemed in those days, to nearly all those who had studied economics, to be a plain and irrefragable deduction from the first elements of that science.

Moreover, the abstract arguments of the economists were powerfully reinforced by the practical interests of the new industries which the industrial revolution had brought into being in North and Central England and in the West and Lowlands of Scotland. These industries lived by their export trade. Protection hit them in two ways. By taxing imports of food and raw materials it raised the cost of production, and by restraining the free importation of those foreign products which were sent to this country to pay for the products of our mines and factories it restricted the foreign market and hampered exchange.

The manufacturers therefore, and all those whose capital was invested in the great industries which had been built upon the northern coalfields, were Free Traders to a man.

Peel was not long in making a move in the direction of the Free Traders. In his Budget of 1842 he went as far in their direction as he could venture to go without risking a mutiny among the country gentle-

Peel's
Budget.

men who formed the bulk of his following. In point of fact his budget did excite grave discontent in his own party. The Sliding Scale was revived so as to reduce the duty on wheat by more than one-half, and an immense number of duties on raw materials and partly manufactured articles were taken off altogether. The sugar duties were retained from fear of the power of the West Indian interests, but cotton was entirely freed of taxation. Following so close upon the great Protectionist victory of 1841 this budget was a clear, though partial, triumph for the League and for its policy of independent pressure. It is interesting to note that a great part in the preparation of this budget was played by a young man, the son of a Liverpool merchant and ex-slave owner, whom Peel had made Secretary to the Board of Trade: William Ewart Gladstone.

Chartism
and Young
England.

Meanwhile the activity of the Chartists continued and on May 2, 1842, a monster petition was presented to the new Parliament by Thomas Duncombe, the Radical member for Finsbury, who moved that the petitioners should be heard at the Bar in its support. Whigs and Tories joined in opposing this proposition which was rejected by a majority of 287 votes to 49, after a speech from Macaulay who prophesied universal anarchy and spoliation as the inevitable result of the enfranchisement of the working classes.

The Chartists had indeed few friends in the House of Commons; the Manchester men, whose influence was increasing every day, stood as much aloof from them as did the two official parties. Outside a small body of extreme Radicals the only sympathy they got was from a curious little group of young Tories who, in imitation of the "Young Ireland" mutineers

against O'Connell, named themselves "Young England."

It was the policy of these men to emphasise the reality of the social problem and to appeal to the younger generation of the native aristocracy to attempt its solution along the lines of what they believed to be "feudalism." This group included several young men of noble family, Lord John Manners, Bailey Cochrane, and Sydney Smythe—afterward Lord Strangford. They were, for the most part, strong High Churchmen of the new "Oxford movement" type, and professed, and, to do them justice, really showed a sympathy with the Catholics of Ireland rare in those days. It was the irony of their situation that they grouped themselves round Disraeli, who was neither particularly young—he was over forty—nor an Aristocrat; but he had a real sympathy with their views on social questions, his taste for the romantic and politically sensational combined with his resentment against Peel attracted him to the movement, while his high talent made him its natural leader.

In India the new Government found itself confronted with an unpleasant situation resulting from one of the blunders of its predecessor. The ruler of Afghanistan, Dost Mahomed, was suspected by the English Government in India of intrigues with Russia. These stories may have been true or false; they were disbelieved by Captain Burnes, the British Envoy at Cabul, but they were widely credited by the Indian Government. In consequence the Indian Government decided to depose Dost Mahomed and substitute Soojah-Ool-Moolk, a rival whom he had supplanted; and Melbourne's Viceroy, Lord Auck-

The
Afghan
War.

land, sent a British Army into Afghanistan for this purpose. Dost Mahomed and his son Akbar Khan showed considerable military talents in their conduct of the defence, and the Afghans fought bravely for their ruler who was as popular as Soojah, the British candidate, was detested. But the troops of the Indian Empire achieved a complete victory, Dost Mahomed surrendered and was sent to India, and Soojah was raised to the throne of Afghanistan, a small British garrison being left to support him.

It soon appeared, however, that the new sovereign was odious to his people. He was hated on his own account and was hated the more bitterly as having been imposed upon the country by a foreign enemy. An insurrection broke out, in the course of which two British residents, Captain Burnes and Sir William MacNaughten, were murdered. The British garrison, consisting mainly of native troops, had no chance to resist. The commanders bargained with Akbar, who had now supreme authority in Afghanistan, for a safe retreat. Their force was, however, nearly annihilated before it reached British territory.

At this point the change of government took place in England, and Peel sent out Lord Ellenborough to replace Lord Auckland. Under the new Viceroy an expedition was organised and sent into Afghanistan. It was completely victorious and entered Cabul on September 15, 1842. The British Government, however, determined not to persist in the attempt to force a ruler upon an unwilling people, and Soojah was left to his fate. He was killed by his late subjects. The British troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan whose independence was now freely recognised.

In Scotland an ecclesiastical crisis of the gravest character marked the first two years of Peel's administration. At the end of the reign of Queen Anne (under the administration of Harley) a compromise had been arrived at in regard to the vexed question of patronage, a question to which the stricter Presbyterian attached the utmost importance.

The Scotch
Disruption.

By that compromise the patron was suffered to present to a living any person that he might select, but such an appointment could be vetoed by the Presbytery if they found anything to condemn in regard to his "life, literature or doctrine." In a disputed case, an appeal would lie, of course, to the courts of law.

Now, these provisions had always been odious to the strict Presbyterian who insisted rightly, if his creed was to have dogmatic value, upon the absolute privilege of a congregation to select its own minister. The matter had already given rise to more than one secession.

It was not till 1841, however, that things came to a crisis. The General Assembly of the established Church, frightened by the increasing tendency to dissent, strove to meet it by an ecclesiastical act empowering the congregation to veto an unacceptable Minister. The validity of this Act was immediately disputed, and in two cases that were brought before the Courts, the Auchterarder and Strathbogie cases, the patron was victorious. The General Assembly was thus brought into direct conflict with the civil power, and as the civil power would not give way a revolt followed. It was led by Dr. Chalmers, who was generally regarded as the chief of the Scotch Presbyterian theologians. The result of this revolt was the seces-

sion of 1843. On May 18th of that year, five hundred ministers threw up their cures, left the established Church, and founded the Free Kirk of Scotland, which henceforward had something approaching half the Scotch population behind it.

The
O'Connell
Prosecu-
tion.

After the General Election and the defeat of the Whigs O'Connell recommenced that agitation for the Repeal of the Union which he had suspended during Lord Melbourne's administration. "The year 1843," he said, "is and shall be the great Repeal Year." He set to work to achieve his object by the same machinery which had been so markedly successful in the carrying of Catholic Emancipation. He formed in Dublin a Repeal Association framed upon the model of the old Catholic Association. Once more he relied upon the priests to organise the movement throughout the country. Once more he summoned monster meetings in every considerable town. Once more, while deprecating all acts of violence, he paraded Ireland before the eyes of the English politicians as an object lesson and a menace. But one important difference existed between the situation in 1828 and that of 1843. In demanding Catholic Emancipation O'Connell had fully half, and that the abler half, of the English politicians with him. In demanding Repeal he had scarcely a friend on this side of the Channel.

After a formidable number of such popular demonstrations had been held O'Connell called a great meeting (which it was expected would number over a quarter of a million people) at Clontarf on the outskirts of Dublin. The Government decided to make this meeting the occasion of a trial of strength with the Irish leader. It was summoned for Sunday, October 8th. On the Saturday preceding it was pro-

hibited by the Lord Lieutenant, and a Proclamation to that effect was posted on every wall around Dublin. Those who desired to attend the meeting were already streaming into Clontarf and they and others would probably have paid little enough attention to a Government proclamation had not O'Connell himself intervened. He issued on his own account a manifesto advising his followers to obey the proclamation and not to attend the meeting. His decision was accepted and no meeting was held.

The ministers now thought their position immensely strengthened. They had "called O'Connell's bluff." It was now clear that the great agitator had no intention of ever offering the only real resistance that can be offered to any tyranny, the resistance of the body at the risk of the body. Had O'Connell been prepared for physical action the Clontarf meeting presented an exceptional opportunity; indeed, there can be little doubt that Peel deliberately intended to provoke him. He was not to be provoked—but by his caution he lost the full confidence of the people of Ireland, and put an end to the vague terror which his name had inspired in England. From that moment the revolt against his leadership begins to gather strength. The Young Irelanders, as they were called, found courage to dispute his authority. They disliked not only his refusal to appeal to the sword, but his reliance upon the Catholic priesthood for the success of his programme. They were revolutionists more on the Continental model, and they desired a National movement which should include Protestants as well as Catholics. Some of them, like John Mitchell, themselves belonged, by tradition, to the Orange faction. Their influence increased as O'Connell's de-

clined, until they led the country into the abortive insurrection of 1848.

Flushed with victory the Government proceeded to the prosecution of O'Connell and his principal lieutenants. They were arraigned at Dublin on the charge of conspiring to excite disaffection. The circumstances of the trial were not such as to raise the character of the Government for justice and fair dealing. The jury list, already mutilated by a Castle official, was submitted in the ordinary way to the Counsel for the Crown who struck out the names of all the Catholics. O'Connell was tried before a packed jury of his enemies in religion and patriotism. The scales were further weighted against him by the Judge, whose charge was admitted by reasonable Conservatives to have been monstrously partisan. He was convicted, and on May 24, 1844, was sentenced to twelve months' imprisonment and a fine of £2,000.

By the gross injustice of their proceeding the Government had largely thrown away their advantage, and their action gave the great Irish Tribune the chance of one last triumph. He appealed to the House of Lords, and the Law Lords, by a majority of three to two, annulled the sentence. O'Connell was set at liberty and returned to the House of Commons, but he was never again to speak for a United Ireland.

Maynooth.

The monster meetings of 1843 had sufficiently frightened the Ministers to make them consider carefully the need of measures that might conciliate Irish opinion. With this object, Peel introduced, in 1845, a measure by which it was proposed to increase very substantially the grant made to the Catholic College of Maynooth (itself a product of the terror inspired by the French Revolution), where Irish students were

trained for the priesthood. This measure was supported by the Whigs, and was easily carried through the House; but it increased the estrangement between Peel and a large body of his supporters. To the discontent of the Agrarians who had been alarmed by the Budget of 1842 and were still more alarmed by the budget of 1845 (which marked a further advance toward Free Trade principles) was now added the anger of the strictly Protestant section of the party, who felt that after having again confided in Peel, in spite of the surrender of 1829, they were now again betrayed.

The relations between the Ministry and the Anti-Corn Law League were at this time very curious. They were always quarrelling in Parliament, Peel on one occasion going to such monstrous lengths as to accuse Cobden of advocating his assassination. Yet in fact, as acute observers could see, Peel was moving nearer and nearer to the League's policy. Disraeli, now in open revolt against the leaders of his party, said, in 1845, that Protection seemed to be in the same position in which Protestantism had been in 1828.

Further
progress of
Free Trade.

The parallel was indeed very exact. It is true that there seemed to be at the moment a lull in the storm of the Anti-Corn Law League's agitation. In the House of Commons the Free Traders got rather worse divisions than at an earlier period. But Peel was not the man to be deceived by such externals. He perceived the full effect of Cobden's propaganda on the middle classes of the great towns—the very men whom it was his fixed intention to rally to the support of the Conservative Party. He also knew that at any moment the Whigs might declare for complete free trade in corn, and that if they so declared they would

sweep, as Parliament was then constituted, the whole of the manufacturing North. He had no intention of allowing them the opportunity. He was resolved that if the change must come he would be the man to carry it, and he believed confidently that he could carry it as he had previously carried Catholic Emancipation without breaking up his party and with nothing worse to fear than a little grumbling. All that he waited for was an excuse.

The threatened failure of the potato crop in Ireland gave him the excuse he needed. It was no more than an excuse. Neither the normal poverty of Ireland nor the horribly abnormal famine which was to fall upon that country was in any sense due to the Corn laws. Ireland was, in fact, growing corn plentifully and, indeed, exporting it. When the famine did come Free Trade had been actually established; Ireland continued to grow corn and continued to export it, while the mass of Irishmen starved. Protection was not at all the cause of Irish distress, nor was Free Trade in any way its remedy. Its cause was the ancient and calculated ruin of the Irish people. Nevertheless, prospects of scarcity strengthened the hands of the Free Traders. There seemed to the unread and untravelled, as well as to the electorate of the towns, something unspeakably horrible about prohibiting the free importation of food when men were on the verge of starvation. They could not think so clearly as to discern that the economic power to buy food, or the military power to seize it, was more important than its mere presence. Indeed, their descendants, the orthodox Free Traders of modern England, have not yet learned that elementary lesson in economics.

Peel called his cabinet together and proposed the temporary suspension of the Corn Laws. He found the majority of his Cabinet opposed to him, and the matter might very likely have dropped until some more convenient occasion had not the move which Peel had feared come from the other side.

Lord John Russell saw which way events were trending. He probably suspected that the meeting of the Cabinet had been called to discuss the Corn Laws. He resolved to be first in the field. He addressed from Edinburgh a letter to his constituents in the city of London in which he abandoned the fixed duty for which his party had hitherto contended and declared for free trade in corn.

Peel once more summoned his Cabinet and put to them point-blank the necessity of repealing the Corn Laws. The majority was now in his favour. The Duke of Wellington, though he hated the project, was willing to acquiesce in it rather than that Peel should resign, and Peel had made it clear that his resignation was the alternative. Yet there was a strong minority, led by Lord Stanley, which still objected. Peel felt that some sharp manœuvring was necessary if their opposition was to be overcome. He resolved to apply pressure. He tendered his resignation and the Queen sent for Lord John Russell.

That Peel did not really mean to give Russell the chance of carrying the repeal of the Corn Laws is made clear by his subsequent attitude. The Whigs were in a minority in both Houses of Parliament. It was obvious that they could not possibly carry Free Trade without Peel's strenuous support. They naturally asked for some pledge that such support would be given. Peel would only give the vaguest assur-

ances; and his language was such as to lead them to believe that he was holding himself free to oppose any bill they might introduce should it suit his political convenience to do so. Eventually Russell's attempt to form a ministry broke down owing to the refusal of Earl Grey (the son of the minister who passed the Reform Bill) to accept a seat if Palmerston was to be Foreign Secretary. But this difficulty would probably have been gotten over had Russell been really anxious to proceed with his task. It is pretty clear that in view of Peel's very dubious declarations he was more anxious to find an excuse for not proceeding with it.

Peel's Last
Ministry.

Peel now resumed office with the highly enhanced prestige of being, apparently, the only possible Prime Minister. Once more he called his own Ministry together and put the case before them. The Duke of Buccleuch and others were now prepared to give way; only Lord Stanley (who had been raised to the Peerage in his own right though he was the heir to the Earldom of Derby) stood firm against the Prime Minister's proposal. Peel—who took no risks if he could help it—countered his opposition by inviting him to form a Protectionist government. Of course he well knew this to be impossible. Peel had the whole of the Front Bench with him and had secured the adhesion of every man of repute and official experience in the party; while even such talent as did exist in the Protectionist rank and file had had as yet no opportunity to display itself. Stanley, still obdurate, therefore resigned the Colonial Secretaryship and his place was taken by Gladstone, who had resigned the year before over Maynooth, and who, owing to the Protectionist opinions of the Duke of Newcastle (his

patron who had returned him for Newark) was at the moment without a seat in Parliament.

Peel had resumed office on December 20, 1845. On January 22, 1846, Parliament met. The speech from the throne clearly indicated the change of economic policy which was in contemplation. When the Address had been moved by one of the Conservative converts to Free Trade and duly seconded, Peel, contrary to the usual Parliamentary usage, himself rose to explain his policy and acknowledge his full conversion to Free Trade. He was followed by Lord John Russell who, after a few words of explanation in regard to his failure to form a ministry, announced his intention of cordially supporting the new policy.

So far Peel had succeeded even beyond his hopes. There was grumbling among the Protectionists no doubt, but as yet there was no sign of overt mutiny; and it seemed likely that the first announcement of the Prime Minister's change of face would be received without protest. It was at this moment, when everybody was expecting the debate to be adjourned by general consent, that Disraeli rose and launched into a fierce attack upon Peel, punctuated by the vigorous cheers of the deserted squires. The speech not only trebled his parliamentary reputation but marked him out, in spite of his alien origin, his lack of lineage, his eccentricity and his unworthy personal motives, as the inevitable leader in the last stand of what may be called the "English Agrarian Party" against Free Trade.

Disraeli's speech made the formation of a Protectionist Party certain. Had that speech not been made it is highly probable that the story of Catholic Eman-

The
Protection-
ists.

cipation would have repeated itself. The squires would have grumbled, would have lamented their betrayal, denounced their unfaithful leader, would even perhaps have taken some sly opportunity of being revenged upon him; but in the end they would have come back to their allegiance and Peel would have remained, as he undoubtedly expected to remain, the leader of the Conservative party. But Benjamin Disraeli, gambling in a welter of personal intrigue for mere personal advantage, was his master in cunning. The adventurous speech was a call to arms, and a call made to men, most of whom were of the gentry. It fell therefore upon ears only too ready to listen to an appeal for action, only too deaf to trickery. Furthermore Disraeli had the good fortune to secure the coöperation of a man eminently fitted to supply what was wanting in himself.

Able as he was and great as was the service that he had already rendered to the new Opposition, Disraeli could not himself at this moment lead straightforward English squires. It required many years before such a thing was thinkable. His fortune, the fate of the country, favoured him at this moment by placing at his right hand a man of the highest rank and thoroughly trusted by the country gentlemen who must necessarily form the nucleus of the new party who yet combined with no contemptible abilities a high admiration for Disraeli's talents, a steady confidence in his judgment, and an ignorance of his kidney. This man was Lord George Bentinck, the brother of the Duke of Portland.

Lord George Bentinck was an exceptional—because an individual—man. He had originally been a follower of Canning, had turned Whig with Palmerston

and the rest when the Canningites seceded from Wellington's Government, and had then turned Tory again with Derby and Graham when the Irish Church question came up for consideration. During the whole of this time he had not opened his lips in Parliament. He was known to the public mainly as a keen racing man and a relentless exposé of scandals on the Turf. His fury at Peel's betrayal of the landed interest made him for the first time a serious politician, and he led the Protectionists with great energy, with industry, and with no little ability during their last desperate fight against the repeal of the Corn Laws.

When Peel submitted to the House his proposal for the immediate reduction of the duties on corn to a nominal figure and their complete repeal within two years, it became evident how strong was the opposition which Bentinck and Disraeli had organized. When the House divided on the Corn Bill, 240 members voted against the Government as against 337 (including, of course, the Whigs and Radicals) in its favour. There was thus a Free Trade majority of ninety-seven in the whole house in favour of the measure, but there was an immense majority—something like two to one—in Peel's own Conservative party against their leader's policy. The only question was whether the Protectionists could be formed into a solid party that should endure. If it could then Peel's retention of the leadership would be clearly impossible.

Bentinck and Disraeli fought the Corn Bill at every stage. They were unable to prevent its passing through the House by triumphant majorities, but the energy of their resistance so consolidated their party

that it was able to exist as a fighting force even after the issue upon which it had originally been formed was settled. The Lords passed the Bill, mainly under the influence of the strong pressure put upon them by the Duke of Wellington. The Corn Laws were repealed and Disraeli—who knew well from that moment that the step which had been taken could not be retraced—alone had personally profited from the resistance of the gentlemen with whom he now associated.

The failure of the Protectionists to prevent the complete triumph of the Anti-Corn Law League, or even to secure to the agricultural interest such consideration and compensation as a wise statesmanship might have dictated, must largely be attributed to the fact that, as a party, they represented but one—and that a highly defined—social class. In the middle of the nineteenth century half the population of England was still living on the land. Had even an appreciable minority of this half consisted of a free peasantry, they would have been strong enough, not perhaps to prevent the repeal of the Corn Laws, but at least to see that it was so carried out as not to endanger the permanent interests of agriculture, and to see that the repeal was accompanied by safeguards against the fall of agricultural prices below a level insuring the continuation of English agriculture. But a free peasantry had long disappeared from English fields. The agrarian interest, politically considered, meant now no more than the squires, and the squires were not strong enough by themselves to resist the power of the new wealth; that is of the great manufacturers, backed by the all but unanimous opinion of the trading and professional classes in the towns. The whole

thing was one of those long deferred revenges on ill-doing, the last of which are not yet matured.

On June 25, 1846, the Corn Bill was read a third time in the House of Lords. The same day the Ministry was defeated in the House of Commons. The occasion of their defeat was an Irish coercion bill which had been opposed from the first by the Irish members, but had been supported in its earlier stages both by Lord John Russell and by Lord George Bentinck. The Whigs, however, had only been disposed to support the government until the corn bill was safe. As soon as it was out of danger they were eager to assume office themselves. As for the Protectionists the final triumph of Free Trade had only increased their bitterness against the leader to whose treason they attributed that triumph.

The Fall of
Peel.

The question for them, as Disraeli put it, was, "How was Peel to be turned out?" It was decided that the coercion bill afforded the best chance they were likely to find. Both Russell and Bentinck spoke against the second reading, and Disraeli wound up the debate in the last, fiercest and most eloquent of all his denunciations of the Prime Minister. The House divided; Whigs, Radicals and Protectionists went into the same lobby with the Irish—nominally to oppose coercion but really to expel Peel from power. The Government was defeated by a majority of seventy-three; Peel instantly resigned and the Queen sent for Lord John Russell.

Russell formed his ministry on an exclusively Whig basis. He was indeed himself disposed to make advances toward some of Peel's supporters with a view to inducing them to accept office under him, and many of his own colleagues were strongly in favour of this

The Whig
Ministry.

course; but Peel was distinctly averse to any of his followers joining the Whigs. He still hoped to reorganize the Conservative party under his own leadership; and the expectation, in view of what had happened after Catholic Emancipation, was not an unreasonable one.

In all probability he would have succeeded, in spite of the bitter feeling which the repeal of the Corn Laws had engendered, had not Bentinck and Disraeli carefully fomented those feelings and done their best to make the breach between the two sections of the Conservative party irreparable. Disraeli's position was a particularly difficult one. His own chances of a political "career"—which alone of all things he desired—were bound up with the permanent alienation of Peel from his party; for he knew that from Peel he could now expect nothing;—neither money nor power. Yet no one knew better than Disraeli that it would be hopeless to attempt the restoration of Protection. He played his cards with a skill characteristic of him in the only type of conflict he could comprehend. Without ever allowing himself to give any specific pledge that could bind him to attempt a restoration of the old Protectionist system, he nevertheless continued to pose as the advocate of the landed interest and he pushed to the front every proposal which was likely to rouse the enthusiasm of the Agrarians which Peel would be obliged to oppose. In this way he worked underground and kept the wound between Peel and the more honest Tories open.

He also played a prominent part in resisting those measures by which the Russell Government completed the system of Free Trade. The Navigation laws—

though defended by the authority of Adam Smith—were repealed. Foreign sugar was admitted on the same terms as Colonial sugar. In both cases the Government was supported by Peel, and in both cases Disraeli took a conspicuous part as the advocate of what was left of Protection.

The success of these tactics was finally marked by the public recognition of the Protectionists as the real Opposition. In the early days of the Russell Government Peel and his late colleagues had occupied the Front Opposition Bench, their followers spreading themselves over the benches behind them, while the Protectionists under Disraeli's guidance marked their rejection of their old leader by sitting on the ministerial side below the gangway. This arrangement was so obviously inconvenient that it had to be abandoned, and the supporters of Peel surrendered their seats on the Front Bench to the Protectionists. The effect of this change was strong. It marked out Disraeli and his group as the normal successors of the existing Government should a change take place. The change was the more important because the greater part of those Conservatives who had followed Peel over the Corn Laws were either placemen or men expecting places. They had voted with Peel not because they agreed with him but because they looked to him as the Dispenser of public money. They now began to look to Derby (for Lord Stanley had now succeeded to that title) and many of them subsequently sat in his Ministry. Peel's close associates—such as Gladstone, Graham and Sydney Herbert—who had committed themselves too far to draw back and who had a lively recollection of Disraeli's vituperation—

formed a little group by themselves around their fallen leader and were known then and for many years afterward as "Peelites."

One result of the Protectionist secession must be noted, for it had an important effect upon the politics of the fifteen years that followed. The vague and general division of the House of Commons, though free, into two parties, a division which had long marked, in general indeterminate outline, the cast of voting and of majorities, and which had some effect upon the governments of Melbourne and of Peel, now ceased for some few years to exist. Henceforth—at least until the formation of Palmerston's last Government, in 1860—we shall find the House of Commons made up of a number of groups (the Whigs, the Protectionists, the Peelites, the Manchester men, the Radicals and so on) acting independently of each other and arranging themselves in all sorts of different fashions, according to the controversy of the moment. This, of course, enormously augmented the power of individual members of Parliament and of their constituents, and increased the prestige of representative government, not only in England, but, by example, throughout Europe, especially in countries where there was no experience of oligarchy. It correspondingly weakened the power of Ministers, and, therefore, of such wealthy men as stood behind the less fortunate of those politicians.

This phase of a House of Commons practically and very limitedly independent—in no way (of course) democratic—was not destined to endure. It was the last, perhaps the most dignified experience of that assembly in its freedom. It was to be succeeded by first a slow, next (under pressure of Parnell and his

Irish) a rapid decline which at last led to the extinction of the Commons as an organ of government.

Sir Robert Peel left no easy legacy to his successors. In 1847, the year following the Repeal of the Corn Laws, there fell upon Ireland that very calamity which the Repeal of the Corn Laws had been partly recommended in the hope of averting. Everywhere the potato crop failed and the people starved. It was soon obvious that those who had reckoned on Free Trade as a means of averting scarcity were out of touch with reality. The Irish people were not suffering from lack of available food-stuffs. They were growing food—corn and cattle—and even exporting it at the very time when they themselves were perishing of hunger. They were suffering from extreme poverty caused mainly by the immense tribute drained from the country by usury, by absentee landlordism and by unjust taxation. To meet this tribute they had to send across the seas the food which their own hands had grown and to subsist as best they could upon potatoes. When the potato crop failed they died of starvation by the thousand in every county.

The Irish
Famine.

The Free Trade philosophy which had been preached so persuasively by Cobden, which had convinced the English middle class and which had now acquired the added prestige of official recognition by the leaders of both political parties, was obviously inadequate to meet the practical necessities of millions who were famine-stricken only because they were poor. It is appalling to remember that Russell had the folly to apply this mere abstraction—and a false one at that—as a remedy to the most terrible and concrete of real tragedies. His incompetence intensified every evil and left deep in the Irish mind an

impression, now ineffaceable, not of his incapacity, but of deliberate cruelty and injustice.

We must here pause to consider a phenomenon which does not often appear in history and which when it does appear is invariably disastrous. This phenomenon is the application to complex human affairs, and in particular to political problems, of one isolated principle, with all the consequences logically deducible from the same.

Such action is always unintelligent, for it neglects the truth that not one but a great multitude of principles must be combined to conduct life wholesomely. But, while it is merely unintelligent in many particular cases, it is disastrous when applied to some matter of grave moment to the happiness of millions. We have already seen what the abstract principle thus applied was called and what was its nature. It was Free Trade: through an amazing incapacity for government, it was applied pedantically and methodically to the life-and-death matter of a starving Ireland.

It seems almost incredible that the particular and narrow first principles underlying the doctrine of Free Trade should have been allowed to ruin the most important and the most neighbouring of the provinces the British Government was called upon to rule. It would seem almost self-evident that when in practice such a first principle only resulted in quite obvious disaster, men would immediately reverse it through an instinct of self-preservation. But so ignorant of Irish conditions were the wealthy classes of Great Britain, and so blind to the future which a continued misgovernment of Ireland would erect to their own peril, that the mere bald doctrine of Free Trade was allowed to consummate what grievous misgovernment

had long prepared, and it was perhaps not without some half-conscious feeling that the ruin of the Irish people might end what had become a grave problem in government that Russell did this unpardonable thing.

The economic doctrine of Free Trade I have already described as so simple that its very simplicity should excite the suspicion of any man pretending to practical statesmanship. As a universal doctrine it is false, and more than this, even where Free Trade may increase the total wealth of a community, we have seen that if the power of demand is ill distributed in a community, the increasing wealth of that community does not produce an increasing well-being of its citizens. It is possible to imagine an extreme case in which one man might be advantaged to such an extent as to double the total wealth of himself and his fellow-citizens combined, and yet to have those fellow-citizens actually starving during the process. For if high power of demand be confined to one small section of the community that section is not bound to relieve the majority in which the power of demand is lacking. It may give effect to its power of demand in the shape of foreign luxuries or of foreign investment. It may reside abroad.

This extreme case was almost that of Ireland at the time of the Famine. Even if it were true (which it was not) that the Irish people as a whole would be wealthier through the leaving of free export untouched by government, there was no guarantee that the mass of them would, though the totality of wealth increased, be able so much as to purchase food. To the facile and unintelligent doctrine of universal Free Trade must therefore be ascribed the main part of

the hideous and criminal blunder here committed. But one cannot absolve those who committed it from a further blunder and crime which was an indifference to the sufferings and perhaps the destruction of something whose existence and even whose prosperity was vital to the ultimate future of England; I mean the Irish nation.

The fatuous policy of ignoring the main difficulty that had lain before English statesmen for one hundred and fifty years was pursued. Even the simple expedient of immediate relief by a great loan was neglected, and the Government saddled all the future of their own and of this neighbouring country with a weight which the first will perhaps never be able to shake off and which the second, for which they were responsible, will certainly never forget.

Irish leaders demanded that the exportation of food-stuffs should be stopped, and that the corn should be kept in the country to feed the starving peasantry. But such a policy was declared to be inconsistent with the principles of Free Trade, and was rejected almost without discussion. Then it was proposed that the British fleet might be employed to convey food from England to Ireland. Russell peremptorily refused, declaring that "such a use of her Majesty's navy would interfere with the legitimate freights of the shipping industry of Great Britain."

This, one would have thought, in the face of a ghastly national calamity, was doctrinaire Free Trade pushed to the point of insanity. But there was to be worse to follow. Russell insisted that any relief given to the famine-stricken districts of Ireland should come, not out of the Imperial Treasury, but out of a

special rate to be levied upon the districts not yet affected by the famine—a measure which, apart from its obvious and flagrant injustice, was calculated to have the effect, and did in fact have the effect, of making the famine all but universal. Nor would the Whig Government suffer the Irish to administer the fund which they themselves were to raise. It was to be administered by commissioners appointed from England, and the principle of its ministration consisted of the harshest application of the odious English Poor Law. Stone-breaking and useless road-making were the most fruitful occupations to which the peasants were allowed to be set. When Lord George Bentinck suggested that money should be voted for the much needed extension of railways in Ireland, his proposal was scouted.

Further, it was decreed that no relief of any kind should be given to any person tilling more than half an acre of land. This provision was, perhaps, the most disastrous of all the blind and cruel follies of the Government. Hundreds of thousands of peasants who occupied land of more than half an acre in extent had no alternative but the facing of starvation or surrendering their holdings altogether. Many died by the road side; the rest gave up, for the sake of immediate relief, the land which they had patiently tilled. Thus was what was left of ownership among the peasantry of Ireland, men intensely attached to the idea of property, deliberately destroyed by the act of the British Government, and in return they got servile labour and pauper relief where the Government could find it for them and death from hunger where it could not. It was not without some justice that Irish juries began everywhere to return verdicts

at inquests on the victims of the famine of "Wilful Murder against Lord John Russell."

Alongside of the wholesale massacre by famine went the constant stream of emigration to America, an emigration accompanied by every circumstance of brutality and humiliation. The "shipping industry of Great Britain," which Lord John Russell had been so afraid to injure by sending British ships in decent charity to the aid of the starving Irish, made a part of its profits out of the honour itself, by carting the Irish across the Atlantic under conditions too closely resembling those of the Middle Passage fifty years before. The legacy of hate sown among these wretched emigrants was yet another result of a contemptible impotence in statesmanship.

In dealing with the land-owning class of Ireland the Government showed itself equally purblind. A joint conference of all parties in Ireland, including many landlords, had recommended a sound and statesman-like policy, including among other things a tax on absentee landlords. The Government refused to tax the absentees. What it eagerly consented to do was to sell up those landlords who had tried to do their duty by their tenants. The encumbered Estates Acts of 1849 and 1850 virtually compelled landlords to evict every tenant whose rent was in arrear if he did not wish to have his estates taken from him. Wholesale evictions followed. The better class of landlords were expropriated and in their place came sharp commercial men who had bought the land cheap, with the intention of screwing the utmost farthing out of it.

All this was horrible enough. But what made it more horrible in Irish eyes was the avowed attitude

of a large section of English opinion. There were to be found English politicians and English newspapers openly rejoicing in the famine as a means of getting rid of the wretched Irish Papists who had given so much trouble in the past. Cromwell's project of granting Ireland to the English Protestants was openly revived. The most influential of English newspapers spoke enthusiastically of the good time coming when "a Catholic Celt would be as rare on the banks of the Liffey as a red man on the banks of the Manhattan." These foolish dreams were soon dissipated, but the language in which they were expressed was remembered in Ireland and is remembered still.

But Ireland was for the moment helpless. She had lost two millions of her population in a single year. Her soul was embittered, but her power of resistance was for the moment broken. Her national spirit flared up for a moment in one brief and futile attempt at insurrection and then died down into temporary darkness and silence.

The year 1848 was marked by revolutionary movements, successful and unsuccessful all over Europe. The House of Orleans fell in France, which country was, for the second time, proclaimed a Republic. The secret societies of Italy began to stir, and the movement for Italian unity and independence grew suddenly in strength, with the ambitions of the House of Savoy behind it and the allied support abroad of honest Democrats, of equally honest Protestants who desired the overthrow of the Papacy and of the less amiable but far more powerful Masonic bodies whose only aim was the destruction of the Catholic Church and all her influence. The Hungarians rebelled against Austria. Even among the Northern Germans

The Year
of Revolu-
tions.

who have shown little aptitude for freedom, a democratic congress met at Frankfurt, claiming authority over North Germany.

In England, 1848 was signalised by the last outburst of Chartism. The accepted leader of the Chartists was at this time an Irishman named Feargus O'Connor. He was a man certainly unequal to the task imposed upon him, even if we dismiss the suggestions of corruption which were freely made at the time. He had been returned for Nottingham at the General Election of 1847, and his return had raised the wildest hopes. The Chartists called a convention to meet in London early in 1848, and a monster meeting on Kennington Common was arranged for April 10th. The Government, informed in good time of what was intended, took every precaution for the crushing of any incipient rebellion that might take place. But, in fact, no such precautions were necessary. Feargus O'Connor had been informed that he would be held personally responsible for any loss of life that might occur. He was frightened, and he temporised. His supporters, many of whom were perfectly prepared to bring matters to the test of violence, freely declared that he had betrayed them, and the meeting at Kennington proved a fiasco from which the cause of Chartism never recovered. From this moment onward we hear next to nothing of the demand of the working classes for political power. The extension of the franchise was—when it came—in no way due to the demand, let alone to the action, of the mass of Englishmen—it was but a trick in the political game; and the only evidence of civic sense the still rapidly increasing proletariat could show appeared in the economic field. The more energetic

spirits among them turned their attention to Trade Unionism, the growth and increasing power of which was the sole—and that a most imperfect—democratic development of the twenty years that followed. It was confined to a minority. It developed an exclusive spirit. It but slightly affected—till another generation had passed—the political mind of England.

In such a year it would have been surprising if Ireland had been quiet. We have seen how O'Connell's influence had begun to wane from the moment of his ill-fated compact with the Melbourne Government; and how his prestige had suffered a still heavier blow by reason of his enforced surrender to the Government over the Clontarf meeting.

Young
Ireland.

He was now an elderly and, indeed, a dying man; in fact, he died on May 15, 1847, at Genoa, on his way to Rome, whither he had proposed to make a pilgrimage of expatriation. The younger patriots had already seceded from the Repeal Association and had started an organisation of their own, to which they gave the name of "Young Ireland." The new movement differed from that of O'Connell in two important respects. It repudiated the Catholic associations which had always clung to O'Connell's movement since the Emancipation time, objected to the influence in politics of the Clergy on whom O'Connell had always relied, and aimed at the union of Catholics and Protestants on the basis of a common nationality. Also its leaders professed none of that hesitation before an appeal to active courage and its physical consequences which O'Connell had always felt. At first they seemed to have had no definite plan of rebellion, but they talked and wrote much of the sacred right of insurrection and led the young enthu-

siasts who surrounded them to anticipate in a somewhat vague fashion the ultimate prospect of drawing the sword in an Irish war of liberation.

The acknowledged leader of these men was one William Smith O'Brien, an aristocrat closely connected with the oldest Irish houses and claiming descent from the national hero, Brian Boru. His politics had originally been Tory, but he had been converted to Nationalism by the horrors of the famine and had played a very honourable part in protesting against the atrocious treatment of his country by the Russell Government. Those who surrounded him were men of high character and, in many cases, of brilliant talents. They included Thomas Davis, the poet; Thomas Meagher, surnamed "Of the Sword," an orator, the memory of whose eloquence still lives; a youth of but three and twenty, Gavin Duffy, afterward knighted for his distinction in the colonies by the government which had prosecuted him for treason—and several others whose names most Irishmen recall to-day with a certain pride. Their organ, "The Nation," was certainly one of the most brilliant papers ever published in the British Isles. But they had a poor hold on the populace. The rural peasantry never followed them as they had followed O'Connell, and as they were later to follow Parnell. They had never anything like the hold on the popular mind of Ireland that even the Fenians obtained.

A little apart from this group, yet associated with them in their protest against O'Connell, and outstripping them in the violence of his language and conduct stood another man, John Mitchell, an Ulster Presbyterian, perhaps the only one of the Young Irishers who had a grip of realities and saw his way

clear. Mitchell was not playing with insurrection as a distant poetic fancy. He was out to make it a fact. The method by which he hoped to achieve his end was that of forcing the Government to prosecute him. He had no intention of seeing such a prosecution end as the prosecution of O'Connell had ended. It was to be the signal for a rising; and in preparation for such an event, as also with the object of forcing the hands alike of the Government and of the more timid Nationalists, Mitchell daily filled his paper, "The United Irishman," with outspoken appeals for rebellion accompanied by detailed descriptions of how such a rebellion could be most effectively conducted. He gave elaborate directions as to how to manufacture pikes, how to cast bullets, how to stop the charge of cavalry, and ended by publishing articles recommending the use of vitriol as a missile against the soldiers. He was a master of strong popular writing somewhat like that of Cobbett, and what he wrote seemed likely to set all Ireland on fire.

He succeeded in the first part of his programme. The Government was soon compelled to move out against him. An act was hurried through Parliament enabling the Government to suppress seditious newspapers, and to keep political prisoners in confinement without granting them bail. Under this act proceedings against Mitchell were begun. "The United Irishman" was suppressed and Mitchell himself was thrown into gaol.

He undoubtedly hoped to be rescued by a popular rising; indeed his whole policy was based on this anticipation. Nor is it improbable that his expectations would have been fulfilled, that Dublin would have risen and that the example of Dublin would have been

widely followed throughout Ireland, had the other Young Ireland leaders been prepared to give him unqualified support. But they were not. For the most part they disapproved of the violence of these proceedings. They were angry at his attempt to force their hands before (as they conceived) the country was ready. Perhaps some of them were a little jealous of his popularity which had thrown them into the shade, and somewhat irritated at the veiled taunts which appeared from time to time in his paper. At any rate they discouraged any attempt to make his arrest the signal for a rebellion. Dublin remained quiet, though a word would probably have roused the populace to fight. Mitchell was brought to trial, convicted and sentenced to transportation. He was hurried on board a ship and sent to Australia, whence some time afterward he escaped to become a warm partisan of the South in the American Civil War. He returned to Ireland in his extreme old age to be elected to Parliament, to be declared disqualified by reason of his unexpired sentence, and to die.

The Young Irelanders continued to talk of an approaching war of liberation, but with the failure to rescue Mitchell the heart had gone out of the business. Warrants were issued for the arrest of O'Brien, Meagher and others. They evaded them, went into the country and tried to start some sort of insurrection in County Tipperary. A small body of half armed peasants under the command of O'Brien came into conflict with the armed police at Ballingarry, drove them into a cottage and besieged them there, but the police fire repelled and dispersed the rebels, and the movement spread no farther. A few days afterward O'Brien himself was arrested at Thurles.

Meagher, who with a few followers, had taken to the hills, was also hunted down and captured. Smith O'Brien and Meagher were put on their trial for high treason and sentenced to death. There was no intention of carrying out the sentence, which was at once commuted to one of transportation. Smith O'Brien objected to the commutation; taking the ingenious ground that as he had been convicted of high treason and as the law had affixed to high treason no other penalty than death, the Government must either hang him or let him go. But his plea failed and he and Meagher were sent to join Mitchell in Australia. His sentence was eventually further commuted and he was suffered to return to Ireland, where he died without taking any further part in politics.

Of all the popular insurrections of 1848 only that of France was successful. In Germany the various kings and princes were easily restored, though some of those who had not already done so were induced to grant "constitutions" to their peoples. In Italy King Charles Albert of Sardinia, who had made himself the champion of national aspirations, was completely defeated by the Austrians at Novara and compelled to abdicate in favour of his son, Victor Emmanuel. The Hungarian insurrection seemed at one time likely to be more successful. Austrian rule was for a time completely suspended, and Louis Kossuth, the national leader, was proclaimed Dictator. But Russia, ever watchful (with Prussia as with Austria) of a possible *Polish* movement lent her armed aid to Austria, and by the aid of a Russian army the Magyars were put down with great cruelty by the Austrian Marshal Haynau.

Foreign
Affairs.

The course of events in Europe gave Palmerston,

who was again Foreign Secretary, great opportunities of increasing his power, prestige and popularity in the country. I have said that he copied his master, Canning, in putting himself forward as the champion of Liberalism throughout Europe. In many cases his intervention was ignorant and meddlesome and came to nothing, but a few happy strokes impressed the popular imagination. Kossuth, after his defeat, took refuge in Turkish territory. The Russian and Austrian governments demanded of the Sultan that he should be given up; but the Sultan, acting by the advice of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the British Ambassador at Constantinople (an old friend and ally of Palmerston's) refused—and his refusal was backed by Palmerston himself in the name of England. The Eastern Powers gave way and Palmerston was soon as much of a popular hero as Kossuth himself, with whose rebellion the English people had been taught to sympathise. The name of Marshal Haynau was held in such general detestation that when he visited England a few years later he was publicly flogged by the draymen of Barclay & Perkins' brewery, while Palmerston, when asked for redress by the Austrian Ambassador, refused him in a defiant letter.

Palmerston's proceedings were by no means acceptable to the court. Prince Albert, whose continental experience leaned him naturally to the Conservative side, strongly disapproved of them; and he affected Queen Victoria with his disapproval. Nor were Palmerston's own colleagues altogether satisfied with his diplomacy. Some of them, and especially Lord John Russell, the Prime Minister, strongly resented his habit of acting upon his own independent judgment in matters of the highest importance without

any consultation with them. Russell's vanity was also wounded by the knowledge that as Palmerston's prestige was rising his own was waning. In the country the popularity of Palmerston was now at its height. The favour he showed to continental insurgents conciliated the Radicals (with the exception of Cobden and the peace party) with whom he was generally at war on domestic affairs, while the general impression (grossly exaggerated, but not wholly false), that he had made England highly considered and respected abroad, was not less acceptable to many Tories.

Indeed, Palmerston needed all the prestige that he could command at this time, for not only had he the court decidedly against him and his colleagues doubtful and jealous, but he was about to be challenged upon an issue where he was plainly in the wrong.

About this time two British subjects had made claims against the kingdom of Greece which the Greek Government was not disposed to admit. One of these was Finlay the historian, some of whose land had been taken compulsorily for an extension of the royal pleasure grounds and who was dissatisfied with the compensation offered him. He refused to submit the matter to the Greek tribunals and appealed to the British Ambassador, who in his turn appealed to Palmerston. The other complainant was a much less reputable figure. Dom Pacifico, a Portuguese Jew, had picked up British citizenship while sojourning in Gibraltar and was now a resident in Athens, where he was carrying on financial operations of an exceedingly dubious character. He became a mark for public odium, owing to the action of the Greek Government in forbidding the customary annual pageant of

Dom
Pacifico.

burning Judas Iscariot in effigy on Easter Sunday. The populace attributed this highly unpopular edict to the pressure exercised on the government by the wealthy Jews; in all probability they were right. Anti-Semitic riots followed the prohibition, the houses of the principal Jewish residents were attacked, and among others that of Dom Pacifico was gutted by the mob.

Dom Pacifico sent in a claim against the Greek Government for compensation for his losses, which he estimated at over £30,000. Some time later he added another claim of over £26,000 for the destruction of certain papers which would have shown that he had a claim against the Government of Portugal for that amount. These claims were on the face of them fraudulent, and when the matter came to be investigated it was found not only that no one but himself had ever heard of the alleged debt due to him from Portugal, but that the more specific claim had been made out by valuing his household goods in a manner inconsistent with notorious facts. Thus he valued his bedstead at £150, his pillow case at £10, and so on in proportion through the whole of his linen and household goods.

Palmerston was undoubtedly entitled to protect British subjects in Greece against injustice, but in the face of the obvious improbability of Dom Pacifico's claim being just and reasonable the matter was clearly one for detailed investigation.

But Palmerston would not consent to inquiry or delay. He lumped together the unadjudicated claims of Mr. Finlay, the unsifted and patently preposterous claims of Dom Pacifico, sundry demands of his own relative to troubles in the Ionian Islands, and the

arrest by mistake of an English midshipman at Patras, and presented the whole to the Greek Government almost in the form of an ultimatum.

Greece appealed to France and Russia. Russia protested in the strongest language against the action of the English Government. France was more conciliatory and offered her good offices for the settlement of the dispute. These good offices were accepted, but, apparently owing to a misunderstanding between the foreign office in London and the English Ambassador at Athens, steps were taken on the spot to coerce Greece into surrender while the negotiations with France were actually proceeding. The French Government was naturally indignant at what looked like a breach of faith, and withdrew its Ambassador from London. For the moment it looked as if Great Britain might find itself at war with two great European Powers over that important problem, the exact value of a Portuguese Jew's bedclothes. However, the matter was explained (not without some humiliation) and the various claims against the Greek Government were eventually settled on the basis provided by the French intervention.

With such strong cards in their hands it was not likely that Palmerston's opponents would refrain from attacking him. Lord Stanley moved in the House of Lords a direct vote of censure on the policy of the Government with regard to Greece, and carried it by thirty-seven votes. In reply to this a motion was moved in the House of Commons, on June 24, 1850, by Mr. Roebuck, a private member, expressing confidence in the Foreign Policy of the Government. The issue was thus shifted from the question of Dom Pacifico—on which Palmerston had really

no case at all—to the general question of the Government's attitude toward the Liberal movements of the Continent; and *there* he had a highly popular case. Nevertheless, he had against him a powerful combination of debating talent. Peel and Cobden, Gladstone and Disraeli, united in attacking the Government. Palmerston replied in a speech of eight hours' duration, a speech which remains a masterpiece of the kind of debating that carries deliberative assemblies. It was the speech which ended with the famous and highly popular invocation, "*Civis Romanus Sum.*" The English House of Commons was at that time almost free of party "discipline." Each member could vote as he thought best for the national honour or well-being, and on this particular occasion many Tories voted with the Government while not a few Liberals followed the lead of the Peelites and of Cobden. In the end Palmerston was absolved by a majority of forty-six.

Death of
Peel.

Sir Robert Peel's speech against the government on the "Dom Pacifico question" was the last he ever delivered. The day after the division was taken he was thrown from his horse while riding in St. James's Park and was fatally injured. He survived a few days without recovering possession of his faculties. On July 2, 1850, he died. The House of Commons, on the motion of Russell, unanimously voted a public monument to his memory, and would have voted a public funeral but for the provisions of his will which forbade it. Peel had undoubtedly on several occasions rendered real services to his country, and since his fall a legend had begun to grow up around him—a legend which has not only survived him but rather increased in acceptance since his death—in which he

appeared as a statesman of something approaching to virtue. There is nothing in his career to justify this legend. He was throughout his life an opportunist of the most obvious type, and the sum of his actions can only be explained from the ordinary motives of a politician. Even the repeal of the Corn Laws was not an act of deliberate self-sacrifice to the public good as has been so often represented. It was, as we have seen, the result of a calculation of the strength of his own position which proved indeed to be false, but which the precedent of Catholic Emancipation seemed to justify. It is not clear that down to the day of his death, Peel had surrendered the hope of resuming his place at the head of affairs; and his later policy of deliberately keeping the Whigs in office until the Conservative party might find itself able to reunite, rather suggests that this ambition inhabited him to the end.

The year 1850 saw an explosion of strong public feeling in England, the motives of which were not political but religious. It was the year of the establishment of the Catholic Hierarchy which was followed by the "No Popery" agitation, the Durham Letter, and the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill. In order to explain these things it is necessary to go back a little in point of time.

"No
Popery."

In the year 1833 a group of men at Oxford, who had grown dissatisfied with the lethargy of religious feeling in the Established Church, launched a movement which aimed primarily at its revival. The theory upon which the movement was based was one more or less familiar to the Anglican writers of the seventeenth century, but one which had gone out of fashion after the Revolution and had almost entirely

The Oxford
Movement.

disappeared from men's minds during the Erastian and ultra-Protestant eighteenth century. Its two leading principles were the doctrine of Continuity and the Appeal to Antiquity. It maintained that the existing Church of England was one with the pre-Reformation Church, which in its turn was one with the Church of the Fathers. All that had happened at the Reformation was that certain popular corruptions which had grown up during the Middle Ages were cleared away, and along with them some useful but not essential customs which it might be well to restore. But the Church of England remained a branch of the one Catholic Church established from the beginning. Her bishops were true successors of the Apostles; her clergy were a true priesthood, as fully qualified to administer the Sacraments as any priests of Rome or Constantinople. Her faith was the Catholic faith as originally transmitted by the Apostles, and this was to be proved by constant reference to the Early Fathers in whose writings there was supposed to be found a complete cycle of Christian doctrine requiring no further interpreting. Both "Romanism" and popular Protestantism were to be condemned, the one for having added to the faith, the other for falling short of it. The schism between East and West, like the later schism between England and Rome, were admittedly regrettable incidents, but they did not impair the true Catholicity of every branch of the Church which mark reposed upon the possession of Apostolic authors the maintenance of the Apostolic Creed, and the continuity of Apostolic tradition in Hierarchy and in Orders.

It will be clear at once that such a theory, though its supporters might call it Catholic and might be

accused by their enemies of "Romanising," strikes at the very root of Catholicism as it is understood by all who acknowledge the supremacy of the Holy See not a whit less than does avowed Protestantism. No Catholic would listen for a moment either to its historical or its doctrinal assumptions. And in point of fact, with perhaps the exception of Hurrell Froude (who died quite early in the movement), all the leaders were vehemently and even ferociously anti-Roman at that time; none more so than the greatest of them, John Henry Newman.

Nevertheless their contemporaries insisted on regarding the Oxford men as Papalisers if not as concealed Papists. They saw that they made much of the Sacraments—attaching to them a supernatural quality of which no eighteenth century cleric had ever dreamed; that they attributed a sacerdotal function to the clergy; hinted at a desire (which they never, indeed, attempted to realise) for a restoration of more elaborate church services; advised auricular confession; spoke in praise of celibacy and even appeared to contemplate the revival of religious orders. In the eyes of English Protestants these things were "Popery," and the "Tractarians" (as they were called after their series of "Tracts for the Times," in which their views found their chief expression) were in proportion to this conception suspected.

They were soon in difficulties—difficulties created partly by the misunderstanding of their position, but very largely also by the inconsistency of that position with itself and with the plain facts of the case. Thus it was perfectly clear that the English State at least was thoroughly "Protestant"; even the hardiest high Churchman did not venture to deny that. This led

the champions of the movement into strong protests against Erastianism. The Church of England, it was maintained, was quite independent of the State. It derived its authority not from the State, but from the Apostles through the laying on of hands. It was not subject to the State, but only to its ordained rulers. This again led to the exaltation of the Bishop almost to the position of a sort of local Pope. The Bishop was the successor of the Apostles and inherited their plenary authority; "a bishop's slightest word *ex cathedra*," wrote Newman about this time, "is heavy." Unfortunately, when the successors of the Apostles (appointed to their Sees by such eminent ecclesiastical authorities as the Duke of Wellington, Lord Melbourne and Sir Robert Peel) began to speak *ex cathedra* it was to denounce the Oxford movement and to condemn, root and branch, the whole theory upon which their exalted authority was supposed to rest. Matters came to a head with the condemnation of the famous Tract Ninety.

Tract Ninety was the work of Newman. Its object was to show that the Thirty-nine Articles were susceptible of what the writer called a "Catholic interpretation"; that is to say, an interpretation consistent with that system of doctrine which the Tractarians professed to find in the Fathers. The articles (it was urged) were not directed against ancient Catholic teaching, or even against the formal dogmas of the Council of Trent—which, in fact, had not finished its sittings when they were drawn up—but against certain "dominant errors" of the Roman system. It was therefore possible for a man to hold what the Tractarians called "the Catholic faith," and even to hold certain doctrines which were generally regarded

as specifically "Roman," and yet to subscribe to the articles with a clear conscience.

Tract Ninety was published in 1841, and at once all the anger which had been rising against the Oxford movement burst in a storm on the head of the author and of his associates. He was accused of teaching men how to enter the Church with a lie on their lips, how to quibble away the plain meaning of words, how, in the phrase of Macaulay (a very typical representative of his time and class), "to hold the worst doctrines of the Church of Rome and hold with them the best benefits of the Church of England." Newman and all the Tractarians, men said, had long been suspected of practising the most flagrant dishonesty. They were now openly preaching it. Could Englishmen any longer doubt for a moment that they were lying hypocrites, Papists, concealed Jesuits?

Newman was evidently appalled by the effect his tract had produced, for he had honestly meant it as a preventative of conversions to Rome; and he might well urge that there was nothing in his interpretations of the articles more flagrantly opposed to their natural meaning than the interpretations to which Low Churchmen had to resort to explain away the services for baptism and the visitation of the sick, or Broad Churchmen to explain the three creeds themselves. More than ten years afterward, when he had passed over to the Catholic Church, Newman saw in a rational perspective the situation which had produced so strange an issue. His clearer vision will be found set out in his "Lectures on Anglican Difficulties." It was not more difficult to reconcile "Anglo-Catholic" dogma with the words of the prayer-book than to reconcile current Protestant dogma therewith. But

the Church of England as a living Organism intrinsically Protestant, readily absorbed Protestant ideas and instinctively rejected Catholic ones.

But at the time Newman's searchings were mostly concerned with the attitude of the Episcopate. Bishop after bishop condemned his tract, and every such Episcopal condemnation of a "Catholic" interpretation of the articles was a nail in the coffin of the original Tractarian theory. Newman, the clearest thinker in the movement, was torn between that part of his theory which bade him submit in all things to his bishop and that part which bade him maintain at all costs unimpaired the faith as he believed it to have come down to him from the first Christians. After a series of humiliating compromises he decided that the whole historical and dogmatic theory to which the Oxford movement had appealed could not be maintained. For four years he remained silent, gradually working out the consequences of those new convictions which the controversy over Tract Ninety had brought home to him. On October 28, 1845, he was received into the Catholic Church. That date may be of consequence to the world. If (as seems to-day so doubtful) the Catholic Church shall increase its hold upon Englishmen, it will become for future historians a date of capital importance. If the Catholic community in England becomes again no more than an Irish colony, the date will still be of curious interest to posterity; for it was the origin of a great experiment.

Newman's conversion intensified the feeling against the Oxford movement; it now appeared obvious that submission to Rome represented its inevitable fulfilment, and men maintained with increased certitude

that this fulfilment had been divined from the first. Nevertheless, the movement went on gathering new strength and attracting new disciples, still repudiating Rome on the one hand and popular Protestantism on the other. But its path was beset with difficulties which were intensified by the attitude of the English Church as an official organisation; for not only did the Episcopal charges continue to condemn the Tractarian doctrine but official acts fundamentally inconsistent to those doctrines were continually being perpetrated with the sanction of the heads of the Church.

Thus, a bishopric was set up in Jerusalem by England and Prussia jointly, and the See was to be filled alternately by an Anglican and a German Lutheran Bishop. The motive of this operation was purely political. Palmerston perceived that France and Russia had secured not a little additional power in the near East as the respective protectors of the Latin and Greek Churches, and he seems to have thought that by lumping together Anglicans, Lutherans and Protestants of all kinds, and adding such heretical bodies as the Nestorians and Monophysites, he could form something like a respectable counterpoise which would give England an equal *locus standi*.

Such a scheme obviously reduced the Tractarian theory to nonsense, yet it was accepted by the Archbishops, who duly consecrated a converted Jew first Bishop of Jerusalem.

A more deadly blow came a few years later in the Gorham judgment. This was the case of a clergyman who explicitly denied the doctrine of baptismal regeneration. He was presented to a living by the patron, but was refused by a High Church Bishop on the ground that the doctrines he held on this sub-

ject were inconsistent with the teachings of the Church of England. He appealed against his Bishop's judgment to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. It decided in his favour. Here was a critical decision for the Tractarians. If a clergyman of the Church of England could deny any supernatural character in the fundamental Sacrament of Baptism it was clear that the whole Sacramental system went by the board. Yet it was on the validity of its other Sacraments, and especially on the Sacrament of Ordination, that the whole claim of the High Churchman to be part of the Catholic Church must rest. Moreover, if the judgment were accepted, it meant a frank recognition that the Church of England was a mere creature of the State; a body whose dogmas could be defined or modified by a committee of lay lawyers. Yet there was no way of resisting the judgment save by secession, and secession in the eyes of an Anglican involved the sin of Schism. The immediate result of the Gorham judgment was the conversion of a fresh batch of High Anglicans to the Catholic Church, among them being Henry Edward Manning, afterward Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster.

This brings us to the year 1850, at the beginning of which the Gorham judgment was pronounced. The progress of the Oxford movement which had so alarmed the bulk of English Protestants was naturally watched with very different sentiments by Catholics and especially by the advisers of the Holy See. Within the Catholic Church hopes were entertained which must in view of the issue be pronounced as extravagant as were the Protestant fears of the time. It was actually believed (particularly in Rome itself) that the recent conversion did but herald a general

return of the English to the Catholic faith. It is true that the currents of thought started by the Oxford movement were destined to have a great effect in undermining the traditional Protestantism of England, especially on its intellectual side, but the people of England were in character as solidly Protestant as ever and had not the smallest intention of becoming anything else, nor had they any avenue of approach to any other moral conception of life.

Nevertheless such hopes and fears as I have indicated produced an atmosphere unstable with anger and suspicion, in which any spark might easily cause an explosion. The spark was provided by the decision of the Holy See to set up an English Hierarchy whose bishops should take their titles from English towns.

The
Catholic
Hierarchy.

There was manifestly nothing in this measure to cause legitimate alarm to any Protestant. Ever since the Penal Laws had been relaxed Catholic bishops and priests had lived openly and practised all the rites of their religion in England. By an old custom dating from the times of persecution, the bishops were regarded as bishops *in partibus infidelium*. The Pope, possibly encouraged to some extent by the progress of Tractarianism and the conversions to which it had led, resolved to alter this arrangement and to call the English Sees after the name of English cities. In order to comply with one of the provisions of the Emancipation Act the titles of the Sees were so arranged as not to clash with the titles of the bishops of the Established Church. Dr. Wiseman (by whose advice the change seems largely to have been made), was created a Cardinal and chosen to be the first Catholic Archbishop of Westminster. It is difficult to see why any Protestant should care whether a Catholic

bishop was called Bishop of Salford or Bishop of Enneapolis. The change was one that could only affect Catholics. No Protestant was obliged to call him anything at all unless he chose. But the Protestant—and national—public, angry at the Oxford movement and alarmed at the conversion of some of its leading men, had seized the idea that the Pope was claiming some sort of temporal jurisdiction over the whole of England. If he had claimed it it would hardly have mattered; he had no possible means of enforcing it. As a matter of fact the Pope was making no more than a new arrangement and nomenclature in the affairs of his own community, but the moment was no moment for logic. A “No Popery” excitement seized on the whole nation. The Pope and Cardinal Wiseman were everywhere burned in effigy. Certain wretched adventurers, some of whom had been expelled from the Catholic priesthood for the most abominable vices, filled their pockets by stumping the country and enlarging on the secret horrors of convents and the tortures of the Inquisition. Outrages were committed on Catholic Churches and on the persons of Catholic priests and worshippers.

The
Durham
Letter.

Lord John Russell, eager to recover that position in the public eye of which Palmerston had of late deprived him, chose to add fuel to the flame by a letter to the Bishop of Durham denouncing the so-called “Papal Aggression,” which he appeared to attribute to the wickedness and treachery of the Tractarians. It was a foolish document and would at any other time have done harm to no one but its author. But, coming upon the violently excited and unreasonable state of the public mind, it was taken as a promise from the Prime Minister to do some-

thing, no one quite knew what, to vindicate the Protestantism of England and abase the arrogance of the Papacy. A clamour arose for the most violent measures to be taken against the bishops and clergy and even the laity of the Catholic Church. Nothing, it would seem, would satisfy the more extreme section of Protestant opinion but a revival of the Penal Laws.

Russell himself, a man of the traditional indifference to religion, which is the mark of his class, had not the smallest intention of posing in the antiquated character of a persecutor. He was looking for such personal and party capital as could be got from the middle class out of the affair, and it seemed an obvious thing to abuse the High Churchmen who were mostly Tories. He had had no particular intention of insulting the Catholics; he probably did not know that he was insulting them, until a passionate outburst of anger (especially among the Irish) enlightened him.

One of his phrases about English people "turning with scorn from the mummeries of superstition" aroused among the Irish such resentment as he evidently neither expected nor was able to comprehend.

When Parliament met, on February 4, 1851, it was obvious that something would have to be done. Disraeli, who was now leading the Opposition, and to whom all varieties (or vagaries) of Christian doctrine were comically indifferent, set himself to fan the flame. He challenged the Prime Minister to make good the words of his Durham letter and propound his scheme for saving the country from Popery. A measure was hastily drafted called the Ecclesiastical

The
Ecclesiastical
Titles
Bill.

Titles Bill. It forbade Catholic bishops to assume titles taken from places within the United Kingdom. It invalidated any bequests made to them under those titles and made them liable to prosecution if they persisted in their use. But such prosecutions could only be undertaken with the consent of the Government. The Bill was simply a bill to save the face of Lord John Russell. Regarded as a measure for restraining the progress of the Catholic Church it was, on the face of it, absurd. Gladstone (seeking for debating arguments) was perfectly justified in saying that it violated the principle of religious liberty without the smallest compensating advantage to the cause of Protestantism. Nevertheless, such as it was, it passed through both houses by large majorities, the second reading being carried by 395 votes to 63. In Committee the Government had a troublesome time. They were continually buffeted backward and forward between those who wished to make the measure one of real and effective persecution and those who wished to destroy it altogether, and were continually torn between their own fears of disappointing and disgusting the English Protestants and their equal fear of driving the Irish Catholics to madness. In the end the Bill emerged as little more than an abstract resolution that Catholic bishops should not take English titles. As such it passed into law; it was never once enforced, and though the Catholic bishops continued to use their titles, not one of them was prosecuted by the Government. In 1871, the Act was repealed, but its existence had long ago been forgotten. The anti-Catholic agitation sank for the moment, leaving no other permanent monument than the brilliant lectures which Newman delivered at

Birmingham on the "Present Position of Catholics in England."

Meanwhile the relations between Palmerston and the court, and also between Palmerston and Russell, were becoming increasingly strained. Both the queen and the Prime Minister were forever complaining that he took the most momentous steps without consulting any one, altered dispatches after they had been approved, and conducted negotiations concerning vital matters by means of private conversations with Ambassadors of which no one knew but himself. Matters became acute when Kossuth visited England in 1851. The Prince was most anxious that no kind of public recognition should be given to the Hungarian Leader, and the Queen shared his views. Palmerston so far allowed himself to be overborn as to decline an official reception of Kossuth. But he accepted addresses from a number of London Radical Associations in which Palmerston was thanked for the protection he had afforded to the refugee and in which the Governments of Austria and Russia were abused in the most violent language. Palmerston, indeed, in his speech to the Deputations deprecated the abuse, but the deprecation was not very whole-hearted. The Court was very angry and a sharp correspondence followed. So matters went on until finally Palmerston received a letter of undisguised censure written by the Queen with her own hand.

The fall of
Palmer-
ston.

It would have been dangerous for his colleagues to have quarrelled with Palmerston over Kossuth; public feeling was too strongly with him. He soon gave them, however, an opportunity to break with him over a question concerning which he was likely to get less support from his fellow-countrymen.

By the Constitution of the Republic, established in France in 1848, the President was elected by the direct vote of the people, and the people had elected, by an overwhelming majority, Prince Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, the putative nephew of Napoleon the Great. This man, after having spent a youth of exile in England and made two futile attempts against the Government of Louis Philippe, had returned to France after the Revolution of 1848. He soon found himself in conflict with his Parliamentary Chambers. For some time division among the deputies enabled him to keep the executive power pretty safely in his own hands, but toward the end of 1851 there seemed a disposition observable among Conservative Republicans, Radicals and Orleanists to unite against him. It is clear that they suspected him of the intention of seizing dictatorial power, and that he suspected them with equal reason of intending to depose and arrest him. He resolved to strike the first blow himself. On December 2, 1851, he dissolved the Chamber, arrested his leading opponents of all Parties, put down an attempt at resistance in Paris by the help of his soldiers, and issued a Proclamation to the people of France re-establishing universal suffrage and appealing for a direct popular vote in approval of his acts. The sentiment of the French people proved to be entirely in his favour, and the plebiscite gave him a majority of nearly seven to one.

Palmerston sympathised with the French President in his quarrel with the French Deputies. He probably cared little for the internal affairs of France, but he desired to see France strong and influential in Europe that she might balance to some extent the two Eastern Empires with which he was always quarrelling. Ac-

cordingly, as soon as the news of the *Coup d'Etat*, as it was called, reached England, Palmerston saw the French Ambassador, Count Walewski, and told him that he wholly approved of what Louis Napoleon had done. Meanwhile the Cabinet had met and had officially instructed Lord Normanby, the British Ambassador in Paris, to express no opinion on the internal politics of France and to make no difference in his relations with the French Government. When Normanby went to the French Foreign Office to inform the French Minister of his instructions, he was told that the Government had received from London assurances of Palmerston's hearty approval of the change.

Normanby's complaint of the way he had been treated gave Russell his chance. It would now be possible to dismiss Palmerston and to have not only the technical right but also the mass of public sympathy in his favour. The *Coup d'État* was strongly condemned by English middle class opinion on which, in those now distant days, all English Government rested, and such disapproval was intensified by the fear which Palmerston was too well instructed to share that the new Napoleon intended to take up the work of the old and to avenge Waterloo by an invasion of England. Palmerston was accordingly dismissed from the Foreign Office.

He had not long to wait for his revenge. The doubt as to the intentions of the new ruler of France led to a universal demand for the strengthening of National defenses. In obedience to this demand Russell introduced a Bill for increasing the militia. Palmerston thought Russell's plan bad and was not sorry for an opportunity of attacking him. He accordingly moved

an amendment, the effect of which would have been to turn the local militia which Russell proposed to raise into a National force. The Tory opposition supported him, as did many of those who usually voted with the Government. It is interesting to note that all the names of the Irish, whom Russell had so bitterly offended by the Durham letter, appeared in the division list on Palmerston's side. It was their votes that turned the scale. The Ministry was defeated by eleven votes and Russell instantly resigned.

**The Derby
Ministry.**

The Queen sent for Stanley, who had now succeeded his father as Earl Derby. It was thought by many that Derby and Palmerston would coalesce and that perhaps the Peelites might be brought in by such an arrangement, but none of the parties concerned were found ready to tolerate such a combination, and Derby was compelled to form his Government out of the old Protectionist Party as it stood.

Lord George Bentinck had died suddenly and rather mysteriously in 1848. After a short period, during which the leadership of the party was in commission, Disraeli, though neither loved nor trusted by the squires, was acknowledged to be the only possible leader. He now took his place as Chancellor of the Exchequer and leader of the House of Commons. For the rest the Government had to be formed by filling the highest offices with men who had never held office before and of whom the public knew hardly anything. Some of these men afterward proved themselves quite as able as the experienced politicians they displaced, but at its start the Derby Government was generally thought an impossible one.

The special difficulty with which it was at once confronted concerned the attitude that was to be taken

up toward Protection. The party was a Protectionist party. It had been brought into being in consequence of Peel's betrayal of the Protectionist cause. The hope of restoring Protection had been the justification for its continued separate existence after the Corn Laws were repealed. Yet the new ministers, and especially the new Chancellor of the Exchequer, knew perfectly well that Protection could not be restored.

They began by pleading for postponement, urging that they could not be expected to make their proposals in the existing House of Commons and promising a speedy dissolution. They got through the remainder of the session by the help of Palmerston who was disposed to keep them in power so long as Russell appeared to be the only alternative Premier. They passed a Militia Bill on the lines of Palmerston's amendment, while Disraeli accepted the Budget of his predecessor. Then they appealed to the country.

For what mandate they were appealing was not very clear. Not only their candidates but the ministers themselves gave totally inconsistent accounts of the issue. Some boldly asked for authority to reimpose the Corn Laws. Others temporised. Disraeli threw Protection over altogether while suggesting that it might be possible to grant some relief to agriculture by way of compensation for its loss. The result was indecisive. Whigs and Protectionists alike slightly increased their numbers, while the Peelites returned to the new Parliament in considerably reduced force.

The apparent danger of a Protectionist reaction led to the revival of the Anti-Corn Law League which had dissolved itself after its victory of 1846.

After the election, the first object of the Free Traders was to secure from the new House of Commons a decisive verdict in condemnation of Protection. A resolution was therefore moved by Mr. Villiers affirming the justice and wisdom of the policy which had repealed the Corn Laws. The Government could not accept this motion without passing a vote of censure on themselves, but they were willing to accept the motion affirming Free Trade to be the accepted policy of the country. Palmerston, who was still desirous of supporting them, came forward with an amendment in this sense and thus saved the Government from defeat. Only fifty-three members recorded their votes in favour of Protection.

On December 3, 1851, Disraeli opened his budget. He proposed to meet the claims of the Agriculturalists by halving the duty on malt, and to make up for the deficiency by a corresponding increase in the inhabited house duty. That proposal foreshadowed the end of the first Derby Ministry. Whigs, Peelites and Manchester Men combined against it, though Disraeli attempted, with characteristic audacity, to open negotiations with the latter through John Bright. On December 17th the division was taken on his financial proposal, which the House rejected by a majority of fourteen.

The
Aberdeen
Govern-
ment.

It was now clear that neither a Whig nor a Tory Government could stand by itself, and that to secure a working majority some sort of coalition would be necessary. A coalition between the Peelites and the party of Derby and Disraeli was made impossible by bitter memories and personal resentments. There remained a possibility of a coalition between the Peelites and the Whigs. Here also there were many

personal difficulties requiring careful adjustment, but under strong pressure from the Court (both the Queen and Prince Albert had long liked the Peelites best of all political parties) the thing was arranged, Lord Aberdeen became Prime Minister, Gladstone Chancellor of the Exchequer, Graham First Lord of the Admiralty, and the Duke of Newcastle (who, as Lord Lincoln, had offended his Protectionist father by supporting Peel) Secretary for War. Russell consented to leave the House of Commons; Lord Clarendon, a Whig, was at the Foreign Office; while the surprise of the Ministry was the appointment of Palmerston to the Home Department—a department in which it had never been supposed that he took the slightest interest.

In quiet times such a ministry might have endured and even won credit to itself; but it was to be tested first by an acute foreign crisis and then by a European war; it failed at the test.

The Aberdeen Government passed vigorously through its first Session. A comprehensive measure dealing with the Government of India was carried without any serious opposition. The same session saw the first of Gladstone's budgets which immediately and permanently fixed his reputation as a master of finance. There were no indications of that friction between the Whig and Peelite wings of the Ministry which had been feared. But meanwhile the danger of war in the East of Europe, or rather a deliberate approach to it on the part of the Western powers, was apparent.

The East-
ern Ques-
tion.

Louis Napoleon had got into a quarrel with Russia. As part of his settled policy of uniting as far as possible all the popular forces in France under his ban-

ner, it was among the foremost aims of the new French Emperor to conciliate the good will of the Catholic Church, and he saw an excellent opportunity of doing this by insisting upon the old claim of France to stand as the protector of Catholics in the East. In pursuance of this policy he had pressed upon the Sultan of Turkey the claims of the Latin monks at Jerusalem and the Sultan had conceded these claims. The Czar, as the traditional protector of the orthodox church, had intervened and had put forward the additional claim that his treaties with Turkey gave him a general right of protection over all Christians within the Ottoman Empire. This claim France disputed and in disputing it demanded the support of England.

It had long been the tradition of English Statesmanship to watch and check any aggression by Russia on the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. There were (and are still) two clear and reasonable bases for such a policy. The first, the military menace which a strong or warlike Russia offers to India; the second, the fact that England's position in India depends upon Mahomedan support. Napoleon the third had therefore no difficulty in obtaining the diplomatic support of England in his opposition to the Russian claims; but when it became apparent that the quarrel might be pushed to the issue of war, the English Cabinet was divided.

It is in great part to these divisions that the failure of the negotiations must be attributed. Had Lord Aberdeen had his way there would have been no war with Russia, though there would have been the grave danger of an agreement between France and Russia at our expense and of subsequent war with France. On the other hand, had Palmerston been in charge of

foreign affairs and had it in consequence been made clear that England intended to support France to the extreme point of military action, Russia would have given way and accepted one of the many compromises which were pressed upon her. Nicholas I. did not desire war with either France or England; but he doubted whether France would act alone, and he doubted (and that not without reason) whether the English Government would act at all.

Palmerston, who was generally regarded both as the principal protagonist of a militant policy and as the special enemy of Russia, had been ostentatiously placed in a position in which it might be supposed that he could exercise no influence on the course of foreign policy. Aberdeen was Prime Minister, and Aberdeen was regarded by the Russian Government as a friend. He had been Peel's Foreign Secretary, and in that capacity had seen the Emperor Nicholas on his previous visit to England, and discussed the Eastern question with him, and had arrived at something like an agreement as to the common action to be taken by the two countries. He made no secret of his personal dislike of the Turks, a dislike which he somewhat indiscreetly expressed to the Russian Ambassador during the progress of the negotiations. The Russian Government seems to have taken his presence as a guarantee that during his Premiership there would be no war.

It was a grave error (as the event proved) in judgment both of the nature of British Government and of the varying weight of politicians. There was a strong war party in the Cabinet with which Aberdeen could not openly quarrel without breaking up his Ministry; and though Palmerston was withdrawn

from the direct control of Foreign Affairs he had not only great weight in the Councils of the Government, but his policy was supported (and even pushed farther than he would have pushed it) by the British Ambassador at Constantinople.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, formerly Sir Stratford Canning, was a man of great abilities and unquestionable patriotism. He had first been sent out to the East by his great relative, who had also been the first patron of Palmerston. He was thoroughly Palmerstonian in his ideas of European policy. He accepted the view that the frustration of Russia must be the principal aim of British diplomacy. He knew that Turkey was not capable of resisting Russia single-handed, and that England had not the military resources necessary to give her effective help, but it now appeared that there was an unexpected chance of enlisting one of the great military powers of Europe in the joint defence of the Sultan. Such a chance, in his opinion, ought not to be lost. He was therefore eager to drive Russia to a complete surrender of her claims or in the alternative to try the chances of war. He had, by his force of character and the proved wisdom of his counsel, acquired an unchallenged influence over the Sultan and his advisers, and that influence he used to direct the policy of the Porte, often in antagonism to the wishes of Lord Aberdeen, but always with a view to what he conceived to be the interests of England.

It is not necessary to follow all the windings of the negotiations. Russia made certain demands on Turkey, and in default of compliance occupied the semi-independent principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, which now constitute the kingdom of Rou-

mania. The other European powers presented notes alternately to the two Governments suggesting conditions of settlement. Some of these notes were objected to by Turkey, others by Russia. Finally, war broke out between Russia and Turkey, and on December 12, 1853, the Sultan's Black Sea Fleet was destroyed by the Russians at Sinope, an incident which was skilfully used to arouse violent indignation among the middle classes in England.

The English and French Fleets entered the Black Sea, and a joint note was presented to Russia by the four governments of France, England, Prussia and Austria. The Russian Government, and the Czar in particular, were not yet wholly decided as to how to receive the pressure thus attempted; they ended by refusing to accept the note in its entirety; but Austria and Prussia would proceed no further, and when war was declared (upon the 28th of March, 1854) it was, so far as the Great Powers were concerned, a war waged by England and France alone against Russia. Turkey, of course, made a third party, for she was already engaged in pursuance of a military policy which ultimately led to the construction of the Italian Kingdom. Napoleon III. brought in a fourth contingent, that of the Kingdom of Sardinia, the soldiers of the House of Savoy which was later to rule united Italy and which desired an opportunity of playing a part as early as possible in European affairs.

The
Crimean
War.

The military operations do not concern this book nor the changes that subsequently took place in military organisation during the latter nineteenth century and the constitution of the British forces: I occupy myself here with the main stream of domestic history in what from this moment was called,

from the Peninsula of the Crimea in which the issue was fought out, the "Crimean War."

The
Popularity
of the War.

The outbreak of war had been welcomed in England with the utmost popular enthusiasm. There was indeed a Peace Party, including many men of great talents and influence, notably Cobden and Bright. With these may be counted Aberdeen himself, who detested the war into which he had been dragged against his will, and to a lesser extent some of his colleagues, such as Gladstone and Sidney Herbert. The court also was by no means whole-heartedly with the war; Prince Albert in particular had a strong aversion both to Louis Napoleon and to Palmerston, who might be regarded as its joint authors. But the nation was all but unanimous. The opposition under Derby and Disraeli was more war-like than the Ministry, and Cobden and Bright found little backing among the Radicals, who had been accustomed for many years to regard Russia as the standing enemy of all "Liberal" ideas and movements on the Continent and were delighted at the prospect of avenging the wrongs of Hungary in the Crimea.

The war therefore had opened in March, 1854, in a mood of all but unanimous enthusiasm. This mood was succeeded later by one of extreme dissatisfaction and anger. The mass of the nation still approved of the war, but it no longer felt a proud and joyful confidence in its issue. In the earlier conduct of the war there was undoubtedly grave mismanagement, and circumstances brought this mismanagement vividly before the public. For the first time an English army on the continent was accompanied by War Correspondents, whose comments on the conduct of affairs, sometimes exaggerated but in the main just, and,

above all, detailed, were read by the whole middle class public daily. The effect produced was intensified by the private letters sent home from the Front by officers and soldiers describing at this stage the tardiness of operations, describing later at once the severe trials of climate and bad equipment. A cry of anger arose throughout the nation and was directed with especial vehemence and the customary malinformation of the mass against the Prince Consort and the Prime Minister.

The Duke of Newcastle was the Minister directly responsible for the conduct of the campaign and supply of the troops. Like Aberdeen himself, he was a Peelite, and he was suspected unjustly, as it would seem, of sharing Aberdeen's dislike of the war. He was therefore included with the Prince and the Premier in the public censure. The conduct of the war, it was urged, ought to be in vigorous and unfaltering hands, and the public voice acclaimed Palmerston as the man whom the emergency demanded.

The clamours found support within the Cabinet. In the Autumn of 1854 Lord John Russell had urged upon Lord Aberdeen the desirability of replacing Newcastle by Palmerston. Aberdeen had refused, and Russell had tendered his resignation, but under pressure had withdrawn it. When, however, it was known, on the opening of the Session of 1855, that a motion would be made in the House of Commons for an inquiry into the conduct of the campaign, Russell—whose function it was to lead the House of Commons—declared that he could not resist such a motion, and resigned his place.

Toward the end of January, 1855, the motion came on for discussion. It was moved by Mr. Roebuck, a

Liberal, a supporter of the war, and, normally, a supporter of the Government. It had behind it the overwhelming support of the nation, and to the voice of the nation the House of Commons was in its then free condition highly responsive. The whole incident is, indeed, a milestone whereby we may judge how far the House of Commons has since proceeded on its road to decay. It acted, in those days, with corporate initiative and as a free assembly. Tories, Whigs and Radicals combined to vote against the Government, which was defeated by a majority of more than two to one, 305 members supporting the motion and only 148 recording their votes against it.

Palmerston
Prime
Minister.

Lord John Russell probably hoped when he dissociated himself from the Aberdeen Government that he would be chosen as Lord Aberdeen's successor; but his conduct in resigning thus suddenly and in so damaging a fashion had affronted nearly all his possible colleagues and it was soon obvious that no cabinet could be formed by him. The Queen sent for Lord Derby, and Derby made approaches to Palmerston on the one hand and to the Peelites on the other with a view to forming a new Coalition. Both Palmerston and the Peelites declined to join the Government and Derby relinquished his task, to the extreme disgust of Disraeli, who conceived that the best possible chance of restoring the prestige of the Tory party had been wantonly thrown away. Derby, however, probably felt that he could not as a patriot confide the interests of England during a continental war to a Cabinet of nameless men such as he had been compelled to form in 1852. Moreover, it was neither Russell nor Derby that the country demanded as Prime Minister. The cry of the whole nation was that the

conduct of the war must be intrusted to one who was thoroughly in earnest in support of its policy; and that the man specially marked out for such a task was Palmerston.

The Court cordially disliked Palmerston and was most unwilling to see him recalled as Prime Minister after having been dismissed in ignominious fashion from the post of Foreign Secretary; but he had become the inevitable man, as he probably knew when he refused to serve under Derby. He was therefore duly installed at the head of the new Government.

Palmerston formed a Ministry which was practically the old Aberdeen Ministry with Aberdeen and Newcastle excluded. The Peelites, Gladstone, Graham and Sidney Herbert consented to serve under him and returned to their old places. The vacant offices were filled by Whigs.

It was hoped that the country would be satisfied with the substitution of Palmerston for Aberdeen and of Lord Panmure (formerly Mr. Fox Maule) for the Duke of Newcastle, and that Parliament would not press for the appointment of that committee of inquiry in its resistance to which the Aberdeen government had fallen. But the House of Commons was determined to show its energy and patriotism and above all its independence. The appointment of the committee was insisted upon, and Palmerston soon found that if he insisted on opposing it he would be beaten. He gave way, though his concession to public opinion cost him the support of most of his Peelite colleagues. Gladstone, Graham and Herbert resigned their offices and their places were taken by Whigs. Their action made them highly unpopular in the country and probably did Palmerston's government more

good than harm. The committee got to work and exposed a number of shameful abuses: it did more, it recommended a number of valuable reforms which Palmerston carried out with characteristic vigour. Owing to this free and vigorous action of the House of Commons the stigma of gross and shameful neglect was removed from the conduct of the British expedition to the Crimea. It was not the last example of the House of Commons acting as a sovereign assembly, but among the examples of this previous to its coming decline it was the most striking.

The
Vienna
Congress.

Meanwhile, on the initiative of Austria, negotiations for peace had been opened at Vienna, and Lord John Russell was sent thither as the emissary of the British Government. He did not distinguish himself as a diplomatist, accepting bases of settlement which he subsequently, under instructions from the Government, had to repudiate. The Vienna conference was a complete failure. The fact was that neither the English nor French Government desired peace while Sevastopol, the great military port which was the object of the Crimean expedition, should be still untaken. It was at this moment that the allies were strengthened, as I have already said, by the adhesion of the little State of Sardinia, ruled by Victor Emmanuel and his minister, Count Cavour. They had seen in Austria's inaction an opportunity for earning the gratitude of the Western Powers and so paving the way for the liberation of Northern Italy; but it was Louis Napoleon who permitted their action and who admitted them to the field.

The Czar Nicholas, under whom the war had begun, was dead, and his successor Alexander II., was believed to be anxious for peace. The Conference broke

up. Lord John Russell returned to England, only to be met by the notice of a vote of censure to be moved in the House of Commons on his conduct of the negotiations. He evaded the vote by resigning his office.

In September Sevastopol fell.

The military object of the war was now achieved and all parties were desirous of peace. On February 26, 1856, a European Congress opened in Paris, and on March 30th the Treaty of Paris was signed. By this treaty Turkey was admitted to the status of a European Power and its "independence and integrity" was guaranteed. The Black Sea was neutralised, and the Russian Fleet there was so limited as to be little more than a maritime police force.

The
Treaty of
Paris.

Palmerston's personal prestige stood now very high, but his Government had been deprived of any strength derived from talents other than his own. It consisted of himself and such old Whig placemen as consented to serve under him. Every man of conspicuous talent had either been excluded from it or had resigned from it. Not only Derby and Disraeli, but Russell, Gladstone, Graham, Herbert, as well as, of course, Cobden and Bright, were now among the opponents or independent critics of the Ministry. This soon became apparent when an issue arose which enabled them to combine.

Toward the end of 1856 a quarrel arose between Sir John Bowring, British Plenipotentiary at Hong Kong, and the Chinese authorities; a quarrel in which our representative was on almost every point clearly in the wrong. It concerned the seizure, on a charge of piracy, of a vessel called the "Arrow" at Canton. The "Arrow" claimed to be a British vessel and flew

The
Chinese
War.

the British flag, though it soon became apparent that it had no right to do so; Bowring, however, protested against the seizure and demanded the surrender of the captured men. Governor Yeh, who was at the head of the Chinese Government at Canton, returned the men under protest, but refused to admit that the "Arrow" had the right to claim any such immunity. Bowring immediately ordered the bombardment of Canton, which was forthwith carried out by the British Fleet.

It should always be borne in mind, when we read of such high-handed action in Asia, that until quite recent years the possibility of danger from *native* power in the Far East never seemed possible. Every European government acted then with a complete freedom so far as the *native* opposition to it went, and was restricted only by the attitude of rival governments in Europe.

At the beginning of 1857 these things began to be known in England, and the dispute between the British Government and the Canton authorities was mentioned in the King's speech of February 3d of that year. On February 26th Cobden moved in the House of Commons what amounted to a vote of censure on the proceedings of Bowring, and it soon became apparent that in support of this motion all the critics of the Government were prepared to unite. Cobden, who was sincere and acted on principle, was supported by less scrupulous men — by Disraeli, by Gladstone and by Lord John Russell, who had personal ends to serve. Palmerston was left even more completely alone than he had been over the Dom Pacifico affair; and on this occasion he did not succeed in carrying a majority of the House of Com-

mons with him. As many as 263 Members voted for Cobden's motion; only 247 against.

Palmerston acted with characteristic boldness. He met his defeat by an instant dissolution of Parliament. He appealed from the House of Commons to the country, and he appealed with complete success. The phrase, "an insolent barbarian wielding authority at Canton," who figured prominently in his election address, served him as well with the constituencies as the tag "*Civis Romanus Sum*" had served him in the House of Commons seven years before. His allied enemies were decisively defeated. The peace party in particular were scattered to the winds. Cobden saw that it would be hopeless to contest again for his old seat for the West Riding of Yorkshire. He stood for Halifax—believed to be the most favourable constituency that could be found—and by Halifax he was decisively rejected. In Manchester itself, which had given its name to the school of which Cobden was the spokesman, Bright and Milner Gibson were left at the bottom of the poll. Palmerston came back with an overwhelming majority and a distinct mandate for war with China.

The execution of that mandate, however, had to be delayed, for a peril of some gravity was rising in the East, and that peril necessarily threw the small and rather sordid quarrel with China into the shade.

The
Indian
Mutiny.

A wave of violent discontent had swept over restricted but important sections of the population of India, where it was subject to the rule of the British East India Company. This discontent was only really acute in one very small point, but that the most dangerous, namely in the native Army, by means of which the rule of the company was held to-

gether. British supremacy in India had originally been established by the old East India Company, with objects primarily and indeed almost exclusively commercial. The company was a trading body, and fought and ruled only that it might trade more profitably. This necessarily involved a policy of conciliation and sympathy toward the native population, with which it desired to exchange products on advantageous terms, and there were many acute observers—notably the two Mills—who believed to the end that the government of the East India Company was superior to any government that was likely to be established by the Imperial authorities. But by a series of compromises extending from the days of Pitt to those immediately preceding the Mutiny, power had been taken more and more away from the company and vested more and more in the British Government. Matters reached a crisis under the governorship of Lord Dalhousie, an able and energetic man who held strong “Imperialist” views. He pushed forward vigorously a policy altogether inconsistent with that originally adopted by the East India Company. He sought to place all India under one unified imperial rule and annexed native States right and left. Jhansi, Nagpore, Oudh and the Punjab all lost their native governments and became part of the British Dominions. The leading families thus ousted were the chief sufferers. It is doubtful and will always be debated how far these measures affected the mass of even conscious Indian opinion, for the administration of those millions, divided in language, custom and religion and ignorant for the most part for centuries of any other than alien rulers, was and is a matter not of force but of judgment.

But in the small body of native troops, upon which so much depended, things were already ripe for a considerable insurrectionary movement. It was provoked by an event, not very important in itself, which precipitated the crisis.

That event was the serving out of the new Enfield rifles and their cartridges to the Indian Army. These cartridges were greased, and a rumor was set afloat that they were greased with a mixture of pig's fat and cow's lard. This would have been a gross affront to both of those sections by the mutual antagonism of which peace in India is secured to the third party, the Government, who stands between them. For to the Mahommedans the pig is an unclean animal, whose flesh must not be touched, while to the Hindu the cow is sacred and cannot be killed without impiety.

A feeling of unrest had been visible among the native troops for some time. It became active on the issue of the new order. The order was recalled in January, 1857, and in May a proclamation of the Governor-General was issued assuring the troops that no insult to their religion was meditated. But it was too late to stop the progress of the military rebellion. In May, 1857, the native cavalry stationed at Meerut mutinied. They were joined by the sepoy, and on May 10th they killed the English colonel of the regiment, fired on their officers, broke into the jail and liberated those of their fellows who had been imprisoned. From Meerut the mutineers proceeded to Delhi, where they sought the palace of the King of Delhi, the descendant of the Great Mogul. The King was induced to countenance them, and the garrison of Delhi and of the camp which adjoined it declared for the same cause. Then regiment after regiment

mutinied, a rising in the Punjab was only prevented by a timely disarmament of the troops. Finally, a horrible and treacherous massacre of men, women and children of European blood was committed at Cawnpore by Nana Sahib, the heir of a long line of native princes whom the English Government had dispossessed and who now put himself forward as the leader of the insurrection.

The alarm with which the news of the first outbreak of the mutiny had been received in England was changed to universal anger when the story of the massacre of Cawnpore was told. There was a natural and violent demand for vengeance. In such a condition of the public mind the wildest proposals were made for dealing with the crisis. It was openly said that captured rebels should not only be killed but tortured, and there was something like a general demand that the massacre at Cawnpore should be revenged by a series of massacres of the native population. It was not only in Europe that such views were expressed. A number of respected officers and public servants in India itself were moved in the heat of the occasion to similar errors.

The
Recon-
quest.

But first it was necessary to suppress the mutiny and to reconquer that part of the Indian dominion in which the absence of a garrison had destroyed British authority. When once the seriousness of the situation was realised this work was put in hand and carried out with memorable vigour and success by a group of soldiers whose names have become deservedly famous. On September 20, 1857, General Wilson recaptured Delhi. The credit of this stroke mainly belonged to his subordinate, General Nicholson, who led the attack and was killed in the assault.

The King of Delhi and his family were captured by Hodson, who spared the King but put to death his three sons. General Havelock was despatched to the relief of Lucknow, which was closely besieged by the mutineers. He was joined on the way by Sir James Outram, who had returned from an expedition against Persia and was in military command at Oudh. Several battles were successfully fought against the mutineers, and Outram and Havelock reached Lucknow on September 25th. They had not, however, sufficient force to dispose of the mutineers, who renewed the siege. Sir Colin Campbell, who was now commander-in-chief of the Indian Army, hastened to the help of Havelock with a larger force. He reached the camp of his allies on November 17th, and at once opened an attack on the revolting sepoys; but it was not until March, 1858, that the resistance at Lucknow was completely crushed, Havelock having died in the meantime. With the complete suppression of the mutineers at Lucknow, all serious danger of a subversion of British rule in India was at an end.

Conspicuous in the result were first the marching and fighting power of the white troops in a climate where the strain put on them was as unexpected as it was severe; secondly, the large proportion of the Indian population which gave active aid against the mutinying soldiery. Certain of the native princes stood firmly by the English Government, even during the brief moment when the situation looked darkest, notably the Rajahs of Gwalior and Indore; while the Sikhs, a military race but recently brought under British administration, played a conspicuous part in the actions which suppressed the mutiny.

Apart from Hodson's admittedly lawless act in

killing the last heirs of the House of Delhi, the suppression of the mutiny was not unaccompanied by vindictive cruelties. But there had been almost unbearable provocation, and what was done was trifling compared with the violent measures for which public opinion both in England and among the Anglo-Indians clamoured. The Governor-General, who seems in the main to have acted with firmness and wisdom, was accused of weak humanity, and was nicknamed "Clemency Canning."

Before the mutiny had been completely suppressed a change of government had taken place in England. Palmerston, who had returned from the elections of 1857 apparently invincible, had been driven from office, and Derby had once more been called upon to form a government.

Orsini.

The original cause of this sudden change of fortune was a plot formed by an Italian named Orsini and certain accomplices of his against the life of the French Emperor. Orsini was an enthusiast for the liberation of his country, and with the almost inevitable misjudgment of such enthusiasm seems to have conceived the idea that the hesitation of Napoleon the Third alone (who alone was actively working for Italian unity) stood in the way of such liberation. He had taken refuge in England, and in England the plot against the Emperor was matured. On January 14, 1858, while Louis Napoleon was driving along the Rue Lepelletier on his way to the opera, three bombs were thrown into his carriage. They exploded, ten persons were killed and more than one hundred, including Orsini himself, were wounded, slightly or seriously, but the Emperor himself was uninjured. Orsini was captured, tried, and guil-

lotined along with one of his principal colleagues.

During the trial of Orsini it came out that all the preparations for the outrage had been made in London, and French opinion, especially Bonapartist opinion, which was at its strongest in the Army, was violently incensed against this country. A number of addresses from French regiments were presented to the Emperor congratulating him on his escape, and in some of them England was openly denounced as the licensed home of assassins. Some of these addresses were published in the "*Moniteur*," known to be the official organ of the French Government.

Meanwhile, Count Walewski, the French Foreign Minister, had communicated with the English Government, suggesting in correct diplomatic language that the English laws ought to be so framed as to make the hatching of such a plot against a friendly sovereign impossible. Palmerston left the despatch unanswered, but proceeded to frame a bill for the more effective punishment of political offences. It was called the "Conspiracy to Murder" bill and it proposed to make such conspiracy a felony and to punish it with terms of imprisonment varying from five years to a life sentence. This bill passed its first reading in the House of Commons, the Opposition under Disraeli supporting it. At the same time a French refugee, Dr. Simon Bernard, was put on his trial in this country as an accomplice of Orsini.

The explosion of public opinion in France against England was met by a similar explosion on this side of the Channel. The addresses already referred to, and still more their official publication, had been bitterly resented. The English nation was sensitive on the subject of the right of asylum which it had for

many years boasted of giving to political refugees. Louis Napoleon was no longer popular in this country. The great majority of the middle class had strongly disapproved of the *Coup d'État* and had looked upon its author from the first with unfavourable eyes. During the Crimean War, it is true, Napoleon the Third, as an ally was made something of a hero of, and shared in the popularity accorded to Lord Palmerston and the Sultan of Turkey. But after the conclusion of the war a certain distrust of him had begun to revive. It began to be said that in his view the Crimean War was a Bonapartist revenge for the retreat from Moscow, and that, now it was accomplished, he was likely to turn on his ally and attempt a revenge for Waterloo. Public opinion was, therefore, on the whole distinctly hostile to the Emperor and was likely to be hostile to any steps which the English Government might be thought to have taken at his dictation. These feelings made themselves manifest in the subsequent acquittal of Bernard, which also served to intensify the feeling of the French that England deliberately harboured political offenders dangerous to Continental governments.

Palmer-
ston's
Defeat.

When the second reading of the "Conspiracy to Murder" bill came before Parliament, Milner Gibson, who had found another seat since his defeat at Manchester, put down an amendment directing attention to Count Walewski's despatch and demanding that it should be answered. Disraeli, perceiving how strong was the feeling, both in the House and in the country against the Government, resolved to profit by it and gave the amendment his support. Gladstone and what was left of the Peelite party took the

same course. On a division the Government was defeated by 234 votes to 215, and Palmerston at once resigned.

Lord Derby formed a government very similar to the government of 1852, save that it included Bulwer Lytton, who had distinguished himself by his speeches on the Crimean War. Disraeli returned to his post as Chancellor of the Exchequer and leader of the House of Commons.

Before Palmerston's defeat his government introduced a bill which proposed to make an end of the East India Company as a governing body and to substitute the direct authority of the Crown. The press had strongly demanded such a measure as the necessary consequence of the mutiny, though there were many public men of proved judgment, including, as we have seen, John Stuart Mill, who strongly deprecated this course. In believing as they did that it was largely the substitution of the Imperial for the commercial power which had provoked the revolt, they perhaps exaggerated the scope of the movement which was mainly a military and a partial rebellion, Palmerston had been defeated before these bills had passed, but Derby's government took up the project, proposing, however, under the advice of Lord Ellenborough, their Secretary for India, to substitute for a purely nominated council a council partly nominated and partly elected by the holders of India stock and by the Parliamentary constituencies of five great commercial cities. These proposals were found unacceptable to the House and were dropped, Ellenborough having meanwhile resigned owing to a quarrel with Lord Canning over a proclamation which the latter had issued confiscating the whole freehold of

The
East India
Bill.

the soil of Oudh. It was decided to proceed by resolution, and by common consent an act was passed terminating all the governing powers of the East Indian Company and vesting them in a Viceroy with a Council of fifteen members. Seven members of the first council were to be elected by the court of directors of the company and vacancies as they occurred were to be filled up by the Crown.

The
Ionian
Islands.

Several notable events mark the short government of Lord Derby. Lytton, who was Colonial Secretary, sent out Gladstone as Commissioner to the Ionian Islands, which, under the treaty of Vienna, had been constituted an independent republic under the protection of Great Britain. The islands desired and demanded union with Greece, and Gladstone was sent out primarily to inquire into their discontent. They hailed him, however, as a liberator, and besieged him with petitions. In the end the Government agreed to the cession of the Ionian Islands, which henceforth formed part of the kingdom of Greece.

The
Jewish
Question.

Another measure passed at this time was calculated to give great satisfaction to the new leader of the House of Commons. For, although indifferent to religion, Disraeli was intensely proud of his race. A bill conferring on such Jews as maintained their religion (renegade Jews had always had them) all the privileges of British citizens—even those privileges from which the Catholics were and are still excluded—was at last passed into law. The Jewish financial power had increased enormously since the beginning of the century when the Rothschild family had laid the foundation of their huge fortune by spreading false news upon the Battle of Waterloo.

This increase of wealth naturally brought with it in a commercial country a corresponding increase of political power, and had led to a demand for the revision of that historic principle which gave to the Jews the status of a tolerated alien colony within the British Commonwealth. In certain points that status had been revised, but the admission of practising Jews to Parliament was long and strenuously resisted. As early as 1833 a bill for their emancipation had passed the House of Commons, but had been rejected by the Lords. One of the Rothschilds had actually been elected for the City of London in 1847, but was unable to take his seat owing to the words of the oath which he was required to take. Another Jew, a Mr. Salomon, was elected for Greenwich in 1851. He also was prevented from taking his seat; but the resistance which he offered to the decision of the House served to forward the question. Meanwhile bills for relieving the Jews of their disabilities had several times passed the Commons, but had always been rejected by the Lords. In 1859, however, probably owing in great part to Disraeli's influence with his chief, the Lords gave way, and Jews were for the first time legally admitted to Parliament and to office. It was a great triumph for Disraeli, who was himself, moreover, a living proof of the futility of attempting to select and define the Jewish nation by the mere test of religion.

Meanwhile, the new Tory Government under the inspiration of Disraeli ventured to bring in a reform bill. As long ago as the time of Lord Melbourne the leaders of the Whigs had professed that the settlement of 1832 had to be revised, and Lord John Russell had actually introduced a reform bill in 1854.

Reform
Again.

The Crimean War rendered this measure abortive, and before peace was restored Palmerston, who was notoriously hostile to Parliamentary reform, had passed Russell in the race and become Prime Minister. Since that time the question of reform had slept, though all the Whigs, Palmerston included, professed publicly to regard it as a matter which would have to be dealt with at some time or other. Disraeli resolved to use the opportunity afforded by a tenure of office which he probably knew was to be brief, to take up the matter himself. The bill which the Derby Cabinet actually produced was a feeble and rather fantastic affair. It did little to extend the franchise to the working classes, while it created a number of what were called "fancy franchises," franchises for which something might be said in the abstract, but which nobody particularly wanted. It is improbable that Disraeli ever thought that he could pass it, or that it would satisfy anybody if he did; his object probably was to challenge the Whig claim to monopoly in the matter of Parliamentary reform, and to commit his own party to the name at least and the idea. Further than this he probably felt that at the moment he could not go. His own interpretation of reform was to come some eight years later.

Russell moved an amendment to the second reading condemning the bill as inadequate. "Liberals" of all shades united to support this amendment, though Gladstone not only opposed it, but made a strongly anti-reforming speech in which he pleaded for the retention of such pocket boroughs as had survived the disfranchisements of 1832. Russell's motion was carried by 330 votes to 291.

The ministers dissolved Parliament; they came

back from the general election somewhat strengthened, but their supporters were still a minority in the House of Commons; meanwhile a great meeting had been called at Willis's Rooms to consider the possibility of common action by all sections of the Opposition. Palmerston attended and Russell; John Bright (Cobden being at the time in America) spoke for the Radicals and Sidney Herbert for the Peelites. It was agreed that a vote of want of confidence should, upon the assembling of Parliament, be moved by Lord Hartington, a young Whig aristocrat who was to play a prominent part in later Victorian politics, and should be supported by the whole force of the coalition. This was done, and the Government was at once placed in the minority.

Derby resigned, and after an attempt to arrange a coalition government under Lord Granville, the Queen sent for Palmerston.

Palmerston took office again under conditions very different from those of his late administration. That administration had consisted of himself and his personal followers, while nearly every other man of equal repute in Parliament was more or less in opposition. But now he had to arrange for the inclusion of every section of the coalition which had overthrown Derby. He was able to form a very strong, if somewhat discordant government. Russell consented to serve under him and took the office of Foreign Secretary. Gladstone, in spite of his speech and vote on the Reform Bill, was again Chancellor of the Exchequer. The Board of Trade was offered to Cobden, who had been elected for Rochdale in his absence. He declined it. He had always been a bitter opponent of Palmerston's policy and he did not

Palmer-
ston's last
Govern-
ment.

think that he could honourably serve under him. There is an interesting story of Palmerston urging him to overcome this objection and pointing out that many of those who had consented to be his colleagues had formerly attacked him in language equally violent. "Yes," said Cobden, "but *I* meant it." Milner Gibson, however, consented to represent the Manchester school in the Ministry.

The troubles of the new government were mainly connected with foreign policy. Derby had made up his mind that Palmerston was now Prime Minister for life and discouraged all attempts to oust him from his place, attempts which he thought would only lead to the accession to power of the more advanced wing of the Liberal party. One attempt and one only was made to deal with the question of reform. A bill was introduced by Russell by which it was proposed to lower the borough franchise from ten pounds to six pounds. The measure did not get very far. It was notorious that the Prime Minister disliked it and had only accepted it in order to keep his government together. A large section of the Whig party shared his dislike, and the Radicals could get out no enthusiasm for so half-hearted a measure. Disraeli condemned the bill in language studiously vague from which it was impossible to gather whether he thought it too extreme or too moderate. In committee it went to pieces and was heard of no more.

Such importance as attached to the domestic policy of Palmerston's last government centred round Gladstone finance, and especially round the repeal of the duty on paper. This measure, which largely made the cheap press of the latter nineteenth century pos-

sible, was strongly opposed by many who habitually supported the government and was secretly disliked by many of the Ministry. The House of Lords, encouraged by the fact that it had only been carried through its last stage in the Commons by nine votes, ventured to reject it, thereby seriously invading the power of the Commons over taxation. Palmerston took the matter very coolly, and would have been glad enough to have dropped the controversy and the repeal of the paper duties together; but Gladstone, feeling that his personal prestige was at stake, was inexorable, and when Parliament met again a series of resolutions asserting the rights of the Commons in the matter were passed at the instigation of the Government. The Lords gave way and the paper duties were duly repealed.

Another important financial event was the conclusion of a commercial treaty with France. Cobden had refused to join the Government, but the ministers were none the less desirous to avail themselves of his great name and perhaps to disarm his opposition. It was decided that he should go on a special mission to France to negotiate a treaty with the Emperor. The Emperor was known to be strongly inclined toward Free Trade doctrines, though public feeling in France was on the whole as strongly Protectionist. Cobden showed himself no bad diplomatist, and terms were arranged which Parliament subsequently ratified; the duties on wine and silk, and other French products, were either very greatly reduced or completely abolished, while a reduction much less considerable, but still sufficient to be advantageous to this country, was made in the French duties on iron and other British exports.

The
Commercial
Treaty with
France.

Foreign
Policy:
Italy.

While the general election of 1859 was in progress Napoleon III. was completing that cardinal point in the foreign policy of France, the creation of an Italian nation. He invaded Italy as the ally of King Victor Emmanuel of Sardinia with the object of liberating the Northern provinces from Austrian domination. The allies won a series of brilliant victories and entered Milan in triumph; but Louis Napoleon hesitated before the invasion of Venetia, perhaps from fear that Prussia would make common cause with Austria in the event of too complete a victory. By the Peace of Villa Franca Austria ceded Lombardy to Sardinia, but retained Venice. Following upon this Sardinia ceded French-speaking Savoy and Nice to France. The arrangement had been agreed upon when the original alliance was formed. It was confirmed by a popular vote of the inhabitants so transferred, and in the case of French-speaking Savoy was perhaps justifiable. But Nice is an Italian town, and its cession left a sore which could be and was used later against the French.

English feeling had been strongly in favour of the liberation of Italy, but its direction changed markedly when the terms of peace were made. The failure to liberate Venetia was severely censured by men who forgot that after all it was France and not England that was taking the risk. Still stronger was the feeling against the price which the French Emperor had claimed for his alliance. Among those who were affected in this way the most notable was Palmerston himself. He described the Peace of Villa Franca in characteristic fashion as "A peace that passeth all understanding." From that moment the friendly feeling which he had entertained toward the French

Emperor, a feeling which had twice cost him his place, changed to distrust and aversion.

Soon after this the Poles, acting perhaps on the Poland. inspiration of the Italian effort, rose against the Government of Russia. Their insurrection was well organized and formidable. Single-handed indeed they had obviously no chance, but the Italian example led them to think, and not without some reason, that they might obtain support from some of the great European powers. Austria, which in the original partition of Poland had been by far the least guilty party, and which had treated its Polish subjects far better than either of its accomplices, was not unfavourable to the movement. The frontiers of Austrian Poland were indeed used by the insurgents as a base for operations against the Russian Government. Napoleon III. was disposed to intervene on behalf of the Poles in an active fashion if England would support him; and Lord John Russell, as Foreign Secretary, had addressed to Russia a number of remonstrances which seemed to favour the idea that such support would be forthcoming. It was not forthcoming. The Ministers were afraid of the Peace Party, and Palmerston, who alone could have defied that party, distrusted the French Emperor. From the moment that England refused any help to the Poles their action began to look increasingly hopeless. Louis Napoleon held back; the Russian government met Russell's remonstrances (now that it was certain that there was nothing behind them) with the pointed and unanswerable suggestion that the condition of Ireland might form an equally appropriate subject for inquiry; Austria was forced to prevent the use of her frontier for Polish raids; the

Polish insurgents were put down and their cause stamped out with extreme cruelty.

Denmark.

Immediately following this misfortune—for to those who respect civilisation it was no less—Europe saw the revival (after a century) of those doctrines which had been the distinguishing mark of Frederick the Great, which Napoleon and the French Revolution had reversed, and which in our own day, after fifty years of success, have endangered all our future. Briefly, these doctrines affirm that the power which will first disregard treaties and arm to its utmost can destroy the unity of Europe (no longer cemented by religion) and do what it will in the moral anarchy so caused. It was Bismarck who, after the abandonment of Poland by England, found his way free to revive this traditionally Prussian idea. The small kingdom of Denmark was marked out as the object of his preliminary attack. The King of Denmark was also sovereign of the Duchies of Schleswig-Holstein and Lauenburg. Prussia resolved to annex these territories. Intrigues were set on foot to this end, and support was given to a Pretender whose claim was nonsensical and who was abandoned as soon as the victory was won; but Prussia got what she wanted, an authorization from the German Diet to attack Denmark.

In defence of their unquestionable rights the Danes looked for support to England, and Russell had by his intervention and advice given them every reason to expect such support. England now appealed to France to join in a protest against the attack on Denmark; but Napoleon III. had not forgotten the refusal of England to act with him in the matter of Poland; he committed the irreparable blunder of

refusing in his turn. England had no alternative now but to withdraw with every circumstance of humiliation from the position she had taken up. Denmark was despoiled at will by Bismarck to the advantage of Prussia, and Palmerston's name ceased with that act to be one commanding respect in Europe. He was fiercely attacked in the House of Commons, especially by the young Lord Robert Cecil, afterward Marquis of Salisbury, who was now beginning to make his political reputation. He saved himself by a strenuous appeal for "liberal unity." The Party System was already half in being.

Indeed the moment is in every respect of great meaning. It was the turning-point in the public morality of Europe, the beginning of a decline—perhaps temporary—in western civilisation and of menaced ruin in the fabric of European unity. I shall deal later with the factors of this great change and peril which gives us to-day the spectacle of all Europe in jeopardy. [*Written in June, 1914.*]

The Government found itself involved in another complication due to events which were happening across the Atlantic. The Northern and Southern States of the American Union had pushed their differences to a point at which there was no appeal but to the sword. The sympathies of much the greater part of England were with the South. Partly from the strong antipathy felt by the governing classes toward the puritan spirit, partly from memories of the War of Independence, much more from an instinctive repulsion against democracy and also because Englishmen felt that the civilisation of the South was still English, while the civilisation of the North was already largely cosmopolitan. The early

The
American
Civil War.

victories of the Southerners excited the keenest enthusiasm, and the English politicians allowed themselves an unusual license in expressing their sympathies in regard to a quarrel which was no concern of theirs. Gladstone in particular, though a Cabinet Minister, went out of his way to declare that "Jefferson Davis had created a nation." All this prepared the way for trouble, and special circumstances soon arose which let loose the strong passions aroused on both sides of the Atlantic.

The
Trent Case.

The new Confederate Government established in the South counted upon the sympathy which it knew was felt for it in Western Europe and particularly in England. It was resolved that envoys should be sent to London and Paris, and two eminent Southerners named Mason and Slidell were despatched with that object. They took their passage on an English steamer called the *Trent*. The *Trent* was intercepted by a man-o'-war of the United States (commanded by a certain Captain Wilkes), who stopped her and sent on board an armed party. They seized Mason and Slidell and transferred them to the American vessel on board which the Southern emissaries were taken to New York.

England protested, and justly. The whole proceeding was utterly contrary to the law of nations. The Government of the United States could not fail to see this and President Lincoln ordered that the captives should be returned. They were not, however, returned with a very good grace and the incident tended to increase the ill-will between England and the Northern States.

In the affair of the *Trent* the English Government was clearly in the right, but a fresh controversy now

arose in which the Americans had a very much better case. The Confederate States were anxious to establish a navy, and they gave orders for the building of ships in Europe and especially in England. In a Liverpool dockyard was built the famous *Alabama*, which sank several ships belonging to the American navy and for two years harried the commerce of the North. While the *Alabama* was being built the Government of the United States had directed the attention of the British Government to the fact that she was almost certainly intended for the use of the Confederates, but the English Government had failed to take any action. In spite of the protests of Mr. Adams, the American Ambassador, the *Alabama* left Liverpool without inquiry, and several others vessels were subsequently built and launched in the same fashion.

The
Alabama.

As soon as the Civil War was over in America the Government of the United States began to press on the English Government claims founded upon the depredations of these privateers. Russell at first refused altogether to listen to such claims, and it was not until eight or nine years later that the matter was settled by the Geneva arbitration, to which it will be necessary to refer hereafter. Here the matter is only referred to as the last of those complications with foreign powers which perplexed the end of Lord Palmerston's reign.

Palmerston died in 1865. In the same year died a very much greater man, Richard Cobden. Russell now became Prime Minister, and was raised to the peerage as Earl Russell, Gladstone becoming leader of the House of Commons. Gladstone, though he had been first a Tory and then a Peelite and had, even as

The
Death of
Palmer-
ston.

late as 1858, spoken against Parliamentary reform, was now highly popular with the left wing of the Liberal Party. He sympathised with their dislike of Palmerston's foreign policy and of the great expenditure on armaments which Palmerston had regarded as its corollary. He sympathised with their desire for an extension and completion of Free Trade. He had found it convenient to come round to their views of Parliamentary reform. The new Prime Minister, Russell, was already a pronounced reformer. The first business of the new government was therefore to introduce that reform bill which Palmerston's supremacy had so long delayed.

Parlia-
mentary
Reform.

The new Reform Bill turned out to be a very paltry affair: its calibre, as its intention, mark the change through which England was passing, for it is at once a purely political measure, interesting politicians alone, a measure uncared for and not demanded by any section of Englishmen, and, with all that, a measure inadequate even to its not very significant purpose.

Men felt instinctively, as the second half of the century proceeded, that the old considerations of the electorate and parliamentary arrangement would gradually cease to take the first place in English affairs. The new conditions, the urban proletarian marks of England, were not yet fully apparent, but they were already felt. They were quickening to birth, and the corresponding unreality of parliamentary life was just threatening.

The fate and causes of this reform of the franchise in 1867 are a first symptom.

This first proposal was, as I have said, inadequate even to its merely professional purpose. It actually

went less far than the Bill which even Palmerston had allowed to be introduced a few years before. It proposed to reduce the County franchise qualification from £50 to £14, and the Borough qualification from £10 to £7. Had it been passed, it would have had no visible effect upon the composition of the electorate. Very few of the working classes would have been enfranchised; the voting power would still have been with the middle class of the big towns.

There seems no particular reason why anybody should be very angry with such a Bill any more than why anybody should feel any enthusiasm for it. Indeed, Disraeli, leading the opposition, was inclined to treat the matter rather with contempt than with hostility. But a new antagonist, whose feelings were very different, arose on the Liberal side of the House in the person of Mr. Robert Lowe, a clever speaker and a man of some learning, who had held minor office under Palmerston, but was now out of a place. Lowe professed to regard the Bill as one opening the floodgates of democracy, and placing all the institutions of England in jeopardy. He attacked it in a series of impassioned speeches, some of them very brilliant, and he succeeded in raising no inconsiderable revolt among the moderate Liberals, who deplored the substitution of Gladstone's leadership for Palmerston's.

These men were called the Adullamites, a nickname given them by John Bright. Disraeli watched the revolt with interest, and helped it where he could, but was careful not to commit himself or his party. In the end the second reading of the Reform Bill was carried only by a majority of five. A Bill so backed could not go far. An amendment on a vital point

was carried by one of the Adullamites, Lord Dunkellin, and the Government resigned (June, 1866).

Lord Derby was now called upon to take office, and did so. He offered places to the principal Adullamites, but the offer was declined. He was therefore forced to form a purely Tory Government; Disraeli returned to his place as Chancellor of the Exchequer and Leader of the House of Commons, and Lord Cranborne (afterward Marquis of Salisbury), who had distinguished himself highly in opposition, entered the Cabinet as Secretary for India.

Disraeli and probably Derby also had firmly determined to pass the Reform Bill themselves before leaving office, and to make that Reform Bill sufficiently comprehensive to kill the question of reform for some time to come. The difficulties were great, for not only in the party but in the Cabinet there were men who strongly objected, who regarded with the strongest disapprobation any step which seemed likely to increase the political power of the working classes, and Disraeli was shrewd enough to know that unless the working classes in the towns were largely enfranchised, the whole question, uninteresting as it was even to those about to receive the vote, might as well be let alone. Even so, it would have little social meaning. If it left the artisans out, it would have none. Disraeli was a master of the domestic trickery of Westminster, and he succeeded in getting his way. After more than one scheme had been produced and abandoned, Disraeli introduced a Bill which virtually established household suffrage in the Boroughs: he calculated that the disturbance this would cause his colleagues would leave him in sole possession: and he calculated right. It professed,

indeed, to contain various securities, designed to check the power of the populace; but these securities were not thought adequate by Tories like Lord Cranborne and Lord Carnarvon, who forthwith resigned from the Cabinet. The securities for what they were worth were swept away in committee, Disraeli being now ostensibly prepared to concede anything rather than lose his Bill. On one occasion, indeed, he accepted from the extreme Radicals an amendment which Gladstone had rejected as imprudently democratic. When the Bill finally passed into law, on August 15, 1867, it conferred the Franchise not only on all householders in Parliamentary Boroughs, but on lodgers also.

Disraeli knew very well what he was about. From the party point of view, the effect of his policy was fully justified. It is true that the elections which immediately followed gave the Liberals the majority; but it is important to note that, while during the twenty years which elapsed between the fall of Peel, the Tory party had never had a majority in the House of Commons, and had only been in power on three occasions on sufferance for a few months at a time. Of the forty years which followed Disraeli's Act, no less than twenty-three saw powerful Tory Governments in power with large majorities.

This remarkable fact is probably due to the absence in the working classes of that distrust of the Derby-Disraeli party which the middle class of the towns had inherited from the memories of the Free Trade struggle.

It is pretty certain that Disraeli also knew that the gift he was conferring on the working classes was one that they would not be allowed to use. What

might have happened had they been enfranchised earlier is an interesting matter of speculation; but in 1867 there was no longer a demand among them for political power. Chartism had been dead for nearly twenty years. The demonstrations in favour of Reform, though often large and apparently enthusiastic, were got up by politicians and political unions; they were not spontaneous like the popular demonstrations of an earlier time.

The English working classes were then and have remained since without political organisation or any power of initiative. Probably their real political power has been rather reduced than augmented by their enfranchisement.

Meanwhile, the Irish problem had entered into a new phase, and was again seriously disturbing the peace of England. Since the downfall of O'Connell, Irish Nationalism had found no effective political expression. Two attempts had indeed been made to form independent political groups, the one on an agrarian and the other on a religious basis. Neither had come to much; and the betrayal of the National cause by Sadlier and Keogh, the leaders of the small group formed to oppose the no-popery legislation of 1850, had disgusted the Irish people with political action. The dream of an armed insurrection revived. An immense impetus was given to the movement by the events of the American Civil War. The considerable initial success achieved by the South encouraged the hopes of the Irish. Moreover, large numbers of Irishmen had fought on both sides. They had become soldiers, and ardently desired to fight for the liberation of their native country. Many of them

returned to Ireland with the intention of arming and organizing the peasantry for a war of liberation.

Considered by itself, the Fenian project was, on the face of it, a hopeless one, but there were circumstances which made it seem more practicable than it really was. Chief among these were the strained relations which at the time existed between Great Britain and the United States. The attitude of English opinion during the war was remembered with no little resentment; the affair of the *Trent* had caused a good deal of bad blood on both sides, and the *Alabama* controversy was still unsettled. The Irish vote counted for a great deal in American politics, and the Irish had obtained great public influence in their new country. That influence they naturally now employed to the utmost to bring about an open rupture between the two countries. Such a rupture would be the signal for an Irish insurrection, which, relying upon American support, might really achieve something. Fenianism.

The project was a complete failure. The American Fenians, though they attempted to force the hands of the American Government by a raid into Canada, failed to bring about war. The plans of the Irish Fenians were betrayed by spies and their organization suppressed. An attempt by the Fenians of Manchester and its neighborhood to seize Chester Castle, with a view to obtaining arms, led to nothing but the arrest of those concerned. The punishments meted out to those Fenians who fell into the hands of the law were ruthless in their cruelty. They were treated as common criminals and sent to penal servitude of the harshest grade for terms of twenty years and more. Three lads, who were alleged to

have taken part in a rescue at Manchester, in the course of which a policeman was killed, were hanged, an incident which aroused the fiercest indignation in Ireland and became the subject of the most popular Irish patriotic songs. Fenianism as such was completely broken, but it undoubtedly did its work in reviving in Ireland the national spirit which had been cowed for nearly a generation.

The
Irish
Church.

One result of this was that the attention of the British Parliament began once more to be directed to Irish affairs. Gladstone, indeed, publicly attributed his own action in raising the question of the Protestant Establishment in Ireland, which, only a few months before, he had declared to be "outside practical politics" to an attempt to blow up a part of Clerkenwell Jail with a view to releasing a Fenian prisoner. It is probable enough that other motives weighed with him. Disraeli had trumped his ace over Parliamentary Reform, and it was highly desirable to find an issue which would reunite the Liberal party and place the Government in a minority. Accordingly, on March 30, 1868, Gladstone proposed a series of resolutions relating to the Established Church of Ireland.

Meanwhile Derby had retired from the Premiership and Disraeli had succeeded him. He probably felt that, in defending the Irish Protestant Church, he was fighting a losing battle; and he was, of course, himself—unlike Lord Derby—quite indifferent to the religious issue involved. Accordingly, he left most of the fighting to be done by others. Gladstone's resolutions were carried in a full House by majorities of over sixty.

Disraeli dissolved Parliament. The results of the

general election were, in the main, favourable to the Liberals, but there were some important exceptions. In Lancashire, the enfranchisement of the working classes converted what had once been the very headquarters of Radicalism into an area predominantly Tory. This was probably due to the hostility with which the workingmen regarded the economics of the Manchester School. Gladstone himself lost his seat in Southwest Lancashire and took refuge in Greenwich.

In the new Parliament, however, the Liberals had a large majority. Disraeli resigned without waiting for the Houses to meet, and Gladstone took his place. He formed a strong Cabinet, which included Lord Hartington and John Bright, and at once took up the question of Irish disestablishment. He introduced his measure on March 1, 1869, and easily carried it through the House of Commons. Nor was it thought wise to use the veto of the Lords for the purpose of seriously obstructing a measure so recently and so directly approved by the constituencies, though Derby made his last great speech in denunciation of it. The Act disestablishing the Irish Church became law on July 26, 1869.

The next measure proposed by the Liberal Government referred also to Ireland. It was the first of the great Land Acts which were passed with the idea of settling the agrarian problems of that country. It affirmed the principle of what was called "Tenant Right," and thus restricted the absolute power of the landlord to evict without compensation. But there was so much contracting-out allowed, and so many exceptions provided for, that the Act was in practice almost inoperative. Nevertheless, the Act began that process of change which could not be stopped until

The
Land Act.

the Irish peasantry became once more owners of their own land.

The
Education
Act.

The same year saw the passing of an Act establishing a system of universal education throughout the country, supported by compulsory powers vested in public authorities, whereby children could be forced to attend school whether their parents consented or not. The great obstacle to the establishment of a national system of education had been what was called the religious difficulty. Such schools as had been established under the old voluntary system had been, for the most part, attached to various religious bodies, some to the Established Church, some to the Catholic Church, and some to the Dissenting sects. The Government proposed to retain all such schools and to give them a measure of public support while exacting from them a certain standard of educational efficiency. But there were considerable areas—amounting, indeed, to nearly half of England—where there was no adequate school accommodation of any kind, and in such areas it was decided to establish public elementary schools and to levy a rate for their support. In such areas a new elected body was to be created called the School Board. In these schools the religious teaching was to be “undenominational.” It was to consist of the reading and the explanation of the Authorised Protestant version of the Bible, but “no catechism or formulary distinctive of any denomination” was to be taught. Though education was to be compulsory, it was not to be free, and with gross injustice the system of school fees was not only continued but imposed upon all parents, even those whose children were only at school because the State had compelled them to go there.

Gladstone was by no means enthusiastic for this measure; and was especially hostile to the "undenominational" religion which it prescribed in the State-established schools. Nor did it please the Non-Conformist element in the Liberal party, who disliked the endowment of any religion other than their own. Nevertheless, under the guidance of Foster, the Minister of Education, it passed into law.

A much more unquestionable reform, carried by this administration, was the abolition of promotion by purchase in the British Army. The method by which this was done raised a very grave constitutional question. Gladstone had originally introduced his proposals in the form of a Bill, and that Bill duly passed the House of Commons. In the House of Lords, however, an amendment was carried at the end of the session postponing the consideration of the Bill until further information should be obtained. Gladstone was not prepared to wait for another session, but forthwith advised the Queen to abolish purchase by royal warrant, contending that it owed its existence solely to the license of the Crown and could, therefore, be abolished by the same authority. He then offered the House of Lords a measure merely compensating those who would lose by the new system, and this measure the Lords could not well reject. It would seem that the best authority is on the side of this contention, though there were not a few protests from both sides of the House against the procedure adopted by the Ministry.

Another measure carried by Gladstone's first administration was that which made voting for parliamentary candidates secret. The ballot had been advocated by many Radicals during the first half of the

Purchase
in the
Army.

The
Ballot.

nineteenth century, though it had been consistently opposed by John Stuart Mill. It was now established as part of the law of the land, and the old hustings disappeared forever.

The
Alabama
Arbitra-
tion.

The controversy between Great Britain and the United States in regard to the *Alabama* claims were at last submitted to arbitration at Geneva. The decision went wholly against England. Not only did the tribunal find that the British Government was responsible for all the damage done by the *Alabama* and by the other vessels built in British ports for the use of the South, but it assessed this damage at so high a figure that the Government of the United States had some difficulty in distributing the money which it received. This decision, which was justly regarded as a humiliation for England, made the Government not a little unpopular in the country.

The Ministers next approached the perilous question of Irish university education. Trinity College, Dublin, was a thoroughly Protestant institution, and the secular colleges established by Peel had been condemned by the Catholic hierarchy in Ireland. The consequence was that the Irish Catholic, who wished to remain faithful to his Church, had great difficulty in obtaining a university education. It was Gladstone's object to establish in Ireland a university which Catholics could attend, but he was hampered by the strong prejudices of English and Irish Protestants, and by the curious theory as to the wickedness of all religious establishments which had grown up among the English Non-conformists. In the result he pleased nobody. The Irish Catholics repudiated his plan, which was equally unpopular in

England. When submitted to the House, it was defeated by a majority of three.

The Government resigned, but Disraeli did not choose to take office at that moment, and the Ministers were compelled to return. They did so under circumstances of discredit and increasing unpopularity. They had lost the confidence of the Irish Catholics. Their Education Bill was disliked by both Catholics and Non-Conformists, while its compulsory clauses were detested by the great mass of the poor. They had passed, against Gladstone's own judgment, a Bill restricting further the hours of opening for public-houses, a Bill which began the long, foolish and oppressive course of what was called "Temperance Legislation," which was to prove so disastrous to the Liberal party in later years. They had also passed an Act purporting to remove the restrictions placed upon trade-unions, an Act which the influence of Liberal capitalists had turned into one for more efficiently persecuting those organizations. Accordingly, when, in January, 1874, Gladstone appealed to the country, the result was his utter defeat and the return of Disraeli to power, in command, for the first time, of an effective parliamentary majority.

The new Ministry began, on the whole, well. Its one definitely anti-democratic measure was the restoration of the appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords which the previous Government had taken away. As against this may be set the fact that it modified the unpopular and tyrannical "Temperance" legislation of its predecessor in the direction of more reasonable freedom, and that it replaced the insidiously oppressive law by which the Liberals, in pretending to liberate the trade-unions, had really

The Troy
Pro-
gramme.

increased their burdens and handicaps, by a genuine charter of liberty which remained in force with excellent results until thirty years later it was destroyed, not by Parliament, but by the arbitrary whim of the judges in the famous Taff Vale case. The Government also made some sort of effort to deal with a subject which the Liberals had wholly neglected, the material condition of the populace. During the general election Disraeli had put forward "Social Reform" as his watchword, and when he got his majority he did not, to do him justice, leave his pledges wholly unfulfilled. His Government codified and extended the Factory Acts and passed measures of some value for the protection of agricultural tenants and for the provision of better housing accommodation for artisans.

The
Plimsoll
Line.

One industrial measure of the greatest value was passed during this Parliament for which the Government cannot claim much of the credit. It was perfectly well known to those acquainted with the subject and was a matter of constant complaint among our merchant seamen that the lives of sailors were continually sacrificed to the greed of shipowners, who sent out defective and overloaded vessels heavily insured, careless of whether they floated or not. Public attention was directed to this infamy by a very honest and indefatigable reformer, Samuel Plimsoll. Disraeli consented to take the matter up, and a Bill, providing for the inspection of such ships and for the fixing of a load-line, was brought in by the Government. The shipowners on both sides of the House protested violently, and Disraeli thought that it would be the line of least resistance to announce that the Bill would not be proceeded with that session. Plim-

soll immediately arose and denounced the betrayal of the seamen. He shook his fist in Disraeli's face, declaring that he had made himself personally responsible for the murder of English sailors. He denounced the shipowners as villains, and threatened to publish their names and records. Of course, he was declared "out of order" and suspended; but the effect on the country was electric. Everywhere meetings were held in support of Plimsoll, at which the instant passing of the Bill was demanded. Disraeli saw that he had acted unwisely; he picked up his dropped Bill and passed it into law. The measure, though an excellent beginning, was in many ways very inadequate, and was subsequently amended several times in the direction of greater stringency. Its most important provision, the load-line, was, however, virtually repealed without debate some thirty years later by an agreement with the shipowners and a Liberal Government when Mr. Lloyd George became President of the Board of Trade, and the shipowners are now once more largely free to trade with insurance companies in the lives of seamen.

In 1876 the peace of a somewhat torpid Parliament was once more disturbed by the introduction of a religious question. Since 1850 the High Church movement had gone on gathering support, especially among the Anglican clergy, and one of its most energetic later developments had been the introduction into Anglican services of many of the accessories of Catholic ritual. This naturally caused much anger among traditional Protestants, but the "Ritualists," as they were called, were generally popular with their own congregations; the law of the matter was very obscure and the machinery by which alone it could

Ritualism.

be enforced was slow and clumsy. In practice, therefore, the "Ritualists" did what they liked, and several attempts to suppress them signally failed.

As in 1850, an accident caused an unexpected outbreak of public feeling. A society had been formed among High Churchmen having for its object the revival in the Anglican Church of the Sacrament of Penance. For this they could not well be touched, for the Reformers, while abolishing the compulsory character of confession, had so far compromised as to retain it as a voluntary and occasional right, and had even provided in the Prayer Book a form of absolution taken direct from the Catholic use. But it was urged against this particular society that its members had used and circulated a translation of a Catholic book of casuistry called "The Priest in Absolution." And by the dishonest selection and transcription of isolated passages of this work it was sought with some success to excite a new storm of indignation against the High Churchmen. Some riots occurred, some prosecutions were instituted, and one "Ritualist" clergyman, Mr. Machonachie, a man of unquestionable sincerity and great popularity among the poor, was sent to prison.

The
Church
Discipline
Bill.

To allay this excitement, the Bishop of London, a Low Churchman of Latitudinarian leanings, brought in a Church Discipline Bill to facilitate the prosecution of clergymen who introduced ritual changes into their services. The measure divided both parties and both Front Benches. Disraeli, indifferent, of course, to the religious issue, thought that popularity might be cheaply won by appearing as a champion of Protestantism, and gave the Bill his hearty support, but his colleague, Lord Salisbury, himself a High Church-

man, not only denounced the Bill but spoke of his chief in terms of very scant respect. Gladstone, of course, took the same side, but Sir William Harcourt, who had been his Solicitor-General, warmly supported Disraeli. Eventually the Bill became law, but it had almost as little effect as the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill had had before it. Hardly a single clergyman has since been prosecuted under it, and the progress of "Ritualism," which Disraeli had declared his intention of "putting down," was not checked for an instant.

But the attention of Parliament and the country was not long concerned exclusively with domestic affairs. Trouble was already brewing in the east of Europe. Russia had seized the opportunity of the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71) to repudiate the restrictions imposed upon her by the Treaty of Paris. That no European power was at that moment in a position to oppose this act had naturally increased her prestige; and this in turn probably encouraged the oppressed Christian subjects of Turkey to make a new effort to regain their own freedom.

An insurrection against Turkish rule broke out first in the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It naturally had the sympathy of the neighboring principalities of Serbia and Montenegro, both of which were now virtually independent. The Turks demanded from these States securities against their encouraging the insurgents, and appealed to the Powers to support their demand. Meanwhile, the insurrection spread, and stories began to be heard of the abominable cruelty with which the attempts to suppress it were made. The Powers at last found it necessary to intervene, and a note was drawn up by Austria urg-

ing on Turkey the necessity of reforms. To this note Lord Derby, the son of Disraeli's old leader, who was now Foreign Secretary, after some delay assented. But when it was proposed to reinforce it by another note threatening drastic action in the event of non-compliance, England refused to be a party, and by her action broke up the Concert.

The
Bulgarian
Atrocities.

And now a new insurrection broke out, this time in Bulgaria. It was put down mainly by the Bashi-Bazouks, and there was no doubt about the horrors committed. The evidence was full and exact and its effect was overwhelming. Gladstone came out of his partial retirement to take up with enthusiasm the cause of the Christian insurgents, and in his celebrated pamphlet, "The Bulgarian Horrors," assailed both the tyranny of the Turks and the unsympathetic attitude of the British Government.

The
Russo-
Turkish
War.

Meanwhile, toward the end of June, 1876, Servia and Montenegro declared war on Turkey. The Servians were rapidly defeated, and their country overrun by the Turkish armies. The Montenegrins had better fortune, but they had to remain on the defensive. It was then that, the union of the Powers having been broken up, Russia moved alone and demanded from Turkey an immediate armistice. Lord Derby replied by proposing a conference of the Powers at Constantinople. This was accepted, and Lord Salisbury went to Constantinople to represent England. The conference came to nothing. Turkey would make no real concessions, and her attitude was virtually supported by England. It broke up without coming to any decision, and on April 25, 1877, Russia declared war on Turkey.

Meanwhile, in the Autumn of 1876, Disraeli had

been raised to the peerage as Earl of Beaconsfield. It was about this time that opinions in England began to be sharply divided on the Turkish question. Up to nearly the end of 1876 most Englishmen, sincerely horrified at the atrocities committed by the Turkish auxiliaries, were inclined to sympathise whole-heartedly with the insurgents and to condemn the callous attitude taken up by the Prime Minister. But from the moment that Russia intervened a change took place in the feelings of many. Distrust and fear of Russia was a very real sentiment at that time with most Englishmen. They would not be persuaded to believe that Russia was moved by any disinterested enthusiasm for the Balkan Christians. She was aiming at supremacy in the East, at the conquest of the whole Balkan Peninsula and the occupation of Constantinople. A strong revulsion of feeling took place in favour of the Government, and Gladstone, whose pamphlet had the year before aroused so much enthusiasm, was now regarded by many as an unpatriotic man, leaguering himself with the enemies of England.

These feelings were intensified by the events of the war. The Turks, hopelessly outmatched, put up a magnificent fight. The heroic defence of Plevna did much to make men forget the horrors of Bulgaria. Positive enthusiasm for the Turk became the order of the day with those who were called "Jingoes," after a music-hall song, in which the determination to resist Russia was expressed in vigorous popular doggerel.

At length the Turkish resistance was broken, Plevna surrendered on December 10th, and the Russian army advanced on Constantinople.

The English Government acted with promptitude and vigour. The British fleet was sent to the Dardenelles. A supplementary estimate of six millions was asked for from Parliament. Indian troops were brought to Malta—a futile measure, but one that impressed public opinion in England—and arrangements were made for a descent on Cyprus and Syria. These measures cost the Government the resignation first of Lord Carnarvon and then of Lord Derby; but Disraeli, as we may still call him, with Lord Salisbury as Foreign Secretary, continued to push on vigorously with a policy which seemed at one time likely to lead to immediate war.

Berlin
Congress.

Meanwhile, Russia had dictated to Turkey the Peace of San Stefano, by which the Porte virtually surrendered all but a nominal sovereignty over its European and Christian provinces. This treaty the English Government refused to recognise. Under Prussian mediation, a Congress was called at Berlin, and this Congress both Disraeli and Salisbury attended in person.

The issue of the Berlin Congress was a great triumph for the English Government. The Treaty of San Stefano was abrogated. In its place a new Treaty of Berlin gave back to Turkey a large part of the territory she had been forced to cede. The independence of Roumania, Servia and Montenegro was recognised, and Bulgaria became a semi-independent State under a nominal Turkish sovereignty. England, by a private convention with Turkey, obtained the island of Cyprus and a protectorate in Asia, while Russia, after all her victories, had to be content with Kars, Batoum and a strip of Bessarabia which she had lost in the Crimean War.

If Disraeli had been wise he would have dissolved Parliament immediately on his return from Berlin. He would in all probability have secured a substantial majority. But he waited, and the popularity of his Government steadily declined. Its later measures were neither wise nor successful, and its prestige soon began to disappear.

Disraeli's first experiment in "Imperialism," as it now began to be called, was harmless, if rather silly. He induced Parliament to confer on the Queen the title of "Empress of India." An Oriental himself, he always loved to describe England as "An Oriental Power." The new title pleased him and pleased the Queen, and, though there was a good deal of opposition, it cannot be said to have done any harm to anybody.

Empress of
India.

The same can hardly be said of some of the other actions of the Government. It was decided to send a special mission to Afghanistan in order to counteract supposed Russian intrigues there. The mission was fitted out with a strong display of troops. It was stopped at the frontier by a representative of the Amir. Thereupon a British army invaded Afghanistan and seized the capital, Cabul. The Amir, Shere Ali, died, and his son made peace with England. But scarcely had he done so than there broke out a popular insurrection, accompanied by the murder of the English envoy and his staff. Cabul had to be taken a second time. But the taking of Cabul did not quiet the country. Eventually the Indian army had to return to within its own boundaries with nothing better than an admittedly torn-up Treaty for its pains.

Next the Ministers found themselves involved in new trouble in South Africa. The Dutch settlers who

The
Zulu War.

had trekked north across the Vaal to escape British rule had got into trouble with the Zulus and their king, Cetewayo. England intervened and went to war with Cetewayo, though he appears, by the showing of the British High Commissioner, to have had right on his side in the dispute. The result was the disastrous battle of Isandula in January, 1879, in which the Zulus completely defeated and almost annihilated the British force sent against them. The disaster was, of course, repaired, and Cetewayo was ultimately captured and brought to England, but the enterprise could not be considered a glorious one.

The
Transvaal.

The next trouble was with the Dutch. Sir Theophilus Shepstone, sent out by the English Government to investigate the conditions on the spot, issued, after the defeat of the Zulus, a proclamation annexing the Transvaal. He professed and no doubt believed that such annexation was desired by the inhabitants, and the Government accepted his view. It soon appeared that he was wildly mistaken. The Boers rose in arms under the leadership of Paul Krüger, proclaimed themselves a Republic, and it rapidly became apparent that the Ministers had allowed Shepstone to let them in for the task of crushing a widespread insurrection, which was all the more dangerous because it had the open sympathy of the Dutch in our own colonies.

The
Irish
Party.

The Parliament, which was nearing its end, had seen among its most significant events the reappearance of Irish Nationalism as a Parliamentary force. The man to whose efforts this resurrection was mainly due was Isaac Butt, one of the most powerful advocates at the Irish Bar. Though originally a Conservative, he had been employed to defend most of the

Fenian prisoners, and had gradually conceived a strong sympathy for his clients' aspirations. He set to work in the early seventies to form a constitutional association, having for its object the formation in Parliament of a Nationalist party pledged to work for Home Rule. His success was great. A considerable number of his candidates were returned for Irish seats at the general election of 1874, and several more found seats at by-elections between 1874 and 1880. At the same time the Irish vote in Great Britain was for the first time organised, so that it could be thrown into the scale in favour of that candidate, irrespective of party, whose return might be considered most favourable to the Irish cause.

For some time Butt's supremacy was undisputed, but later there arose a group within his party, in and out of Parliament, to whom it seemed that his leadership lacked vigour. Excellent resolutions were moved, excellent bills introduced, excellent speeches made, but the Irish cause did not seem to be making any headway. Some Irish members came to the conclusion that the only way to make an English Parliament listen to Irish grievances was to interfere continually in English affairs, and to obstruct the working of the English Parliamentary machine until Irish wrongs were dealt with. Charles Stewart Parnell, who had recently been returned at a by-election for Meath; Joseph Gillis Biggar, an Ulsterman, no speaker but a man of indomitable courage and endurance, Mr. O'Donnell and Major O'Gorman began to develop those tactics of "obstruction" which in another Parliament were to lead to such astounding results. This led to a quarrel within the party between Butt and his more energetic followers—a quar-

Obstruc-
tion.

rel which ended in his dethronement, and, after a brief interval, to his supersession by Parnell.

The
Midlothian
Campaign.

A general election was now imminent, and Gladstone, who had virtually resumed the Liberal leadership since the Bulgarian agitation, threw all his energy and eloquence into the task of raising the country against the Government by his celebrated Midlothian campaign. He succeeded completely. When, in March, 1880, Disraeli at last dissolved Parliament, he was met with overwhelming defeat and at once resigned, to survive his relinquished power by less than two years.

The
New
Ministry.

Gladstone became Prime Minister. At first, indeed, the Queen, who had thoroughly approved Disraeli's foreign policy and had resented deeply Gladstone's attitude toward it, was disposed to consider his retirement from public life final, and invited successively Lord Hartington and Lord Granville to form a Ministry. Both, however, realised the utter impossibility of such an arrangement following on the Midlothian campaign, and Gladstone was at liberty to form his Government as he chose.

He formed a strong one as far as talent and prestige were concerned. Hartington was Secretary for War and all the great Whig Lords had their assured places. Forster went to the Irish Office. Bright, whose health was failing, entered the Cabinet with the sinecure office of Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. The most important appointment was that of Joseph Chamberlain to be President of the Board of Trade. Mr. Chamberlain had entered the House of Commons during the lifetime of the previous Parliament as junior member for Birmingham. He had distinguished himself as a debater, especially in his

successful co-operation with the Irish members to secure, against the opposition of both Front Benches, the abolition of flogging in the army. His admission to the Cabinet was an official recognition of advanced Radicalism.

The first problem with which the new Government was confronted was that of the policy to be pursued toward the Dutch insurrection in South Africa. Every one knew by this time that the pretence that the Transvaalers wanted to become British subjects was the emptiest nonsense. The Boers were in arms, and so far their arms had been successful. Shortly after the general election, British troops were utterly defeated at Laing's Neck and Majuba Hill. Another British force was cut off and compelled to surrender at Potchefstroom. If the Transvaal was really to be annexed it must be conquered by arms, and at any moment during such conquest the Dutch of Cape Colony might rise.

South
Africa.

The Liberals had opposed Disraeli's South African policy. They were quite justified in reversing it. Whether it would have been wise to have vindicated British prestige by at least one victory before doing so may be a matter of opinion. At any rate, this was not done. Almost on the morrow of Majuba negotiations for peace were opened. The Transvaal Republic was recognised. It was to be subject to British "suzerainty"—this phrase was abandoned after another convention three years later—and was to have no foreign relations to which Great Britain was not a party. Otherwise, its internal affairs were left to its inhabitants.

The next trouble was with Ireland. The Irish vote had gone to the Liberals at the general election be-

The
Irish
Question.

cause Disraeli, despairing of success on any other issue, had tried at the last moment to raise an anti-Irish cry; but the friendly relations between the Liberals and the Nationalists did not survive the first few weeks of the new Parliament. Ireland had been lately visited with acute agrarian distress, and some time before the general election the Land League had been formed for the purpose of protecting the interests of the tenants. Its campaign was soon in full swing, accompanied here and there by violence, always made effective by the overwhelming force of unanimous popular support. Meanwhile, in Parliament, the Irish members, now formed into a strictly disciplined party under the energetic leadership of Parnell, pushed their obstructionist tactics to the fullest extremity and loudly demanded the redress of both national and agrarian grievances.

The Government resolved to answer these demands by two Bills—a Land Bill, to relieve the distress of the tenant farmers, and a Coercion Bill, to break the back of the agitation.

The
Land Act.

The Irish Land Bill was the subject of long deliberation in the Cabinet, and was repeatedly cast aside before it saw the light. In its ultimate form it established Land Courts, to which the tenants could appeal for a revision of their rents, and it also gave a measure of security of tenure prohibiting arbitrary evictions. Virtually, it established throughout Ireland a sort of dual ownership, and was therefore an important step in the direction of peasant proprietorship. The Bill passed into law, though the Irish members, led by Parnell, refused to accept any responsibility for it and abstained on the third reading.

Gladstone was sincerely unwilling to resort to co-

ercion, more especially as he had made a great point of abandoning it on assuming office. Mr. Chamberlain was even more hostile to it, and fought a vigorous battle against it in the Cabinet. But the Irish office was insistent. An attempt to prosecute Parnell and others under the ordinary law had failed in an even more humiliating manner than the attempt of Peel to imprison O'Connell had failed.

The
Coercion.
Act

Forster altogether misunderstood the nature of the problem with which he had to deal. He was absurd enough to say **and** perhaps to think that the land agitation was the work of a few "village ruffians," and that if he was permitted to suspend the Habeas Corpus Act and clap these mischievous persons into gaol everything would be quiet. The Coercion Bill was fought by the Irish members with every weapon of obstruction. They were repeatedly suspended both individually and in bulk; nor did the Bill pass as law until grave inroads had been made upon the privileges of the House of Commons and precedence enacted fatal to its liberties. At last, however, it did pass. It completely failed. Forster's arrests, though wholesale, did not appear to affect the agitation except to inflame it. New leaders appeared to replace those who were in prison, and most significant of all, the Catholic priests took up the popular cause with enthusiasm. Gladstone, in the face of all that he had written concerning "Vaticanism," tried secretly to induce Rome to move against the patriotic priests; but Newman, to whom he applied, refused the office of tale-bearer, and this attempt also failed.

The Government now resolved to strike at higher game. Gladstone declared in a phrase which became proverbial that "The resources of civilisation were

The
Arrest of
Parnell.

not exhausted.” Following close on this Parnell, who had made a strong but perfectly legitimate speech in Dublin, was arrested, together with his principal lieutenants, and sent to Kilmainham Gaol. The arrest was announced by Gladstone at the Mansion House dinner amid the unanimous cheers of the Liberals and Conservatives. This violent measure also failed. The only effect of Parnell’s imprisonment was to throw the whole movement into the hands of the extremists, and so made Ireland more unmanageable than ever. Parnell was sent to prison on October 13, 1881. Before the year 1882 was two months old the Liberal leaders were begging Parnell to be so kind as to come out again, and were prepared to offer up Forster as a sacrifice.

The
Kilmain-
ham
Treaty.

The Kilmainham Treaty was made, while Parnell was still in prison, by Captain O’Shea, representing the Irish leader, and Mr. Chamberlain, the leading anti-Coercionist of the Cabinet, with the full knowledge and approval of the Prime Minister.

Parnell was genuinely anxious to get out of Kilmainham, not assuredly for any personal motive, but because he perceived that in his absence the movement was getting out of hand, and that his careful scheme of tactics might at any moment be disconcerted by the growing power of the extremists. The wiser members of the Government, on the other hand, saw that they had made a bad blunder and were anxious to retrieve it. The bargain was soon struck. Parnell and his friends were to be liberated, the most oppressive provisions of the Coercion Act were to be dropped, and the Government was to take up the Arrears Question—that is, the case of those tenants who owed large arrears of rent which they could not

pay. Parnell, on his side, promised to do his best to keep the movement within constitutional limits. Upon the conclusion of this agreement Forster and Lord Cowper, the Viceroy, resigned, and their places were taken by Lord Frederick Cavendish and Earl Spencer.

The Kilmainham Treaty never came into full force. What Parnell had feared had happened. A powerful secret society, called the Invincibles, had sprung up in Ireland during his imprisonment. Its object was to secure the redress of Irish wrongs by methods of terrorism. Among the victims marked out for its vengeance was one Thomas Burke, a permanent official of Dublin Castle, who had been particularly active and ruthless in administering the Coercion Act. A plot was formed to waylay and assassinate Burke in Phoenix Park. The attack was duly made, but it happened that Burke had in his company the new Chief Secretary, Lord Frederick Cavendish. His identity was unknown to the murderers, but he shared the fate of his companion.

The
Phoenix
Park
Murders.

Had Burke alone perished it is probable that the Phoenix Park murder would have created no greater sensation than the many other acts of violence which had accompanied the struggle for Irish freedom. But the death of Lord Frederick, a cadet of one of the most wealthy aristocratic houses in England, caused a violent explosion of horror. That horror was, indeed, shared by most Irishmen, more especially as the victim had in some sort come to Ireland as a messenger of peace and conciliation. No man felt it more strongly than Parnell; indeed, apart from any moral emotions, it had entirely upset his whole scheme of political tactics. He and the other Irish leaders im-

mediately and publicly denounced the assassins, while privately he went so far as virtually to offer to resign the Irish leadership if it was thought that such a course would avert further mischief.

Coercion
Again.

The Phœnix Park murders destroyed the Kilmainham Treaty. The murders took place on May 6, 1882. Immediately Parliament met a new and severe Coercion Act was introduced and carried through Parliament. Most of the murderers of Cavendish and Burke were captured and brought to trial. One of them, Carey, was induced to turn Queen's evidence. The others were hanged. Carey was quietly shipped off to Australia under another name, but before he reached his destination he was shot dead on board ship by another Irishman called O'Brien.

Egypt.

Meanwhile, the Government had involved itself in grave complications in the East. Egypt, nominally still a part of the Ottoman Empire, was really by this time an independent state, ruled by the Khedive. Its finances were in a chaotic condition, and the cosmopolitan financiers, mostly English and French Jews, who had lent money to the Khedive, were clamouring for their interest and getting very nervous about their principal. England had, moreover, acquired a special interest in Egypt by reason of the action of Disraeli when Prime Minister, in buying on her behalf through the Rothschilds the Khedive's shares in the Suez Canal. At length, in obedience to the demands of the bondholders, Egypt had been subjected as regards its finances to the dual control of England and France.

Shortly after Gladstone had taken office a new development took place. A patriotic movement, beginning in the Egyptian army, spread rapidly to large

sections of the native population. Its object was the expulsion of the foreigner and the control of Egyptian affairs by Egyptians. Its leader was one Arabi Pasha, a soldier who had been minister of war, and apparently a humane and simple-minded man. The Khedive seemed sometimes to lean to Arabi and sometimes to repudiate him. At length, on June 11, 1882, riots broke out in Alexandria and some Europeans were killed. England and France had dispatched fleets to Egyptian waters; but France, now virtually ruled by Gambetta, declined to go farther. English authorities, however, determined on the bombardment of Alexandria, and the English admiral, having first summoned Arabi's army to surrender the forts guarding the harbour, met with a refusal and opened fire on the town, with the result that Arabi was compelled to abandon it. English troops landed in Egypt, and a short campaign sufficed to suppress the insurrection. Arabi was defeated at Tel el Kebir and made a prisoner. He was sent to Ceylon.

These measures naturally met with the strong disapproval of John Bright, who forthwith resigned from the Government as a protest against the bombardment of Alexandria. They were also severely criticised by Radicals outside the Ministry as well as by the Irish Nationalists. In addition to these, the opponents of the Egyptian war found their unexpected ally in a young Tory aristocrat, Lord Randolph Churchill, a younger son of the Duke of Marlborough.

Lord
Randolph
Churchill.

Churchill had sat in the Parliament of 1874 without making any conspicuous mark. The overwhelming Liberal victory of 1888 gave him his chance. The

retirement of Disraeli had left the Conservative party practically leaderless. The prestige and eloquence of Gladstone overawed all his surviving opponents. Churchill refused to be overawed. He had the advantages of high rank, considerable ability, especially as a demagogue, and above all a self-confidence amounting to effrontery. He installed himself below the gangway with a few kindred spirits who characteristically designated themselves the "Fourth Party." He continually attacked and flouted Gladstone in a manner which no one had ventured to adopt since Disraeli became Lord Beaconsfield. He continually flouted his own leaders. But he put new spirit into the Conservative Opposition. His first great success had been over the Bradlaugh case. Charles Bradlaugh, who had been known for many years as an active propagandist of Atheism, was at the election of 1890 returned to the House of Commons as member for Northampton. He asked to be allowed to affirm instead of taking the oath, since the oath would be to him a meaningless form. Gladstone was in favour of granting his request, and the Conservative leaders seemed at first disposed to acquiesce. But Churchill saw an opportunity of scoring off the Government and dividing its followers. He fought determinedly against the admission of Bradlaugh, and by the help of some Non-Conformist and some Irish Catholic votes repeatedly placed the Ministers in a minority. In the end, after several expulsions and many violent scenes, Bradlaugh was quietly admitted to the House without discussion, but Churchill had achieved his end, which was not to exclude Bradlaugh but to weaken and discredit the Government. He now saw another opportunity of raising a sec-

tion of the Ministry's supporters against them. He took up the cause of Arabi, and he had the good fortune to be in close touch with a man who thoroughly understood the question, Mr. Wilfred Scawen Blunt. Armed with Mr. Blunt's facts, Churchill in the House and in the country denounced the Egyptian expedition as a "Bondholders' War," and urged the Conservative party to join the Radicals and Irish in opposing it. On this occasion, however, the Conservative party refused to follow Churchill, and the Government was safe from electoral defeat. But its troubles in Egypt were by no means at an end.

Neither were its troubles in Ireland. As soon as the first shock of the Phoenix Park murders was over, the division between the Coercionists and anti-Coercionists in the Government once more asserted itself. At the head of the latter party was Mr. Chamberlain, who was already in negotiation with the Irish members as to a scheme of federal self-government which he wished to submit to the Cabinet as a settlement of the Irish question. Gladstone was also in communication with the Irish leader, the chosen medium of his negotiations being that lady whose name was to be so tragically associated with Parnell—Mrs. Catharine O'Shea.

During the session of 1884 the Government passed a Reform Bill, the principal effect of which was to extend the franchise to the agricultural laborers. This was to apply to Ireland also, so that the mass of the Irish peasantry would at the next election be admitted to the electorate for the first time since 1829. The passing of this bill led to a temporary dispute with the House of Lords. The Peers refused to pass it unless it was accompanied by a scheme for the re-

The
Reform
Bill.

distribution of seats. After some agitation the Government gave way and a redistribution scheme was added to the Bill, which then passed into law.

Gordon.

Meanwhile, the Government was faced with new trouble in Egypt—dual control. An English army was in occupation of Egypt, and England was practically compelled to make herself responsible for the government of the country. The bondholders on whose account we had gone there were insistent that we should not leave until full security had been taken for the payment of their interest. How long we should be compelled to remain there was still an open question; but Gladstone never ceased to declare that the occupation was purely temporary. However, having undertaken the responsibility of governing Egypt for the time being, we were bound to consider the question of defending its boundaries; and this was at the moment a real problem, for a powerful religious leader—"the Mahdi"—had established himself in the Soudan and was raiding and conquering all along the Upper Nile. The English Government, acting in the name of the Khedive, decided to abandon the Soudan, and after the destruction of Hicks Pasha's force by the Mahdi, sent General Gordon to bring away the garrisons whose safety was in danger. Gordon went out, but found the support provided for him altogether inadequate, and instead of being able to bring away the Egyptian garrisons was himself shut up in Khartoum. He sent home appeals for relief. A disgraceful delay occurred in sending him help, the blame of which is attributed by some to the Home Government, and by some to the English administration in Egypt. In any case, the relief expedition started far too late, and before it got near Khartoum, that

post had been surrendered, probably by treachery, and Gordon had been killed. The news of his death caused a violent outbreak of indignation in England, and in the House of Commons the Government was saved from a vote of censure by only fifteen votes.

The Irish party was now definitely in opposition, and Churchill was working hard to bring about a coalition between the Nationalists and the Tories. Mr. Chamberlain's scheme for Irish self-government, though approved by Gladstone, had been rejected by the Cabinet. Lord Spencer insisted on the renewal of the Coercion Act, and the anti-coercionist members of the Government were forced to submit. Then Churchill played his trump card. Speaking at a Tory Club in London, he declared against the renewal of coercion. Men waited to hear of his repudiation by the official leaders of the Conservative party; but he was not repudiated. He was, at the moment, the most popular man on the Opposition side, and had just captured the electoral organisation of his party. His declaration, made without protest from the official leaders, was taken as committing the Conservative party against coercion. This at once made an end of the Liberal coercionist scheme. It was hard enough to ask Radicals, who must soon face their constituents, to face them with a coercionist programme. To face them with such a programme while the Tories were demanding a return to the ordinary law, was totally out of the question. There was probably no member of the Government who would not have been glad of an excuse for resigning. The excuse soon came. On the budget of 1885 Tories and Nationalists combined to vote against the wine and spirit duties. Normally, the Government had a majority over such

The Fall
of the Gov-
ernment.

a combination, but so many Liberals were secretly desirous of defeat, that when the division was taken, on June 8th, the Government was defeated by a majority of twelve.

Gladstone resigned. There could not be an immediate dissolution, for the Reform Act of 1884 was not yet in force. Lord Salisbury, therefore, became Prime Minister without a parliamentary majority. The composition of his Ministry showed how powerful Churchill had become. He was made Secretary for India, with a seat in the Cabinet. All his old colleagues of the Fourth Party were provided for in one way or another. He was, moreover, able to insist upon the dethronement of Sir Stafford Northcote from the leadership of the House of Commons and his elevation to the Lords in a sinecure office. But perhaps the most important appointment was that of Lord Carnarvon as Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland.

This appointment was regarded as a guarantee of the persistence of the Tory-Nationalist alliance. Carnarvon was a perfectly sincere Home Ruler, and immediately on his acceptance of office opened negotiations with Parnell with a view to agreeing upon a basis of Home Rule. These negotiations were "unofficial," but Salisbury was kept informed of their progress. Meanwhile, the new Cabinet got through the session, passed a small but excellent Act, which made a beginning of land-purchase in Ireland, and in August the Parliament was dissolved.

It was a curious election. Parnell issued a manifesto advising the Irish throughout Great Britain to vote Tory. The Conservative leaders did their best to make this easy for him by repudiating coercion and speaking in the most sympathetic terms of Irish

grievances. Gladstone issued a manifesto of a very vague and non-committal character, ending with the request that he should be given a majority that would make him independent of the Irish vote. Chamberlain put forward an "unauthorized" programme, of which the main feature was the establishment of peasant proprietorship in England. At the same time Chamberlain was forced into a conflict with the Irish, in the course of which he was led to repudiate Home Rule as defined by Parnell.

When the elections were over it was found that the transfer of the Irish vote, together with Churchill's "Tory Democracy," had greatly strengthened the Conservatives in the boroughs, but that Chamberlain's appeal had been irresistible to the new electorate of the counties. The Liberals of all shades numbered 335, exactly half the House. The Tories and Irish made up the other half. In Ireland, except in the little Orange corner, Parnell carried all before him and returned at the head of a solid party eighty-five strong. The Conservatives, finding that the support of the Irish would not give them a majority, repudiated that support, and the Irish in turn combined with the Liberals to expel the Government from office by voting for an amendment to the Address, moved by Mr. Chamberlain's henchman, Mr. Jesse Collings, in favor of the Birmingham Land Policy.

Gladstone had already allowed hints to escape him that he was leaning toward the Home Rule position. He now definitely declared for it, and formed a Government on that basis, only those who were prepared at least to consider some scheme for self-government in Ireland being invited to join. Hartington and others therefore declined to join the new Administration;

Home Rule.

but Chamberlain, though he had committed himself against a separate Parliament for Ireland, consented to join, on condition that he should be free to accept or reject such proposals as might be made. It must in fairness be said that Mr. Chamberlain was not treated with great consideration, though he had won the election, and that he came into the Ministry in a mood not unnaturally embittered.

From this moment to the end of his career, Gladstone devoted himself wholly to the task of carrying Home Rule. His motives cannot be known, and may well have been mixed. He had certainly fully realised the difficulty of governing Ireland against the unanimous will of the people without a continual resort to coercion, and such a resort to coercion he particularly disliked. Some of his actions lend colour to the idea that he was not altogether unwilling to break with Mr. Chamberlain, whose assumption of a virtual leadership during the election was not likely to please his leader. But it is difficult to judge of such things so near the event.

A Home Rule Bill, such as Parnell could accept, was submitted to the Cabinet. It had been framed by Gladstone himself in conjunction with Mr. John Morley (now Lord Morley), the new Secretary for Ireland. It was generally accepted. Its one vigorous critic was Chamberlain. Little attempt, as Lord Morley himself tells us, was made to meet his views, and he eventually resigned.

On April 8, 1886, Gladstone introduced his Home Rule Bill in the House of Commons. It provided for the creation, in Ireland, of a Parliament consisting of two chambers. It was supported by Parnell but opposed by Hartington and Chamberlain. The Lib-

erals and Nationalists constituted together a large majority of the House. The fate of the Bill therefore depended upon the size of the Liberal secession. It proved greater than was anticipated. When, on June 7th, the House divided on the second reading of the Bill, more than a hundred Liberal members divided against the Government. The Bill was rejected by a majority of thirty.

Gladstone at once appealed to the country. The verdict was against him. In the new Parliament, though the Conservatives had no clear majority, they had in combination with the Liberal-Unionists a majority of 118. Gladstone resigned, and Lord Salisbury again became Prime Minister. He offered seats to the leading Liberal-Unionists, but the offer was declined. Churchill became Chancellor of the Exchequer and leader of the House of Commons.

Churchill did not long retain his position. The budget which he prepared was not acceptable to some of his colleagues, and he quarrelled with the War Office and the Admiralty in regard to the size of the Army and Navy estimates. He had several times tendered his resignation. At last he did so, on December 22, 1886, and it was accepted. He was never again a Minister. His place at the Exchequer was taken by Goschen, one of the Unionist seceders, while Mr. W. H. Smith became leader of the House of Commons.

The
Fall of
Churchill.

The rejection of Home Rule had led to a revival of agitation and disorder in Ireland. With the resignation of Churchill disappeared the last influence which might have prevented the Government from recurring to coercion. Mr. Arthur Balfour, who had been a member of Churchill's Fourth Party, was now

The
New Coer-
cion Act.

Secretary for Ireland, and passed a Coercion Act even more drastic than Forster's. Leading Irish politicians were imprisoned under it with all the sufferings of the criminal. Ireland replied with the plan of campaign; a strike against rent, which dried up at source the incomes of the powerful cosmopolitan financiers, already the masters of English politicians and the main receivers, through mortgage interest, of Irish rents.

The
Pigott
Letters.

On April 18, 1887, the day upon which the decision was to take place on Mr. Balfour's Coercion Bill, the *Times* newspaper published what purported to be a letter from Parnell. It was dated May 15, 1885, and its purport was a condonation of the Phoenix Park murders. Parnell at once stigmatised it as a forgery, but he declined to bring a libel action, maintaining that he could not expect fair play from an English Court, while any verdict that he might obtain in Ireland would be discounted by his enemies. He asked for a Committee of the House of Commons to investigate the matter, and was prepared to accept a committee with a Unionist majority. The Government offered instead a Judicial Commission, consisting of three judges, which should investigate not the origin of the letter only, but the whole of the allegation made by the *Times* in a series of articles as to the connection between the Nationalist Party and agrarian crime. The Commission was duly constituted, and both sides were represented before it by Counsel, the Attorney-General, Sir Richard Webster, being the principal advocate for the *Times* and Sir Charles Russell, himself an Irishman and a Home Ruler, for Parnell and the Nationalist Party. It

soon became apparent that the *Times* had obtained the incriminating letter from one Richard Pigott, who had once been a Nationalist journalist, but had for some years past been picking up such a living as he could by begging letter-writing and blackmail. Under Russell's cross-examination Pigott hopelessly broke down and eventually confessed that he had forged the letter, together with many others which he had sold to the *Times*. A warrant was issued for his arrest, but he escaped to Madrid, where he committed suicide. After that no one cared what the other findings of the Commission might be. The issue was universally regarded as a great victory for Parnell.

It was followed by a great disaster. In 1889 the world was startled to learn that Parnell had been made co-respondent in the Divorce Case brought by Captain O'Shea against his wife. Parnell made no defence—in deference, it is said by some, to the lady's wishes. The divorce was therefore obtained, and as soon as the decree was made absolute, Parnell married Mrs. O'Shea.

The
Fall of
Parnell.

It did not seem at first that the incident was to endanger Parnell's political position. He was re-elected leader of the Irish Party with unanimity immediately after the decision of the Court had been given. But the English Non-Conformists became restive. Mr. Hugh Price Hughes, Mr. Stead, and other of their leaders demanded the deposition of Parnell as a condition of their continuing to support the Liberal-Irish alliance. Gladstone grew frightened and gave way to such pressure. He wrote a letter to Mr. Justin Macarthy suggesting that Parnell should resign, and hinting that if he did not resign

he himself might have to do so. Many Irish members saw in this threat the utter destruction of Home Rule. The Irish Party met in Committee Room, No. 15. A long battle was fought, at the end of which Parnell found himself in a minority. The Irish Party was split in two, the majority electing Mr. Justin Macarthy as leader.

Both sides now appealed to Ireland. In Ireland Parnell would probably have been successful but for the fact that the Catholic priesthood were inevitably arrayed against him. Also he had somewhat neglected the work of public agitation of late years, and his personal influence had accordingly declined. The wear and tear of the desperate struggle wore him out, and after losing two bye-elections he died on October 6, 1891.

Domestic
Legislation

Two important measures of Domestic Reform marked the career of the second Salisbury Government. One was the establishment of County Councils throughout England and Scotland. The other was the completion of the work of 1871 by the establishment of Free Education. The latter measure was largely the work of Mr. Chamberlain who, though not in the Government, forced it on his Conservative allies.

The
Second
Home Rule
Bill.

In 1892 the Parliament of 1886, having run its course, was dissolved. The result of the elections was somewhat indecisive. The Unionists lost seats, but they retained a majority of 16 in Great Britain. The Irish votes turned the scale, giving a Home Rule majority of over 50, but in estimating this majority allowance had to be made for the twelve "Parnellites" who now followed Mr. Redmond and were not distinctly in alliance with the Government. The major-

ity, however, was sufficient to turn Lord Salisbury out of power and put Gladstone in his place.

Gladstone immediately introduced a new Home Rule Bill which differed in some important particulars from its predecessors. The complete exclusion of the Irish members from the Imperial Parliament, which had been the especial mark of Mr. Chamberlain's hostility in 1886, was abandoned in favour of a compromise by which the Irish members were to vote on Imperial but not on English questions. This compromise was itself abandoned in Committee, and a reduced number of Irish members were included for all purposes.

This time Gladstone succeeded in carrying the second reading of his Bill in the House of Commons, piloted it with some difficulty through Committee, and sent it up to the Lords who, as every one had expected, unceremoniously rejected it.

Gladstone was now in favour of an immediate appeal to the people against the action of the Lords, and there can be no doubt that this course would have given the Liberal Party its best chance of victory. But his colleagues would not agree, and the Government continued to cling to office, passing a number of Bills which the House of Lords, growing day by day more unpopular, either mutilated or rejected. Gladstone himself resigned the Premiership in March, 1894, and the Queen, who was thoroughly out of sympathy with her Ministers, without consultation with him, sent for Lord Rosebery, then Foreign Secretary. The misfortunes of the Government were now increased by the friction between the new Prime Minister and his colleague, Sir William Harcourt, who led the House of Commons. The Government went

Gladstone's
Resignation.

on with dwindling majorities until, on June 21, 1895, the Ministers were defeated on the Army Estimates and another General Election took place. The victory of the opposition was of the most overwhelming character. In the new Parliament the Liberals numbered less than 160 members. The Unionists had a solid majority over Liberals and Irish combined of 156

The
Unionist.
Ministry.

Lord Salisbury was again Prime Minister, but this time he presided over a Coalition Government, consisting of Conservatives and Liberal-Unionists. Mr. Balfour led the House of Commons. Hartington (who had now become Duke of Devonshire) was Lord President of the Council. Mr. Chamberlain was Colonial Secretary.

The
Jameson
Raid.

The new Government had been but a short time in power when England was startled by the news that on New Year's Day, 1896, Dr. Jameson, who was at the head of the Administration of the territories of the British South Africa Company, had with the forces of that Company, crossed the frontier of the Transvaal Republic. Englishmen had hardly heard anything about the politics of South Africa since the Peace which followed Majuba, but trouble had been brewing for some time in that country. The Treaty of 1881, revised and confirmed in 1884, had guaranteed the independence of the Transvaal Republic, subject to certain conditions as to its foreign relations; but after the conclusion of the second of these arrangements an unexpected complication occurred. Gold was discovered in plentiful quantities within the territory of the Republic. The presence of the gold naturally attracted those adventurers who are always eager to seek a rapid path to fortune; but the conditions in South Africa were so far different from those

of the early days of Australia and California, that there was an abundant supply of native labour for the rough work of mining. It was, therefore, the financier and speculator even more than the miner who migrated to the Rand, and before many years there had grown up around Johannesburg a cosmopolitan community containing many immensely wealthy men of divers origin but predominantly Jewish.

The Boer Government regarded this community with not unnatural distrust, and placed various obstacles in the way of the "Outlanders," as they were called, obtaining the privileges of citizenship. A number of the wealthiest men in Johannesburg responded by forming a "Reform Committee" which had had for its object the overthrow of the Boer Government and the constitution of one which they themselves could control. In this scheme they obtained the active support of Mr. Cecil Rhodes, who was at once Prime Minister of Cape Colony and the principal Director of the Chartered Company which ruled in Bechuana-land and Rhodesia. He was himself a millionaire and a man of the same type as those who were directing the rebellious movement in Johannesburg, and the Jameson Raid was part of the scheme concocted between them.

The attempt miscarried. Jameson started too early, and the millionnaires of the Rand were hardly to be relied upon for the physical risks of revolutionary action. There were no serious disturbances on the Rand, and Jameson's small force was easily surrounded and captured by the Boer commandants. The conspirators at Johannesburg were arrested, and some of them were sentenced to terms of imprisonment. The raiders were handed over to the English

Government, were tried, convicted and sent to prison.

The responsibility of the English Government remained. Though Mr. Chamberlain had issued at once a proclamation repudiating Jameson, it was widely believed that the Colonial Office had some cognisance of what was intended. A Committee of the House of Commons was appointed to investigate the matter, but the apparent resolution of all the members of that committee, including those supposed to represent the Opposition, to prevent the matter being thoroughly probed, only increased the suspicion that there was good ground for such allegations. Meanwhile, Mr. Chamberlain had opened negotiations with President Krüger with a view to securing to the Outlanders some of the concessions which they demanded.

Foreign
Affairs.

Two foreign disputes troubled the early days of the Unionist Ministry. A massacre of Armenians occurred in Constantinople, and was followed by others throughout the Turkish Empire. A strong agitation made itself felt in Great Britain, and even drew Gladstone from his retirement to make his last public speech in denunciation of the Turkish Government. The British Government made representations to the Sultan, but nothing effective was done, and the only practical effect of the agitation was the deposition of Lord Rosebery from the leadership of the Liberal Party. At about the same time a dispute arose between Great Britain and the Republic of Venezuela concerning the boundary between the territories of that state and those of British Guiana. The United States intervened, taking its stand upon what was called "The Monroe Doctrine," the doctrine that it concerned the United States to prevent

any European Power from extending its boundaries on the American continent. Negotiations followed between Lord Salisbury and Mr. Olney, the American Secretary of State, and the Venezuelan question was satisfactorily settled, but the attempt to so extend the agreement as to make it a general treaty of arbitration between the two countries was defeated by the refusal of the American Senate to ratify it.

England was still in occupation of Egypt, and the occupation might now be regarded as almost avowedly permanent. The question of the Soudan reappeared. The Mahdi was dead, but his successor, the Khalifa, ruled over the vast regions of the Upper Nile, including Khartoum. The English Government in Egypt resolved to send an expedition to reconquer these old Egyptian dominions. The expedition, which was commanded by General Kitchener, was wholly successful, the Khalifa's forces were defeated without loss at the battle of Omdurman, and his territory annexed to Egypt. When, however, the Egyptian troops penetrated farther into the Soudan, they found the post of Fashoda occupied by a French expeditionary force under Major Marchand. This led to a fierce dispute between England and France, which nearly brought the two nations to the verge of war. In the end, however, the French Government recalled Major Marchand, and the whole of the Egyptian Soudan was restored to Egypt—that is, in effect, to England.

The
Soudan.

Mr. Chamberlain, who had been largely responsible for the electoral victories of the Unionists in 1895, had won them by putting forward a programme of social and industrial reform as an alternative to the constitutional changes advocated by the Liberals. One

Domestic
Reforms.

important item in this programme he succeeded in carrying into law, namely, a measure for the compensation of workmen during their employment. With another reform which had figured prominently during the election, he was very successful. The question of Old Age Pensions was referred to a committee; its report was indecisive and unsatisfactory, and the Government allowed the matter to drop.

The
Transvaal
Again.

Meanwhile the dispute initiated on the morrow of the Jameson Raid concerning the condition of the Outlanders continued to drag on. President Krüger had been re-elected in 1898 by a large majority, as against General Joubert, who was regarded as a candidate more favourable to their claims. Shortly afterward Sir Alfred Milner was appointed British High Commissioner in the place of Lord Rossmead, this election being understood as indicating the intention of the British Government to pursue a more masterful policy. Prolonged negotiations followed between Lord Milner and Mr. Krüger, into the details of which it is not necessary to enter. Lord Milner was clearly bent upon enforcing complete submission and Mr. Krüger, although he was prepared to make certain concessions, was not prepared to accept such submission.

It is probable that the Government did not realise how close it was getting to war. On the other hand, the great financial interests in South Africa desired war and openly worked for it, and these interests had in their control a large part of the English press. They were also powerful with the politicians on both sides of the House. The corruption which centred round the vast secretly subscribed funds of the two parties had already begun to infect every department

of British public life, though few Englishmen yet suspected its existence. Neither the politicians nor the Jewish and other Rand magnates seemed to have had any suspicion of the difficulties and dangers which a war with the Boers would entail. Yet the Government had been warned of these difficulties and dangers in the plainest terms by the able, experienced and patriotic soldier who held the chief command in South Africa, General Butler. General Butler's only reward was to be stigmatised as a "pro-Boer" by the kept press of the mine-owners and recalled. In September, 1899, the Transvaal Government withdrew a qualified offer which it had made of enfranchisement for the Outlanders after five years' residence. The English Government replied by formally demanding a simple five years' qualification and a fixed representation for the Gold Fields, and by calling out the reserves. President Krüger then issued an ultimatum demanding the withdrawal of British troops from the frontier. On the 12th of October war was declared. The Orange Free State, under the terms of a secret treaty with the Transvaal, joined in the war as its ally.

The
South
African
War.

General Butler's warnings were fully justified by the event. The opening of the war was disastrous for England. Over the wide area of the conflict there were nothing but defeats. General White, who had command in Natal, was shut up in Ladysmith, and General Sir Redvers Buller made several unsuccessful attempts to cross the Tugela and relieve him, the most celebrated leading to the disastrous battle of Colenso. Meanwhile Mafeking and Kimberley were invested by the Boers, and Lord Methuen, in marching north to their relief, was sharply checked at

Maggesfonteine. In the south, General Gatacre met with an equally humiliating reverse.

These disasters, occurring one after another, brought home to the Government and the nation the need of more vigorous action, and a much larger force was dispatched to South Africa, under the command of Lord Roberts, with General Kitchener as his subordinate. The immediate effect was great. Lord Roberts invaded the Orange Free State from the southwest, and a great Boer force under General Cronje was captured at Paardeverg. Kimberley was relieved and later Mafeking, while the necessary withdrawal of Boer troops from Natal enabled General Buller at last to pass the Tugela and relieve Ladysmith. The British army now invaded the republics. Blomfontein, the capital of the Orange Free State, was entered on May 28, 1900, and Pretoria, the capital of the Transvaal, on June 5th. Both states were declared annexed to the British Empire.

The
General
Election.

It was generally believed that the war was now over and the Government thought the moment opportune for a dissolution of Parliament. The war had been highly popular, so much so that those who opposed it would hardly venture to call public meetings. It was felt that the Ministers would never have so good a chance again of securing a renewal of their power. They dissolved Parliament and appealed to the country. Their hopes were justified. The Liberals were divided on the issue of the war, and, indeed, on nearly all other issues. A strong disposition on the part of their most eminent leaders to repudiate Home Rule dampened the enthusiasm of the Irish, and apart from the Irish the populace still supported the war. The Unionists were returned to

power, with a majority of 130 over all other parties, almost exactly as strong as before.

It soon became obvious that the conclusion of the war was still far off. The whole countryside rose behind the British army, and it was soon as much as they could do to hold their lines of communication. A long guerilla warfare followed, extending over some two years, during which the British commanders in vain endeavoured by concentration and other expedients to put down the irregular resistance of the Boers. Some of the irregulars which had gone out toward the end of the war were very bad material, and surrenders were lamentably frequent. On the Boer side, General de Wet especially distinguished himself in keeping up this kind of fighting. Exhaustion was of course inevitable in the end if England was prepared to keep up the struggle, and if no foreign nation could be induced to intervene on behalf of the Boers. Nevertheless, it was not until May 16, 1902, that peace was made at Vreniging, and then, though the republics were formally annexed to the Empire, the conditions were such as made the virtual handing back of their government to the Dutch four years later inevitable. But before the last embers of the war had been trampled out, the Queen died.

The War
Renewed.

Queen Victoria had passed her eightieth year, and had been more than sixty years on the throne, having celebrated her Jubilee in 1887 and her Diamond Jubilee in 1897. Her health had been failing of late, and she had probably hastened her end by the energy with which she travelled the country and showed herself everywhere during the darker days of the war. On January 22, 1901, she died.

CHAPTER IX.

THE REIGN OF EDWARD VII.

With the reign of King Edward VII. I will, as I proposed in the introduction to this second part, abandon the method of a mere dry chronicle of events and proceed to sum up and to judge, as best I can, the conclusion of a period. I do so, because in this brief space of nine years there culminated, with rapid effect, all the causes that had been at work in England during the nineteenth century: the transition of the country from an agricultural to an urban community; the complete establishment of capitalism; the decay of Parliament; the menace presented by, and the origins of, bureaucratic control over that industrial proletariat which had now become the mass of the English population.

During five of those brief nine years, I myself, sat as a member of Parliament in Westminster. I had opportunities for watching, very closely, that political world which is so childishly misrepresented in the public press; and though my judgments will be necessarily personal and strong and must differ in many points from those of many of my readers, I must beg him to believe that those judgments are not only sincere, but are based upon a varied and considerable experience of the realities hidden behind the façade of our politics.

King Edward VII.. when he came to the throne

upon the 22d of January, 1901, was already in his 60th year. His long heir-apparency had brought him little into contact with the official side of government in England, still less into contact with the forensic and Parliamentary side of Government. But there were in his position three elements which might, had he succeeded as a younger man, have aided a reaction toward monarchical government, or at any rate the strengthening of the Crown. In the first place he was personally popular. His popularity, strikingly apparent in the first days of his reign, increased beyond all the calculation of the politicians, and never stood higher than at the close of his life. Next, he was, partly by association, partly from personal inclination, an associate of and therefore familiar with that cosmopolitan financial world which is so much the strongest force in modern England. Finally, though restricted to the narrow social experience which the member of every royal family in Europe has suffered since the French Revolution, he had a wider knowledge of the Continent and of Europe in general than commonly falls to the lot of a politician. It is debated and debatable to what an extent he personally exercised initiative in the diplomatic changes which marked his reign, and how far in these he was but the mouthpiece of the trained, permanent officials of the Foreign Office. But it is certain that his international experience was the basis of all the influence he exercised, or at least represented, in this direction; and he will certainly be remembered in history chiefly through the association of his name with the very considerable revolution through which English foreign policy passed between his accession and his death. That foreign policy and

the sudden maturing of a very difficult social problem in the first years of the twentieth century, are between them the whole of the history of this short reign, unless we add (perhaps the most important point of all) the apparently final settlement of Ireland.

Briefly, the revolution in British foreign policy which marked the reign was a change from a reliance upon the new German Empire and from a suspicion of, often an antagonism against, the Russian Empire and the French Republic, to a reliance upon the latter two and particularly upon the French as a counterweight to the sudden growth of the German fleet.

It is not possible to mark the steps whereby this transformation was effected, for it has been carefully kept out of public documents, but the general process may be thus described. Just before King Edward came to the throne a German Naval programme, designed in 1900, but intended to be spread over a long seventeen years, proposed the construction of a great fleet. That proposal was not yet one menacing to British naval supremacy. But with every year that passed the determination of the German Empire to create a fleet that should be at least the second in the world, was more and more apparent. Programmes were accelerated, expenditure perpetually exceeded ordinary estimates and, what perhaps alarmed British opinion more than the actual number of the German naval units, a very determined and successful effort was initiated to ensure perfect efficiency at sea. It is probable that this feature was exaggerated by the alarmed opinion of this country. The German authorities were characteristically slow in taking up any new invention (notably the submarine) and their fleet, like so many other of their modern developments, was un-

tested. But, coupled with the very rapid industrial and commercial expansion of Germany, the appearance of the new Empire as a great naval power disturbed to their foundations the old postulates of British foreign policy. In the year 1903, two years after King Edward's accession, Great Britain was spending nearly four times as much as Germany upon her fleet; five years later she was not spending twice as much as Germany. Again, two years after King Edward came to the throne, German naval expenditure was but just over ten million pounds; a year after his death it was twenty-two million pounds. Now the chief feature of British foreign policy must always be opposition to a growing or menacing naval power. That, and not the empty talk of "preserving a balance" upon the Continent, is and must always be the chief preoccupation of British statesmen when they watch the strength of their rivals. It is true that this sudden and rapid growth of German naval power was but part of an increase going on everywhere in the world in this department; but it was novel, and it seemed particularly dangerous because Germany, with a rapidly increasing trade and a rapidly increasing mercantile fleet, was highly restricted in her colonial development. Possessions oversea must necessarily tempt her, and a great carrying trade in hands other than her own was necessarily an obstacle to her and a target for possible aggression.

The policy of gradually transforming English foreign policy from a support of the Central to a support of the Eastern and Western powers was aided by the check experienced by Russia in the Far East. Russia, in common with all Europe, had miscalculated the success with which the Japanese had imitated,

down to their least details, the externals of European civilisation—particularly in the department of arms. When, after the absorption of Manchuria, and the setting up of a great fortified naval post at Port Arthur, Russian finance and the Russian Court began an economic invasion of Korea, the Japanese Government prepared to challenge that advance. They challenged it successfully, particularly as Great Britain formed an alliance with the Japanese Government just as the struggle approached. The war which broke out between the two powers in February, 1904, lasted for more than a year; the military prestige of the Russian people was very highly raised in the opinion of every expert critic by the manner in which the Russian armies met the wholly unexpected strength of Japan. Not only were they maintained at the end of a single line of railway, many thousands of miles in length, but they supported hitherto unparalleled losses in action with no loss of morale, and with a tenacity that increased as the campaign proceeded. None the less, that campaign resulted in the retreat of Russian power in the Far East. Port Arthur fell after a long siege, half Manchuria and all Korea were abandoned to the Japanese, and, what was perhaps graver than such a reverse, the war, which was exceedingly unpopular with the Russian people, provoked a revolution that came within an ace of destroying the fundamental institutions of the State. Against the revolution the Russian Government was at last successful; but this congeries of events satisfied British diplomacy in its belief that no aggression from Russia need now be feared. In the last years of the reign of King Edward an increasing tendency appeared to trust to support, or to

compromise with Russian territorial ambition even in that region of Western Asia where it had for generations been held a menace to our Indian Empire. The change has not been popular with the English people, or at least with their commercial middle classes, but it has been thought necessary as a price to be paid for insurance against the growing naval power of the Germans.

With France the issue was simple. A deep-rooted conviction common to nearly all the educated classes in England that the French people were suffering from an incurable process of decay, made it comparatively easy to persuade what little public opinion there may be upon foreign affairs, that no danger could arise in the future from the Republic; and the calculation was made that the French Army could be used to hold in check, to stalemate (without actual war) the foreign efforts of Germany against any other Power, and in particular ourselves. There was, indeed, an uneasy feeling that the gradual decline of France might produce an anxious moment in the not distant future, but for the time an arrangement of this sort would counterbalance, coupled with the corresponding understanding with Russia, the supposed formidable strength of North Germany under her Prussian hegemony.

Such, in brief *résumé*, was the conversion of English foreign policy during the nine years of King Edward's reign.

It need hardly be pointed out that our new Allies were not slow to take advantage of our admitted necessities. Russia has made herself the mistress of Northern Persia; the French, who had been kept out of Morocco by an English veto for more than a gener-

ation, played the Anglo-German quarrel so skilfully and protested their weakness and embarrassment with such success that they are to-day the masters of that province. None the less, the diplomatic revolution which this country entered upon was the only course that circumstances would admit. It is possible that with a different temper in the German Government there might have been another issue. Efforts were made to restrict the competition in naval armaments—they successively failed, and with their failure the Triple Entente (as it was called) between the British, the French and the Russian Governments, could not but continue.

The position of Ireland during the new reign may be compared, accurately enough, to that of some ship moored in a tideway and swinging with the new direction of the current as the flood begins to set in after low water.

Superficially it might have seemed that the long agony of the Irish nation during the nineteenth century had been suffered in vain; but tenacity in the service of a clear purpose is never thrown away, and when it is accompanied by suffering borne in service of that purpose the result is nearly always fruitful.

After heavy suffering the Irish had won their claim to a continued tenancy of their own land, but they had apparently failed to obtain any complete possession. With an equally intense and continuous activity they had put forward at Westminster their political claim to self-government. But the only result of this effort had been, apparently, the breakdown of the Irish Party over the unhappy adventure of Parnell, and the eager abandonment of the Irish

cause by its professed champions among the politicians of England. The phrase "Home Rule" was indeed kept by one of the professional parties in the double caucus which had come to be the complete master of the House of Commons. The opposing phrase "Unionist" was also retained. But no one, as the nineteenth century drew to a close, expected the developments that were to follow. Two causes, the one social, the other more strictly political, were preparing the new state of things. In the first place the toleration of Catholicism had permitted the Irish nation, in some degree, to recover its organisation and to express in public fashion its homogeneity. For the full lifetime of a man no sufficient temptation had been held out to the best organisers, the best thinkers, the best leaders of the Irish race to abandon the National tradition by abandoning or actively denying the Faith. That is the principal and underlying condition which gradually but unceasingly built up Ireland in spirit during the fifty years that followed the Famine.

The second factor, which I have called the political one, consisted in two deliberate acts (and many subsidiary ones of similar complexion) undertaken by two English statesmen, each in every way superior, both in vision and intelligence, to the run of politicians. One of these acts I have already dealt with. It was the establishment of local government in Ireland by Lord Salisbury. This Act, and all that went with it involved a deliberate revivifying of Irish society. It made a great part of the life of every Irishman dependent upon, and concerned with, the responsible action of men of his own race chosen by himself and in comprehension with him. It withdrew

from the necessarily incompetent action of aliens I know not how many activities, leaving to the action of the distant and unsympathetic general government things not the most important in human life; at any rate not in the daily life of a peasant. But the second political act and far the most important, falls within the reign we are discussing. It was that act by which Mr. George Wyndham, when Secretary for Ireland in 1904, originated the new Peasant Proprietary in Ireland.

I have no space to describe either the details of that measure or the most unfortunate but luckily only partially successful efforts that have subsequently been made by the English Treasury to diminish its efficacy. But, in general terms, what was done was this. A difference in price was arranged between that sum at which the landlords could be persuaded to sell and the tenant should be able to buy, and the difference between the two amounts was met by cash provided by the British tax-payer, while the whole transaction reposed for its credit upon the credit of the English Treasury. A landlord requiring payment at the rate of say £112 per unit of his land, received that payment. Possession was immediately given to the tenant, who was established as a Freeholder upon the condition that he should pay instalments spread over many years, but amounting not to the full £112, but only to £100. For the difference between the two sums the politician at Westminster wisely taxed his own countrymen.

The effect of this excellent measure was not only to initiate a peasant proprietary in Ireland, which is rapidly growing, which cannot but continue to grow, and which will shortly cover the whole agriculture of

the country, but to turn that dominating force in our politics, the cosmopolitan money-lender, from an enemy to a friend. So long as the financiers who held the mortgages upon Irish land depended for their interest upon rents gathered for them by the landlord's agent, so long throughout the world our masters forbade us to grant Home Rule. But when they had in their safes not only mortgages on land but Land Stock as security for their loans, then the content and prosperity of the peasant was essential to them, and from that moment Home Rule was secure. There was, in the last days of Mr. Balfour's administration and during the first four years of the Liberal Government under Sir Henry Campbell-Bannermann and Mr. Asquith, a sort of interregnum. Appointments were made in Ireland, not in the teeth of Irish opinion, but after consultation with the Irish Party. University education was extended to Catholics in their corporate capacity, though the gift was accompanied by childish regulations forbidding any official celebration of the Mass at the expense of these bodies, and there remained hardly any element of friction (by the end of King Edward's reign) save the incurable jobbery of the Treasury. All that remained of the Home Rule problem after the Election of 1910, was the settlement of details. With the portentous froth raised over these details we are not concerned. They belong to the next reign, and they may be regarded with indifference by all those who are concerned with the realities of their time. The whole direction of Irish life, political as well as social, is now set toward a material as well as a spiritual advance, and that autonomy, which is the only alternative to subsidy and Imperial legislation (things no

commercial oligarchy will grant to a province), is already virtually accomplished.

In domestic policy the reign of King Edward VII. was marked by novel, dangerous, and hitherto uncalculated strains in the body politic, which are not yet resolved, although their solution and the nature of the new society to which industrial England is tending are now (four years after King Edward's death) beginning to appear.

The worst of these strains did not develop during the King's own lifetime. At least, their acute symptoms—the great strikes and the new repressive legislation both actual and proposed—belonged, not to the end of his reign but to the beginning of that of his son, George V. None the less, it is the short reign of Edward VII. which will appear in history as the turning-point in the social fate of modern England; for it was during those nine years that the first clear signs of breakdown in certain fundamental national institutions were observable. And it was also during his reign that the experiments in founding capitalist power upon new and firmer bases were begun.

The two phenomena, the breakdown of fundamental institutions and the necessity for social reconstruction had totally different origins, but appeared at the same moment and powerfully reacted one upon the other. That the fundamental political institutions and in particular the House of Commons, should so rapidly have lost their long-maintained vitality was due to a phenomenon common in all civilisations and best compared to old age in the life of a man. The Party System, the arbitrary powers of the politicians and of the financiers behind them, the system of large secret payments which put legislation largely into the

hands of the great capitalists, the duping of the electorate by sham battles between "government" and "opposition"—all these evils which were to ruin Parliamentary life had been growing for some time. The shock of the South African War and, perhaps more important, its sequel in the election of 1906, brought those evils to a head and at the same time made them for the first time apparent to the mass of the people.

At the close of the South African War, when the King had been duly crowned with great pomp in the Summer of 1902, and the strain of those difficult years was thought to be over, the political machine had lost something of its motive force. It was difficult to find "a cry." The pretence of an official Opposition could hardly be maintained, for there was no issue of the least importance upon which even a sham battle could be fought. Both the political parties were bound to the cosmopolitan financial interests at whose bidding this extraordinary campaign had been undertaken, either was under the necessity of leaving the Jewish Mine owners and the Boers in South Africa to a complete independence for the future. At home no questions were allowed to the professional political advocates save petty matters of licensing and sectarian educational quarrels between the various middle-class Protestant bodies. To such things the mass of the people were, of course, quite indifferent. But, in the Summer of 1903, Mr. Chamberlain, the most prominent member of Mr. Balfour's government, suddenly proposed a return to Protection. The presentation of so incalculable and revolutionary a change in the whole commercial policy of a nation that lived by its commerce, put forward as an issue

in the petty and now decrepit game of party politics, had in it a contrast almost comic. What exactly the new scheme of protection was to be, no one knew. It had an indefinite number of aspects! It was supported for an indefinite number of reasons according to the private interests involved and the political ideals it might subserve. With Mr. Chamberlain himself, the object was undoubtedly the formation of an Imperial Customs Union, but the nature of colonial import into this country and of British export into the self-governing colonies had not been studied in any detail by the politicians and no definite scheme was put forward. Before the end of the year Mr. Chamberlain had left the Government with the object of freeing himself to pursue the advocacy of this uncertain policy, which his Chief, and the Government in general, would neither approve nor condemn. Meanwhile certain other members of the Cabinet, most notable of whom was the Duke of Devonshire, had resigned in view of their fixed Free Trade principles.

In such a situation the official "Opposition" had a perfectly simple task to perform. All they need do was to maintain the negative attitude of a continued adhesion to Free Trade. Mr. Balfour continued in power with more and more difficulty until the Autumn of 1905, when he resigned his office and Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman became Premier. There immediately followed in the January of 1906, an election which was of real moment in English history, for it was the hopes raised during that election and their subsequent disappointment which produced the more immediate and rapid decline in the national institutions and the more immediate and rapid rise of the

new industrial complaints and the new restrictive legislation proposed for the proletariat.

Briefly the election of January, 1906, betrayed, for the first time in many years, something of democratic sentiment. Not that the populace, or rather that half of the adult males who, in Great Britain, have the privilege of the suffrage, proposed any democratic scheme or could have desired a democratic reform in the system of government. The nation was, in all its instincts, as aristocratic as ever. But there was a distinct expression of popular criticism. The election showed a really considerable minority who were prepared to protest against the unreality of public life, to regard Parliament as a representative institution, and to give that institution certain mandates which it was to carry out. Instead of the usual shifting of a small margin of votes by the official machinery—a shifting destined to secure a rotation of power between the two allied groups of professional politicians (now called “Liberal” and “Unionist”)—there was a real movement of opinion extending to perhaps as much as one-fifth of the electorate, and this movement of opinion showed itself in widespread abstention from the polls on the one hand by men who had been accustomed to accept the “Unionist” label, and indefinite agitation and a definite mandate proceeding from many who, in the past, had been taken to the polls as “Liberals.”

This latter force spoke clearly upon three points. In the first place the importation of Chinese labour into South Africa by the Mine-owners and the Boers, to whose control the colony was now abandoned in practice and was about to be transferred in legal

theory, must be condemned by the Imperial Government. The politicians were bidden by the electors to reverse the policy of unfree labour, to defy the cosmopolitan financiers who had ordered it, to break up the compounds and send the Chinese home.

The matter was merely symbolic. The black labour long existing in the mines in South Africa, with its enormous death-rate and its frankly servile conditions, was not considered. But the imagination of the proletariat, especially in the North of England, was moved by the crudity of the Chinese experiment. Here were great masses of alien proletarian labourers moved by cosmopolitan capitalist interests half across the world. It was a policy which, if it once became habitual, would completely transform the relations between capital and labour and at any cost it must be destroyed.

Next there was an equally definite mandate for the freeing of the Trades Unions from perils recently imposed upon them by the lawyers. After many years of development, during which the Trades Unions had had the same privileges as any other corporate body, a legal decision had been given (in what was known as the Taff Vale case) which would have permitted the capitalists to ruin any Trades Union at will. Briefly the decision amounted to this: That when the individuals composing a Trades Union caused damage to their employer by their combined action, as loss by cessation of work or technical breach of contract, the funds of the Trades Union could be confiscated to recoup the injured capitalist. As the individual members of a Trades Union were poor men and damages could not be obtained from them, damages should be obtainable from their com-

mon fund, the only instrument which they possessed in their struggle with accumulated wealth.

The second point in the election of 1906, was a definite mandate for the reversal of this new law arbitrarily imposed by the lawyers and not even by the capitalists in Parliament.

The third point in the election was a demand for non-contributory, non-compulsory old-age pensions. The proletariat had long been duped with proposals more or less definite for relief to be given to the indigent in old age (when they could no longer work for the profit of others) which relief should secure them from imprisonment in the workhouse or the capricious and arbitrary doles known as "outdoor relief."

This long-repeated promise made by the politicians to the mass of the people went by the name of "Old Age Pensions."

When Parliament met in the February of 1906, it contained a great number of new men (not enough to modify the essentially oligarchic character of the institution but still in larger proportion than such new elements had ever appeared before) and there was actually present the disturbing factor of a new political group dissociated from the regular official machine of "Government" and "Opposition." This group was called "The Independent Labour Party."

In the presence of all these novel phenomena combined those insufficiently acquainted with the history of the country believed some conscious and revolutionary change to be at hand. A great change was indeed at hand, for the old respect which Parliament had so long enjoyed, the moral authority upon which its oligarchic power depended, was to fail it. But that change was to be neither conscious nor revolu-

tionary and the coming breakdown of Parliament was to be due to the exact opposite of that democratic movement which the less wise of contemporary observers confidently expected.

On the three matters where a definite popular mandate had been given the politicians offered a resistance to public pressure not uniformly successful at the outset, but ultimately and upon the whole successful.

In the matter of Old Age Pensions, they were best prepared to meet the popular demand. After all, expenditure of one sort or another was necessary in the maintenance of that great proletarian majority of the country when the individuals composing it became too old to work for their capitalist employers and the taxation required to provide Old Age Pensions was, or might be, a relief from the taxation required to maintain a system of imprisonment in the workhouse and of the doles called "Outdoor Relief." The reform was delayed as long as possible in order to weaken the new democratic feeling. Had Old Age Pensions been given at once they would have had to be universal and completely free. By delaying them it was possible to introduce certain novel elements into the scheme, the high importance of which will be immediately apparent.

When the reform was granted (in 1908) the conditions attached to it (momentous indeed to the future of the proletariat in this country) showed the lines which capitalism intended to take through its servants, the professional politicians, in dealing with the proletariat peril which menaced it. The two principles governing those conditions were bureaucratic control—that is, inspection accompanied by the threat

and exercise of punishment—and the establishment of the narrowest margin of subsistence. A third principle dear to the new capitalist policy and equally dear to the politicians was, under the memory of the recent and strong feeling at the elections, foregone. This third principle was *the principle of a compulsory registration of the proletariat*.

Old Age Pensions to the amount of five shillings a week for completely indigent individuals past the age of seventy, were the basis of the scheme.

But it was carefully graduated so that the receipt of the weekly payment decreased according to income obtained from any other source, until, when that income was equivalent to the amount of the Old Age Pensions, payment ceased altogether.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer of the moment, Mr. George, acted of course in all this as the agent of the great capitalist interests involved. From the moment the measure came into action the whole mass of the proletariat—that is, the great bulk of the English people—were put into the alternative of foregoing a benefit in old age (upon which benefit escape from the workhouse depended) or of submitting themselves in old age to minute police inspection and control. For instance, they could be imprisoned for secretly earning small sums or receiving alms after having claimed the five shillings.

To make the scheme complete it was, of course, to be accompanied by compulsory registration, and every one under the age of seventy, below a certain level of income, must, in the capitalist plan, expose his situation to officials nominated by the professional politicians.

This completing principle was therefore intro-

duced in the next great step toward the capturing and regulation of the proletariat, the Insurance Bill. As that fundamental piece in the new policy belongs to the period immediately after King Edward's death, I need not discuss it here. It is sufficient to remark that with the new principles introduced into the Old Age Pensions Bill by Mr. George as Chancellor of the Exchequer in Mr. Asquith's government (for by 1908, Mr. Asquith had succeeded Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman as Premier), the first overt step was taken in the transformation of our society from a free community of citizens indifferently equal before the law, into a society divided between a free minority and a large proletarian majority increasingly subject to registration and control and ultimately destined to various forms of compulsory labour. It was some time before this chief character in the Old Age Pensions Act and the motive of its organisation was apparent to the middle classes. It needed further progress along the same road to make the matter clear. But two considerations are sufficient to expose the objects which later Acts and in particular the Insurance Act, were to make abundantly clear.

The first is this: Had a pension of five shillings a week, to be claimed at discretion, been voted to all who could prove their age to be seventy or more, the total expenditure reasonably to be expected under such a scheme would have been somewhat over thirteen million pounds a year, but less than fourteen million. The existing scheme costs just under thirteen million pounds in payments alone, and an indefinite but large sum in inspection, appeals, and control exercised by the police. In other words, a free scheme innocent of the whole servile machinery de-

liberately introduced as a stepping-stone toward the complete control of the proletariat would have been no more expensive than the scheme as we now have it.

The second consideration is this: Out of nearly a million Old Age Pensioners little more than fifty thousand are, with all this elaborate machinery for control, inspection and punishment, in receipt of less than the full five shillings. That is, nineteen-twentieths of the recipients are absolutely indigent—a fact with which the Government was well acquainted at the time. What is more, the huge and despotic machinery set at work to discover the pitiful earnings or doles less than five shillings a week which are the excuse for the system of control, does not discover more than one and one-half per cent. of the old people to be receiving as much as half a crown (60c.) in a week from private sources, earnings or alms in any form, and upon these the total saving which would be effected by the Exchequer even if the police control, inspections, etc., cost nothing, is less than thirty thousand pounds—.23%, one four-hundredth!

I have dealt at such great length with this one point of the Old Age Pensions Bill because it was the beginning of all that new and servile legislation which my readers will be interested to follow in the contemporary development of this country.

In the matter of the Trades Unions a desperate attempt was made by the politicians to evade the strong mandate of the constituencies. It failed for two reasons. First, the memory of the elections was still strong enough in the new members to make them afraid of going back to their constituencies with the new disabilities of Trades Unions unrepealed. Next, the great employers were confident that with the pas-

sage of time some other means could be discovered (as in fact they were) of sapping the economic power of the Trades Unions. The Government did bring in a bill which left the Trades Unions at the mercy of the employers, but as the Parliament was quite young, there was enough opposition even among their own supporters to insist upon a modification of that bill, and the Trades Unions were restored by the "Trades Disputes Bill" to their long established position of equality with other corporations.¹

In the matter of the third mandate, Chinese labour, the politicians were bound hand and foot. With the best will in the world to obey the most direct and popular mandate ever given at an election, they could not do it at the risk of offending the overwhelming Financial interests involved. The political career of no man who should prove so daring would have been safe. The Government, humorously enough, *increased* the number of Chinese working in the gold mines, and the most that they would grant was that the Chinese labour should be gradually replaced by black labour, as the latter became more abundantly available. This, of course, was the original policy of the mine-owners and perfectly agreeable to them; the Chinese having been introduced to break the back of

¹The reply of the lawyers to this check was the "Osborne Decision," by which the Judges forbade a Trades Union to pay the expenses or the salary of a member of Parliament. They were careful *not* to forbid similar payments made by the great Capitalists for the support of Members of Parliament through the Party Funds. The reply of the disappointed politicians was to include some years later in the Insurance Bill, when the agitation had grown stale, provisions earmarking Trades Union Funds and forbidding them to be used in strikes when collected for the general purposes of the Union.

the resistance of the black population to forced conscript labour in the mines. Once that resistance, which had been made possible by the employment of black labour at high and free prices during the war by the military authorities, was over, the Boers and the German-Jewish financiers, to whom South Africa was now definitely abandoned,¹ were fully prepared to replace, in a gradual and orderly manner, the Chinese serfs by the much cheaper black serfs available upon the spot.

The failure of the popular pressure, such as it was, in the elections of 1906, was the most powerful of the various causes which led to the immediate and rapid decline of Parliament. It bred a disgust for political effort, under existing institutions at least, from which there is no sign of recovery, and it exposed in the eyes of all the insincerity of professional politics. But other causes were at work in the same direction.

The South African War had lowered the credit of this country by something between one-fifth and one-quarter, and the rates at which England could borrow had risen until, for the first time in generations, they were not appreciably more favourable than the rates obtainable by her great rivals. Unfortunately, just at the moment when this new strain appeared, was,

¹ Imperial control over the Transvaal and the Mines was abandoned at the end of 1906. The union of the various South African Colonies into a virtually independent State was accomplished in 1909-1910; and the final renunciation of British Control in any form was marked by the acquiescence of Mr. Asquith's Cabinet in the shooting down of British subjects in the streets of Johannesburg under martial law established by the Boers and the German-Jewish mine-owners in 1914, followed by the arrest and ignominious expulsion of a number of Englishmen (without trial or any legal form whatever) in the early months of the same year.

as has so often been the case with other and less favoured nations in the past, coincident with a necessity for greatly increased expenditure. The main-spring of this necessity was the rapid growth of rivals, and particularly maritime rivals, in every part of the world. A subsidiary cause was the necessity of setting up the bureaucracy which should control the proletariat.

In the year when King Edward came to the throne the Navy cost less than 30 millions, the Army but little over 24 millions, the Consolidated Fund (that is the tax levied upon the community by the rich creditors of the State) less than 20 millions. Within three years of his death the Consolidated Fund was costing between 24 and 25 millions, the Army close upon 28 millions and the Navy over 44 millions—this last item was further rapidly rising; four years after the King's death it was to touch 50 millions.

There were two possible ways of providing for this heavy and unexpected strain. The first taxation, the second loans. Great loans were, however, impossible. No one knew what might happen to the national credit should they now be attempted; and even the absolutely necessary borrowing during the South African War had had in part to be sought abroad. Nothing, therefore, could meet the case save highly increased taxation.

This taxation could, of necessity (if the régime of Free Trade was to be maintained) fall under only two main heads: Indirect taxation upon the common articles of popular consumption (beer, tobacco, tea, sugar, etc.) and direct taxation levied upon accumulated wealth and incomes superior to those of mere subsistence.

Both sources were strained to the uttermost, but to the first there was an obvious limit. The mass of the English people being dispossessed of property and dependent upon a weekly wage, and the foundation of all wage systems being the wages of subsistence, articles of ordinary consumption could not be taxed beyond a certain point without raising wages, diminishing profits and dislocating the Capitalist system of production. For further levies there was nothing left but the direct taxation of the wealthier classes. The process reached its culmination in the year 1909, when the Budget introduced imposed new Taxes in the proportion of about seven-twelfths upon articles of popular consumption, and five-twelfths upon the well-to-do. At this point it is most important to note very carefully a certain lacuna in the scheme of intensive taxation to which the country was unfortunately reduced. Great financial operations, particularly that unproductive part of them which is essentially gambling, were left virtually untouched. The original slight levies made upon them in the shape of stamp duties were but insignificantly increased. Wealth which was easily ascertainable in its amount—particularly, therefore, landed wealth—was made to bear the chief burden. Great financiers, themselves doubtful of their origin, common to all countries and able to move their liquid wealth at discretion, might indeed be made to pay a due but moderate proportion in death duties and in income tax; but the class that was hit hardest of all was the class of the great Land Owners who could not evade their responsibilities, whose form of wealth was easily ascertainable, and who had whole communities dependent upon them. Upon this class taxation was levied passing the limits

of tribute and often trespassing upon the domain of confiscation. The result was an attempt at resistance upon the part of the House of Lords, many of whose members drew their revenues principally from land and the great majority of whose members (in spite of recent strange purchases of membership) were owners of land.

Now in the degradation and public contempt into which the House of Commons had fallen the House of Lords might possibly have increased its power. It had only to take up popular causes, to resist the growth of the new bureaucracy, to expose political scandals and to demand the punishment of corruption, to suggest the due taxation of finance and particularly of unproductive finance,—it had only to do this to become an organ of popular vigour. But the House of Lords had lost all power of initiative. It had lost moral authority and therefore political vitality by allowing, without protest, the open and shameful sale of places upon its benches by the professional politicians. Men of the lowest character and of the most dubious past had been of late years perpetually introduced to the Upper House upon the payment of sums of money to the professional politicians of the day, and this without a word of remonstrance from any peer. When, therefore, the House of Lords chose at last to take some sort of action upon the purely selfish ground of certain new taxes to which its members were subject it found public opinion as indifferent to its own claims as that opinion had already become indifferent to, and contemptuous of, the House of Commons. The Budget of 1909 was rejected, a General Election followed and it was at once apparent in this Election that the electorate had

become quite disillusioned and no longer believed, even an active minority of them, that it was worth while giving any popular mandates to candidates who were thinking, not of their constituents, but of payment to be received from the caucus or attempting to bring pressure by mere voting upon and between the professional politicians, who had already arranged between them to fleece the taxpayer.

This indifference to the caucus and its fruits at Westminster, and this disgust with both were largely increased by the manifest collapse of the Independent Labour Party. That body in the short period of four years had been captured by the official Caucuses, the creation of salaried posts a few of which were carefully ear-marked for members of Parliament proceeding from the Labouring classes, arrangements between the Liberal headquarters and the independent Labour Party whereby particular Labour Members could be certain of their seats, and other commonplace tricks of the same sort had destroyed all promise of activity in the new body.

The result of the election was mechanical in the highest degree. Men were brought up to vote in the old fashion (at the cost of some two million pounds); they voted under the old labels, and in the old convenient arrangement—upon which the political machine depends—of two nearly equal teams. The result was the return to Westminster in 1910 of a House of Commons containing no new elements worth mentioning, possessed of no mandate, standing in no fear of popular pressure and fit to act only as the Registrar of orders proceeding from the combined Caucuses, "Liberal" and "Conservative," which controlled it. The delayed Budget was passed and the

politicians seized upon the opportunity to get rid of the House of Lords which though it was in full decay, had shown itself for a moment (and upon ridiculously ill-chosen grounds) able to interfere with the calculations of the wire-pullers. A "Parliament Bill" was introduced (subsequently to become law) by which the veto of the House of Lords was restricted to two rejections of a Bill from the House of Commons, to be exercised in two years, after which whatever legislation had been ordered by the two Caucuses of the House of Commons should ultimately become law. In the midst of this negotiation King Edward VII. died in Buckingham Palace upon the 6th of May, 1910, in his 69th year; and with that date, though it falls in the midst of such rapid, essential and perilous changes in the polity of England, I must end this work.

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